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The Australian process for the competition regulator to authorise anti-
competitive conduct on the basis of public benefit is a distinctive one. The path 
followed by the regulator in its early years was significantly influenced by its 
chairman, who established open lines of communication with a view to avoiding 
litigation, while at once scolding and cajoling, using discretion innovatively, 
and bringing business on board to see the underlying sense of the legislation. 
The philosophy of dialogue and responsiveness of these early years fell away 
during the 1990s as the regulator took on the responsibilities of a deregulated 
market and a decentred regulatory environment. 
Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, including 
an examination of authorisation determinations over three decades and 
interviews with past and current staff of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC), this book studies the manner in which the term 
public benefit has been interpreted. Although the role of economic efficiency 
factors has always been important in these determinations, so too have the 
non-economic efficiency factors, including the encouragement of governance 
networks, equitable dealings as a means of monitoring powerful players in a 
decentred market, and the incorporation of a dispute resolution mechanism into 
codes of conduct. The meta-regulatory shift towards procedural regulation of 
self-regulation by the ACCC can only be explained as a triumph of practice over 
theory. Extemporised practice has resulted in inclusivity deficits that have grown 
over time. This approach, while experimental and outcome driven, remains ad 
hoc and under-theorised, and comes at a great cost. It is proposed that the ACCC 
should reassess its performance, developing overarching principles, which are 
founded on a discourse that is more universal than economic efficiency and with 
a fundamental commitment to inclusivity. With this in mind a principle-based 
approach consisting of nine principles is suggested. 
The first principle provides a broader theoretical framework for defining public 
benefit by first identifying the main human rights that embody public benefits 
and secondly, by extracting the immanent rights that have been recognised 
by the regulator in practice. These two sets of rights are used to create a 
set of heuristics, which become principles defining public benefit, while 
providing sufficient flexibility to accommodate regulatory challenges. This 
book addresses the inclusivity deficit by developing a further eight principles 
for promoting responsiveness, incorporating ongoing dialogue and fostering 
democratic participation. This is based on finding a place for participation by 
designing strategies for inclusion as well as crafting the art of practice whereby 
participation by stakeholders is nurtured.
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This book, then, brings together the principles defining public benefit and 
promoting responsiveness and democracy as a set of nine broad principles 
that can provide the basis of a shared understanding for the trade practices 
communities. The regulator, in collaboration with these communities, will 
continue to imbue these principles with inclusive practices and shape these 
principles to suit the regulatory considerations of our time.
ix
Acknowledgements
There have been many people who have assisted in different ways in the 
completion of this book and I am grateful to have this opportunity to express 
my thanks to them.
I am indebted to the people interviewed for this book including Ron Bannerman, 
past and present staff of the ACCC and members of numerous non-government 
organisations. Heartfelt thanks go to John Braithwaite whose enthusiasm and 
generosity is second to none.  I would also like to acknowledge Imelda Maher for 
her assistance with linking past developments in competition policy with present 
trajectories, and Christine Parker for her thoughtful and generous insights.  I am 
grateful to Natalie Klein and Margaret Thornton for their encouragement and 
facilitations. Friends and colleagues have talked through, heard about, and read 
many parts of this book in seminars, over too many coffees and too long lunches. 
My thanks go to them all and special mention must be made of Paul Ashton, 
Archana Parashar, Ross Taylor and Annie Wardrop for their constant presence. 
I am lucky to have three wonderful women in my life for which I am grateful: 
my mother Nalini and my daughters Jaya and Asha. This book is dedicated to 
my late father, Radhakrishnan. 

1
1. Competition Policy and the 
Authorisation Process
Competition law in Australia is spelt out in the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth) and its predecessor the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). It is enforced 
by the competition watchdog, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC). The competition law provisions that are most familiar to 
people are those prohibiting mergers, cartel conduct and the proposed criminal 
penalties for cartel conduct. Much more important and much less well known, 
however, are the authorisation provisions within the Act. A significant part of 
the ACCC’s work is geared to granting such authorisations. These provisions 
allow the ACCC to grant immunity from prosecution for a specified period of 
time and under certain conditions. Authorisation means that otherwise anti-
competitive conduct can legally proceed, without the possibility of prosecution 
by the ACCC. On the one hand, anti-competitive conduct is prohibited by the 
Act and, on the other, it can be authorised by the regulator. A variety of conduct 
has been authorised in the past. Agreements between competitors, who share a 
vertical relationship, to set a levy on the goods they sell to customers has been 
authorised, as have agreements between companies, in a horizontal relationship, 
to fix the amount of goods supplied to another retailer, who may also be a 
competitor. Such agreements are anti-competitive but can be authorised.
The grounds on which authorisation can be granted are governed by the public 
benefit test.1 The applicant has to satisfy the ACCC that the public benefit 
resulting from the proposed conduct outweighs the public detriment that is 
likely to result from the proposed conduct. The Act offers little guidance on how 
public benefit should be interpreted or who should be consulted when making 
the decision. The public benefit test remains vague, the meaning of the words 
‘public’ and ‘benefit’ are difficult to define and the interpretation of the phrase 
is left in the hands of the ACCC. This discretion also carries responsibility. There 
are two main aspects of discretion in the context of the public benefit test that 
need to be noted. The first arises from the lack of clarity about the meaning of 
the phrase public benefit. The second aspect is the stakeholders, who should be 
consulted and whose views should be considered in determining the meaning 
of the phrase — the significance of this obligation, and how it can be fulfilled, 
is also unclear.
The meaning of ‘public benefit’ is a source of considerable debate. Some have 
argued benefit should refer primarily to economic efficiency factors, such as 
1 Sections 90(6) and 90(8) Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
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promotion of cost savings or improvement in administrative practices.2 Others 
have argued benefits can also include non-efficiency factors such as the creation 
of jobs in a rural town. Still others have stated public benefits should be able to 
include factors such as increased personal security or improved environmental 
conditions.3 It has also been contended that nothing can be regarded as a public 
benefit unless it flows through to the public or at the very least to the consumer.4 
These are the vexed questions that the ACCC has had to tackle when exercising 
its discretion.
The second aspect about discretion is that the ACCC has to decide whom to 
consult in making the decision about the interpretation of the phrase. The ambit 
of consultation will inform the meaning of the phrase. The views brought to 
the ACCC’s attention by the applicant seeking the authorisation will be quite 
different to the views expressed by its competitors. It will be different again 
from the views of consumers or employees, who may be affected by the decision. 
Ideally the ACCC might engage with all the stakeholders, fostering participation 
in the tradition of deliberative democracy, to develop a balanced dialogue to 
which everyone can lay claim. But of course this ideal is not easily met. Small 
competitors may not have the time to raise their concerns with the ACCC. 
Consumers may not have the technical expertise to query the claimed public 
benefits the applicant may have established by relying on econometric data or 
expert evidence. Yet these will be the very groups affected by the decision.
This book sets out to explore some theories on how discretion is exercised and 
compares them to the ACCC’s practice. It evaluates the way in which discretion 
is used by regulatory agencies and goes on to focus on the manner in which 
the ACCC has used its discretion in interpreting public benefit within the 
authorisation process.
The Empirical Study
This book relied on an empirical study of authorisation determinations over four 
decades from 1976 to 2010. The study of public benefit in this book is restricted 
to the examination of authorisation determinations involving sections 45 and 47 
of the Trade Practices Act, whereby authorisation can be granted by the Trade 
2  For example, see Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, Commonwealth 
of Australia, National Competition Policy (1993) [Hilmer Report] 99.
3 See Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies (2003) 55. 
4 See Rhonda Smith, ‘Authorisation and the Trade Practices Act: More about Public Benefit’ (2003) 
11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 21; John Fingleton and Ali Nikpay, ‘Stimulating or Chilling 
Competition’ Office of Fair Trading (United Kingdom) (Paper presented at Fordham Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, 25 September 2008) <http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/
speeches/2008/0808> at 25 October 2008.
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Practices Commission (TPC) or the ACCC under section 90(6). The study does not 
include mergers, which operate under a different test detailed in section 90(9). 
The empirical research includes both quantitative and qualitative data. While 
the analysis relies on ACCC authorisation determinations, court and tribunal 
decisions generally, it makes special use of 244 authorisation determinations 
made over seven years. It is also informed by 19 interviews conducted with key 
people involved in the authorisation process.
The seven years studied are 1976, 1984, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010. The 
choice of the years was purposive rather than random. These years represent 
key periods in the development of competition regulation, often reflecting 
important policy shifts or focus. I have collated the data after taking into 
account an appropriate time lag to allow for the policy effects to filter through 
to the authorisation process. The first set of data, from 1976, gives a good 
understanding of how decisions were made in the early years of the creation 
of the TPC. The Act was only passed in 1974 after a good deal of disquiet; the 
1976 decisions illustrate the contemporary decision-making process, and they 
act as a basis for comparisons over time. The second set of data comes from 
1984, when there was a focus by the new Labor government under Bob Hawke 
on creating an efficient industrial base in Australia and on economic efficiency 
and self-regulation. The third set of data comes from 1998 — this year was 
selected for empirical analysis because it was well into the implementation of 
national competition policy, which had a significant effect on competition policy 
and the authorisation process. The fourth and fifth sets of data from 2003 and 
2006 examine a period following the deregulation of essential facilities and the 
increased scope of the Act to regulate the conduct of professionals. Finally, the 
data in 2008 and 2010 have been collated to closely scrutinise how the ACCC has 
been trying to encourage a market economy while minimising market failure. 
Each of the years represents a snapshot of the manner in which the ACCC made 
its decisions. The objective was to collate data that will allow for an assessment 
of the ACCC’s decision-making over four decades.
There were 35 determinations examined in each of the seven years, with the 
exception of 2008, in which there were 34 appropriate determinations, making a 
total of 244 authorisation determinations. It was the year the determination was 
made that was considered in selecting the determinations for the study, rather 
than the date the application was lodged. These determinations accounted for 
over 80 per cent of the total determinations made in the years 1984, 1998, 2003, 
2006, 2010 and 100 per cent in 2008. Due to the poor reporting of determinations 
in 1976, it is difficult to estimate with certainty the number of the commission’s 
determinations.
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There were 16 public benefit factors coded for each determination as part of 
the study and these are contained in Table 1.1. Of these public benefits, 14 
were recognised by the ACCC in 1999.5 Two other public benefits that have 
been recognised by the ACCC have been added to this list. The ACCC began 
to actively endorse environmental benefits in 2001 and this has been added to 
the list as PB11, Steps to protect the environment, in Table 1.1.6 The ACCC has 
always recognised that such lists are non-exhaustive7 and, accordingly, PB16, 
Other, has been added as a catch-all category, for benefits that do not come into 
one of the other 15 categories.
Table 1.1: Public benefit (PB) factors examined in the empirical study
Public benefit 
(PB) no Meaning
PB1 Economic development, for example, of natural resources through 
encouraging exploration, research and capital investment
PB2 Industry rationalisation resulting in more efficient allocation of 
resources and in lower or contained unit production costs
PB3 Expansion of employment or prevention of unemployment in efficient 
industries
PB4 Expansion of employment in particular areas
PB5 Attainment of industry harmony
PB6 Supply of better information to consumers and businesses to permit 
informed choices in their dealings
PB7 Promotion of equitable dealings in the market
PB8 Promotion of industry cost savings resulting in contained or lower 
prices at all levels in the supply chain
PB9 Development of import replacements
PB10 Growth in export markets
PB11 Steps to protect the environment
PB12 Fostering business efficiency, especially when this results in improved 
international competitiveness
PB13 Assistance to efficient small business, for example guidance on costing 
and pricing or marketing initiatives which promote competitiveness
PB14 Enhancement of the quality and safety of goods and services and 
expansion of consumer choice
PB15 Promotion of competition in the industry
PB16 Other
Source: Author’s research.
5 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Authorisations and Notifications (May 1999) 
6–7. These benefits are PB1 to PB10 and PB12 to PB15 in Table 1.1.
6 Allan Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (Paper presented at the National 
Competition Policy Workshop, Melbourne, 12 July 2001) 7.
7 ACCC, (May 1999) 6, where it is stated the ‘Public benefits recognised by the Commission and the Australian 
Competition Tribunal have included’. Also see Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ 8. 
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As the authorisation process involves the weighing of public benefit against the 
public detriment, it was important to examine the manner in which the ACCC has 
addressed detriments over time. Public detriment is focused on whether there 
has been a lessening of competition in the market and it has been acknowledged 
that this will include a reduction of competitors, increased conditions of entry 
and constraints on competitors. These three factors are coded as PD1 to PD3 in 
Table 1.2 below.8 As with the public benefits, it was recognised that such lists 
are non-exhaustive and a fourth catch-all category, PB4 Other, was also coded 
for the 244 determinations.
Table 1.2: Public detriment (PD) factors examined in the empirical study
Public detriment 
(PD) no Meaning
PD1 A reduction in the number of competitors
PD2 Increased conditions of entry
PD3 Constraints on competition affecting the ability of market 




Each of the 16 public benefits and 4 public detriments were coded. They were 
given a weight from 1 (not important) to 4 (very important) to indicate the 
weight attached to each of these factors by the commission in its determination. 
The explanation of the weights used is presented in the Appendix.
This study sought to further compare the different benefits and the importance 
given to them across the seven years of the empirical study. In order to do so, the 
weights attached to each public benefit and each public detriment were added 
together and the sum of these weights were used to plot a number of figures that 
are contained in chapters 3, 4 and 6. Where a benefit was seen to occur twice, 
such as cost savings in administration and cost savings in production, it was 
weighted twice. Other factors were also collated in the study including the type 
of industry that the applicant belonged to; whether conditions were imposed 
by the ACCC in granting authorisation; and, the type of conditions imposed as 
detailed in the Appendix.
8 Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ 9; also see the decisions of the Australian 
Competition Tribunal in Victorian Newsagency (1994) ATPR 41-357 at 42,683.
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Theoretical Frameworks
There are two main frameworks that inform this book: historical institutionalism 
and responsive regulation.
Historical institutionalism is a diverse field, which enquires into the development 
and function of institutions,9 as well as the evolution of a new institution required 
to operate in a multicultural and multinational environment and the challenges 
posed therein.10 It is useful as it relies on historical processes to explain the 
present.11 This rejects the functionalist view of institutions and, rather, sees 
institutions as enduring legacies of political struggles.12 Institutions are social 
and cultural constructions that embody the values of the time and the emphasis 
is on how these institutions emerge from and are embedded in concrete temporal 
processes.13 Institutions in two different jurisdictions will evolve differently 
depending on the cultural and social constructions they embody. Tony Freyer’s 
work on the history of comparative antitrust regulation,14 examines the 
institutional trajectories taken by different institutions in regulating antitrust 
in different jurisdictions.
Further historical institutionalism is institutionalist — it focuses on institutions. 
Clearly institutions provide the site for political actors to pursue their interests 
and it is important to understand how politics has shaped the institution. 
Historical institutionalists develop this line and their central theme is that 
institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics.15 As Kathleen Thelen 
and Sven Steinmo have stated:
institutional analysis also allows us to examine the relationship between 
political actors as objects and as agents of history. The institutions … 
can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they 
are themselves also the outcomes (conscious or unintended) of deliberate 
political strategies, of political conflict or of choice.16
9 Colleen A Dunlavy, ‘Political Structure, State Policy, and Industrial Change: Early Railroad Policy in the 
United States and Prussia’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (1992).
10 Brigid Laffan, ‘Becoming a “Living Institution”: The Evolution of the European Court of Auditors’ 1999 
37(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 251; Paul Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical 
Institutionalist Analysis’ (1996) 29(2) Comparative Political Studies 123.
11 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political 
Science 369, 371.
12 Thelen (1999) 386.
13 ibid.
14 Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America: 1890–1990 (1992); Tony 
Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism 1930–2004 (2006).
15 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, in Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis (1992).
16 ibid, 10.
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The claim made by historical institutionalists is that actors may be in a strong 
initial position, seek to maximise their interests and, nevertheless, carry out 
institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own 
positions in ways that are unanticipated.17 Institutions can be mediators of 
policy and the ways in which the policy is interpreted and applied. This is 
particularly relevant in an examination of the manner in which the institution, in 
this case the competition regulator, has shaped policy and can remake politics.18 
Historical institutionalism can help us understand how institutions can confer 
power on some actors while withholding power from others — in the words of 
Hall and Taylor historical institutionalists are explaining how institutions can 
be constitutive of political agency.19 The institutions’ role has a temporal quality 
and its priorities will change over time.20
Thus, an institution can shape policy, as the study by Stephen Wilks and Ian 
Bartle illustrates.21 These authors examine the creation of independent agencies, 
which occurred at different times, to regulate competition policy in the United 
Kingdom, European Union and Germany. They argue that the original decision 
to delegate the task of competition regulation to such agencies was motivated 
by a need for governments to reassure citizens by appearing to act.22 These 
agencies, however, each had different missions: the German mission was to 
defend the market economy, the European mission was market integration, 
and the British mission was to protect the public interest.23 But the passing 
of time demonstrates that these ‘agencies have become more activist and have 
contributed to policy through a demonstration effect, showing what can be done; 
as a source of technical expertise; and as an available agency of implementation 
to be enhanced or adapted by subsequent government.’24 The consequences of 
creating agencies have been ‘to populate the policy area with actors … who have 
their own priorities, interpretations, and influence’.25
Historical institutionalism relies on critical events to explain the origins of the 
institution and the path it follows. Critical events, large and small, can affect 
the manner in which the institution evolves. However distinction must be 
made between the critical events that are responsible for the foundation of the 
institution and other critical events. The moment of institutional formation 
17 Pierson (1996) 126.
18 See Thelen and Steinmo (1992) 10; also see Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ‘Political Science and the 
Three New Institutionalisms’ (1996) 44 Political Studies 961.
19 Hall and Taylor (1996) 942.
20 Colin Hay and Daniel Wilcott, ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism’ (1998) 44 Political 
Studies 951, 954.
21 Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle, ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition 
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is referred to as critical juncture. Other events that affect the institution’s 
evolution, such as funding, political manoeuvering or global movements, are 
referred to as critical events.
The moment of origin or critical juncture is vital as it determines the path that 
the institution will follow. This critical juncture can be a lasting legacy and the 
institution’s behavior will be shaped by its origins. But the moment of origin is 
not all there is. The historical development of institutions reveals that they are 
remade over time as a consequence of other events or actors. Wilks and Bartle’s 
examination of independent agencies to administer law and policy in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the European Union reveals that there were both expected 
and unexpected consequences.26 They contend that, although the original decision 
to establish such agencies was motivated by a need to reassure the public, these 
agencies are far less independent than commonly supposed.27 The way in which 
they have evolved not only differed from one jurisdiction to another, but there 
were also a number of unanticipated consequences, including the evolution of the 
agencies from a passive, symbolic defence of a competitive market economy to an 
aggressive promotion of market freedoms,28 where the agencies escaped capture 
by business but stepped into ‘the arms of lawyers and economists’29 and where 
the ‘old, broad, balancing public interest criteria employed by agencies’ have 
been replaced by a ‘far narrower and dogmatic focus on market efficiency’.30
Historical institutionalism provides a valuable lens to view the manner in 
which multiple political, economic and social forces came together to create the 
Australian competition regulator as the institution responsible for determining 
‘public benefit’ and the manner in which that institution has mediated those 
forces to shape policy and apply it with existing legal culture. In order to 
understand the path an institution has travelled, it is useful to examine the 
critical juncture of its origin and the power vested in it as an independent 
agency to determine the public benefit within the authorisation process, and to 
explore the relationship between politics and the institution.
Responsive regulation and restorative justice is the second theoretical framework 
adopted in this study. The core idea of responsive regulation is that regulators 
should be responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding 
how to respond. Scholars have examined the manner in which responsive 
strategies can be incorporated into the competition regulators’ practices, such 
as encouraging corporations to voluntarily include informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms or implement compliance programs that bring the conduct within 
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the boundaries of the law.31 These responsive strategies can work alongside the 
conventional strategies of litigation and penalties. The ACCC has used a variety 
of responsive strategies through its history. One example of such a responsive 
strategy has been to grant authorisation on the basis that a complaint mechanism 
is adopted by the industry associations to regulate their actions. Another 
example is the granting of an authorisation on the condition that information 
about industry practices is made publicly available, thus allowing people both 
within and outside the industry to monitor the conduct of corporations.32
Criticism has been levelled at regulators adopting such approaches on the 
basis that they give unfettered discretion to the regulator to go beyond its 
grant of power. Scholarship on the manner in which regulators are constrained 
addresses these criticisms, arguing for the development of a new administrative 
law.33 More recent scholarship has built on these contributions by providing the 
ideals that can guide all responsive regulators.34 This book uses these scholarly 
contributions to evaluate the effectiveness of the ACCC’s use of its discretion in 
the determination of public benefit within the authorisation process. It looks at 
the types of benefits that have been recognised, the processes employed and the 
terms on which authorisation has been granted.
Restorative justice has been more recently linked to responsive regulation in 
an effort consider mechanisms for allowing everyone affected by a decision 
the right to be included in the decision-making process.35 An authorisation 
determination will affect conduct in the market and can impact on a wide cross-
section of the community. Not everyone, however, can effectively participate 
in this process. The authorisation process makes room for submissions by 
interested parties and also provides, in certain instances, for the holding of a 
pre-decision conference, both of which are aimed at expanding the number of 
voices heard in the deliberations.36 This book critically evaluates the manner in 
which the regulator has accommodated participation of stakeholders within its 
current decision-making process.
31 See Christine Parker, ‘Restorative Justice in Business Regulation? The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission’s Use of Enforceable Undertakings’ (2004) 67(2) The Modern Law Review 209; John 
Braithwaite and Ian Ayres, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992); John 
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002).
32 See Re Allianz Australia Insurance Limited A30217, A30218, 243 March 2004, 55 and Medicines Australia 
authorisation A90779, A90780 14 November 2003, 40.
33 See Jody Freeman, ‘Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative State’ (2000) 52 
Administrative Law Review 813, 854; Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law (1997); Colin Scott, 
‘Accountability in a Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38. 
34 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) Modern Law Review 59.
35 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better (2008); 
John Parkinson and Declan Roche, ‘Restorative Justice: Deliberative Democracy in Action?’, (2004) 39(3), 
Australian Journal of Political Science 505; Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation 
and Democracy (2002).
36 This process, provided for by section 90A of the Trade Practices Act, gives applicants and interested 
parties the opportunity to discuss the draft determination and to put their views directly to a commissioner. 
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Overview
The public benefit test relies on the discretion of the regulator to interpret it, 
and this book explores how the ACCC has used its discretion in interpreting this 
phrase and evaluates ACCC performance over the last four decades.
Chapter 2 studies the history of the current authorisation process and argues 
that the wide discretionary powers granted for the interpretation of the public 
benefit test are explained by the historical developments between 1960 and 
1965. This was the period when Australia settled on a distinctive approach to 
competition regulation, including the creation of a secret register by a regulator 
with wide powers who was directed to use its powers to raise awareness and 
gain acceptance for the legislation. It is argued that this path set the regulator 
on its own trajectory, which later resulted in it working responsively to create 
workable competition in the market.
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the term ‘public benefit’. Chapter 3 examines the 
interpretation of public benefit, which has been far from straightforward. There 
are two main questions that have been debated for four decades. The first is 
whether the term ‘benefit’ should focus primarily on economic efficiency or 
whether it should be open more broadly to both efficiency benefits and other 
benefits, such as improvement in the quality of health or environment, which 
may not have an efficiency focus. The second question involves the term ‘public’ 
and whether this term should be given a wide or narrow interpretation. A 
wide view of the term would include any section of the community, including 
the corporations applying for authorisation or the shareholders of those 
corporations. According to this view a benefit that reaches the shareholders of 
the corporation will be acceptable. A narrow interpretation of the term would 
require the benefit to reach the public or at least the consumer. The chapter 
explores the discourses around these two questions, concluding that, while the 
ACCC has been both sensitive to the different views, its responses have been 
constrained by the decisions of the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT).
Chapter 4 explores the types of public benefit recognised in authorisation 
determinations, relying on the data set of 244 determinations. It concludes that 
the ACCC has been open to recognising a variety of benefits as they have become 
relevant. It has always recognised benefits based on economic efficiency, such 
as promotion of cost savings and industry rationalisations. Alongside this, it 
has also recognised non-efficiency benefits, such as the increasing safety and 
quality of goods and services as well as the promotion of equitable dealings. 
The ACCC has worked with a list of public benefits adding to it as new benefits 
were recognised. It has not, however, developed a theoretical framework for 
its determinations. Nevertheless, these determinations have been responsive to 
1 . Competition Policy and the Authorisation Process
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changing circumstances and needs. This ad hoc approach can be described as 
a triumph of practice over theory. The chapter concludes that the ACCC could 
remedy the criticism of being ad hoc by developing an overarching theoretical 
framework for public benefit. This would serve the applicant, all stakeholders 
and the regulator better than the current approach.
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on examining the use of discretion by the ACCC in 
applying the public benefit test. Using a multidisciplinary approach, Chapter 5 
conducts a thorough examination of how the use of discretion by a regulatory 
agency is perceived and limited. It begins with the legal scholarship on discretion 
and goes on to consider the contributions of sociologists and political scientists 
which, it argues, better reflect the way in which regulatory agencies operate 
in practice. It draws on this multidisciplinary scholarship to develop a set of 
core values as well as a number of institutional, practical and moral factors that 
constrain the regulatory agency. It concludes that the operation of discretion 
by a regulatory agency is difficult to constrain and manage as it can exist both 
within strict rules or vague phrases, which remains the paradox of discretion. 
This discussion provides the basis for carrying out a detailed evaluation in 
Chapter 6 of how the ACCC has used its discretion.
Chapter 6 examines the use of discretion by the ACCC. It looks first at the 
regulatory scholarship that is useful to carry out such an examination and then 
classifies the manner in which the ACCC has exercised discretion in determining 
public benefit into four categories: epistemological discretion, procedural 
discretion, outcome-weighing discretion and immunity discretion. The chapter 
concludes that the ACCC has used its discretion in an experimental manner 
focusing on obtaining reasonable outcomes. Evidence shows, however, that 
not all stakeholders are engaging in the determination process. There is a need 
for greater consideration to be given to increasing the participation of certain 
groups representing non-business interests, which can include consumers and 
all citizens affected by decisions, by providing them with a voice in the decision-
making process. It is argued that giving such groups a voice would make for a 
better process than the way the ACCC is currently operating.
Chapter 7 addresses the two main criticisms of the ACCC that are raised in earlier 
chapters: first, that the determination of public benefits would be better served 
by a broader theoretical framework giving greater direction to all stakeholders; 
and, second, that participation by non-industry groups in the deliberations 
should be increased. It proposes that a principles-based approach would be 
better able to address both these criticisms. It develops a set of heuristics based 
on human rights and ACCC practice to identify public benefits. This would 
provide an overarching theoretical framework to improve on the current ad hoc 
approach. This is then expressed as a principle, which is formulated as the first 
in the set of principles. Building on the literature on principle-based regulation 
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
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and responsive regulation, a set of nine principles are then proposed. These are 
aimed at lowering the barriers to participation, increasing inclusiveness and 
making the ACCC a more genuinely responsive regulator in this area.
13
2. Architecture of Authorisations
This chapter looks at the origins of the authorisation process, examining the 
period from the early twentieth century until 2010, when the new Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) was introduced. The design of the authorisation 
process within the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) can only really be understood 
by looking at the extended context. We should look particularly to the early 
1960s to glean a better understanding of the place and architecture of the 
authorisation process. This was the time that the business and general community 
began to engage in a discourse about restrictive trade practices, setting the stage 
for the introduction of the 1974 Act more than a decade later. 
The Regulatory Landscape: Corporations, 
Clubs and Cartels
The role of corporations in Australia’s economic development has been 
influential in shaping legislation regulating restrictive trade practices. The role 
of corporations can be traced back to the Australian Agricultural Company, 
incorporated by royal charter in 1824 and conferred with the power for the 
cultivation and improvement of wasteland in the colony of New South Wales. 
The company engaged in a variety of activities, including using convict labour 
in gold and coal mining, and in pastoral and agricultural activities, including 
wool-growing. Indeed, the sudden surge in incorporation of corporations 
during the gold rush years of 1875 to 1888 in Victoria and New South Wales 
is no coincidence, merely highlighting the important role of the corporate 
enterprise in economic development. Big corporations were important not just 
for economic development, as is demonstrated by the role played by the Colonial 
Sugar Refinery (CSR) company, the size and location of which in northern 
Australia went some way to assuaging the government’s concerns over security 
and defence. CSR had monopoly status due to government protection; it was 
important to the government, which had the problems of a sparsely settled 
continent and the resulting concerns over how these areas were going to be 
defended. As is illustrated by the conclusions of a 1912 royal commission, in 
relation to the multifaceted roles of CSR:
[I]t follows that the supreme justification for the protection of the 
Sugar Industry is the part that the industry has contributed, and will, 
as we hope, continue to contribute to the problems of the settlement 
and defence of the northern portion of the Australian continent. 
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The recognition of the nature of this supreme justification is the first 
condition of a sound public policy in relation to the Sugar Industry. 
Relatively to it, all other issues are of minor importance.1
Cartels were a feature of Australian life, collusive practices were common and 
Australian industry was always highly concentrated.2 It was estimated that the 
level of concentration of power in Australia ‘is twice as great as it is in the 
United Kingdom and three times as great as it is in the United States’.3 Many 
reasons were advanced for these levels of concentration. Particularly during the 
early years of Federation, governments favoured certain industries in return for 
support and loyalty. An example of this political dimension was illustrated by 
the appointment of Essington Lewis, the ‘steel master’ and head of the Broken 
Hill Proprietary Steelworks to the position of director-general of munitions in 
1940 in the midst of World War II. Clearly the availability of steel was important 
to this position and it was remarked that, as director-general, ‘Lewis controlled 
the production of all ordnance, explosives, ammunition, small arms, aircraft and 
vehicles and all materials and tools used in producing such munitions’.4
Prior to the introduction of statutes specifically dealing with competition, it 
was the common law that addressed such activity. The general rule at common 
law was that restraints of trade could not be enforced unless it ‘is reasonable 
in the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in the interests of the 
public and not injurious to the public’.5 This position was established in the 
oft-quoted passage of Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns 
and Ammunition Co Ltd:
The public have an interest in every person’s carrying on his trade 
freely: so has the individual. All interference with individual liberty 
of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is 
nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void. That 
is the general rule. But there are exceptions: restraints of trade and 
interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by the 
special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, 
and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable — 
reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned 
and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and 
1 Alan Birch and JF Blaxland, ‘The Historical Background’, in AG Lowndes (ed.), South Pacific Enterprise: 
The Colonial Sugar Refinery Company Limited (1956) 51. 
2 For a discussion of the 14th Royal Commissions on Restrictive Trade Practices conducted in Western 
Australia, see Geoffrey de Q Walker, Australian Monopoly Law: Issues of Law, Fact and Policy (1967) 15.
3 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 December 1965, 2137, (Senator Lionel Murphy, New 
South Wales); Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism 1930–2004 (2006) 318. 
4 Geoffrey Blainey, The Steel Master: A Life of Essington Lewis (1981) 147.
5 Report from the Joint Committee, Parliament of Australia, Constitutional Review (1959) Chapter 17, para 843 116.
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so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour 
it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the 
public. That, I think, is the fair result of all the authorities.6
This line of argument had been made to support cartel activity whereby cartel 
arrangements were considered reasonable and there was a public interest in 
avoiding cutthroat competition.7 Even though the first statute regulating 
this area was introduced in the early nineteenth century, in the form of the 
Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906, it did little to alter the view 
that cartels may be in the public interest.8 The main focus of the Act was the 
protection of Australian manufacturing industries from unfair competition from 
foreign companies, rather than promoting domestic competition.9 
These public interest arguments were examined by the High Court in the 
Coal Vend case.10 The claim was that numerous coal proprietors and shipping 
companies were part of a cartel engaged in price-fixing, as well as monopolising 
the coal trade in Newcastle and Maitland. These practices were described as 
conduct that was detrimental to the public because it involved the practical 
and persistent annihilation of competition on land and sea; excessive, arbitrary 
and capricious prices charged to consumers; restrictions on consumer choice; 
and, amongst other points, difficulties in obtaining particular classes or grades 
of coal.11 The defendants claimed that the higher price could be offset by the 
advantages the cartel delivered to members of the community, other than 
consumers, in the form of the continuation of an industry. 
The High Court saw the notion of public detriment as requiring the consideration 
of a wide cross-section of the public, including consumers as well as producers, 
and stated:
It may be that the detriment, if it be one, of enhancement of price to 
the consumer is compensated for by other advantages to other members 
of the community, which may, indeed, include the establishment or 
continuance of an industry which otherwise would not be established 
or would come to an end.12
6 [1984] AC 535 at 554.
7 See David Meltz, ‘Happy Birthday Mr Nordenfelt! — The Centenary of the Nordenfelt Case’ (1994) 2 Trade 
Practices Law Journal 149, 153.
8 Bruce Donald and John Dyson Heydon, Trade Practices Law vol 1 (1978) 5.
9 David Merrett, Stephen Corones and David Round, ‘The Introduction of Competition Policy in Australia: 
The Role of Ron Bannerman’ (2007) 47(2) Australian Economic History Review 178; Andrew Hopkins, Crime, 
Law and Business: The Sociological Sources of Australian Monopoly Law (1978) 28. 
10 Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v The King and the Attorney-General (Cth) (1912) 15 CLR 65. This case rendered 
the Australian Industry Preservation Act (1906) nugatory.
11 Attorney-General (Cth) v Associated Northern Collieries (1911) 14 CLR 387, 399.
12 Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v The King and the Attorney-General (1912) 15 CLR 65.
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The court, however, did not accept that producers could be regarded as 
‘trustees for consumers’. The High Court found the prices had not been raised 
to an unreasonable amount and the conduct was not detrimental to the public. 
The case went to the Privy Council, which was sceptical about the value of 
competition, and regarded the agreement as an attempt at avoiding ‘cutthroat’ 
competition without the intention of charging unreasonable prices.13 The efforts 
of the Privy Council can be contrasted to those of the American courts, which 
were strongly opposed to restrictive trade practices, leading to the formation of 
different types of business consolidation.14
Economic downturns, such as the depression of the 1930s, encouraged cartel 
activities and provided the breeding ground for trade restraints.15 The role of 
trade associations in generating such practices was widely acknowledged and 
business did not view restrictive practices as improper; these practices were 
frequently termed ‘orderly marketing’ or, as it has been provocatively suggested, 
as just another consequence of Australian mateship.16 It was stated that a club-
like attitude existed and business was happy with their arrangements, which 
were based on a ‘network of restrictive agreements’.17 ‘The rules were known to 
the members, but they did not want to talk about them to other people. Price 
agreements between competitors were common’.18 Senator John Gorton declared 
that ‘the growth of monopoly and restrictive trade practices has gone so far as 
to become a disease’,19 and it was evident any legislation overtly attempting to 
strike at cartels and collusions would not be supported by the business sector. 
The Origins of the Authorisation Process
The postwar world introduced new issues, including industrial progress, 
global corporations and high levels of industrial concentration — a climate 
13 Attorney-General (Cth) v Adelaide SS Co [1913] AC 781.
14 For a discussion contrasting the approaches, see Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain 
and America: 1890–1990 (1992) 35. 
15 See Report from the Joint Committee, Parliament of Australia, Constitutional Review (1959) 856; see also 
Walker (1967) 17. For the American experience during the depression years, see Eleanor Fox and Lawrence 
Sullivan, ‘Antitrust — Retrospective and Prospective: Where are we coming from? Where are we going?’ 
(1987) New York University Law Review 936, 941.
16 Maureen Brunt, ‘Legislation in Search of an Objective’, in John Nieuwenhuysen (ed), Australian Trade 
Practices: Readings (2nd edn, 1976) 240. See also Brunt, ‘The Australian Antitrust Law After 20 Years — A 
Stocktake’ (1994) 9 Review of Industrial Organization 483.
17 Interview with Ron Bannerman (Commissioner of Trade Practices Commission 1966–1974 and Chair of 
the Trade Practices Commission, 1974–1984) (Canberra, 27 September 2001) (Bannerman interview). 
18 Ron Bannerman, ‘Points from Experience 1967–84’, in Trade Practices Commission, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Annual Report 1983–84, (1984) 157.
19 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Second Reading Speech (Trade Practices Bill 1965), 8 
December 1965, 2198 (Senator John Gorton, Victoria, Minister for Works). 
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that encouraged cartels and anti-competitive conduct.20 Different countries 
responded to these challenges in different ways.21 The inadequacy of the common 
law in quelling such practices was recognised as evidenced by the report of the 
Western Australian honorary royal commission in February 1957, which stated 
that, among the trade associations studied, it had found in at least 111 of such 
associations there existed a standard pattern of restrictive practices, including 
exclusive dealing, price-fixing agreements and collusive tendering agreements.22 
Similar findings were made in the Report of the Royal Commissioner on Prices 
and Restrictive Trade Practices in Tasmania (1965), in which the commission 
asserted two thirds of the trade associations were involved in restrictive trade 
practices.23 It was stated of this period: 
Resale price maintenance by suppliers was a way of life. The ‘tied house’ 
system in liquor retailing and petrol retailing was entrenched and 
thought to be essential. All these matters had been countenanced and 
indeed defended, by the common law and so they represented valuable 
‘rights’. The common law had preserved ‘sanctity of contract’ in the 
interests of the parties and largely put aside the interests of customers 
and the public.24
The growing dominance of neoclassical economics and the contributions of 
industrial economists who linked high levels of concentration to the firms’ 
performance led many developed countries to introduce legislation aimed at 
controlling monopolies and collusive practices.25 In Australia there had been 
numerous attempts at state level to regulate anti-competitive conduct.26 These 
were by and large ineffective, particularly because state laws could not adequately 
regulate a corporation’s conduct in another state.27 The only federal statute on 
restrictive trade practices until this time had been the Australian Industries 
Preservation Act 1906, which had been weakened owing to the High Court 
20 See Fox, ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’ (1981) 66 Cornell Law Review 1141, 1149, 
for discussion on the increasing number of mergers in the wake of World War II; see also Freyer (1992) 269–71.
21 See Freyer (2006). See also Stephen Wilks, In the Public Interest: Competition Policy and the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (1999) 27; Helen Mercer, Constructing a Competitive Order: The Hidden History of 
British Antitrust Policies (1995) 3.
22 Alex Hunter, ‘Restrictive Practices and Monopolies in Australia’ (1961) 37 Economic Record 30–31.
23 Royal Commission on Prices and Restrictive Trade Practices in Tasmania, Parliament of Tasmania, Report 
of the Royal Commissioner on Prices and Restrictive Trade Practices in Tasmania (1965) 31.
24 Bannerman (1984) 157.
25 For example, Canada passed the Combines Investigations Act 1951; the United Kingdom passed the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956; New Zealand passed the Trade Practices Act 1958; six national parliaments 
in the European Union had ratified the Treaty of Rome, which gave some emphasis to antitrust. See also Freyer 
(1992) 278; John Kenneth Galbraith, ‘The Development of Monopoly Theory’, in Alex Hunter (ed), Monopoly 
and Competition: Selected Readings (1969) 19–23. See also Eugene V Rostow, ‘British and American Experience 
with Legislation against Restraints of Competition’ (1960) 23(4) Modern Law Review 477, 490.
26 See, for example, Monopolies Act 1923 (NSW); Fair Prices Act 1924 (SA); Prices Act 1963 (SA); Profiteering 
Prevention Act 1948 (Qld); Unfair Trading and Profit Control Act 1956 (WA); Trade Associations Registration 
Act 1959 (WA). 
27 See Freyer (2006) on the efforts and effectiveness of state’s attempts to regulate monopolistic practices, 318–20.
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decision in Huddart Parker declaring parts of the Act as unconstitutional.28 The 
need to have a national regulatory approach was appreciated by parliamentary 
committees in 1958 and 1959, which had recommended that the constitution be 
amended to give the federal government greater power to legislate.29 There was 
a recognised need for another attempt, at the federal level, to regulate restrictive 
trade practices.
Two approaches to the control of restrictive trade practices, those of the 
United States and the United Kingdom, have informed the design of Australian 
competition statutes at different times. While the main US statute was a broadly 
worded one that relied on the courts for interpretation, the Robinson-Patman 
Act 1936 allowed for administrative discretion to be exercised for protecting 
small business.30 The British approach, however, relied on an administrative 
body, rather than the courts, to apply the legislation on a case-by-case analysis.31 
The first Australian statute, the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906, 
was firmly based on the US approach, as is reflected in its language and the 
inclusions of treble damages.32 The effect of this Act was severely limited by the 
High Court decision in the Coal Vend case and it fell into disuse.33 Following this 
experience, the debate on the appropriate approach for Australia resurfaced. 
It was clear that, among both business groups and parliamentarians, there was 
little support for US-style legislation. 
Antitrust, as a philosophy and body of law reflecting political democracy in 
the United States, had emerged from a tumultuous history.34 There was much 
less certainty, however, about its place in Australia and it was noted by Neville 
Norman that the 1950s was a time when restrictive practices were rife and 
industry did not conceal such agreements because there was no public or 
political censure against them.35 The prevailing view of the time is summarised 
by Maureen Brunt who was influential in the development of competition 
policy in Australia:36 
28 (1909) 8 CLR 330.
29 Hopkins (1978) 33.
30 The main statutes were the Sherman Act 1890 (US) and Clayton Act 1914 (US). 
31 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948 (UK); Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1956 (UK).
32 Donald and Heydon (1978) 5.
33 See Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v The King and the Attorney General (1912) 15 CLR 65. This decision denied 
the Commonwealth Government the power to legislate such corporate activity. See also Donald and Heydon 
(1978) 5.
34 Fox (1981) 1141.
35 Neville Norman ‘Progress Under Pressure: The Evolution of Antitrust in Australia’ (1994) 9 Review of 
Industrial Organization 527, 529; See also ‘Brewery Keen to Protect Interests’ Australian Financial Review, 22 
November 1963, 4.
36 Maureen Brunt had a tremendous influence in shaping Australian competition law, sitting as part-time 
member of the Trade Practices on important appellant decisions, writing in scholarly journals and being an 
active participant in annual conferences and seminars. See Alan Fels, ‘Distinguished Fellow of the Economic 
Society of Australia 2006: Maureen Brunt’, (2006) 83, Economic Record 204.
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In the early days, when restrictive practices were so pervasive in 
Australia, it was unclear to legislators how many of them might be 
‘justifiable’ (Barwick’s word) — or why. While it was thought that in the 
small developing Australian economy, there might well be efficiencies 
that were dependent upon scale or agreements, this was not the only 
consideration. It was thought to be unwise to be doctrinaire. At the 
same time, it was thought to be appropriate to give business firms 
the opportunity to demonstrate that their acquisitions, practices and 
agreements were in society’s interests.37
It was well understood by parliamentarians and government officials that, when 
discussing this issue, it was best not to associate with the US approach.38 The 
ties with Britain were more influential.39 The British approach to the control 
of anti-competitive practices had originated in more recent times, resulting in 
the passing of legislation in 1956,40 and there was the opportunity to speak 
with British regulators on their experiences and successes. Further, the British 
legislation was more palatable to business41 and, therefore, it had a greater 
influence on the shape of the Australian legislation, as evidenced by the two 
main statutes that followed, the Trade Practices Act 1965 and the Trade Practices 
Act 1974. 
It was the notion of a ‘fair go’ that provided the focal point for the early 
discussions of regulating restrictive trade practices and competition policy. The 
main protagonist in these early discussions was Garfield Barwick, the attorney-
general, who was responsible for beginning the discussions on regulating anti-
competitive practices in Australia. After examining the American, Canadian 
and British approaches and speaking with many aggrieved parties, Barwick, 
in December 1962, presented an outline of the proposed legislation and, in 
November 1963, published a talking paper.42 Barwick came to this area with 
the support of government, as evidenced by the governor-general’s comments 
to parliament in 1960 pointing to the need for legislation regulating restrictive 
trade practices.43 
Andrew Hopkins has argued that the decision to legislate must be seen in the 
context of the policies developed by the Liberal government of Robert Menzies. 
Hopkins asserts that the government, in its fight against inflation, wanted to 
37 Brunt (1994) 483, 506.
38 Bannerman interview. For different views on the goals of US antitrust and UK competition law, see Wilks 
(1999) 27; Freyer (1992) 7–8.
39 Bannerman interview; see also Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory. Garfield Barwick’s Reflections & 
Recollections (1995) 147.
40 Freyer (1992) 295; see also Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 (UK).
41 See Mercer (1995) 6. Here, Mercer argues that the British legislation was shaped fundamentally by business.
42 Barwick (1995); Hopkins (1978) 36–7, Merrett, Corones and Round (2007) 181–82.
43 Hopkins (1978) 34.
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show it opposed wage rises and price increases, which were often stimulated by 
price agreements between competitors.44 Thus, he argues, inflation was the main 
reason behind the government’s decision to consider legislation in this area. 
In a paper titled ‘Some Aspects of Australian Proposals for Legislation for the 
Control of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies’, Barwick indicated the 
need for such legislation and proposed the terms of a Bill.45 Described as the 
musings of a ‘nineteenth century individualist, applying the techniques of the 
twentieth century, to bring nearer to fruition, his own ideas of individualism 
in society’,46 this paper was clearly directed at the predicament of small 
businessmen, such as storeowners who were not able to acquire goods because 
of the restrictive trade practices that prevented their supply to individuals 
outside the network. Tony Freyer has succinctly described this approach as ‘the 
conservative idea of competition defined as free enterprise versus socialism’.47 
This unique Australian flavour , supporting small businesses and ensuring a 
fair go, was summarised by Barwick, when he wrote that increased efficiency 
from so-called economies of scale may not always be the answer to the problem 
of restrictive trade practices and, rather, it was necessary to consider the 
manner in which small- or medium-sized enterprises will be more satisfactory, 
both humanly and economically facilitated.48 It was small business that was 
identified as deserving special attention, rather than ‘consumers’, the idea of 
which became important a decade or so later. 
Barwick delivered public addresses around the country elaborating on the Bill’s 
philosophy and harnessing support.49 This was intended to enable interested 
parties to make representations and promote debate.50 Although the Bill and 
Barwick’s paper were much debated, it did not form part of government policy 
at the time and there was little available detail about the legislation. But it is 
clear that Barwick favoured the British approach to legislation, and David Marr 
has argued:
[T]he British system of setting up a register of all agreements in restraint 
of trade also appealed as a clean and relatively bloodless method of 
collecting information on the practices he was setting out to control.51
44 ibid, 34–35.
45 Barwick, ‘Some Aspects of Australian Proposals for Legislation for the Control of Restrictive Trade 
Practices and Monopolies’, Paper presented at 13th Legal Convention, Canberra, January 1963.
46 Bannerman interview; see also Freyer (2006) 323.
47 Freyer (2006) 324.
48 Barwick (1995) 147.
49 Bannerman interview; Hopkins (1978) 36.
50 Hopkins (1978) 35.
51 David Marr, Barwick (2005), 188.
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Barwick, however, was keen to avoid the objectionable features of the UK 
legislation studied.52 From the outset Barwick identified the manner in which 
the Australian proposal would be different to the British counterpart. For the 
purposes of my discussion, I want to emphasise two features. First, unlike the 
open register of the British, Barwick wanted the Australian scheme to incorporate 
a register of agreements that may constitute restrictive practices that would be 
absolutely confidential53 and, second, the decision to investigate the matters 
contained in the register would depend on whether the actual practice carried 
on was ‘inimical to the public interest’.54 The two features were innovative, 
departing from the British scheme and placing considerable power in the hands 
of officials. In later years, Barwick was equivocal about these features saying: 
The suggestion was that if the trader did not disclose that he carried on 
a described restrictive practice he would lose the right to assert later 
that the [practice was in fact harmful to the public interest.
This part of the scheme was not completely understood and caused 
considerable opposition. In retrospect, I think it would have been 
better to rely on heavy penalties … on non-disclosure while retaining 
the trader’s right to justify the practice as not harmful to the public 
interest.55 
These two features were to remain as part of the legislation, which was passed 
many years and many drafts later. In 1963, Barwick left the Attorney-General 
portfolio, and passed the regulation of trade practices into the hands of the 
newly appointed Senator Billy Sneddon, who shaped and reshaped the idea over 
a period of three years, until it was eventually passed as the Trade Practices Act 
1965.
Factors that Shaped the 1965 Act
Regulatory measures must fit with the commercial landscape and this was 
foremost in the minds of legislators who determined the design of the 1965 
legislation. Two factors were particularly important in shaping this Act. First, 
there was no clear support from business for legislation controlling anti-
competitive conduct and business lobbied hard, fundamentally influencing 
the design of the Act. Thus, the Act was a result of considerable compromise. 
Second, there was greater support for matters of interpretation to be dealt 
52 Barwick, (1995) 147.
53 ibid, 148.
54 ibid; see also Merrett, Corones and Round (2007) 182, for how the legislation made further concession to 
business interests by softening the adjudication process used in Britain.
55 Barwick (1995) 148.
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with by an administrative body, rather than being placed in the hands of the 
judiciary. Accordingly, the administrator was given wide powers and a tribunal 
created to hear trade practices matters. 
Parliamentarians were more accustomed to the notion of legislation regulating 
trade practices during the 1960s. Business attitudes, however, were harnessed 
in opposition to this idea. Business was ‘happy with the way things were 
and did not see any reason for legislation’.56 An example is the Chamber of 
Manufacturers, which queried the objectives of a competitive economy, arguing 
the benefits derived by the manufacturing industry and its participants from 
anti-competitive agreements should be recognised before benefits to others.57 
This view certainly influenced the design of the 1965 legislation and the Act 
was described as ‘one of the most ineffectual pieces of legislation ever passed by 
Parliament’.58 It is clear, however, that business support and successful transition 
from Bill to Act status was unlikely if the legislation had been more stringent. 
The process from first announcement to enactment took over five years and the 
content of the Act changed considerably during that time.
There was support for the Act from diverse quarters. Consumer groups were 
in their infancy in Australia during this period and had little voice during the 
early 1960s. There was, however, support for the legislation from other sectors. 
Farmers and primary producers, who had long bought machinery and pesticides 
at uncompetitive high prices set by cartels, supported the legislation.59 Likewise, 
small business people, who had not been able to enter the market, favoured 
regulation of such practices. Labour organisations and public authorities, both 
of which were exempted from the Bill, supported the legislation.60 Finally the 
press, too, entered the fray, expressing a diversity of views.61
The Barwick scheme had proposed that four practices be directly banned by 
legislation and subject to criminal prosecution. They were: collusive bidding, 
collusive tendering, monopolisation, and persistent price cutting at a loss. It 
was proposed that these practices were per se illegal.62 Business opposition 
to this was clear and loud, saying it was a ‘savage application of the concept 
of crime’63 and ‘that no business practice could be condemned per se’.64 As 
Hopkins pointed out, the reason for the success of business representations in 
56 Bannerman interview.
57 Brunt, ‘The Trade Practices Bill II: Legislation in Search of an Objective’ (1965) 41 The Economic Record 
357, 364. 
58 Brunt (1994) 491.
59 Hopkins (1978) 42. It is worth noting that the Bill did not catch those activities of government marketing 
boards that stabilised the prices of farmers and primary producers.
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opposition to the scheme was because they were based on values that were 
shared by government, including the non-criminal nature of businessmen, the 
importance of not burdening business with compliance costs and the necessity 
of encouraging economic growth.65 The Liberal government of the day was 
sympathetic to these arguments and the Act dropped many of the Barwick 
proposals. The compromise was effectively to remove the per se prohibitions 
from the Act and make them all examinable by the regulator.
The underlying philosophy of the Act was stated by Barwick, who emphasised 
the public interest in controlling restrictive practices.66 The Bill proposed a 
list of practices that would be unlawful, subject to a public interest defence. 
This list underwent numerous drafts and the provisions in the final Act were a 
watered-down version, evidencing the strong impact of the business lobby. The 
Bill that went to parliament did not attempt to control mergers and takeovers, 
but concentrated on price-fixing and resale price maintenance. While in some 
quarters it was as weak,67 the much-redesigned Bill did, however, address the 
most prevalent types of restrictive trade practices. Ron Bannerman, reflecting 
on the Bill, stated: 
In the end the legislation wasn’t much more than an introduction and 
its life was principally in the areas of horizontal price fixes and resale 
price maintenance. There were some other sections, a section that dealt 
with price discrimination and a section that pretended to deal with 
monopolisation, but they weren’t real. If you are to start competition 
law from nowhere, you had to start with price fixing and that is what we 
did in Australia and we did it quite effectively under that legislation.68
The Act, which received Royal Assent on 18 December 1965 and came into 
operation on 1 September 1967, contained four practices of examinable 
agreements within section 36: obtaining discrimination in prices or terms of 
dealing,69 forcing another person’s conduct,70 inducing refusal to deal71 and 
monopolisation.72 The Act provided for the registration of such agreements in 
the Register of Trade Agreements by virtue of section 40(1). This was to be 
a secret register, unlike the British counterpart. It has also been stated that 
Barwick thought this may act as an inducement for business to register.73 
Barwick had always considered confidentiality as important:
65 ibid, 65.
66 See D Stalley, ‘The Commonwealth Government’s Scheme for the Control of Monopoly and Restrictive 
Practices — A Commentary’ (1963) 37 Australian Law Journal Reports 85, 87.
67 See Brunt (1965) 357; Merrett, Corones and Round (2007) 181; Donald and Heydon (1978) 8.
68 Bannerman interview. 
69 Section 36(1)(a) Trade Practices Act 1965.
70 Section 36(1)(b) Trade Practices Act 1965.
71 Section 36(1)(c) Trade Practices Act 1965.
72 Section 36(2) Trade Practices Act 1965.
73 Bannerman interview.
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The register would be absolutely confidential, protected by severe 
penalties for disclosure. Having been registered, the disclosed practice 
could be continued without restriction or penalty until it was found by 
the appropriate tribunal to be harmful to the public interest.74
The proposal merely asked for the registration of practices and was hailed as 
‘simple and certain’ as well as avoiding ‘tremendous administrative costs and 
harassment of business’.75 The legality of the practice relied on whether the 
requirement to register had been complied with and the legislation acknowledged 
that many examinable agreements would be innocuous and should be allowed 
on the basis of public interest. It was compulsory to register such agreements 
and it was prosecutable if this was not complied with. The administrator had the 
power to view the register and decide whether the legality of certain practices 
was worth pursuing. 
The Trade Practices Tribunal was to consider whether the restriction or practice 
was in the public interest. This was similar to the British legislation, which had 
been criticised as vague.76 Section 50(3) provided that, in considering whether 
any restriction or practices were contrary to the public interest, the tribunal 
weigh the detriment against the needs and interests that may have resulted. 
Section 50(2) listed the matters that were to be taken into account and these 
included:
a. the needs and interests of consumers, employers, producers, distributors, 
importers, exporters, proprietors and investors
b. the needs and interest of small businesses
c. the promotion of new enterprises
d. the need to achieve the full and efficient use and distribution of labour, 
capital, materials, industrial capacity, industrial know-how and other 
resources
e. the need to achieve the production, provision, treatment and distribution, 
by efficient and economical means, of goods and services of such quality, 
quantity and price as will best meet the requirements of domestic and 
overseas markets 
f. the ability of Australian producers and exporters to compete in overseas 
markets.
74 Barwick (1995) 148.
75 Barwick ‘Administrative Features of the Legislation on Restrictive Trade Practices’ (The Robert Garran 
Memorial Oration, speech delivered at the Australian Regional Groups Royal Institute of Public Administration, 
Canberra, 3 November, 1963) 32.
76 Wilks (1999) 36.
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The definition of public interest in the legislation was imprecise. It had been 
much debated in Cabinet and had been ‘added to and subtracted from’, the final 
form being a compromise.77 Ultimately, the definition was criticised on the basis 
that the criteria were couched in terms of benefits to sectional interests as well 
as competition and good performance.78 
Brunt, one of the most longstanding scholars in trade practices regulation, 
wrote of this provision:
What is the criteria of the ‘public interest’? ... It is true that we have 
s 50 that proposes to spell out such a criteria. But examination reveals 
that it consists of such vague and all embracing language as to delegate 
to the Tribunal virtually legislative powers. In rather less mellifluous 
language, it seems that the Government has passed the buck.79
It was also pointed out that it would have been difficult to specify in advance 
the manner in which the interests of the different groups could have been 
weighed.80 The legislation, by virtue of section 47, gave the commissioner of the 
Trade Practices Commission (TPC) the power to bring proceedings, on the basis 
that the examinable agreements were contrary to the public interest, before the 
tribunal which, by virtue of section 51, could determine whether the practice 
was illegal or unenforceable.81 Bannerman stated of this power:
The Commissioner … had to decide what cases to put to the Tribunal, 
and had to decide personally, without the power to delegate, and 
couldn’t do that until he had formed an opinion that what he wanted 
to refer to the Tribunal was against the public interest. He had to form 
that opinion after having conferred and consulted with the industry 
that was affected by it … And I am told that this was much debated in 
Cabinet and reached its final form as a compromise.82
The second important factor in the regulatory landscape was the decision about 
who would be the decision-maker: which body would interpret the legislation. 
There was a shift away from the courts to a ‘dual enforcement system’: a specialist 
commission and tribunal.83 Whereas the Australian Industries Preservation Act 
1906 had given the courts power to interpret the legislation, the Trade Practices 
77 Bannerman interview.
78 Brunt (1965) 357, 384.
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 The Tribunal decision in Re Frozen Vegetables Marketing Agreement 18 FLR 196 was important in 
considering the meaning of public benefit. See John Hatch, ‘The Implications of the Frozen Case for Australian 
Trade Practices Legislation’ (1978) 48 Economic Record 374.
82 Bannerman interview.
83 Robert Baxt and Maureen Brunt, ‘The Murphy Trade Practices Bill: Admirable Objectives, Inadequate 
Means’ (1973–74) 1 and 2 Australian Business Law Review 3, 58.
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Act 1965 legislated for a shift of responsibility from the courts to the newly 
established Trade Practices Tribunal.84 Again, Brunt described the rationale for 
the creation of the tribunal, in the context of the current Act, as:
The Trade Practices Tribunal is an Australian invention, designed to 
take some of the pressure off the courts, in what is largely a court-
centered antitrust system, by offering a quasi-judicial resolution of 
some of the more economically complex trade practices matters. So in 
the initial design of the Trade Practices Act it was sought to partition 
subject-matter between the courts and two administrative bodies — the 
Commission and the Tribunal.85 
Although here Brunt was referring to the 1974 legislation, this rationale was true 
of the tribunal under the 1965 legislation. And, the tribunal was empowered 
to consider all proceedings brought by the commissioner.86 This shift from 
the courts to the tribunal was pragmatically explained on the basis that the 
interpretation of ‘public interest’ was essentially an administrative task that 
could not be given to the courts87 and it was stated as follows: 
It is of course a possibility that a rule of reason such as that developed 
in the United States might be adopted by our Courts and other 
administrative authorities in their interpretation of this new law, 
but traditionally our Courts have taken the view that their duty is to 
interpret, not to make the law.88
This shift was criticised soundly as an attempt to avoid responsibility, and it 
was argued that this placed on the tribunal ‘the onus of making decisions which 
are more appropriately the responsibility of the legislature’89 and of ‘passing the 
buck’.90
This Act established a powerful and influential regulator, and the Bill 
contemplated an active and nimble commissioner who would be able to seek 
undertakings from the regulated parties on ways to vary behaviour, and still 
be able to prosecute them in cases of breach.91 The extensive powers given 
84 Section 9 Trade Practices Act 1965. 
85 Brunt, ‘Practical Aspects of Conducting a Hearing Before the Australian Competition Tribunal’, paper 
presented at The New Era of Competition Law in Australia Conference, Perth, July 1995, cited in Stephen 
Corones, Competition Law in Australia (2006) 38.
86 Section 47 Trade Practices Act 1965.
87 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Second Reading Speech, Trade Practices Bill 1965, 8 
December 1965, 2198 (Senator John Gorton, Victoria, Minister for Works).
88 Australian Development Industries Commission, ‘The Trade Practices Bill 1973 — An Analysis, with 
Proposals for Amendment’ (February 1974) 12.
89 J Hutton and John Nieuwenhuysen, ‘The Tribunal and Australian Economic Policy’ (1965) 41 Economic 
Record 2387, 2389.
90 Brunt (1965) 357, 384.
91 See JE Richardson, ‘The 1965 Bill: The Legal Framework’, in Nieuwenhuysen (1976) 220.
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to the commissioner caused much debate, with many members of parliament 
expressing their concern over the extent of these discretionary powers.92 The 
commissioner was required to mediate between interested parties and exercise 
skill in deciding the order in which practices should be challenged.93 It was 
noted that the commissioner needed to be a man of the world, with a good 
appreciation of the industrial and business scene, approachable by business 
without being officious and having his finger on the pulse.94 Indeed, one 
example of the characteristics of the nimble commissioner was the manner in 
which he was expected to be able to inform the public and bring about a shift 
in public opinion on the need for competition. 
It has been persuasively argued that Bannerman, as the First Commissioner of 
Trade Practices,  played a pivotal role in making the Act a success.95 David 
Merrett, Stephen Corones and David Round highlight the commissioner’s role 
in raising public awareness of restrictive trade practices. The authors emphasise 
Bannerman’s personal traits in contributing to this, including his powerful 
ambition for the institution,96 being a slave of duty97 and possessing a good deal 
of political nuance.98 They point out Bannerman’s recognition that, in return for 
statutory independence, he must remain a neutral administrator,99 maintaining 
government support before building respect for the legislation among the wider 
community.100 This included building an effective regulatory agency and actively 
developing a corporate culture with a commitment to competition principles. 
One example of the importance of these personal traits was the manner in which 
Bannerman was able to inform the wider community about the incidence of 
restrictive practices in the market. Even though the Register of Trade Agreements 
was secret, knowledge about existing webs of restrictive trade practices was 
made public and the commissioner was able to bring about a shift in public 
opinion. As to why the secret register did not protect business, as intended, 
Bannerman stated:
It [the secrecy provisions] didn’t work simply because of the power 
and duty that the Commissioner had to present Annual Reports to the 
Parliament. In those Annual Reports he detailed all the information about 
the agreements, without disclosing names to the Parliament. The picture 
became clear. It became very clear across the community that there 
92 Merrett, Corones and Round (2007) 185.
93 Barwick, ‘Administrative Features of the Legislation on Restrictive Trade Practices’ (1963) 43.
94 ibid.
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was a network of restrictive agreements, up and down and sideways 
all of industry. The types of them were detailed. The provisions, which 
were copied from one industry to another … became known in spite 
of the secrecy provisions. That meant that the Commissioner’s reports 
were much used by the press and the professions and put pressure on 
parliamentarians and thinkers about the adverse effects on the economy, 
initiative and on efficiency.101
Section 48 of the Act required that, prior to instituting proceedings in the 
tribunal, the commissioner carry out consultations with persons who would 
be the other parties to the proceedings, or with representatives of those 
persons with a view to securing some undertaking, cessation or variation of 
the agreement. These powers were criticised and the commissioner was called 
a grand inquisitor and the great bottleneck, who had been interposed between 
the tribunal and the object of its statutory functions.102 These powers did, 
however, encourage the commissioner to engage with business and to build up 
a staff who could work effectively and with a shared ethos.103
The choice of the commission, rather than the executive department, to deal 
with the competition regulation was a choice being made in other jurisdictions, 
including the United States and United Kingdom. Marver Bernstein, in 1955, 
listed the advantages of relying on a commission as a regulatory tool, and 
they remain applicable today.104 Bernstein pointed out that, in the nineteenth 
century, there was a shift in the character of economic regulation away from 
the judiciary to a commission that may be better resourced and better skilled in 
dealing with such specific areas.105 Commissions were often seen as a means of 
‘taking regulation out of politics’106 and they could engage in creative regulatory 
responses.107 Further, there has always been distrust in the judiciary’s ability to 
handle complex areas of economic regulation,108 whereas commissions were seen 
as having a significant input into the determination of public policy.109 Choosing 
to delegate such activity to an agency was also part of the British tradition, 
101 Bannerman interview.
102 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 November 1965, 3239 (Mr 
Reginald Connor, Member for Cunningham).
103 Bannerman interview. See also Merrett, Corones and Round (2007) 196.
104 Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955).
105 ibid, 26. This work is often quoted for the evolutionary lifecycle of an agency. I do not think that this is 
applicable today and agree with the views expressed in Michael Moran, ‘Understanding the Regulatory State’ 
(2002) 32(1) British Journal of Political Science 431, 433. 
106 Bernstein (1955) 71.
107 For a contrary view see Paul Craig, ‘The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Competition and 
Administrative Rationality’, in Robert Baldwin and Christopher McCrudden (eds), Regulation and Public Law, 
(1987), 197, 222, where he argues that an agency is a good way of retaining political control.
108 Bernstein (1955) 28. See also these sentiments expressed in Independent Committee of Inquiry into 
Competition Policy in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, National Competition Policy, (1993) [Hilmer 
Report]. See also Craig (1987) 223.
109 Bernstein (1955) 66.
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whereby such delegation was controlled in a framework of trust and the focus 
was on the interest of the public.110 All these factors have been relied on from 
time to time in Australia and formed a part of the regulatory landscape, which 
resulted in the creation of the TPC as the powerful regulator.111
The Critical Juncture of the Authorisation Process in the Trade 
Practices Act 1974
The critical juncture for the public benefit test within the formation of the 
institutional support for the authorisation process, under the 1974 legislation, 
was the period between 1962 and 1965, before even, the passing of its 
predecessor, the 1965 Act. Here I use the definition of critical juncture, namely 
that there should be a significant change, this change took place in a distinct 
way, and it produced historical legacies.112 The significant change in this case 
was the recognition that some attempt had to be made to control cartels, even 
though it may be unpopular in the electorate. 
The change did indeed take place in a distinct way in Australia because of the 
adoption of a secret register, with wide powers granted to the independent 
regulator who could decide which agreements to query as being against 
the public interest. This choice to use a registration system handled by the 
independent regulator resulted in legacies that have shaped our current 
competition regulatory structures. It would be untrue to say these legacies were 
intended or, even, that Australia’s current competition laws were intended or 
planned. This is clearly not the case. Many other factors influenced the path 
over the ensuing years. But the decisions to make the register secret, and to 
grant wide powers to the commissioner, including the power to discuss matters 
with business with a view to avoiding proceedings,113 were important. Although 
widely regarded as weak legislation, these aspects were vital in determining the 
trajectory the institution took and its legacy.
The 1960s brought a change in attitude and an acknowledgement that cartels 
had to be controlled by legislation, as demonstrated by Barwick who stated: 
The regulation of restrictive trade practices and monopolies is a field 
into which most of the countries of the West who desire to maintain a 
110 Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle, ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition 
Agencies’ (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 148, 153.
111 See John Warhurst, ‘Exercising Control over Statutory Authorities: Study in Government Technique’, in 
Patrick Weller and Dean Jaensch (eds), Responsible Government in Australia (1980) 151.
112 Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and 
Regime Dynamics in Latin America (1991).
113 See Merrett, Corones and Round (2007) 182; Richardson (1976) 90.
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free economy have felt themselves obliged to enter. They have entered 
it to varying degrees, and with varying fortunes, with quite divergent 
schemes.114
Any attempt at regulating collusive conduct, to be successful, had to be 
sympathetic to the existing market structure of Australian industry. It was the 
Liberal Country Party that had conducted the early enquiries into legislative 
design and proposed the legislation. The political ideology saw restrictive trade 
practices creating problems of both a sociological and economic nature: the 
sociological problems arose from activities that excluded persons from the market 
and limited free enterprise, while the economic problems were responsible for 
distorting the market and exploited consumers.115 The proposed legislation 
made the link between free enterprise and competition and received bipartisan 
support from both the Liberal Country Party, who proposed the legislation, as 
well as the Labor Party, who proposed more severe legislation. Bannerman has 
described this Bill as providing the competition edifice that we see today.116 
Rather than being a top-down attempt to control businesses, it was recognised 
that, in order to survive and be successful, any regulatory approach had to be 
essentially a compromise that listened to and accommodated the concerns of 
business. This is evidenced by the comments made by Barwick addressing the 
Chamber of Manufacturing Industries in 1963:
In the middle of all the harouche, we had last Monday discussions with 
the Industries Advisory Council. We had put to us the most balanced, 
sensible and impressive ideas on this matter that I have ever heard … 
We do not want to be doctrinaire on this matter. We, like you, want to 
preserve competition. We can with good sense eliminate unfairness and 
injustice. All I want to tell you is that what has been said to me and my 
colleagues in the last few days has been so helpful, and that it may well 
determine the future course of action.117
This sentiment was echoed in the long title of the Trade Practices Act 1965, ‘An 
Act to preserve Competition in Australian Trade and Commerce to the extent 
required by the Public Interest’.118 
The 1965 Act made similar concessions to business and the registration process 
was aimed at assuring business that change would not be sudden. Neither 
business interests nor governments wanted to rely on the courts to interpret 
the statute, as had been the case under the 1906 Act. Any successful attempt 
114 Barwick ‘Some Aspects of Australian Proposals for Legislation’ (1963).
115 ibid.
116 Bannerman interview.
117 Marr (2005) 191.
118 For a discussion on the importance of workable competition as an important feature of Australian 
competition regulation and the manner in which it is consistent with the public interest, see Brunt (1994) 483.
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to regulate collusive conduct had to find a distinct way, as demonstrated by 
Gorton’s statement that ‘the philosophy which runs throughout the Bill is that 
the agreements and practices to which it applies are lawful unless and until they 
have been determined by the Tribunal to be contrary to the public interest’.119 
The distinct way of embodying this philosophy was the creation of the 
commission to negotiate these issues, and an important feature, the sweetner, of 
this scheme was the secret register of anti-competitive practices.120
The choice of the independent regulator and the creation of the secret register 
produced historical legacies. A fundamental legacy of the Act was that it created 
an independent agency and a commissioner with the discretion to interpret 
the term public benefit. It recognised certain restraints of trade may be in the 
public interest and should be allowed — thus, what may be bad for competitors 
may be good for the public. This became the foundation for the authorisation 
process under the 1974 legislation. As time passed, this authorisation process 
was seen as a strength of competition regulation in Australia and it represented 
a recognition that there are instances in which anti-competitive conduct is of 
value to society.121 This has been considered to be particularly relevant in small 
economies where pursuing efficiency considerations alone may not always result 
in optimal outcomes.122 
Further there are three important and specific legacies. First, the creation of the 
secret register, which was the beginnings of the authorisation process that was 
to become an important aspect of the Trade Practices Act 1974. The authorisation 
process under the 1974 Act, unlike its predecessor, was not a secret process. It 
did, however, allow for the authorisation of certain anti-competitive processes, 
whereby the public benefit outweighed the public detriment. This was only 
possible because the business community had accepted the register under the 
1965 Act with the commissioner as the referee and regulatory mechanism. The 
phrase ‘public interest’ under the 1965 Act was changed to ‘public benefit’ 
under the 1974 Act, but its meaning remains imprecise.123 The meaning of the 
phrase relies considerably on the discretion of the regulator and the major 
discourses of the time. As stated by Bannerman:
119 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Second Reading Speech, 8 December 1965, 2133 
(Senator John Gorton, Victoria, Minister for Works). For a discussion on the distinctive nature of the 
authorisation process, see Brunt (1994) 483. 
120 Section 47 Trade Practices Act 1965; the commissioner only took two such cases to the tribunal. See 
Donald and Heydon (1978) 8.
121 See [Hilmer Report] (1993) 29; Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, Australian Association of Convenience Stores 
Incorporated and Queensland Newsagents Federation (1994) ATPR 41-357, 42,645, 42,677.
122 Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies (2003) 55.
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Public interest can never be a precise thing that people will be able to 
accept or predict. It affects foreign policy, political judgment in areas of 
fiscal policy, tax policy and so on. It will always include anything that 
appears relevant and will depend on who is making the judgment.124
The second important legacy was the creation of the commission empowered 
with a wide discretion, which continues to engage in a dialogue with regulated 
parties and uses a diverse set of regulatory tools, and the creation of the tribunal 
to hear appeals on authorisations. Under the 1965 Act, Bannerman worked hard 
persuading parties to discontinue many anti-competitive agreements, gaining 
support and facilitating a gentle acceptance of the notions of competition and 
competitive practices. This was important in bringing about a cultural shift 
among the regulated groups.125 Bannerman recounted:
The significance of the 1965 Act was that it survived and made the 
existence of competition law known through the community and the 
professions. The press became interested in it; the lawyers became 
interested in it; the lawyers talked about it; the Parliament has people in 
it who became interested in the topic. So it survived. It survived because 
it got bipartisan support in the Parliament and it survived because there 
were sufficient people within business who were prepared to use it 
or allow the Commissioner to use it with their support by becoming 
witnesses.126
It was successful in raising the concerns of the regulator and in beginning a 
dialogue between the regulator and businesses. It won acceptance from the 
commercial world for this type of regulation127 and laid the groundwork for the 
passing of the Trade Practices Act 1974. As Bannerman stated, rather modestly 
of his role:
The role of Commissioner was important. He was an initiator, consultant 
who talked with industry, who in a sense corresponded with the 
Parliament through his Annual Report, which became a political tool in 
the hands of parliamentarians and the administration; his administration 
was able to take on many matters on legislative development and other 
constitutional points.128
124 Bannerman interview.
125 See Bannerman (1984).
126 Bannerman interview.
127 John Nieuwenhuysen (1976) 34–35. See also Donald and Heydon (1978) 8.
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2 . Architecture of Authorisations
33
Indeed, the powers of the commissioners only increased under the 1974 Act, 
both in an informal and formal sense. One example of such powers has been 
the use of undertakings in influencing industry structure.129 On the manner 
in which the commission has been able to use such powers, Bannerman stated:
The role of the Commission changed in my time and has changed very 
much more since … [Under the 1974 Act] informal powers grew more 
and more and they are not found in the Act. Power of forbearance, 
for example, is very important in formalising industry structure. This 
is entirely non-statutory and was gathering pace in my time. Non-
statutory power is now exercised by the Commission with consent and 
it delivers it relatively efficiently, quickly and in a semi-secret or secret 
manner. This is quite remarkable. This has meant that the Commission 
has become so important especially in the international arena. It has also 
become important in legislative policy because of its micro-knowledge 
of the industry. So the Commission has become an advisor in industry 
matters and does seem to hesitate to make its views known ... That 
would never have happened years ago. A sharp distinction was drawn 
between administration and policy at a government level. Now it seems 
to have matured to be much more a partner of government.
Certainly, the commission plays a more proactive role today, as demonstrated by 
the successful conclusion to its calls for amendments to legislation to provide 
for criminal sanctions for cartel conduct. 
The third legacy of the Act was the retention of the Trade Practices Tribunal. 
Many saw this as the government passing the buck by delegating virtually all 
its legislative powers to the tribunal to interpret and give effect to the Act’s 
vague language.130 The tribunal, whose membership was to include a federal 
judge as chair and two lay persons, which in practice became a business 
person and an economist, fleshed out the concept of public interest in an early 
decision, drawing the link between competition and public interest.131 In a set 
of three decisions, namely Frozen Vegetables Processors,132 Fibreboard Container 
Makers133 and the Book Trade decision,134 the tribunal made a significant impact, 
changing forever the way in which price agreements would be viewed. Here the 
tribunal fleshed out the concept of public interest in an early decision drawing 
the link between competition and public interest and demonstrated the manner 
in which such a regulatory approach could work.
129 ibid.
130 Brunt, Economic Essays on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law (2003) 53.
131 See Re Frozen Vegetables Marketing Agreement, 18 FLR 196.
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133 See: Re Agreement of the Australian Fibreboard Container Manufacturers’ Association (1973) ATPR 8377.
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The Frozen Vegetables Processors case involved a price-fixing agreement between 
frozen vegetable processors and retailers in an effort to halt the intense price 
cutting in the industry following excess production of peas in the 1969–70 
growing season. This agreement was registered with the Commissioner of Trade 
Practices who decided that it was anticompetitive and was maintaining the 
price at a level higher than a competitive market would have allowed, and was 
thereby contrary to the public interest. The matter proceeded to the tribunal, 
where 10 public benefits were put forth by the vegetable processors. They 
argued that the intention behind the agreement was to prevent a price war, 
by providing stability to the processors and to avoid social waste. The tribunal 
stated that, given the structure of the industry and the change in production 
patterns within this industry, the agreement to fix the price at the nominated 
level was unreasonable and contrary to the public interest. 
In the Fibreboard Container Makers matter, the commissioner formed the 
view that members of the Australian Fibreboard Container Manufacturers’ 
Association had agreed to a number of restrictions that were contrary to the 
public interest. Whereas some of these restrictions were connected directly to 
price, such as controlling the price charged or quoted by association members, 
others were less direct. They dealt with the standardisation of materials and 
designs of corrugated and solid fibre cartons, as well as the concerted efforts of 
the association in relation to research and development, all of which involved 
agreements between competitors. Citing the Frozen Vegetables Processors 
decision as good authority, the tribunal decided that the pricing provisions 
were contrary to the public interest and would result in denying the benefits 
of price competition to consumers. As to the non-price-related agreements, the 
tribunal stated that these practices were likely to continue without agreement as 
there would be strong incentives to adhere to industry standards and continue 
research and development activities. 
The third tribunal decision was the Book Trade agreement, where the major book 
publishers and retailers had made an agreement about the resale price of books 
which the commissioner argued constituted a resale price agreement contrary 
to the public interest. The members of the Book Trade applied to the tribunal 
seeking exemption from the provisions of the Act. However the Tribunal 
agreed with the commissioner and in doing so took a significant step, that saw 
Australia take a different approach to England, where a similar agreement had 
been exempted under their legislation. 
These three decisions should be regarded as providing support for a registration 
process in the hands of an independent commission and tribunal as an effective 
way to monitor and regulate cartels. Business saw the writing on the wall and 
the commissioner was able to flex his muscle and a number of price agreements 
involving various industries were queried and practices abandoned. Agreements 
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by bread manufacturers, concrete manufacturers, insulation manufacturers and 
beer breweries are some of the examples of price agreements that subsequently 
ceased. The tribunal decisions and subsequent actions by the commissioner laid 
down the groundwork for the 1974 legislation which retained a place for the 
tribunal. Later tribunal decisions have been able to articulate the theoretical 
basis of competition regulation, founded firmly on neoclassical principles 
while giving consideration to the context within which the conduct occurs. 
One example of such a decision is that in Re Queensland Co-operative Milling 
Association Ltd, which has informed all later discussion on the meaning of 
the term ‘public benefit’ within the authorisation process under the 1974 
Act.The tribunal has continued to play a key role in shaping competition law 
developments.135
The critical juncture for the trajectory taken by Australian competition law 
was the period in the early 1960s which saw the need for a different form of 
regulation and which, after much compromise, settled on the Trade Practices 
Act 1965. Many events and individuals influenced this trajectory. Other key 
players during these early years, apart from Barwick and Bannerman, included 
politicians and important industry groups, and their influence led to the passing 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, which retained an independent regulatory 
agency with wide powers and a registration process, albeit in a varied form.
The Trade Practices Act 1974 
When the Trade Practices Act 1974 was introduced, it was referred to as 
Austerican,136 as it relied heavily on the British model, while also borrowing 
the American language and staunch belief in the importance of competitive 
markets.137 The Act was introduced and passed by the Labor Party, which 
had won government in 1972 after 23 years in opposition. It brought with 
it a commitment to a host of policies on social welfare and equity, including 
commitment to making the consumer an important agent in the political arena. 
When introducing the 1974 Act, the government was set on introducing 
a composite package, making the link between consumer protection and 
restrictive trade practices.138 It was stated that the 1974 Act was bringing 
together four fundamental rights: the right to be safe, the right to know, the 
135 Some of these important decisions include Re Media Council of Australia (No 2); Re 7-Eleven Stores; 
Qantas; Re Rural Traders Cooperative (WA) Ltd.
136 Baxt and Brunt (1973–74) 6.
137 See particularly sections 1 and 2 Sherman Act 1890 (US) and Sections 2, 3, 7 Clayton Act 1914 (US).
138 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Trade Practices Bill, Second Reading, 
16 July 1974, 573–4; see also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 November 
1973, 2918 (Mr Al Grasby, Minister for Immigration); see also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 
27 September 1973, 1013 (Senator Lionel Murphy, Attorney General).
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right to choose and the right to be heard.139 Competition policy and consumer 
protection was to be in the hands of the same regulator. It made sense to have 
both consumer protection and competition in the same regulatory hands as they 
were linked. Investigating a consumer complaint was likely to uncover anti-
competitive practices. It has also been suggested that making the regulatory 
institution answerable to both consumers and business has been a key factor in 
preventing it being captured by any particular group.140
Consumer groups were encouraged to participate in the debates over trade 
practices and the Labor government sought to introduce consumer groups into 
a number of debates, including pre-Budget consultations that, in the past, had 
been dominated by the private sector.141 This Act was important in making the 
express link between consumer protection and competition regulation and gave 
rise to the consumer movement as a formidable force. The role of these groups 
in deliberations and decisions depends on the manner in which discretion is 
exercised by the regulatory agency.142 
The changing tide of economic thought and political support for neoclassical 
economic thought meant the secret register could not continue.143 The Trade 
Practices Act 1974 put an end to the secret register, which had been largely 
ineffective in controlling anti-competitiuve practices and had come to be 
viewed, rather, as reinforcing the ‘mateship–collusion ethos’. The annual report 
of the TPC provided a picture of the disenchantment with the legislation and 
the secret register. The first report gave an indication of how widespread cartel 
activity among Australian industry was and subsequent reports demonstrated 
the limitations of the 1965 Act. The number of agreements registered rose from 
5186 on 1 November 1967, to 10,841 on 30 June 1968. The 1972–73 report 
supplied the ‘epitaph for the 1965 Act’144 and the commissioner stated: 
The current legislation, which is clearly coming towards the end of its 
time, has nevertheless served a valuable role. Among other things, it 
provided an entry into a field substantially untouched for many years, 
it brought the problems to public and business attention, and it became 
139 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 July 1974, 575 (Mr William 
Morrison, Member for St George, Minister for Science).
140 Bannerman interview.
141 See Australian Financial Review, 18 June 1973, 3.
142 See Baxt, ‘Consumer and Business Protection’, in Frances Hanks and Philip Williams (eds), Trade 
Practices Act: A Twenty-Five Year Stocktake (2001) 172, for a discussion on the importance of consumer 
protection and small business unconscionability within Part V.
143 See Richard Ackland, ‘Administration in public is a very fine discipline to have’, Australian Financial 
Review, 8 October 1975, 5. For the support shown to the proposed Bill by the opposition Liberal Country 
Party, see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Trade Practices Bill 1974, Second 
Reading Speech, 24 July 1974, 567 (Mr Robert Ellicott, Member for Wentworth).
144 See Bannerman (1984) 152.
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a means of moving towards principle and demonstrated the need for 
further legislation. It was also an important vehicle for the development 
of constitutional law in this field and beyond it.145 
In 1973 there were more than 14,000 restrictive agreements on the register.146 In 
1965, Senator Lionel Murphy of the opposition Labor Party pointed out some 
of the obvious deficiencies of a secret register and stated in the second reading 
speech of the 1965 legislation:
We are entitled to clear laws against the deleterious actions of monopolies 
and trade conspiracies. This Bill does not give us these. It is a pretence, 
a smokescreen. It will set up an administrative morass. By requiring 
the innocent as well as the guilty to register, it will no doubt arouse 
opposition to any attempt to deal with commercial misconduct. The 
Government has done all that it can reasonably do to make the Bill 
ineffective.147
Senator Ivor Greenwood’s comments on the then proposed legislation moving 
to an open register makes some of these inherent reservations and consequences 
evident:
[T]he co-operation of business was sought by inducing companies 
to hand over to the Commissioner of Trade Practices agreements into 
which they had entered on the basis that if the agreements were with the 
Commissioner they would be kept secret … But under this legislation, 
it appears that all those agreements will be able to be used as the basis 
for these quasi-criminal prosecutions which the legislation envisages. 
I imagine that many people would want to protest to see whether 
that could not be changed. These are areas in which the legislation is 
important and to which time for consideration ought be given.148
A registration process, be it via a secret or open register, was needed to gain 
the support of the business community, as recognised by the Minister for 
Manufacturing Industry, Kep Enderby, who stated: 
Special provisions are included in the Bill for no other reason than 
to remove uncertainty. These are the provisions for clearances and 
authorisations. In the great majority of cases the applicability of the 
provisions in this Bill will be clear. In those cases where some uncertainty 
145 ibid, 153.
146 See Donald and Heydon (1978) 8. See also Richard Ackland, ‘Trade Practices Bill Cracks Down on 
Business’, Australian Financial Review, 18 September 1973, 1, 18.
147 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Second Reading Speech, 8 December 1965, 2137 
(Senator Lionel Murphy, New South Wales).
148 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 24 October 1973, 1419, (Senator Ivor Greenwood, Victoria). 
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does arise, particularly during the early years of its administration, 
there will generally be opportunity for the uncertainty to be removed 
by seeking a clearance or an authorisation.149
The proposed legislation, for which considerable credit should go to Murphy, 
echoed the philosophy but not the design of the US antitrust legislation. 
This was no accident. The historical legacy of the 1965 legislation meant the 
commission and tribunal would deal with these matters. The determination of 
authorisations was to become a large part of the work of the commission as the 
new Act of 1974 retained the central role of the commission in determining 
authorisations. It also established a much clearer authorisation process, which 
gave the commission wide discretion to consider a range of matters, including 
determining authorisation decisions under a public benefit test.
The Authorisation Process and the Role of Public Benefit 
Authorisations can simply be described as immunities from Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) prosecution for breaches of the 
specified anti-competitive provisions in Part IV. It is described by the ACCC as:
A process under which the ACCC can grant immunity on public benefit 
grounds from the application of the competition provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act except for misuse of market power. The Commission will 
grant an authorisation only if it concludes that the proposed conduct 
will result in a benefit to the public that will outweigh the detriment 
from any lessening of competition.150
Section 88 provides that the ACCC can grant authorisations in relation to the 
following:
i. an anti-competitive agreement breaching section 45
ii. a secondary boycott provision breaching sections 45D, 45DA, 45DB, 45E and 
45EA
iii. conduct that could constitute exclusive dealing
iv. resale price maintenance, or 
v. an acquisition that occurs outside Australia.
Regulations provide the necessary forms that the applicant is required to 
complete. Guidelines with checklists are also provided to applicants making 
such applications. Before lodging such applications, the ACCC encourages 
149 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Trade Practices Bill, Second Reading, 
16 July 1974, 228 (Mr Kep Enderby, Minister for Secondary Industry and Minister for Supply).
150 <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/3663> at 21 August 2007.
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applicants to have informal discussions and obtain guidance from the 
adjudication branch.151 Members of staff have at times advised parties that their 
conduct would not attract the provisions of the Act and that authorisation 
would not be necessary, the officers interviewed stating that they are conscious 
of the need to provide information to applicants and to save them the time and 
expense of making an application where there are clear indications that it may 
not be necessary.152 There is a fee payable for such applications.153 Due to policies 
introduced in 2007, the ACCC has undertaken to consider all applications for 
non-mergers within a six-month period, unless the ACCC has issued a draft 
determination or has obtained the applicant’s agreement to an extension.154
The Act contains two tests for authorising different types of conduct.155
a. The first test, contained in section 90(6), applies to proposed or existing 
agreements that might substantially lessen competition and proposed 
exclusive dealing conduct, with the exception of third line forcing.156 This 
test states the ACCC can only grant authorisation if it is satisfied that this 
conduct is likely to result in a public benefit that outweighs the likely public 
detriment. 
b. The second test is contained in section 90(8) and applies to proposed 
exclusionary provisions, secondary boycotts, third line forcing, and resale 
price maintenance. This test states the ACCC can only grant authorisation if 
it is satisfied in all the circumstances that the proposed conduct is likely to 
result in such a benefit that the conduct should be permitted.
The ACCC is required to keep a public register of authorisation applications 
as well as applications for minor variations, revocations and substitutions of 
authorisations by virtue of section 89. The register also includes all documents 
relevant to the authorisation, such as documents submitted by the applicant 
in relation to an authorisation application,157 any draft determination made by 
the ACCC,158 record of conferences held by the ACCC in accordance with section 
90(8A),159 and oral submissions made to the ACCC,160 as well as the determination 
151 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Authorisations and Notifications: A Summary (2007) 6.
152 Interview 3. See also the discussion in Chapter 3.
153 Currently this fee is A$7500 for non-merger applications and there is provision for waivers of such fees. 
The ACCC will take into consideration factors such as whether the applicant is a not-for-profit organisation 
or whether the applicant will incur financial hardship. See ACCC, Authorisations and Notifications (2007) 7.
154 ibid, 8.
155 There is a separate test for the authorisation of mergers, which is outside the ambit of this discussion.
156 Third line forcing is defined as the supplying of goods or services on the condition that the purchaser 
acquires other goods or services from a third party. 
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made by the ACCC.161 All publicly available materials are available on the ACCC 
website.162 This open process is motivated by the imperative ‘that claims made 
by those supporting an application can be tested and interested parties have the 
opportunity to put their views to the ACCC’.163 
Provision is made to ensure confidential information is excluded from the 
register, thereby recognising the property and commercial interests in certain 
types of information that may be submitted as part of the authorisation 
process.164 The ACCC has provided guidelines on how such requests can be 
made.165 It has stated that, under the Act, the ACCC must exclude information 
from the public register if it contains the details of: a secret formula; the cash 
consideration offered for the acquisition of shares or assets; or the current 
costs of manufacturing, producing or marketing goods or services.166 Where 
the ACCC is of the view the request to exclude material is excessive, it will 
discuss the matter further with a view to narrowing the claim.167 There is also 
provision made for the ACCC to refuse a request to exclude information from the 
public register, where the request is not accompanied by sufficient supporting 
information or where that information is necessary to identify the conduct or 
arrangements for which protection is sought.168
The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the ACCC that the public benefit test is 
satisfied. The ‘future with or without test’ has been used by the ACCC in its 
recent decisions to identify and weigh the public benefit and anti-competitive 
detriment generated by the arrangements for which authorisation is sought.169 
This is discussed further in Chapter 3 — Discourses on Public Benefit.
While making its determination in accordance with one of the tests in section 
90, the ACCC seeks the views of interested parties on the application, including: 
‘competitors, customers, suppliers, regulators and other relevant government 
bodies, industry and consumer groups, unions and independent parties with 
161 Section 89(4)(c).
162 See website for authorisations <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/314462> at 10 January 2008.
163 ACCC, Authorisations and Notifications (2007) 9.
164 See Sections 89(5), 89(5A), 89(5D).
165 ACCC, Authorisations and Notifications (2007) 10. 
166 See ACCC, ‘Guidelines for excluding information from the public register for authorisation, merger 
clearance and notification processes’ (2007) <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/776053> 
at 23 August 2007, 1.
167 Russell V Miller, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act (2002) 986.
168 ACCC, ‘Guidelines for excluding information’ (2007) 2.
169 Adopted by the tribunal in Re John Dee (Export) Pty. Ltd (1989) ATPR 40-938, 50206 and regularly used 
in authorisation decisions. In Medicines Australia A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003, it was stated that the 
‘future with and without test’ was first established by the ACT in Australian Performing Rights Association 
(APRA) A90918, A90919, A90922, A90924, A90925, A90944, A90945, 8 March 2006. For examples of where 
the test has been used, see, for example, The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners A90795, 19 
December 2002, paras 5.5–5.9; NSW Department of Health A90754, A90755, 27 June 2003, paras 6.1, 6.2; and 
Mortgage Industry Association of Australia A90880, 18 February 2004, para 5.7. 
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an interest or expertise in the markets and subject matter involved.’170 The 
ACCC has also stated that, where appropriate, it may also seek submissions from 
the community through advertisements in newspapers and trade journals. In 
addition, the ACCC conducts its own enquiries and research.171 Furthermore, 
greater reliance is now being placed on experts to provide assistance with the 
interpretation of complex data and econometric evidence on various aspects, 
including market definitions or quantification of the various benefits and costs 
likely to be incurred by the proposed conduct.172 All these submissions are 
generally placed on the public register unless a claim of confidentiality is made. 
These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 — Discourses on Discretion.
Section 90A requires the ACCC to prepare a draft determination. Usually the 
commission distributes this draft determination to the applicant and all parties 
who made submissions. The commission then considers any further submissions 
that parties may make at this stage.173 Section 90A also provides the opportunity 
to interested persons to request that a pre-determination conference be held. 
Section 90A(7)(a) provides for the procedure to be followed at such conferences.174 
While such pre-decision conferences are generally not transcribed, a record of 
the parties attending and the discussions undertaken are placed on the public 
register. These determinations are also forwarded to the applicant and other 
interested parties and the decisions are also available on the internet and copies 
are published by commercial legal reporting services. 
Section 91 allows the ACCC to grant authorisations in a number of different 
forms. The authorisations can be in an interim form or for a limited duration. 
Section 91(2) allows the commission to grant an interim authorisation in certain 
cases, including where a minor variation and substitution is being considered 
or where there is an appeal for review to the tribunal. Of particular importance 
is the power given under section 90(3) to grant authorisations subject to 
conditions; this has been actively used in the recent past.175 
170 Allan Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’, paper presented at the National 
Competition Policy Workshop, Melbourne, 12 July 2001 3; see also section 90(2) which requires the commission 
to take into account any submissions made.
171 For example, see the early decision of Hardware Retailers Association A7102, 31 March 1976, where the 
TPC staff surveyed approximately 10 per cent of association members in order to check on the submissions made. 
The TPC did not accept the applicants’ submissions. Similarly in Port Waratah A90906-A90908, 9 July 2004.
172 For example, see the econometric evidence submitted by the parties in Qantas Limited and Air New 
Zealand Limited A30221, A 90862, A90863, 9 September 2003.
173 Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (2001) 4.
174 The pre-decision conference was introduced by amendments to the Act in 1977. These amendments 
abolished public hearings for the commission, substituting the requirement for the commission to issue a 
draft determination on an authorisation application and to hold a pre-determination conference on the draft 
if any of the parties required it. Interested parties and their lawyers could attend the conferences, although 
they could not participate. The commissioner stated that these changes stopped the commission looking 
like a court and allowed direct contact with business which increased confidence in the administration. See 
Bannerman (1984) 170.
175 See the discussion in Chapter 6 under Outcome-based Discretion.
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Minor variations can be made to the authorisations under section 91A and 
they can also be revoked by the ACCC under section 91B. Under section 91C 
the applicant can apply to the ACCC for a revocation of the authorisation and 
the substitution of a new authorisation for the one revoked. Any party with 
a sufficient interest can appeal to the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT) 
against the decision of the ACCC by virtue of section 101.176 
The inclusion of the phrase ‘public benefit’ was not without controversy. The 
Bill, which was redrafted numerous times, had initially used the term ‘public 
interest’, later changed to ‘public benefit’. It has been suggested this term had 
the ‘advantage of enabling a fresh line of interpretation by the Commission 
and Tribunal, unencumbered by previous judicial pronouncements on “public 
interest”’.177 The phrase ‘public benefit’ was subject to scrutiny, much of which 
remains relevant. The authorisation tests were said to be ‘couched in language 
of very high generality which will require substantial elaboration in the course 
of their interpretations by Courts and Commission’.178 It was also argued the 
use of ‘loose terms like “the public interest” invites conflict between economics 
and the law, by indicating government unwillingness to specify clear economic 
objectives for anti-monopoly policy’.179 
The discourses that shaped competition law in the United States did not 
operate as clearly in Australia. Two sets of discourse have been important in 
the United States: the Harvard and Chicago schools. While the Harvard School’s 
contribution is often identified as the link between Structure–Performance–
Conduct, the Chicago School sees the goal of antitrust as, distinct from other 
public policy objectives, rather focused on the promotion of market efficiency. 
The authorisation process, which brings public benefit into consideration, 
however, demonstrates the complexity of Australian competition policy. It was 
clear that economics was important to understanding the new legislation and 
economists and their writings had provided ‘reasoned intellectual foundations’ 
for it.180 Economists would have preferred the use of the term ‘efficiency’ in the 
Act, so that the notions of consumer welfare could be imported into the Act 
and the consumer welfare standard could have been adopted in determining 
the public benefit.181 Following on from this were concerns about the meaning 
of the word ‘public’. Could a benefit to a sectoral group, such as producers, 
constitute a public benefit or did the benefit have to apply to a wider group, 
such as consumers?182 Many of these concerns remain. 
176 For the meaning of ‘sufficient interest’ see Re Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] ACompT 1 (7 December 2001).
177 Allan Fels and Tim Grimwade, ‘Authorisation: Is it Still Relevant to Australian Competition Law?’ (2003) 
11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 187, 200.
178 Baxt and Brunt, ‘A Guide to the Act’, in Nieuwenhuysen (1976) 88, 98.
179 Geraldine Gentle, ‘Economic Welfare, the Public Interest and the Trade Practices Tribunal’, in 
Nieuwenhuysen (1976) 59.
180 Bannerman (1984) 165.
181 Gentle (1976) 76, 74. 
182 ibid, 73.
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Shifts in the Regulatory Landscape and to the 
Authorisation Process 
There have been many amendments to the authorisation provisions since 1974. 
The test as originally enacted required that, to be authorised, the conduct had 
to result in a substantial benefit to the public that would not otherwise be 
available. Recommendations of the Swanson Committee that the test be made 
less onerous were adopted and the Act was amended in 1977. 
The importance of the market economy in regulation became central to economic 
policy with microeconomic reform beginning in Australia in the 1980s, reflecting 
the growing importance of neo-liberal philosophies across the globe. A major 
stage of reform came as a result of the Hilmer Committee recommendations in 
1993. This resulted in Australia’s current national competition policy, which 
emphasises the importance of attaining a uniform national competition regime; 
deregulating government business entities in the pursuit of competitive 
neutrality; and, finetuning of the Act for improved efficiency, including the 
extension of the authorisation provisions to all forms of conduct with the 
exception of monopolisation.183 Amendments followed that extended the reach 
of the Act to state government businesses as well as the professions.184 The 
National Competition Council was created in 1995 to act as a policy advisory 
body to oversee the implementation of national competition policy.185
Further scrutiny of the Act was undertaken through the Dawson Committee 
in 2003, which conducted a review of the Act. This resulted in a number of 
amendments to the authorisation process, primarily aimed at making it more 
time efficient.186 These amendments included section 90(10), which deems that 
if the commission has not determined an authorisation within six months it is 
taken to have granted the application. Section 90(10A) provides that this may 
be extended by not more than six months, where the commission has prepared 
a draft determination and the applicant agrees to the extension. In 2007 further 
amendments introduced a new notification process under which small business 
could collectively bargain with large businesses without breaching the Act, 
if the total price of goods or services to be supplied is expected to be under 
A$3 million in a 12-month period. Further, under sections 93AA – 93AF, small 
businesses must notify the ACCC of the proposed collective bargaining and if the 
ACCC does not object within 14 days of the notification, the business which has 
notified the ACCC receives immunity from legal action in respect of collective 
bargaining for three years.
183 See Brunt (2003) 35.
184 Section 6(4) Trade Practices Act. 
185 See <http://www.ncc.gov.au>
186 The amendments to the merger authorisations are not discussed herein.
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3. Discourses on Public Benefit
This chapter looks at the place of ‘public benefit’ within Australian competition 
legislation, before examining each of the words ‘public’ and ‘benefit’ in the 
phrase and then considers the types of public benefits that the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has recognised over the last 
four decades. Although the interpretation of both these terms has not been 
straightforward, the ACCC has in practice recognised a wide range of public 
benefits based on promoting economic efficiency as well as those concerned 
with social and environmental benefits. The authorisation determinations can 
be understood in their political and social context. Whereas the 1970s were 
concerned with the shape of the post-industrial economy, when economic 
efficiency was becoming the dominant discourse, the 1980s was a period in 
which concerns about market reform came to the fore. In contrast, the concerns 
of the 1990s revolved around becoming a competitive nation, and more recent 
times have brought the challenges of sustainability and climate change. 
The Place of Public Benefit within the 
Authorisation Process
A standard introduction to the authorisation process is included at the 
beginning of each authorisation determination. It gives a brief outline of the 
test used to grant authorisation and spells out that the ACCC is able to grant 
businesses immunity from legal action for anti-competitive conduct where it 
is satisfied the public benefit from the arrangements or conduct outweighs any 
public detriment. The standard introduction also states that the ACCC may 
conduct a public consultation process, including inviting interested parties to 
lodge submissions outlining whether they support the application or not. After 
considering the submissions, the ACCC issues a draft determination proposing 
to either grant or deny the application. The introduction notes that, after the 
release of the draft determination, further written submissions on the draft 
determination may be lodged and the applicant or any interested party may 
request the ACCC hold a public conference. Following this the ACCC issues a 
final determination either granting or denying authorisation. In certain cases 
the ACCC may grant authorisation with conditions imposed, where these 
conditions aim either to sufficiently increase the public benefit or to reduce the 
public detriment. 
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
46
The three main tests for granting authorisation were discussed in the last chapter 
and they apply to different types of conduct. All require a consideration of the 
public benefit that arises out of proposed conduct. There are three main tests for 
granting authorisation and they apply to different types of conduct. All require 
a consideration of the public benefit that arises out of proposed conduct. The 
first test in section 90(6) states the ACCC can only grant an authorisation if it is 
satisfied this conduct is likely to result in a public benefit that outweighs the 
likely public detriment. It applies to proposed or existing agreements that might 
substantially lessen competition and proposed exclusive dealing conduct, with 
the exception of third line forcing. The second test specifically relates to cartel 
conduct and is contained in section 90(5A) and 90(5B). This test is identical to the 
first and the ACCC can only grant an authorisation if it is satisfied this conduct 
is likely to result in a public benefit that outweighs the likely public detriment. 
As this was only introduced in 2009, it is of limited relevance to the study 
of authorisations prior to this date. The third test, contained in section 90(8), 
applies to proposed exclusionary provisions, secondary boycotts, third line 
forcing, and resale price maintenance. This test requires that the authorisation 
be granted only if the ACCC is satisfied in all the circumstances the proposed 
conduct is likely to result in such a benefit that the conduct should be permitted. 
The ACCC sees these tests as very similar and has stated, while applying any test 
it will take all public detriments likely to result from the conduct into account 
when assessing whether the public detriment is outweighed by the likely public 
benefit.1 
Although the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT) has stated the tests in 
practice are essentially the same, it has at times taken a different view.2 In relation 
to the first test, the tribunal found in Re Australian Association of Pathology 
Practices Incorporated the test under section 90(6) limits the consideration of 
detriment to the public constituted by any lessening of competition resulting 
from the relevant conduct, whereas no such limitation is to be found in section 
90(8).3 In relation to the second test, under section 90(8), it has been suggested 
that because these types of conduct constitute per se offences, the test requires 
that public benefit be shown to exist in all the circumstances. In Re Rural Traders 
Cooperative (WA) Limited the tribunal stated that in this provision benefit to 
the public refers to a net or overall benefit after any detriment to the public 
resulting from the conduct has been taken into account.4 
1 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Authorisations and Notifications: A 
Summary (2007) 9; see also The South Australian Oyster Growers Association (2010) A91229, A91230, 26–28.
2 See Re Media Council of Australia (No2) (1987) ATPR 40-774, 48406, 48418. For an alternative view, see 
Re Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004) paras 92, 93.
3 Re Australian Association of Pathology Practices [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004) para 93; see also Re 
EFTPOS Interchange Fee Agreement [2004] ACompT 7, 9, in which the ACT agreed to this limitation.
4 Rural Traders Co-operative (WA) Ltd (1979) ATPR 40-110, 18123.
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The Meaning of the Words ‘Public’ and ‘Benefit’ 
The ambit of the ‘public benefit’ is not defined in the Act. There has been 
significant discussion of this term, the manner in which it can be distinguished 
from the term ‘public interest’ contained in the 1965 legislation, and how 
different it is from the common law concept of public interest. It has been noted 
that public benefit is a nebulous concept; there is also a lack of consensus over 
the meaning and scope of the term public interest, and this term is difficult to 
translate into a workable concept.5 The term ‘public interest’ under the 1965 
legislation was criticised as being too vague and the term ‘public benefit’ was 
to be preferred as being more specific.6 Further, it had been stated the term 
was only introduced into the statute as a result of pressure from large producer 
associations. This allowed the interests of investors, producers, exporters and 
the like to be taken into account rather than a more restricted group consisting 
mainly of consumers.7 
There has not been an overt acknowledgement by the ACCC within the 
authorisation process of the common law concept of ‘public interest’, nor the 
manner in which this term connects to the term public interest under the 1965 
legislation. The ACT has stated ‘public benefit’ should be given its widest 
possible meaning. In particular, public benefit was said to include ‘anything 
of value to the community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by 
society including ... the achievements of the economic goals of efficiency and 
progress.’8 
The ACCC has compiled a list of public benefits over the years. In its 
Authorisations and Notifications Guide of May 1999, the ACCC stated:
Public benefits recognised by the Commission and the Australian Competition 
Tribunal have included:
• Fostering business efficiency, especially when this results in improved 
international competitiveness;
• Industry rationalisation resulting in more efficient allocation of resources 
and in lower or contained unit production costs;
• Expansion of employment or prevention of unemployment in efficient 
industries or employment growth in particular regions;
5 See Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (2004) 3, 12.
6 Maureen Brunt, ‘The Trade Practices Bill: Legislation in Search of an Objective’ (1965) 41 Economic Record, 
357, 384; see also Geraldine Gentle, ‘Economic Welfare, the Public Interest and the Trade Practices Tribunal’, 
in John Nieuwenhuysen (ed), Australian Trade Practices: Readings (2nd ed, 1976) 59.
7 See Geoffrey de Q Walker, Australian Monopoly Law: Issues of Law, Fact and Policy (1967) 5; see also 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Restrictive Trade Practices Bill 1971, 9 November 1971, 1745, 
(Senator Lionel Murphy, New South Wales, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate).
8 Re Victorian Newsagency (1994) ATPR 41-357.
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• Promotion of industry cost savings resulting in contained or lower prices at 
all levels in the supply chain;
• Promotion of competition in industry;
• Promotion of equitable dealings in the market;
• Growth in export markets;
• Development of import replacements;
• Economic development, for example of natural resources through encouraging 
exploration, research and capital investment;
• Assistance to efficient small business, for example guidance on costing and 
pricing or marketing initiatives which promote competitiveness;
• Industry harmony;
• Improvement in the quality and safety of goods and services and expansion 
of consumer choice; and
• Supply of better information to consumers and business to permit informed 
choices in their dealings.’9
The ACCC has been consistent in referring to these factors in its decision-
making. More recently, however, other factors have been discussed. In 2001, 
the then chairman, Allan Fels stated: 
In addition, the Tribunal and the Commission have granted authorisations 
taking into account the following non-economic public benefits:
• the likely reduction in carbon, nitrous oxide and greenhouse gas emissions 
flowing from a joint venture’s upgrading of a sodium cyanide plant in 
Gladstone, Queensland …
• encouraging the provision of information on formula feeding from public 
health professionals that is accurate and balanced and not undermining the 
decision of women to breastfeed …
• promoting public safety by … ensuring the safe use of farm chemicals …
• fostering fitness and recreation …
• reducing the risk of conflicts of interest …
• facilitating the transition to deregulation …
• maintaining the viability of efficient firms. For example the Commission 
recognised in a recent draft decision that efficient private hospitals can 
provide benefits to the communities in which they operate …10
9 ACCC, Authorisations and Notifications, Guidelines, (May 1999), 7; see also Trade Practices Commission, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Authorisation [pamphlet] (March 1990).
10 Allan Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (Paper presented at the National 
Competition Policy Workshop, Melbourne, 12 July 2001) 7–8.
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Still other benefits have been recognised in the recent past. For example, 
countervailing power has been an important consideration in collective 
bargaining authorisations,11 while facilitating competition in deregulated 
industries has been raised by the applicants,12 and meeting Australia’s 
international treaty obligations13 has also been discussed as public benefits.
Other factors that may have once held sway are clearly not now regarded as 
public benefits. One example of this is the national champions argument that 
assisting a business develop in the national market will assist it perform in the 
international market. The contribution of Michael Porter in 1990 suggested 
this was a flawed argument and the ACCC has clearly endorsed these views, 
as illustrated in the Qantas authorisation determination, where it rejected the 
argument by Qantas that the authorisation would assist in making Qantas 
increase its global competitiveness.14
Causal Link—The Benefit Must Flow from the Conduct
An important step in authorisation determinations is to link the claimed benefits 
arising from the proposed conduct to that conduct. If the claimed benefits are 
likely to result irrespective of the proposed conduct, there would not be a case 
for authorisation. The early case of Shell illustrates this point.15 Here the Trade 
Practices Commission (TPC) refused a clearance application by petrol sellers 
to sell only their supplier’s petrol — approval for exclusive dealing contracts. 
Shell claimed the proposed exclusive dealing arrangement would result in 
single brand selling, which brought with it economies of scale in supply and 
transportation.16 The commission pointed out that single brand selling or 
solo trading is quite distinct from exclusive dealing contracts and concluded 
solo trading is likely to continue even if authorisation is not provided for the 
exclusive dealing contracts. The TPC pointed to the market structure at the time 
where multi-brand trading was negligible — of a total of 3636 service stations 
supplied by Shell, only 34 were multi branded and the remaining 3602 were 
solo trading. The causal link was not established and the TPC stated:
11 See Australian Hotels Association A90987, 1 March 2006; Inter-hospital agreement between Friendly Society 
Private Hospital Bundaberg A50019, 1 September 1999; Steggles Limited and Others A30183, 20 May 1998.
12 National Electricity Code A90652, A90653, A90654, 19 October 1998, and United Energy Limited A90665, 
A90666, A90670, 25 November 1998.
13 Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers Inc A90658, 26 August 1998.
14 Qantas and Air New Zealand A90862, A90863, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003, iii; Qantas A40107, 
A40108, A40109, 13 September 2006 38; Also see; Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 
(1990) 702; for a discussion of how Porter’s work fits with Australian competition policy, see Allan Fels, 
Chairman, Trade Practices Commission, ‘The Future of Competition Policy’, (Address to the National Press 
Club, Canberra, 10 October 1991).
15 Shell Company of Australia Ltd A4540, A4543, A4544, A4665, A4666, A4668 9 December 1975, (1976) 
ATPR, 35.220, 16,701.
16 ibid, 16,752.
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A fundamental point in the Commission’s analysis is that solo trading 
and exclusive dealing by contract are not the same thing. The contracts 
secure solo trading, but it would occur in most cases without them. 
To accept that solo trading is efficient is not to accept the necessity 
of exclusive dealing contracts, removing as they do for substantial 
periods even the possibility of fringe movements that could have some 
disciplinary effect and assist the working of the market.17
The commission has looked carefully in other cases for this causal link. In 
Australian Swimmers Association Incorporated the ACCC noted the association 
could establish a code of conduct and make a number of representations on 
behalf of its representatives without raising trade practices concerns.18 The 
ACCC was of the view that many of the claimed benefits would likely occur 
without the authorisation and, therefore, could not be overstated. Likewise in 
the NSW Department of Health authorisation, the NSW Department of Health 
sought authorisation for its policy of requiring private in-house patients in 
NSW public hospitals to obtain pathology services from the pathologists of 
NSW Department of Health.19 One of the benefits claimed was that the proposed 
exclusive agreements would result in private patients receiving a higher quality 
of service than they would if there were multiple pathology providers. The 
ACCC refused to accept this argument and stated the quality of service would 
be largely unaffected by the proposed policy. 
Similarly in the Australian Medical Association authorisation, although the 
ACCC allowed the authorisation it refused to accept some of the arguments put 
forth by the association for collective negotiation of fees.20 The ACCC stated all 
of the public benefits claimed would result without recourse to the collective 
negotiation of fees: these benefits included the creation of a framework for 
dialogue between the Health Commission and medical practitioners that would 
prevent public hospitals extracting monopsony rents, as well as the facilitation 
of continuing medical education programs and increasing the availability of a 
skilled medical workforce to rural populations.
In the Showmen’s Guild authorisation, the guild, which described itself as a 
trade association of showmen, applied for authorisation in relation to its code 
of conduct and rules of the guild, and also sought approval for collective 
negotiations with show societies. The ACCC stated it was not convinced the 
code, rules and collective bargaining arrangements greatly contributed to the 
development or maintenance of the circuit nor attendance at rural and regional 
17 ibid, 16,753.
18 Australian Swimmers Association Incorporated A90966, 26 April 2006, 8.
19 New South Wales Department of Health A90754–A90755, 27 June 2003, i.
20 Australian Medical Association Limited and South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association 
Incorporated A90622, 31 July 1998.
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shows and the circuit and current levels of attendance would be likely to exist 
even without these arrangements.21 The guild successfully demonstrated such a 
link by making further submissions to the commission. 
The BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd22 authorisation concerned a joint venture 
agreement to allow the parties to develop mining areas in the Pilbarra region 
with the aim of producing iron ore and delivering it to each of the parties to 
the joint venture. The ACCC accepted there was a necessary link between the 
exclusive dealing arrangement BHP had proposed and the benefits a pilot plant 
would bring. The ACCC asked whether there was a necessary link between 
the exclusive dealing agreements and the benefits BHP claimed for the pilot 
plant. It accepted BHP’s arguments about the public benefits that the projected 
pilot plant might bring and accepted BHP’s contention that these arrangements 
would be necessary before BHP could commit funds to the project. In the 
Qantas and Air New Zealand authorisation, however, the ACCC was not satisfied 
the proposed arrangements would lead to increased tourism given that the 
proposed arrangements were to result in higher prices and reduced capacity.23 
It had refused authorisation but its decision was later overturned by the ACT. 
The tribunal calculated the benefits differently, attaching different weights to 
benefits claimed and also on the basis that the market had altered in the time 
during the authorisation decision and the tribunal hearing.24
Benefits which accrue over the short to medium term are easier to establish 
than long-term benefits. The approach of the European Commission has been to 
discount such long-term benefits for this very reason.25 This issue has arisen in 
authorisation applications dealing with deregulated industries, and the ACCC 
has generally accepted that industry restructuring can result in facilitation 
of competition in the longer term. In such cases, although benefits over the 
longer term are more difficult to determine, the ACCC has accepted, in numerous 
decisions since 1998, that deregulation of regulated industries brings longer-
term public benefits, so has authorised conduct which facilitates deregulation.26
21 Showmen’s Guild of Australasia A90729, 25 February 2003, 39.
22 BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd A70015, A70016, A70017, 5 March 2003.  
23 Qantas and Air New Zealand A30220, A30321, A90862, A90863, 9 September 2003, para 13.215. 
24 Re Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004). 
25 Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty’ (2004) 
OJ C 101/08; Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance 
Which do not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (de minimis)’ (2001) OJ C 368/13 para 70.
26 Australian Dairy Farmers Limited A90966, 26 April 2006; Dairy Western Farmers A90961, 20 February 
2006; Inghams A90825, 22 January 2003; Steggles Limited and Other A30183, 20 May 1998; Australian Wool 
Exchange Limited A30185, 30 December 1998; Australian Stock Exchange Limited A90623, 1 April 1998. 
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Balancing Public Benefit and Public Detriment
Central to the authorisation process is the comparison of the public benefit and 
anti-competitive detriment likely to result from the proposed conduct. The 
tribunal in Re QCMA recognised this and stated a claimed benefit may in fact be 
judged to be a detriment when viewed in terms of its contribution to a socially 
useful competitive process.27 Similarly, in Re 7-Eleven Stores the tribunal stated 
the benefits and detriments are two sides of the one coin28 — both flow from the 
same conduct. Thus it is not only benefits that may be passed on to the consumer, 
but also detriments. It was noted in Re Coalition of Major Professional Sports that 
one of the results of the collective negotiations would be an increase in the costs 
of sports betting operators and that this increase in costs may well be passed on 
to consumers.29 The ‘future with or without’ test, discussed below, is used for this 
purpose and requires an examination of the detriments likely to flow from the 
proposed conduct, balancing those benefits against the detriments.
Further, there is clear recognition that, while in certain instances the market may 
fail to take into account all the costs and benefits involved in specific actions, 
the ACCC has a role to consider such externalities in its decision-making. In 
Agsafe the ACCC acknowledged its role in addressing market failure and stated 
arrangements that correct market failures may constitute public benefits. 
Here the authorisation application sought approval for the parties to enter the 
drumMUSTER program, which was an agreement to give effect to an industry 
waste reduction scheme for agricultural and veterinary chemical containers, as 
well as an agreement to charge a levy in order to finance the scheme. The public 
benefits were associated with environmental protection; the market failure 
being addressed was the inability of the market to deal with the environmental 
impact of product packaging and disposal.30
ACCC staff stated in interviews that any enquiry into the public benefit of 
proposed conduct would also take into account the likely detriments. This 
was seen as part and parcel of examining public benefit. These detriments 
were described as negative public benefits, public dis-benefits and also as dis-
efficiencies.31 In its decisions the ACCC has paid attention to four main categories 
of public detriment. These categories are a non-exhaustive list and examine 
both structural and behavioural factors. They include: consideration of whether 
there has been a reduction of the number of effective competitors in the market; 
examination of whether the conditions of entry have increased; examination of 
27 Re QCMA and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169, 186.
28 Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-357, 42645, 42683.
29 Coalition of Major Professional Sports A91007, 13 December 2006, i.
30 Agsafe Limited A90871, 18 September 2003, 16. 
31 Interview 8.
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whether the proposed conduct places any constraints on competition by market 
participants, affecting their ability to innovate effectively and conduct their 
affairs efficiently and independently; and any other detriments.
Similar to the list of public benefits, a list of public detriments has been compiled 
by the ACCC consisting of four main detriments:
• A reduction in the number of competitors 
• Increased conditions of entry 
• Constraints on competition by market participants affecting their ability to 
innovate effectively and conduct their affairs efficiently and independently 
• Other.32 
The empirical study on which this book is based examined the public detriments 
that the ACCC found existed or were likely to exist in the determinations studied. 
The public detriments, which were considered to be of minor importance, 
important and very important, were summed and used to plot Figure 3.1, which 
shows the importance attached to the different categories of public detriments 
has varied in the different years.
Figure 3.1: Four important categories of public detriments in ACCC 
authorisation determinations in the sample studied 1976–2006
Source: Author’s research.
32 Although the wording of public detriments varies from one document to another, it covers substantially 
the same detriments. See Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (2001) 9–11 and ACCC, 
Authorisations and Notifications, Guidelines (1991), 5.
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The most commonly cited public detriment category in every year, except 2003 
was the constraints placed on competition. For example, the United Energy 
authorisation was concerned with the proposed rules of a scheme that breached 
sections 45 and 47 of the Act. It involved agreements that had the effect of 
determining energy generation capacity, controlling the secondary trading of 
energy generation capacity and the basis for calculating seller’s commission 
under the scheme.33 The ACCC noted the scheme placed restrictions on 
participants’ rights to trade in the market and this could be viewed as a public 
detriment. The ACCC also noted, however, that the underlying rationale was 
to enhance the level of confidence in the scheme, which would outweigh the 
public detriments.34
In Tasmanian Forest Contractors Association Limited, the association was 
seeking authorisation for collective bargaining between members, who carried 
out silviculture, harvesting and transport services, and a number of wood 
companies. The ACCC noted collective bargaining may lessen competition 
between forest contractors and reduce their incentive to innovate in respect 
of the services they provide; adversely affect the incentive to pursue more 
effective work practices; and also may reduce the incentive of forest contractors 
to differentiate themselves from their competitors.35 The empirical study of 
decisions in 1984 and 2003 demonstrated that the ACCC referred to a number of 
the pubic detriments in its decision-making. In the NSW and ACT Newsagency 
System authorisation determination, the detriments cited by the ACCC included 
reduction in the number of competitors, increased conditions of entry, and 
constraints on competition by market participants.36 
In certain instances, it is difficult to determine precisely the magnitude of the 
benefits and detriments and to decide whether the public benefit will clearly 
outweigh the detriment. In many such cases, conditions have been used to 
restrict the extent of the public detriment. For example, in Australian Hotels 
Association (NSW), which involved authorisation of collective bargaining 
arrangements, the ACCC was concerned about the constraints placed on 
competitors and granted authorisation subject to conditions that restricted 
the size of, and information sharing between, the negotiating committees.37 
Similarly, an appeal process within the code of conduct can be aimed at reducing 
the anti-competitive detriment. In Recruitment and Consulting, although the 
ACCC stated the code was unlikely to restrict competition in the employment 
services industry, the businesses being inappropriately penalised for breaching 
the code expressed concern about the process. The ACCC stated the existence 
33 United Energy Limited A90665, A90666–A90670, 25 November 1998.
34 ibid, 13.
35 Tasmania Forest Contractors Association Limited A90973, A90974, 22 February 2006, 34.
36 NSW and ACT Newsagency System A30092, 26 April 1984.
37 Australian Hotels Association (NSW) A90837, 27 June 2003, i.
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of a fair and transparent disciplinary process is an important means of reducing 
the detriment that could flow from the code of conduct.38 It acknowledged it 
could not in the circumstances impose conditions because the public benefits 
outweighed the public detriments. The ACCC did, however, point to some ways 
in which the code could be improved, for example, by taking steps to bring 
the code to the attention of the public, including workers who might deal with 
its members; allowing third parties to lodge and progress complaints; and by 
publishing the full details of breaches of the code on the association’s website. 
So, for example, in Agsafe, the condition imposed required information on the 
industry association website to be corrected in order to clearly indicate that it 
would be possible to procure accreditation through alternative sources.39
The Future With or Without Test
The ‘future with or without test’ is used in the process of balancing the public 
benefit and the public detriment. In Re John Dee (Export) Pty Ltd, the ACT 
discussed the place of the future with or without test and stated:
[F]irst it is for the parties seeking authorisation to satisfy the Tribunal 
that benefit to the public is likely and that there will be sufficient public 
benefit to outweigh any likely anti-competitive detriment;
secondly, since the likely benefits and detriments to be considered 
are those that would result from the proposed conduct, the Tribunal 
is required to consider the likely shape of the future both with and 
without the conduct in question; and 
thirdly, that task will generally entitle an understanding of the 
functioning of relevant markets with and without the conduct for which 
the authorisation is sought.40
The future with the authorisation is sometimes referred to as the factual and 
the future without the counterfactual.41 Recently, the counterfactual has been 
used consistently in the determination of authorisations.42 In BHP Billiton, the 
application was straightforward and the applicants listed the counterfactual 
as primarily involving economic and trade issues. They argued that if the 
agreement did not go ahead the result would be decreased sales, decreased trade, 
38 Recruitment and Consulting Services Association A90829, 24 September 2003, 26. 
39 Agsafe (2010) A 91234, A 91242, A91243 and A91244, 30.
40 John Dee (Export) Pty Ltd (1989) ATPR 40-938, 50206.
41 Stephen Corones, Competition Law in Australia (3rd edn, 2004) 145.
42 This is more common in the determinations after 2003. See, for example, BHP Billiton (2003/1); 
Association of Australian Bookmaking Companies Inc A30243, 9 July 2006, where a standard paragraph is used 
to explain the counterfactual.
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and decreased opportunities to expand export markets.43 The ACCC accepted 
alternative arrangements to the proposed agreement in the authorisation were 
unlikely. In Golden Caskets Agents Association Ltd the ACCC applied the 
counterfactual to a collective negotiation agreement. In this case it considered 
whether the proposed anti-competitive agreement, which was the subject of 
the authorisation, is/was likely to allow the association to negotiate with the 
corporation and stated:
[W]hile making no comment in relation to the extent to which the 
corporation engaged in a consultative process in the past, the Commission 
also believes that in general, parties are more likely to actively engage in 
effective consultation whether it is subject to a more formalised collective 
bargaining process rather than ad-hoc or less formal processes.44
Some applications are much more complex, however, raising multiple alternate 
counterfactuals for consideration. One example with such multi-counterfactuals 
was the Qantas Air New Zealand authorisation application in which five 
counterfactuals were considered. The counterfactual that is relied on to establish 
the authorisation will have a significant impact on the calculation of the net 
benefits.45 
If the applicant is unable to satisfy the ACCC that the future with the 
authorisation is preferred, the authorisation will not be approved. In Tasmanian 
Forest Contractors, the ACCC denied authorisation for collective negotiations 
on the basis that the proposed benefits were likely to continue without 
authorisation approval. The ACCC asserted the likelihood of individual forest 
contractors continuing to engage in individual bargaining with their respective 
wood companies, and this would accrue the proposed benefits.46 Similarly, 
in Re Australian Hotels Association, the ACCC stated that, even without the 
authorisation, the standard form contracts offered by service providers that 
allowed for limited input from the Australian Hotels Association would continue 
to allow for certain benefits to continue.47 Likewise, in Re BHP Billiton the ACCC 
pointed out that due to other projects beginning in the area, certain benefits 
would occur even if the joint venture proposal was not authorised.48
43 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd A90981, A90982, A90983, 1 February 2006, 9. Also see BHP Billiton 
Minerals Pty Ltd A70015, A70016, A70017, 5 March 2003 which deal with similar issues.
44 Golden Casket Agents Association Ltd A90853, 4 September 2003, 18 or para 8.31.
45 Qantas, Air New Zealand A30220–A30222, A90862, A90863, 9 September 2003, 70-88.
46 Tasmanian Forest Contractors Association Limited A90973, A90974, 22 February 2006, 31–32.
47 Australian Hotels Association A90987, 1 March 2006, 14.
48 BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd A70015, 5 March 2003, 28.
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The Ambit of ‘Public’ in ‘Public Benefit’
The predecessor to the Trade Practices Act contained the phrase ‘public interest’. 
This was criticised as a key weakness of the legislation and it was stated public 
interest is couched in terms of benefits to sectional interests as well as competition 
and good economic performance.49 An alternative approach consisting of three 
parts was proposed by Maureen Brunt, comprising a statement that, prima 
facie, the public interest is served by effective competition; an affirmation of 
the primacy of consumers or users; and a specification of ways in which the 
standard of living of the community may be raised through non-competitive 
organisation.50 Much of the debate surrounding the term ‘public benefit’ in the 
1974 legislation still involves these fundamental issues.
Since the inception of the Trade Practices Act, the meaning of the word ‘public’ 
in the phrase ‘public benefit’ has been widely discussed.51 Another way of 
framing this issue is to ask to whom does the term ‘public’ refer? There are two 
main views on this issue and both are well represented in Australia. The first 
is that the public can mean any group of citizens, being producers, consumers 
or shareholders, with no distinction made between these sectional or sectoral 
interests. All that has to be established is that there is a sum benefit experienced 
by some sector of the public. This group would advocate the use of the total 
welfare standard to determine public benefit. The second view defines the 
public as consumers and a benefit being passed on to producers or shareholders 
would not constitute a public benefit. This group would prefer one of a number 
of other standards to be used in determining whether there is a public benefit, 
with most references being to the consumer welfare standard.
Private/Sectional Benefit 
Some economists, including Robert Officer and Philip Williams, have argued 
that any benefit to a sector of the public should be recognised as a public benefit 
for the purposes of determining whether authorisation should be granted. This 
interpretation focuses on efficient resource allocation rather than optimal wealth 
distribution, with no distinction made between public and private benefits.52 
The proponents of this view argue the Trade Practices Act should not concern 
itself with specifying the group that will benefit, a process that is related more 
to wealth distribution. They further argue assessments about the interpersonal 
49 Brunt (1965) 384.
50 ibid, 384–85.
51 For a discussion of the possible difficulties the interpretations may present, see, for example, Gentle, 
(1976) 59, 73–75. 
52 Robert Officer and Philip Williams, ‘The Public Benefit Test in an Authorisation Decision’, in Megan 
Richardson and Phillip Williams (eds), The Law and the Market (1995) 157–66, 160–61.
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comparisons of utility that consumers or producers may derive are subjective 
and should not be undertaken by those administering the Act.53 Their arguments 
have been summarised in Pareto improvement terms:
The essential test … should be whether there is an improvement in the 
use of society’s resources. If, for instance, a prospective merger would 
result in efficiencies, reflected in lower costs and higher profits, that 
is, sufficient to establish the existence of public benefit. ‘Insofar as the 
producer is better off and the consumers are no worse off we have a 
Pareto improvement’.54
Once Pareto improvement is identified, these economists would dismiss wealth 
distribution or equity arguments on the basis that there would be reason to 
believe a benefit to a poor producer might be better than requiring the benefit 
to reach a rich consumer. But, because it is difficult to determine whether wealth 
transfers are actually taking place, it is preferable to resist using the Trade 
Practices Act to achieve such ends. Rather, they would suggest such ends could 
be met by transparently using redistributive legislation, such as tax laws, with 
which the Trade Practices Act does not concern itself. This school favours the 
use of the total welfare standard in determining authorisations, which considers 
the economy-wide welfare effects of an authorisation. It requires that a person 
may be made better off without others being made worse off. This standard is 
focused on efficiency.55 
In cases where the conduct does not involve consumers, the ACCC has accepted 
public benefits where they accrue to a private grouping. In the Port Waratah 
decision, the ACCC granted authorisation to conduct that would only result in 
benefits to the producers of Hunter Valley coal and where the two main producers 
would be the recipients of the maximum savings. In this the applicants sought 
authorisation for a coal distribution system to be loaded onto ships with ease in 
order to enable export to overseas markets.56 
Where consumers are involved, however, the ACCC has often looked for at least 
some of the benefits to reach consumers. In doing so the ACCC is, contrary to 
the view of economists discussed above, distinguishing between public and 
private benefits. In NSW Department of Health, authorisation was sought by 
NSW Health for its policy requiring private in-house patients in NSW public 
hospitals to obtain pathology services from the pathologists of NSW Department 
of Health. The ACCC concluded the transfer of five million dollars from persons 
with health insurance to taxpayers caused by NSW Health’s pathology policy 
53 ibid, 163.
54 Brunt (1965) 329. 
55 Officer and Williams (1995) 160–61. 
56 Port Waratah Coal Services Ltd A90906–A90908, 9 July 2004. 
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was not a public benefit for the purposes of this authorisation.57 Authorisation 
was granted on other grounds, however, subject to conditions. In Re Australian 
Hotels Association (NSW) the ACCC considered the transfer of benefits from one 
group to another may not constitute a public benefit. In this case the ACCC noted 
that gains transferred between businesses may not in themselves constitute a 
public benefit and stated: ‘a mere transfer between businesses (that is a transfer 
of money from wagering and broadcasting service providers to hotels) is 
not itself a public benefit’.58 A similar decision was reached in Re Australian 
Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated, although the ACT did not 
agree, and focused its attention on the analysis of anti-competitive conduct 
generating financial benefits and on economic efficiency considerations.59 
 There have been a number of cases where the private benefit occurs alongside 
other benefits to a wider section of society. One such example is the Australian 
Medical Association Limited and South Australian Branch of the Australian 
Medical Association Incorporated authorisation, which related to a fee-for-
service agreement between the association and public hospitals in South 
Australia.60 Here, although the authorisation was granted, the ACCC refused 
to accept some of the benefits claimed on the grounds that ‘the public benefits 
claimed would result in private benefits that would enhance the welfare or 
bargaining position of the applicants, but would not result in broader public 
benefits’.61 
The ACCC has stated it does not consider a sectoral interest to necessarily 
constitute a public interest and it is looking for something more comprehensive 
in application. The TPC in its first annual report addressed whether a private 
benefit could be considered to fall within the definition of public benefit. Here 
it stated that the test would require benefits to the public and not merely to the 
applicant or some other limited group.62 The ACCC, and the TPC before it, has 
been consistent in requiring that there be some benefit beyond that accruing 
to the members of an association.63 In the Hardware Retailers Association of 
WA authorisation, the members of the association applied for authorisation to 
circulate price lists to its members. The TPC denied this authorisation application 
on the basis the ‘applicant’s submissions ... emphasise benefits to the Association 
57 NSW Health A90754, A90755, 27 June 2003, para 7.69, 28.
58 Australian Hotels Association A90837, 27 June 2003, 55. 
59 Re Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004). 
60 Australian Medical Association Limited and South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association 
Incorporated A90622, 31 July 1998.
61 ibid, 50. The authorisation was granted, however, on the grounds that it would facilitate the profession’s 
full compliance with the Act.
62 See Re QCMA (1976) 25 FLR 169, 182. 
63 See, for example, National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council (1976) ATPR (Com) 35-200, 16533; 
ACI Operations Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR (Com) 50-108; BMW Australia Limited (1998) ATPR (Com) 50-001; see 
also Qantas/New Zealand A30221, 9 September 2003.
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member retailers themselves rather than the public as a whole’.64 In the Qantas 
and Air New Zealand authorisation the applicants sought authorisation for 
arrangements which coordinated activities related to scheduling and pricing 
for all passenger and freight services on all Air New Zealand and Qantas flights 
within and departing from New Zealand. The applicants argued the public 
benefits included increased tourism and cost efficiencies. The ACCC refused 
to accept the benefits as claimed on the basis that ‘the benefits accrue to the 
Applicants and their shareholders rather than consumers in an environment 
where there is reduced competition’.65 
Thus, the general rule is that the ACCC has expected evidence of a benefit to a 
group that is wider than a small sectoral group. In a number of instances, however, 
the ACCC has granted authorisation to cases where only a private benefit is 
evident; in Medicines Australia, the ACCC stated the code of conduct that was 
the subject of the authorisation generated a public benefit, but the size of the 
public was not clear.66 Similarly, in the Australian Tobacco Leaf Corporation 
authorisation, the ACCC was sympathetic to the tobacco growers who were 
moving from a highly protected industry to a competitive environment and 
who were the main beneficiaries of the authorisation.67 In Pareto improvement 
terms, as long as there is a net benefit the conduct would be authorisable. 
In the Qantas and Air New Zealand authorisation application, the ACCC was 
not willing to accept that the claimed benefit, which would go primarily to 
shareholders, constituted a public benefit.68 On appeal to the tribunal, the 
applicants to the authorisation argued benefits flowing to every member of the 
community, including both final consumers and producers, should be treated 
alike.69 The ACCC argued that unless benefits were shared with consumers it 
was inappropriate to characterise such benefits as ‘public’ benefits, except in 
exceptional circumstances. The ACCC submitted that the tribunal should treat 
the cost savings that would accrue to the applicants and their shareholders as 
deserving little or no weight.70 In allowing the appeal, the tribunal rejected 
the ACCC’s argument, saying the ‘public verses private’ dichotomy in relation 
to cost savings claimed by the applicants ‘is of fairly limited assistance when 
examining public benefits’ and proposed:
64 Hardware Retailers Association A7102, 31 March 1976; (1976) ATPR 35-200, 16540.
65 Qantas, Air New Zealand and Air Pacific Limited A30220–A30222, A90862, A90863, 9 September 2003. 
Note this decision was overturned on appeal by the ACT [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004).
66 Medicines Australia Ltd A90779–A90780, 14 November 2003, para 5.52.
67 Australian Tobacco Lead Corporation Pty Ltd A90532, (1992) ATPR 50-124.
68 Re Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004) para 8.
69 ibid, para 168.
70 ibid, para 169.
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Does it fall in to the category of ‘anything of value to the community 
generally’? If it does, what weight should be given to that benefit, 
having regard to its nature, characterisation and the identity of the 
beneficiaries of it?71 
Benefit to a Wider Group
Perhaps the widest group to whom the public benefit would flow is the 
world at large. This issue was discussed in the Association of Fluorocarbon 
Consumers and Manufacturers Inc.72 Here the commission accepted benefits 
would flow from the agreement between association members to limit the 
imports of hydrochlorofluorocarbon gases and to cease the importation and/
or manufacture of disposable containers of hydrochlorofluorocarbon and 
hydrofluorocarbon gases. The commission stated a scheme or arrangement that 
contributed to limiting the risk to human health and the improvement of the 
environment would benefit the Australian public and may also benefit the total 
world population and environment. It is worth noting, however, that the Trade 
Practices Act deals only with conduct within Australia. This also applies to 
the recognition of public benefit as reflected by the ACT decision in Qantas, 
in which the benefits flowing to foreign shareholders were not considered to 
benefit the public.73
A narrower notion of the public was canvassed in Re Coalition of Major 
Professional Sports. The applicants claimed that members of the professional 
sports groups bargaining collectively would result in benefits to the wider 
community, including the development of sport at a grassroots and amateur level, 
increasing Australia’s profile in the international community through publicity 
generated by the sports, as well as focusing on the ongoing promotion of sports.74 
The ACCC accepted these public benefits and granted the authorisation.
Usually economists espousing a flow through of benefits are not looking at such 
a wide definition of the public. Rather, they concentrate on the consumer when 
discussing the ‘public’. They have argued that any saving of resources must be a 
public benefit. Brunt, however, stated that cases where the benefit is not passed 
on to the consumer may raise other concerns about market conduct and market 
structure:
It is not the immediate distribution of benefits that is important but 
their durability. If a merger, for example, gives rise to rationalisation 
71 ibid, para 188.
72 Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers Inc A90658, 26 August 1998. Further, there 
was considerable government support for this authorisation.
73 Re Qantas Airways Limited [2004] T 9 (12 October 2004), paras 770.
74 Coalition of Major Professional Sports A91007, 13 December 2006, 10.
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economies and higher profits that are not ‘passed on to the Consumer’, 
one needs to ask why this is so. It may well reflect enhanced market 
power which would need to enter the benefit-cost equation; and there 
may well be a question of whether the lack of competitive pressure will 
allow productivity gains to be lost  —  ‘benefit’ to be dissipated  —  in 
slackness and rent-seeking activities.75
The consumer welfare standard is the most popular standard advocated by those 
who require that for something to constitute a public benefit the beneficiaries 
must be the consumer.76 The consumer welfare standard is the sum of the 
individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods and services.77 This 
standard looks at the effect of a proposed authorisation on the consumer. It 
disregards the benefits experienced by producers or shareholders and would 
require the benefit to be passed on to consumers. 
Although a clear adherence to either the consumer welfare standard or the total 
welfare standard is not evident in the authorisation determinations, the ACCC 
has required at least some of the public benefits be passed on to the consumer 
in a number of determinations.78 For example, in Re Showmen’s Guild, the guild 
argued that the code for which it sought authorisation resulted in providing 
assistance to small businesses as well as providing greater bargaining power 
to such businesses. The ACCC stated it would be more likely to recognise the 
transfer of bargaining power as a public benefit if such benefits were felt by 
consumers, for example, in the form of lower prices to consumers or the reduced 
prospect of unconscionable conduct.79 
The Role of ‘Pass-through’
Strict adherence to the consumer welfare standard has been proposed as 
appropriate for determining public benefit. Rhonda Smith has recalled Brunt’s 
comments, discussed above, on consideration of market structure and proposed 
the following rationale:
75 Brunt (1965) 330. 
76 The other standard is the balancing weights standard and further discussion of the alternative standards 
is contained in Chapter 6. 
77 Rhonda Smith, ‘Authorisation and the Trade Practices Act: More about Public Benefit’ (2003) 11 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 21, 23. See also John Fingleton and Ali Nikpay, ‘Stimulating or 
Chilling Competition’, Office of Fair Trading (United Kingdom), (Paper presented at Competition Enforcement 
Conference, 25 September 2008) <http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/speeches/2008/0808> at 25 October 2008.
78 See Qantas A90962, A90963, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003.
79 Showmen’s Guild A90729, 25 February 2003, 41.
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Failure to pass-through some of the savings indicates that the firm/s 
concerned is/are not subject to much competitive pressure. Consequently, 
the efficiency gains anticipated from the conduct may not eventuate or 
may be dissipated subsequently.80
Pass through occurs when there is evidence to show that the public benefit 
can be passed on to a consumer or a group of consumers. The empirical work 
in this book indicates that both the concept and the term ‘pass-through’ have 
become more accepted in ACCC determinations since 1998. The decisions since 
this time deal with the extent to which the claimed benefits may flow through 
to the consumer. In the decisions studied, the term and concept are used in 
the determinations from 1998,81 whereas they are not referred to at all in the 
commission decisions of 1976 and 1984.82 
Pass-through will be easier to show in cases of economic efficiency that can 
result in cost savings, as illustrated in Southern Sydney Regional Organisation 
of Councils. The ACCC acknowledged that there were a number of public 
benefits that could arise from the proposed conduct although it was clear that it 
was easier to quantify the pass-through where there were cost savings involved. 
The ACCC noted: ‘improvements in business efficiency and the reduction of 
operational and transaction costs to councils are likely to result in lower prices to 
ratepayers’.83 The ACCC also noted, however, the other benefits of the proposed 
conduct were environmental in nature, reducing the amount of waste diverted 
to landfill, but this was not clearly connected to pass-through in the decision.
The reported decisions at times clearly refer to the term pass-through and at other 
times the reference is oblique. For example, in Australian Hotels Association, 
pass-through was an important factor in the commission’s decision, stating it 
was of the view that ‘any increase in PubTAB commissions or reduction in SKY 
Channel fees is unlikely to result in a significant pass-through to consumers’.84 
The ACCC in its determinations has not required all the benefits to reach the 
consumer, as illustrated in the Australian Society of Anaesthetists, where the 
ACCC accepted that improved efficiency represents a public benefit even where 
the full extent of the benefit is not passed on to the final consumer.85 
80 Smith (2003) 28.
81 For example see: Job Futures Market A90625, 8 April 1998; Australian Medical Association Limited 
A90622, 31 July 1998; Qantas A90962, A90963, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003; Inghams A90825, 22 
January 2003; Australian Direct Marketing Association A90876, 29 June 2006; Coalition of Major Professional 
Sports A91007, 13 December 2006; Australian Performing Rights Association (APRA), A90918, A90919, 
A90922, A90924, A90925, A90944, A90945, 8 March 2006.
82 Some reference to the concept is made in Real Estate Institute of Australia A90396, 25 June 1984; 
International Air Transport Association A3485, 31 October 1984.
83 Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils A90980, 25 January 2006.
84 Australian Hotels Association A90987, 1 March 2006, 58.
85 Australian Society of Anaesthetists (2000) ATPR 50-278, 53412.
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The empirical study collates the instances where pass-through was referred to 
in either the authorisation application or determination. Figure 3.2 shows that 
the discussion of pass-through has increased over time by charting the times the 
concept of pass through is raised in the ACCC determinations included in the 
sample study. It also illustrates the number of cases where the authorisation was 
granted when pass-through was raised — which means that the authorisation 
was successful. Figure 3.2 also shows the number of cases where the concept of 
pass through was raised although the authorisation was not granted. This figure 
shows that, in 1976, the concept of pass-through was discussed in five cases 
although the authorisation was not granted. In 2006 and 2010 pass-through was 
raised in 23 and 24 decisions respectively and authorisation was granted in all 
these cases. This may point to an improvement in the types of guidelines being 
issued to the authorisation applicants as well as growing familiarity with the 
concept itself. 
Figure 3.2: Evidence of pass-through in ACCC authorisation 
determinations in the sample studied 1976–201086
Source: Author’s research.
In the Qantas and Air New Zealand authorisation, the ACCC looked at whether 
the benefits were going to be passed through to the consumer and stated it was of 
the view that benefits to a particularly small group or segment of the community 
may be regarded as benefits to the public. The ACCC expressed reservations 
about the extent of public benefit claimed and stated any cost savings were 
likely to accrue to shareholders rather than consumers in an environment of 
reduced competition.87 These reservations were rejected by the ACT on appeal, 
where it rejected the consumer welfare standard.88 As discussed earlier, the ACT 
86 Evidence of pass-through was noted by the ACCC as present in these decisions.  
87 Qantas A90962, A90963, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003.
88 Re Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004), paras 190, 191.
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clearly did not require the consumer welfare standard to be satisfied for public 
benefit to be established. There was no need for the benefits to directly accrue 
to the consumers and the tribunal stated efficiencies need not ‘necessarily be 
passed on to consumers’, although ‘gains that flow through only to a limited 
number of members of the community will carry less weight.’89 In the later 
decision the ACCC clearly stated that not all of the efficiency benefits accrued 
from the proposed arrangements would be benefits to Australians.90 
Following the tribunal decision in Qantas and Air New Zealand, the ACCC 
demonstrated a clearer approach to the consideration of public benefit. For 
example, in the Australian Performing Rights Association (APRA) authorisation, 
the ACCC recognised that the cost savings generated by the proposed 
arrangements would be passed on to APRA’s members who were also composers, 
many of whom were overseas composers. Nevertheless the ACCC, referring to 
the Tribunal’s decision in Qantas and Air New Zealand, accepted that ‘while 
carrying less weight than if they were passed through, significant weight 
should be accorded to those cost savings the benefits of which accrue primarily 
to APRA’s members’.91
The need for some of the benefits to reach the consumer was acknowledged in 
Australian Hotels Association. Here it was argued that allowing the collective 
bargaining process to be authorised would mean more favourable terms of trading 
for members and this would result in reduced costs, which would be passed on 
to the consumers in the form of enhanced service standards and facilities.92 It 
was pointed out that in this case the benefit that reached the consumer was 
likely to be low. The ACCC, however, accepted this as a public benefit, stating 
the revenue gains to the hoteliers, who were the association members, would 
likely be passed through in the form of lower prices and improved quality to 
consumers as a result of the collective bargaining process and that this would 
constitute a public benefit.93 In Australian Brick and Blocklaying Training 
Foundation Limited, the ACCC recognised that authorising the implementation 
of a levy on the sale of bricks intended to fund a national training program to 
alleviate shortages of skilled bricklayers would have a number of benefits. It 
would result in increases in efficiency in an industry that is ‘the engine room of 
the Australian economy’ and would contribute to increases in the gross domestic 
product, which would provide public benefits that spread across the economy.94 
Thus the benefits would be to a wider cross-section of the public. 
89 ibid, 50.
90 Qantas A40107, A40108, A40109, 13 September 2006, 35.
91 APRA A90918, A90919, A90922, A90924, A90925, A90944, A90945, 8 March 2006, 689.
92 Australian Hotels Association A90987, 1 March 2006, 19.
93 Australian Hotels Association (NSW), A90837, 27 June 2003, 58, para 11.63.
94 Australian Brick and Blocklaying Training Foundation Limited A90993, 26 April 2006, 30.
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At times, pass-through may be an easy issue to resolve, as illustrated by the 
Myer authorisation where the ACCC stated: ‘given the large number of Myer 
stores ... this is likely to result in significant discounts across a range of retail 
goods being offered to consumers across Australia’.95 Smith, however, pointed 
out pass-through can be difficult to determine and stated the ‘problem for the 
ACCC in assessing the claimed efficiency gains from conduct is that it cannot 
know whether the benefits will be enduring’.96 Such information can only be 
gained by monitoring the conduct after the authorisation has been given. 
This was discussed by both the ACCC and the ACT in the EFTPOS decision. 
This application concerned the use of Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale 
(EFTPOS) transactions. Such transactions are facilitated by a debit card that 
is issued by the cardholder’s financial institution and linked to a transaction 
account. The cardholder is able to use this card to purchase goods and withdraw 
cash at various merchants. The cardholder is able to use the merchants’ electronic 
network to instruct the merchant’s financial institution to transfer the funds 
and this information is communicated via the merchant’s financial institution 
to the customer’s financial institution. In 2003 there were approximately 63.8 
million EFTPOS transactions processed at a value of A$4 billion. The proposed 
authorisation application was an agreement among card-issuing financial 
institutions and merchant-acquiring financial institutions to set the interchange 
or wholesale fees for EFTPOS transactions to zero. As such an agreement was 
likely to attract the price-fixing provisions under section 45A, the authorisation 
application was necessary. Both the ACCC and the ACT pointed out that pass-
through was not easy to identify. In the draft determination, the ACCC was 
concerned competition between card-issuing institutions may not be sufficient 
to ensure a lasting pass-through of the savings by card issuers to cardholders, 
and that the barriers to entry erected from this agreement may inhibit 
potential new entrants that may also adversely affect the benefits that could 
be passed on to the wider community.97 Following the draft determination, 
the Australian Payments Clearing Association, among other interested parties, 
made submissions to the ACCC. The ACCC reassured the association that access 
reform would be introduced and this would reduce the barriers to entry for 
new entrants. Further, the submissions made by the applicants on ways in 
the authorisation would enhance disclosure and the details of the information 
campaign it proposed to implement also reassured the ACCC that the benefits 
may be passed on to the consumers. Following these submissions the ACCC 
granted authorisation.
95 Myer Stores Limited A400082, 4 June 2003, 17. See also reauthorisation of the same conduct in 2008: Myer 
A91091, 3 September 2008, 13.
96 Smith (2003) 28.
97 Re EFTPOS Interchange Fee Agreement [2004] ACompT 7 30.
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The ACT, however, did not agree with the ACCC’s decision stating the ‘Proposed 
Agreement is likely to have the effect of passing on to the general body of 
consumers an annual cost of $170 million, or a substantial part thereof’.98 The 
ACT queried the evidence on pass-through from the banks, stating: ‘while 
all economists who gave evidence agreed with the general proposition that 
the proposed change in interchange fees is likely to be passed on (at least to 
some extent) to cardholders, the evidence presented leaves us quite unable 
to make any worthwhile finding as to the quantification’.99 The tribunal also 
pointed out there was unlikely to be any audit of the claim so pass-through 
to consumers would be guaranteed.100 This again raised the issue of how all 
types of public benefit claims can be monitored. In the Cuscal101 and Suncorp 
Metway102 applications, authorisation was granted for an agreement not to 
charge cardholders for ATM transactions operated by network members, which 
was an attempt to reduce the competitive disadvantage that smaller financial 
institutions faced when competing with larger financial institutions with broad 
networks.
There are other reasons that make the pass-through requirement difficult to 
establish in all cases. This includes cases where the conduct is at an intermediate 
stage of production, which does not necessarily translate to consumer 
savings. In the Agsafe authorisation, which dealt with a code of ethics among 
distributors of veterinary and agricultural chemicals, the commission noted that 
the distributors’ additional costs of compliance with the code were likely to be 
passed on to retailers and, in turn, consumers, as well as the benefits of having 
more information and safer handling processes.103 In other cases, however, the 
effect on the consumer is more difficult to establish, as illustrated in the Port 
Waratah and Newcastle Port Corporation authorisation decisions. The applicants 
in Port Waratah were granted authorisation for a capacity distribution system. 
This system aimed to match the amount of coal that was marked for export by 
Hunter Valley coal producers to the capacity of the rail and port systems to 
transport coal onto vessels in the port of Newcastle. The commission granted 
authorisation on the basis of benefits that would accrue to the producers of coal 
in the Hunter Valley. There was no evidence, however, that these benefits would 





101 Cuscal Limited & Ors (2010) A91175–A91177.
102 Suncorp Metway Limited & Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Limited (2010) A91232–A91233.
103 Agsafe (2010) p 24, 28.
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It does not seem practical to attempt to measure exactly how much of 
the benefit and detriment flows through to the Australian community. 
The Commission therefore proposes to discount both the benefit and 
detriment equally.104
Furthermore there may be cases where the effect on the consumer is difficult to 
determine or where no consumer is affected. This occurs in deregulated markets 
such as primary producers of chickens or milk. These parties have sought to 
gain authorisation for collective bargaining to work as a group in entering 
contracts with wholesale purchasers of their product. In such instances, the end 
consumer is absent and pass-through may be difficult to gauge. In the Victorian 
Farmers Federation105 the chicken-meat growers sought authorisation for 
collective bargaining with nominated processors of the produce. Here the effect 
on the consumer was not at issue. Rather it was the ability of the small growers 
to bargain that was important and pass-through was not directly relevant.106 
In the Surgeons authorisation, the proposed conduct involved processes within 
the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, which provides for the training of 
surgeons and the provision of continuing training programs. The benefits to the 
consumer from having qualified surgeons were recognised, although the issue 
of pass-through did not receive extensive attention.107 Similarly in Refrigerant 
Reclaim Australia Ltd, the public benefit in the form of improvement to the 
environment was acknowledged, although the actual pass-through, however 
obvious, was not discussed.108 And, in Central Queensland Local Government 
Association, the applicant argued that authorisation would benefit the ratepayers 
through a streamlined and consistent waste and recyclables collection service,109 
and the ACCC stated that it was reasonable to expect that the benefits would be 
passed on to the taxpayer,110 although there was little discussion of how this 
might happen.
Many professional groups, including lawyers, accountants and architects, have 
submitted applications dealing with codes of conduct and the incorporation of 
ethical practices or fixed fees. These have been authorised in the past by the 
ACCC on the basis that, even though such conduct may be anti-competitive, 
there are overall benefits in promoting ethical practices via self-regulation 
104 Port Waratah A90906–A90908, 9 July 2004, 62. See also Newcastle Port Corporation A91072–A91073, 
23 April 2008. 
105 Victorian Farmers Federation (2010) A91214.
106 See also Tasmania Farmers & Graziers Association (2010) and Premium Milk (2010) A91236 22 in which 
pass-through was examined.
107 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003.
108 Refrigerant Reclaim Australia Ltd A90854, 7 May 2003. See also The South Australian Oyster Growers 
Association (2010).
109 Central Queensland Local Government Association (2008) A91087 13 August 2008, 22.
110 See also Council of the Municipality of Ashfield (2008) 24.
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mechanisms.111 In the example of the Australian Medical Association Limited 
and South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association Incorporated 
authorisation, the ACCC accepted the main public benefit was facilitation of the 
application of the Act to the medical profession. Although it is clear there would 
be a long-term benefit from the wider application of the Act and the creation of 
a more competitive marketplace, a pass-through of the benefit to the consumer 
within a specific time frame may be difficult to achieve. Price agreements 
between health practitioners in one workplace has also been authorised on the 
basis that consistency of fees, continuity of patient care and predictability of 
cost is a benefit to consumers.112 Similarly, authorising a code of conduct that 
gives improved information and complaints avenues to consumers is working 
at empowering different stakeholders in the marketplace, although it may be 
difficult to assess whether the information or complaints procedures will be 
more frequently accessed by consumers.113
The European Commission has recognised some of these problems and noted 
such qualitative efficiencies may be harder to pass-through to the consumer 
in the short term and, where these consumer gains may occur sometime in the 
future, the value of future gains must be discounted.114 It also stated it would 
consider allowing agreements on research and development that may result in 
the creation of a safer product to proceed because the safety effects are greater 
than the anti-competitive effects. It acknowledged that any such assessment 
necessarily requires value judgment/s and it is difficult to assign precise values.115
The above discussion illustrates the many complexities involved in interpreting 
the term ‘public’. Much discussion has turned on who the public is that benefits 
from the proposed practices. Can it mean one slice, section or part of the 
community or does the benefit have to flow to a wider group, requiring evidence 
of pass-through? Decisions of the ACCC after 1998 show a greater awareness 
of the concept, and reference to the concept in deliberations is common. The 
approach has become even more consistent in the 2006 deliberations included 
in the empirical study, following from the tribunal’s decision in Qantas, where 
the ACCC indicated its acceptance of benefits accruing to both sectoral groups 
as well as the wider public. 
111 See Fels, ‘Regulation, Competition and the Professions’ (Paper presented at the Industry Economics 
Conference, Melbourne, 13 July 2001). 
112 Australian Dental Association A91094, A91095, 10 December 2008, 20, 22. See also CALMS Ltd A91092, 
30 June 2008. 
113 See Generic Medicines Industry Association Pty Ltd A91218 & 91219, 3 November 2010; see Vision Group 
Holdings Limited (2010) A91217.
114 ACCC, Authorisations and Notifications, Guidelines (1991) 88.
115 ibid, 16, para 103.
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The Meaning of ‘Benefit’ in ‘Public Benefit’
The starting point for any examination of the word ‘benefit’ within the phrase 
public benefit is the seminal decision in Re QCMA, where the tribunal opted for 
the widest possible conception of public benefit and stated: 
This we see as anything of value to the community generally, any 
contribution to the aims pursued by the society including as one of 
its principal elements (in the context of trade practices legislation) the 
achievement of the economic goals of efficiency and progress. If this 
conception is adopted, it is clear that it could be possible to argue in 
some cases that a benefit to the members or employees of the corporations 
involved served some acknowledged end of public policy even though 
no immediate or direct benefit to others was demonstrable.116 
This issue was discussed in the Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd decision, where the 
ACT agreed that it would be a public benefit to encourage small businesses 
as long as they were efficient.117 Here the applicants were seeking a review of 
the commission decision that refused authorisation. The facts concerned the 
system of distributing newspapers in Victoria: a system that granted territorial 
monopoly rights to newsagents. This system had been authorised previously. 
The tribunal’s decision clearly emphasised the economic goals of efficiency and 
progress. The tribunal returned to the QCMA decision and the phrase ‘efficiency 
and progress’. It stated:
The assessment of efficiency and progress must be from the perspective 
of society as a whole: the best use of society’s resources. We bear in mind 
that (in the language of economics today) efficiency is a concept that is 
usually taken to encompass ‘progress’: and that commonly efficiency 
is said to encompass allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency.118 
The emphasis is on economic efficiency, which is viewed as the ultimate goal of 
competition policy.119 The ACT was of the view that the distribution system was 
protecting inefficient business (the newsagent and the subagent) and preventing 
other small business (convenience stores) from entering this market.120 In 
116 Re QCMA (1976) 25 FLR 169, 182–83.
117 Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, Australian Association of Convenience Stores Incorporated and Queensland 
Newsagents Federation (1994) ATPR 41-357, 42645, 42681.
118 ibid, 42677.
119 Allan Fels and Tim Grimwade, ‘Authorisation: Is It Still Relevant to Australian Competition Law?’ (2003) 
11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 187, 200. See also Re Qantas Airways Limited [2004] A Comp T 9 
(12 October 2004) para 157, in which the tribunal stated that it is necessary to consider the significance of 
allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency.
120 Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-357, 42645, 42681.
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considering the arrangements, the tribunal stated that they had resulted in ‘past 
losses to the community incurred through suppression of competition [that] 
can never be recovered’.121 The tribunal also stated the proposed arrangements 
resulted in ‘efficiency losses through the non-achievement of available scale 
economies, and lost consumer choice’.122 It stated these losses could be lessened 
by hastening the advent of fully competitive market forces. The tribunal 
proposed different transition periods to a deregulated market for the different 
types of arrangements under consideration.
In the Re Australian Wool Growers Association Ltd decision, the tribunal was 
asked to review a decision by the ACCC granting authorisation to the Business 
Rules, which included rules providing for quality control procedures, market 
reporting, and research and development activities of the Australian Wool 
Exchange Limited. The tribunal was satisfied that the rules of the marketplace 
provided a properly supervised and controlled facility for the offering of wool 
for sale in a competitive environment. The tribunal pointed out:
It is a benefit to the public that there be administered, as part of the 
process of offering of wool for sale, a system of quality control and 
quality assurance whereby quality standards can be propounded, 
supervised and controlled by an entity such as the Wool Exchange 
whose standards and controls are recognised throughout the industry.123
It is clear that the term benefit has been construed widely.
The Role of Economic Efficiency in Examining 
Public Benefit
At various times throughout history, antitrust policy has had different 
objectives.124 This is no less true of Australia than elsewhere.125 Today the 
primary objective of competition law and policy is the attainment of economic 
efficiency. The importance of economic theory is largely unquestioned. This 
is attributable partly to the failure of previous regulatory regimes to deliver 
results, partly to the soured relationship between business and the regulators, 
and partly because it promises a value-free, objective way to allocate resources. 
Dominance of economic theory in regulation is unlikely to fade. 
121 ibid.
122 ibid.
123 Re Australian Wool Growers Association Ltd [1999] ACompT 4 (3 September 1999), para 72. 
124 See Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Antitrust — Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We 
Coming From? Where Are We Going?’ (1987) 62 New York University Law Review 936, 942–47.
125 See Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘The Accommodating Act: Reflections on Competition Policy and the Trade 
Practices Act’ (2002) 20(1) Law in Context 34. 
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Economic efficiency arguments have been important in the assessment of public 
benefit since the inception of the Act.126 Both the commission and the tribunal 
have emphasised the importance of economic efficiency, while recognising that 
there is room for other matters to be considered.127 The Hilmer Committee, which 
reported on Australia’s national competition policy in 1993, heard a number 
of submissions calling for a change in the authorisation process whereby 
economic efficiency would become the sole objective of the Act. Although the 
committee saw a place for both economic efficiency and other considerations, 
it recommended the legislation be amended to confirm that, in determining 
questions of public benefit, primary emphasis should be placed on economic 
efficiency considerations.128 
Table 3.1 divides the commonly claimed public benefits into three categories: 
economic efficiency benefits, non-economic efficiency benefits and those 
benefits that could fall into either category.
Table 3.1: Public benefits claimed in authorisation determinations
Clearly efficiency-
based benefits
Benefits which may overlap 
efficiency and non-efficiency
Benefits not justified 
on efficiency grounds
Economic development Facilitating competition through 
deregulation
Promotion of equitable 
dealings in the market
Industry rationalisation Enhancement of safety and quality 
of goods and services
Promotion of certain types 
of conduct* (usually in the 
Other category)
Expansion of employment  
in efficient industries
Steps to protect the environment Professional ethics
Promotion of cost savings 
resulting in lower prices at  
all levels in the supply chain
Attainment of industry harmony Access to dispute 
resolution
Growth in export markets Supply of better information to 
customers and suppliers to permit 
informed choices
Enforcement of codes
Benefits flowing from 
import substitution
Promotion of employment in 
particular areas
National security
Promotion of competition  
in the industry
Development of import replacements Meeting Australia’s treaty 
obligationsProviding countervailing power
* See, for example, ACT Law Society (1977) ATPR (Com) 16615 where the then TPC considered the potential 
risks of conflicts of interest arising from solicitors acting for both the vendor and purchaser in land sales. 
See also the recognition of self-regulation schemes and codes of conduct that are recognised as public 
benefits: Australian Tyre Dealers and Retreaders Association (1994) ATPR (Com) 50–162.
Source: Author’s research.
126 See Joseph Griffin and Leeanne Sharp, ‘Efficiency Issues in Competition Analysis in Australia, the 
European Union and the United States’ (1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journal 649, 649.
127 See Fels and Grimwade (2003) 200–01; see also Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition 
Policy in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, National Competition Policy [Hilmer Report] (1993) 97.
128 [Hilmer Report] (1993) 99.
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It has been generally accepted that non-efficiency benefits have a place in the 
consideration of public benefit.129 Fels commented that a broader range of 
social benefits are recognised by the ACCC under Australian law than under its 
European Union counterpart.130 It is unclear, however, how much weight should 
be given to non-efficiency factors or these factors alone could become the basis 
of a successful authorisation application. Emphasising allocative efficiency and 
couching public benefits in the language of economics has made it difficult to 
develop a thorough approach to such non-efficiency benefits. 
Furthermore, the important autonomous and active role attributed to the 
consumer in the market, and idea about consumer rationality have been criticised 
as too simplistic and not reflecting real market behaviour. Behavioural economists 
have queried the proposition that market failures result only from information 
failure and have proposed that market failures are caused by consistent biases 
in consumer behaviour.131 There are numerous biases that have been recognised; 
the most relevant to this discussion is the ‘endowment effect’. This is an attempt 
to explain the observed phenomenon that, irrespective of price, some consumers 
will be loyal to a particular supplier. Behavioural economists suggest that, rather 
than approaching the market with a firm shopping list, consumers’ behaviour 
can be influenced by the environment in which the market transaction is taking 
place, where issues, such as stress of changing suppliers, may determine the 
decision.132 
All these contributions query the underlying assumptions of neoclassical 
economics and the uncritical acceptance of economic efficiency as the central 
focus. They advocate a move away from a ‘one size fits all’ policy to one that 
allows for greater scrutiny and assessment. 
Economists have also queried the viability of one competition policy for 
all economies. Early on, in the mid eighties, Richard Caves identified the 
connection between small economies and concentrated markets,133 while Porter 
discussed the varieties of institutions and environments that can shape the 
competitiveness of a nation.134 More recently, Michal Gal suggested that the 
competition policy of large economies may not necessarily suit small economies. 
129 See ACCC, ‘Submission to the Commission of Inquiry: Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Dawson Review)’ (June 2002) 247; for an alternative view on the decline of non-efficiency 
factors, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘The Goal of Competition Law 
and Policy and the Design of Competition Law and Policy Institutions’, (2004) 6 (1 and 2), Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development Journal of Competition Law and Policy 78, 79.
130 Fels, ‘The Public Benefit Test in the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (2001) 3.
131 OECD (2004) 13. Also see: Department of Treasury, ‘Consumer Policy in Australia: A companion to the 
OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit’, <http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/consumer_policy/downloads/
Companion_to_OECD_Toolkit.pdf>
132 See OECD (2004) 14.
133 Richard Caves, ‘Scale, Openness and Productivity in Manufacturing Industries’, in Richard Caves and 
Lawrence Krause (eds), The Australian Economy: A View from the North (1984) 313.
134 See Porter (1990).
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She identified Australia as a small economy because most of its industries are 
characterised by concentrated market structures.135 Gal argued small economies 
have key characteristics that should be taken into account before determining 
the design of competition policy. Three of these key characteristics are worth 
noting in relation to Australia. First, unlike large economies, a firm’s ability to 
realise economies of scale and adopt efficient technologies is limited in small 
economies.136 Second, high levels of industrial concentration are likely to affect 
the contestability of local or regional markets in small economies. Third, high 
barriers to entry, such as Australia’s tyranny of distance, may create supply 
constraints on factors of production or inhibit institutional and technological 
change, whereas in large economies this may result in new and better products.137 
Gal argued that these key factors place a handicap on economic performance. 
Market forces alone cannot achieve efficiency in such cases, and ‘competition 
policy in a small economy is thus a critical instrument with respect to determining 
domestic market structure and conduct and the intensity of competition.’138 For 
Gal, it is important that competition policy in small economies has clear goals, 
namely economic efficiency goals that should not be sacrificed for broader policy 
objectives.139 She identified small business protection for special mention and 
stated such protection would be to the detriment of consumers. Gal argued that, 
even if small business protection were a chosen goal, competition law should 
not be the method employed to achieve this.140 Many economists would agree 
with this view. Officer and Williams argued that, whereas Part V of the Trade 
Practices Act addresses the wealth distribution issue, Part IV is directed at the 
promotion of efficient or optimal resource allocation.141 They emphasised the 
need for Part IV of the Act to focus clearly on economic efficiency. 
So, what does Gal propose as the appropriate design for competition policy in 
Australia? She argued small economies should reject per se rules and opt for ‘a 
rule that balances possible efficiency enhancements against the anti-competitive 
effects of cooperative conduct and allow arrangements in which the benefits 
offset the restrictions on competition.’142 On this basis it would appear that the 
design of Australia’s authorisation process, which allows for such examination, 
is appropriate. 
135 Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies (2003) 55, 2. See also Fels and Grimwade 
(2003) 196–98, for a discussion of size and competition policy in Australia.
136 ibid, 45.
137 ibid, 20–21.
138 ibid, 21, 45.
139 See ibid 50–51. Gal examines the multiplicity of goals in the competition statutes of Israel and Canada. 
140 ibid, 48.
141 Officer and Williams (1995) 157–66.
142 Gal (2003) 174.
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Gal, however, would focus more on efficiency benefits than other benefits. Gal 
accepts that, in certain circumstances, non-economic considerations may be 
relevant and cited as an example for the need to produce a particular product 
within jurisdictional borders for security reasons. An Australian instance that 
falls into this category The Council of Textile and Fashion Industries Limited 
authorisation decision, where the parties sought an authorisation of the 
arrangements in the Homeworkers Code of Practice.143 Here the ACCC accepted 
many non-efficiency benefits, such as social and health benefits, as public 
benefits. They included: lessening the risk of exploiting a less advantaged group; 
the provision of information to homeworkers to understand their entitlements; 
and the provision of improved working conditions for such workers and their 
families. Another, earlier authorisation decision that raised interesting issues 
was the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association decision.144 Here, the 600 
growers of poppies used in the production of opiate alkaloids, which are in 
turn used in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products, sought authorisation 
for collectively negotiating with the purchasing companies. The growing and 
production of the poppies, in accordance with the Single Convention of Narcotic 
Drugs 1961, is required to be closely controlled and supervised and Tasmania is 
the only state where the growing of poppies is permitted. The TPC approved the 
authorisation, recognising that it was important for the international market to 
perceive Australia as a secure and reliable source of supply.145 
Environmental concerns were the reasons for the authorisation of the Australian 
Retailers Association Code of Practice for the Management of Plastic Bags, which 
was a voluntary code for the managed reduction and recycling of lightweight 
plastic bags.146 
There have been many who have emphasised the need for public benefits to 
be efficiency-based. Frances Hanks and Philip Williams discuss the different 
approaches of the commission and the tribunal in determining vertical restraint 
cases, and express similar views.147 Their preference is for greater emphasis to 
be placed on current economics literature. Reviewing the decisions in the area, 
they point to the number of benefits that may result from vertical restraints, 
including the provision of cost-minimising dealership services in the case of 
franchises; the prevention of free riding on services of the manufacturer in the 
case of exclusive supply contracts; and, the existence of an optimal number of 
143 The Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia and The Council of Textile and Fashion Industries 
Limited A90722–A90725, 31 July 2000; The Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia and The Council 
of Textile and Fashion Industries Limited (2000) ATPR (Com) 50-282, 53,544.
144 Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association A80001 (86) ATPR (Com) 50127, 55447.
145 ibid, 50127, 55447, 55453.
146 Australian National Retailers Assn Limited (2008) determination. 
147 Frances Hanks and Philip Williams, ‘The Treatment of Vertical Restraints Under the Australian Trade 
Practices Act’ (1987) 147 Australian Business Law Review 147 165–67.
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
76
dealerships in the case of resale maintenance agreements.148 They are critical 
of the commission for not giving adequate consideration to these factors and 
conclude that, while ‘the authorities are generally well-informed when analysing 
anticompetitive detriment, their analysis of offsetting benefit to the public would 
be enhanced if arguments were presented along the lines of the contemporary 
economics literature.’149 Such an approach would add transparency to decision-
making. There are, however, no straightforward definitions of efficiencies as 
David Round stated:
Efficiencies come in all shapes and sizes. Real ones and pecuniary ones; 
scale and scope economies; technical and allocative efficiencies; dynamic 
efficiencies and x-efficiencies; short run and long run efficiencies; and 
production, management, distribution, buying and retailing efficiencies. 
Some are harder to achieve than others … Some are easier to measure, 
others are not. Some are mere wealth transfers. Some are of more lasting 
value to society than others. Do we count them all equally? Should we? 
Are they all of equal value to society?150
Clearly, adopting a limited view of efficiencies would make recognition of non-
efficiency-based benefits difficult, as quantifying benefits, such as environmental 
protection or the facilitation of collective bargaining, is a fraught task (discussed 
below). Alternatively, there is no justification for ignoring efficiency benefits 
without a considered coherent analysis capable of withstanding close scrutiny.
Benefits Recognised in the Commissions’ 
Determinations
There has been a good deal of emphasis placed on economic efficiency arguments 
in interpreting the phrase ‘public benefit’. Economic discourse, however, can 
only partly explain a nation’s competition law. For example, Peter Hall and 
David Soskice emphasise the role of informal rules and understandings that 
lead actors to coordinate on one outcome rather than another, when both are 
feasible in the presence of a specific set of formal institutions.151 The manner in 
which firms coordinate their activities are different in a liberal market economy 
148 See ibid, 167–68.
149 ibid, 168.
150 David Round, ‘W(h)ither Efficiencies: What is in the Public Interest? A Commentary on “The Great 
Efficiencies Debate in Canadian Merger Policy: A Challenge to Economic Foundations of Canadian Competition 
Law or a Storm in a Teacup?” by Michael Trebilcock’ (Paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Workshop of 
the Competition and Policy Institute of New Zealand, Auckland, 13–15 August 2004) 2–3.
151 Peter Hall and David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in Hall and Soskice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism: The International Foundations of Comparative Advantage (2001), 13.
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from a coordinated market economy.152 Likewise, efficient antitrust principles in 
a liberal market economy will be different from those in a coordinated market 
economy in the context of institutions, such as intellectual property rules or 
industrial policy, which regulate the activities of firms. Michael Porter, Hirotaka 
Takeuchi and Mariko Sakakibara further illustrate this in their study of how 
Japan could increase its competitiveness, in which they argue that, rather than 
becoming a clone of American capitalism, the answer may lie with developing a 
distinctly Japanese conception of competition.153 Joseph Stiglitz added that a free 
market cannot solve all problems and argued ‘one-size-fits-all’ economic policies 
can damage rather than help countries with unique financial, government and 
social institutions. He argued that the answer for public institutions may be 
for them to become more responsive to their constituents.154 Thus, reliance on 
economic efficiency alone may not be appropriate, and the context in which the 
conduct is occurring needs careful attention. 
Reliance on economic discourse is also fraught for other reasons. Maher referred 
us to the difficulties faced by an enforcement agency in adopting one particular 
theoretical perspective, when alternatives are available.155 Experts can present 
lucid, well-honed arguments for either side. Furthermore, although it is best for 
legislation to be focused towards clear goals, such as efficiency, there is always a 
contest between what is thought to be more manageable and what is thought to 
be more important. The Trade Practices Act 1974 has tried to do many things in 
the past and, even today, it is concerned with the protection of small business 
in ways that may be at odds with the goal of economic efficiency.156 The question 
as to whether it should do so is, however, unresolved.
Interviews with ACCC staff indicate that, whereas staff in the past relied more 
on experience in determining public benefits, there had been a greater focus 
on efficiency benefits in the recent past. Two past staff members were critical 
of relying solely on economic evidence, one saying that, in many instances, 
economic evidence can be flawed and cited the Australian Meat Holding case as 
an example.157 In this case, several economists proposed different definitions of 
the market, which prompted the court to state: ‘economics is a study of human 
behaviour and to determine the boundary of a market, one has to consider what 
people do and what they are likely to do in the market  — in fact and not merely 
152 Hall and Soskice classify the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
Ireland as liberal market economies, whereas Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Sweden among others are classified as coordinated market economies. See ibid, 19.
153 See Michael Porter, Hirotaka Takeuchi and Mariko Sakakibara, Can Japan Compete? (2000).
154 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (2000). 
155 Imelda Maher, ‘Regulating Competition’ (Paper presented at the Regulating Law Conference, Canberra, 
21 March 2003) 3.
156 See Nagarajan (2002) 52–56; see also Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
The Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business (2004).
157 Interview 9.
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
78
in economic theory’.158 Another current staff member stated that efficiency 
arguments of mainstream economists have begun to dominate the authorisation 
process, excluding issues of vulnerability of consumers.159 Yet another current 
staff member stated that the diversity in economic thought, particularly that of 
behavioural economics, was not a large part of the deliberation of the ACT and 
rarely considered by the parties involved in the authorisation application or 
parties making submissions in relation to the application.160
Seven figures have been plotted to illustrate the changing emphasis given to the 
16 public benefits considered by the ACCC in determining authorisations.161 In 
each of these figures (Figure 3.3 to Figure 3.9), the public benefits are plotted 
in order of their importance, except for the category of ‘Other’, which appears 
below all of the named public benefits. The number in brackets on the vertical 
axis, next to each of the public benefits, refers to the number of determinations 
in which authorisation was granted out of the number where it was accepted 
as present by the commission. On the horizontal axis, each public benefit is 
coded and the summed weights are plotted. The figures in this section collate 
the public benefits which were weighed as important and very important in 
compiling the data. A number of different benefits may have been considered in 
the same determination.
Figure 3.3 deals with 1976, when only nine out of the 35 determinations 
studied were successful in gaining authorisation, which may say much about 
the operation of a regulatory agency in it neophyte stage than is possible to 
discuss in this article. This period was also a time when domestic policy was 
being shaped by postwar economic growth and increasing global business. 
The need to dismantle a protectionist regime, reconsider the cost of high tariff 
protection162 and restrictive trade practices in terms of competitiveness could 
no longer be ignored.163 All these factors are reflected in the shape of the Trade 
Practices Act, which contained far-reaching anti-competitive measures.
158 Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1989) ATPR 40-932, 51105.
159 Interview 8.
160 Interview 10.
161 Benefits that are ‘very important’ in the determination are given a weighting of 4 and those that are 
‘important’ are given a weighting of 3, ‘minor importance’ a weighting of 2, ‘minimal importance’ a weighting 
of 1. Where a benefit is seen as occurring twice, such as cost savings in administration and production, it is 
weighed twice. These weights are added together and the sum of these weights is used to plot Figures 3.3 to 
3.7. Further discussion of the weighting used is discussed in Chapter 1 and the Appendix.
162 The Vernon Report of 1965 was instrumental in this shift in thinking, recommending several changes 
to the Tariff Board to place a greater emphasis on the broader economic consequences of the protection of 
particular industries.
163 John Warhurst and Jenny Stewart, ‘Manufacturing Industry Policies’, in Brian Head and Allan 
Patience (eds), From Fraser to Hawke: Australian Public Policy in the 1980s (1989) 160; Fred Brenchley, Allan 
Fels: A Portrait of Power (2003) 24; Margot Hone, From Industry Assistance to Productivity: 30 Years of ‘the 
Commission’ (2003) <www.pc.gov.au/about-us/history 2, 10–11>.
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Figure 3.3: Summed weights of important public benefits and the number 
of cases in which authorisation was granted by the TPC in the sample 
studied in 1976 (9 out of 35 determinations were successful) 
Source: Author’s research.
Nevertheless it was, in many respects, these provisions that were incompatible 
with the structure and operation of the Australian national economy where 
protectionism was the result of the long-standing tradition of state intervention 
to both improve the efficiency of capitalism and temper its adverse impacts. 
Protection of the manufacturing sector to maintain local industry and labour-
market regulation in the form of the industrial arbitration system which 
guaranteed a minimum wage had historically formed the basis of what is 
described as the ‘Australian Settlement’, where an accommodation between 
capital and labour had become the settled policy of the Australian state.164 
The Trade Practices Act was the culmination of a growing recognition of this, 
marking the end of bipartisan support for high levels of protection.165 Figure 3.3 
reflects the concerns with promoting efficient business as a means of increasing 
competition, where ‘fostering business efficiency’ was successfully argued in 
six determinations.166
The 1980s saw a continuing shift from interventionist policies towards a greater 
emphasis on market forces.167 The Liberal government under Malcolm Fraser 
(1975–83) had introduced economic rationalism into policy debate, raising 
awareness of the need for economic reform. It began deregulation of the financial 
system and, in January 1983 foreign banks were permitted to apply for an 
164 See: Jenny Stewart, ‘Industry Policy’, in Brian Galligan and Winsome Roberts (eds), The Oxford Companion 
to Australian Politics (2007) 275 and Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Australian Settlement’, Galligan and Roberts (2007), 56–57.
165 See: Ray Steinwall, ‘The Legislative Basis of the Act’, in Steinwall (co-ordinator), Butterworths Australian 
Competition Law (2000) 9. See also Brenchley (2003) 28.
166 See, Permanent Building Societies A5077, A21277, A21289, A21290, A21291, (1976) 17/11/1976.
167 Within the Liberal Party, the ‘new right’ emerged in the 1970s, and included those who subscribed to 
what became known in Australia as ‘economic rationalism’, a reworking of classical laissez-faire economics. 
They were the Australian equivalent to the Thatcherites in Britain and the Reaganites in the United States 
(www.primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/fraser/in-office.aspx at 26 January 2012).
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Australian license. The Hawke government was elected in 1983 and continued 
with deregulation of the financial system and with the floating of the Australian 
dollar, which saw economic reform firmly placed on the agenda.
Figure 3.4: Summed weights of the important public benefits and the 
number of cases where authorisation was granted by the TPC in the 
sample studied in 1984 (33 out of 35 determinations applications were 
successful)
Source: Author’s research.
Of the nine categories of public benefit featured as important in 1984, Figure 3.4 
illustrates that ‘industry rationalisation’ was most prominent having been argued 
successfully as an important public benefit in all 13 determinations. Cost savings 
was accepted as an important public benefit in seven determinations while the 
promotion of competition in industry was accepted in six determinations, and 
fostering business efficiency in three determinations. This reflects the stronger 
focus on economic efficiency factors in the commission’s decision-making. 
This is offset by the recognition of the promotion of equitable dealings as an 
important public benefit in six determinations, all of which dealt with ethical 
conduct within professional codes of conduct.168 For some time, professional 
ethics provisions had been acknowledged as an important regulatory tool 
by the commission. It recognised the value of industry codes and stated that 
codes are an effective and market-sensitive mechanism for delivering the 
detail of consumer protection rules, provided they are appropriately framed, 
administered and monitored.169 The importance of consumer protection was not 
forgotten, with eight determinations accepting supply of better information as 
an important public benefit and, likewise, eight accepting the enhancement of 
quality and safety. 
168 For example, see Real Estate Institute of Qld (1984) A90396 and A30397, 1984; Society of Auctioneers 
and Appraisers Inc A60009; Canberra/Queanbeyan Panel Beaters Group A90371; Stock and Station Agents 
Association of NSW A90400.
169 ACCC, ‘Submission to the Financial System Inquiry (Wallis Inquiry)’, September 1986.
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By the 1990s, microeconomic reform had come to dominate the economic 
and political agenda and the associated policies included the removal of tariff 
protection, corporatisation of government utilities and business enterprises, the 
deregulation of industries including the airline industry and the abolition of the 
two-airline policy and introduction of competition to the telecommunications 
sector, all of which fostered competition. The governments’ focus was on 
promoting economic growth in a global market.170 The national competition 
policy (NCP) of 1995, an outcome of the Hilmer Report, involved the application 
of the principles of competition policy to the states and territories171 and resulted 
in amendments to the legislation extending the application of competition 
to include the professions, public utilities and government enterprises.172 By 
the mid 1990s, competition policy had ‘reached right into the bowels’ of the 
Australian economy173 and forged a cultural change in Australian business.174 
An important tool of this reform was the Productivity Commission, established 
in 1998 to operate as the government’s principal advisory body on all aspects of 
microeconomic reform. Not only did this body replace the Industry Commission, 
but its broader charter gave greater emphasis on productivity performance of 
industry.175 Its primary role was to identify obstacles to improved productivity 
in particular sectors, having ‘due regard to the important relationships between 
improved use of resources in one sector and the rest of the economy’.176 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the importance to the various public benefit factors in 1998 
where 29 out of 35 determinations were authorised. The bar graphs reflect the 
continuing concern with the promotion of competition in industry, fostering 
business efficiency and cost savings. Promotion of competition and fostering 
business efficiency were important factors alongside the non-economic efficiency 
public benefit of enhancement of quality and safety. Wider application of 
competition laws across all sectors saw the commission faced with authorisation 
applications from bodies that were previously exempt. Although promotion 
170 For a discussion of the Labor party’s changing economic agenda, see Kevin Davis, ‘Managing the 
Economy’, in Brian W Head and Allan Patience (eds), From Fraser to Hawke: Australian Public Policy in the 
1980s (1989) 66–109, 68. 
171 Against the backdrop of major microeconomic reforms, in October 1992, Prime Minister Paul Keating 
commissioned an independent inquiry into national competition policy, chaired by Professor Frederick 
Hilmer, which reviewed the structural inefficiencies that limited the effectiveness of competition law and 
prevented development of a competition regime across all sectors. 
172 Among the reasons identified in favour of developing a national competition policy was that Australia 
was now ‘for all practical purposes a single integrated market as the economic significance of state and 
territory boundaries diminished’, Hilmer Report (1993) xvii–xviii.
173 Brenchley (2003) 18.
174 ibid, 8.
175 Hone (2003) 87, 94.
176 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 7720, cited in Hone (2003) 93.
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of competition was advocated as a public benefit in many applications, it was 
not always accepted, as demonstrated by the Australian Performing Rights 
Association determination.177 
Figure 3.5: Summed weights of the important public benefits and the 
number of cases where authorisation was granted by the ACCC in the 
sample studied in 1998 (29 out of 35 were successful in 1998)
Source: Author’s research.
The focused efforts described in the last section to build a competitive market 
economy remained a priority in the first half of the last decade. The Productivity 
Commission had been asked to assess the impact of the NCP reforms and, in 
2005, it reported that productivity and price changes would be likely to raise 
Australia’s GDP by around 2.5 per cent.178 The increasing use of modelling and 
quantification in order to enable assessment of policy was being promoted by 
government and used by regulators.179 
177 Australian Performing Rights Association (1998), A30192 and A30193.
178 See Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Inquiry Report No 33, 
Canberra, February 2005.
179 Interview 2; see also Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth of Australia, Office of 
Best Practice Regulation (OBPR), ‘Cost Benefit Analysis’, which emphasises cost benefit analysis. <http://
www.finance.gov.au/obpr/cost-benefit-analysis.html> at 15 October 2008.
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Figure 3.6: Summed weights of the important public benefits and the 
number of cases where authorisation was granted by the ACCC in the 
sample studied in  2003 (31 out of 35 were successful in 2003)
Source: Author’s research.
Figure 3.7: Summed weights of the important public benefits and the number 
of cases where authorisation was granted by the ACCC in the sample studied 
in 2006 (32 out of 35 applications were successful in 2006)
Source: Author’s research.
This is reflected in the 2006 determinations in Figure 6 where the promotion of 
industry costs savings was more commonly cited in these ACCC determinations, 
featuring in 10 out of 35 determinations in that year. This factor is linked to 
economic efficiency and has the advantage of being open to quantification, which 
was steadily increasing in Australia following the necessity for government 
departments and regulators to improve transparency of decision-making. 
Unlike all the years studied previously, the category of ‘Other’ was not referred 
to, perhaps indicating a preference for identifying specific public benefits. 
Fostering business efficiency and growth in export markets were often cited and 
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this year also saw the return of expansion of employment as a criterion, which 
had not had a showing since 1976. Steps to protect the environment appeared in 
one determination, which was lower than in 1998 and 2003. 
Figure 3.8: Summed weights of the important public benefits and the 
number of cases where authorisation was granted by the ACCC in the 
sample studied in 2008 (33 out of 34 were successful in 2008)
Source: Author’s research.
The focus on competition and economic growth was shaken by the recognition 
that the rollout of competition policy into all sectors may not be straightforward. 
This focus was also shaken, perhaps more indirectly, by the challenges posed 
by the global financial crisis and climate change. These factors have impacted 
on competition policy in two main ways that are relevant to the discussion on 
authorisation determinations: first the complexities inherent in introducing 
competition to infrastructure and technology industries such as the health care 
sector and deregulated sector was recognised and a number of authorisations 
dealing with these industries came before the commission; second the need to 
promote business-driven initiatives aimed at market stability and environmental 
sustainability also played out in the determinations made in 2008 and 2010. 
By 2006, all the main NCP reforms had been implemented and the impediments 
to achieving productivity in certain sectors, particularly health care, were 
acknowledged.180 Regulating the health industry via competition laws has 
been controversial. This was partly explained by the tribunal when it stated 
that the health industry is unique in way that result in market failure and, 
in such circumstances, more competition is not necessarily a good thing for 
efficiency.181 The application of the competition law to the medical profession 
180 See Paul Gretton, ‘Assessing the importance of national economic reform — Australian Productivity Commission 
experience’ in Conference on the Micro Foundations of Economic Policy Performance in Asia, (New Delhi, 2008).
181 Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004), paras 144, 158.
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and related health industries has caused confusion among the profession,182 as 
illustrated by the Australian Medical Association determination183 in which the 
association stated that the reason for making the application was to provide it 
with certainty and legal protection in its dealings with state and territory health 
departments.184 Similarly, in Australian Dental Association,185 the commission 
agreed that the accepted norm of having consistency of fees within a medical 
or dental practice, although constituting exclusionary conduct, would ensure 
a shared responsibility for the continuity and quality of patient care within 
a shared practice.186 In 2008 there were six authorisations dealing with the 
medical and dental sectors and they were all authorised.187 
Figure 3.9: Summed weights of the important public benefits and the 
number of cases where authorisation was granted by the ACCC in the 
sample studied in 2010 (34 out of 35 were successful in 2010)
Source: Author’s research.
The position was similar in 2010. Environmental concerns were raised in 6 
determinations successfully in 2010, including the Agsafe and Refrigerant 
Reclaim authorisations. Cost savings and fostering business efficiency still 
remained as important public benefits, although the number of determinations 
where other public benefits (outside those in the list in Table 1.1) was increasing.
182 See Stephen G Corones (2005), ‘The uncertain application of competition law in health care markets’ 
(2005) 33(6) Australian Business Law Review 407–28.
183 Australian Medical Association Limited & Ors (2008) A91100.
184 ibid, 14, 33.
185 Australian Dental Association Inc (2008) A91094 & A91095.
186 Australian Dental Association Inc A91094 and A91095, 20; see also Vision Group Holdings Limited (2010) 
A91217, 8.
187 Australian Dental Association (2008) A91094 and A91095; Australian Medical Association (2008) A91100, 
A91088; CALMS Ltd (2008) A91092; and Rural Doctors Association of Australia Limited (2008) A91078.
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In Summary …
It is clear from this survey of benefits recognised in the seven years under 
scrutiny that the ACCC’s determinations reveal a continuing acceptance of both 
economic efficiency benefits and other benefits, such as the enhancement of 
safety and the promotion of professional ethics. The manner in which the term 
public should be interpreted has, however, been less clear. Earlier authorisation 
deliberations do not make reference to the concepts of pass-through, or the 
consumer welfare standard, and often deal with authorisation applications 
from which there was little likely impact on consumers, such as approval for 
agreements between professional groups or associations. As the economic 
discourse has gained widespread acceptance in government policy, there have 
been attempts by the ACCC to give effect to these discourses by seeking evidence 
of some benefits finding their way to consumers. Following the tribunal’s 
decision in Qantas and Air New Zealand, however, the ACCC’s deliberations 
have been more circumspect. More recent deliberations are specifically located 
within the principles expressed by the ACT and plainly refer to the decision, 
demonstrating the importance of the economics discourse in shaping the 
meaning of this phrase. 
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4. Types of Public Benefit
This chapter builds on the discussion in the last chapter by examining in detail 
the types of public benefits that have been recognised in Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) determinations. The discussion is divided 
into three main sections. The first part deals with economic efficiency benefits, 
the second examines non-economic efficiency benefits, and the third part looks 
at specific areas where public benefit analysis is more complex, defying easy 
categorisation. It is clear from this that ACCC authorisation determinations have 
become more myopically focused on efficiency. Although economic efficiency 
concerns have always focused the regulator’s attention, reflecting the rise of 
economic rationalism by Australian governments and indeed globally, a number 
of varying non-economic efficiency benefits, such as environmental benefits or 
increasing safety of goods, have been emphasised at different times during the 
last 30 years. The study reveals that the ACCC has recognised these benefits 
in its determinations and has been able to work with the changing regulatory 
state by varying its use of regulatory strategies, most interestingly by being 
able to enlist others in the regulation game, such as professional associations, 
in incorporating ethical practices and appeals procedures into their codes of 
conduct.
Role of Efficiency-based Public Benefits 
Competition is usually linked to efficiency and it is generally acknowledged that 
competition is valued for what it can deliver in terms of allocative, productive 
and dynamic efficiency.1 Interviews with ACCC staff, including members of 
the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT), suggest that any authorisation 
decision-making process begins with economic efficiency factors before moving 
to non-efficiency factors.2 It has been stated that the ACCC’s primary emphasis 
is on those detriments that affect competition and economic efficiency, although 
other factors have been recognised.3
The public benefits used by the commission are listed in Table 1.1 and, of the 
16 public benefits in this table, only 14 are classified as economic efficiency 
1 Re Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004) 32. 
2 Interview 2 and Interview 10.
3 Allan Fels and Tim Grimwade, ‘Authorisation: Is it Still Relevant to Australian Competition Law?’ 
(2003) 11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 187, 2003; see also Dawson Report Committee of Inquiry, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act [Dawson Review] 
(2003) 32; Productivity Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, The Growth and Revenue Implications of 
Hilmer and Related Reforms: A Report of the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments 
(1995) 385 <http://www.pc.gov.au/ic/research/independent/hilmer/finalreport> at 1 November 2007.
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related, with PB11 (environment) and PB16 (other) not dealing with economic 
efficiency. Many of the factors overlap with each other and, for example, in 
the deregulated sector the public benefits of industry rationalisation and the 
promotion of competition go hand in hand. Likewise, the promotion of cost 
savings is usually coupled with the facilitation of business efficiency. These 
factors are often cited and discussed together in ACCC determinations. 
The three most important public benefit factors based on economic efficiency 
are plotted in Figure 4.1. The public benefits that are considered to be of minor 
importance, important and very important were summed for the compilation of 
these figures. Of a total of 244 determinations studied across the 36-year span, 
cost savings was considered to be of importance on 73 determinations, fostering 
business efficiency was considered important in 56 determinations, and the 
promotion of competition was considered important in 68 determinations. 
Figure 4.1: Top three public benefits based on economic efficiency across 
seven years
Source: Author’s research.
The role of cost savings has been constant across all the years studied, with it 
becoming the most important factor in 2006 and again in 2010. The ability to 
increase efficiency via reduced costs has been consistently argued in applications 
stemming from a variety of industries, including the milk, liquor and iron ore 
industries.4 It was the most consistently considered factor across time, despite 
spikes in arguments based on fostering of business efficiency and promotion 
4 See: Liquor Stax Australia Pty Ltd (2010) A91237; Premium Milk Ltd (2010) A91236; Tasmanian Farmers 
and Graziers Association (2010) A91197; North West Iron Ore Alliance (2010) A91212.
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of competition in 1998, this year having been selected for the study in order 
to examine the effect of the implementation of the national competition policy 
(NCP) on authorisation determinations. This factor has levelled out, being 
raised consistently in 11 determinations in each of 2006, 2008 and 2010, which 
should be read against the increasing use of modelling and quantification being 
promoted among regulators in the assessment of policy.5 
Figure 4.2: Less important public benefits related to economic efficiency 
across seven years
Source: Author’s research.
That promotion of competition and fostering business efficiency peaked in 1998 
can be understood against the backdrop of the microeconomic reform programs 
in the late 1980s when the Labor government under Bob Hawke and Paul Keating 
(1983–96) deregulated financial markets, floated the dollar, cut tariffs and 
privatised and corporatised government businesses, like many other European 
counterparts.6 This is reflected in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development reports that pointed to Australia having less interventionist 
strategies than other countries after the United States, United Kingdom and 
Ireland.7 As discussed in Chapter 3, another obvious explanation for this spike 
is that it reflects the deregulation strategies that were implemented following the 
5 Interview 2; see also Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth of Australia, Office of Best 
Practice Regulation (OBPR) ‘Cost Benefit Analysis’, which emphasises cost benefit analysis. <http://www.
finance.gov.au/obpr/cost-benefit-analysis.html> at 15 October 2008.
6 Some of the corporatised and privatised businesses included the Commonwealth Bank, Qantas Airlines, 
Telecom Australia and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories. See also Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘Reform of Public 
Utilities: What About Consumers?’ (1994) Competition & Consumer Law Journal 155.
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Surveys: Australia, (August 2001) 118.
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NCP. The authorisation determinations in 1998 included the wool,8 electricity9 
and gas10 industries as well as Stock Exchange.11 The expanded application of the 
Act in 1995 also meant previously unregulated conduct of professionals could 
now be regulated: this accounts for the Australian Medical Association12 and the 
Australian Performing Rights Association (APRA) decisions.13 
In 2003, while the promotion of competition and cost savings continued to be 
important, numerous other factors also rated mention, providing a more even 
spread across the public benefits factors dealing with economic efficiency. This 
can be partially explained by the determinations in 2003 covering a variety of 
conduct, with nine of the 35 decisions involving the aviation industry.14 Further, 
in 2003, there was a greater reliance on non-efficiency factors, illustrated by the 
CSR Limited authorisation as well as the Golden Casket Agents Association Ltd 
determinations in which the ACCC found that one of the public benefit grounds 
was the promotion of equitable dealings and, in Refrigerant Reclaim and Agsafe, 
in which the commission found that environmental benefits would be delivered 
by the proposed practices.15 The 2006 figures mimic the 2003 data, although 
the role of exports increased. Consideration of a wide range of public benefits 
during these years is interesting and refutes the claim of a rigid regulator, 
strictly adhering to the book.
In interviews, representatives of consumer groups stated that the ACCC 
emphasised economic efficiency considerations in its determinations: ‘economic 
efficiency is paramount and social environmental considerations don’t get an 
airing’.16 Another representative of a consumer group stated that concerns 
about an association’s standard contracts were dismissed by the ACCC on the 
grounds that such contracts were economically efficient.17 These comments are 
consistent with the views expressed by Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle of the 
English competition regulators, which they argue ‘steadily developed a stronger 
economic input and used economic analysis, and economic doctrine, to build 
8 Australian Wool Exchange Limited A30185, 30 December 1998. 
9 National Electricity Code A90652, A90653, A90654, 19 October 1998.
10 Gas Services Business Pty Ltd A90630, 19 August 1998.
11 Australian Stock Exchange Limited A90623, 1 April 1998.
12 Australian Medical Association Limited A90622, A90622, 31 August 1998.
13 Australian Performing Rights Association Limited (APRA) A30186–A30193, 14 January 1998. See also 
Honourable JJ Spigelman AC, ‘Are Lawyers Lemons? Competition Principles and Professional Regulation’ (The 
2002 Lawyers Lecture, St James Ethics Centre, 29 October 2002).
14 Air New Zealand on behalf of all members of the Star Alliance A30209–A30213, 4 September 2003; Qantas 
and Air New Zealand A90862, A90863, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003.
15 Golden Casket Agents Association Ltd A 90853, 4 September 2003; CSR Limited A90808, 10 June 2003; 
Refrigerant Reclaim Australia Ltd A90854, 7 May 2003; Agsafe Ltd A30194, 2 September 1998; see also 
Medicines Australia Inc A90880, 18 February 2004; these factors are discussed later in this chapter.
16 Interview 14. 
17 Interview 13. 
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their credibility’18 and point to the prominence of economists in the relevant 
agencies. They contend that this approach has ‘moved the agencies towards a 
narrower and less critical judgment of market behavior.’19 
ACCC staff expressed mixed views, with one past staff member stating the ACCC 
appeared to place greater emphasis on efficiency-related factors than previously 
in its history.20 Another staff member pointed out that distributive justice issues 
cannot be ignored in decision-making, but should not drive the decision.21 
Simply recognising diverse factors, however, may not be enough. It was stated 
by another ACCC staff member that ‘bad economic analysis can occur with both 
efficiency factors and non-efficiency factors’.22
By 2008, all the main NCP reforms had been implemented and the impediments 
to achieving productivity in certain sectors, particularly health care, were 
acknowledged.23 In 2008 there were six authorisations dealing with the 
medical and dental sectors and they were all authorised.24 These relied on the 
a combination of efficiency related and non-efficiency related benefits in their 
applications and, for example, in Australian Dental Association, the public 
benefits that were accepted as important were cost savings and enhancement 
of quality of services, with assistance to small business being seen to be of 
minor importance.25 The importance of the environment, which had featured 
in the determinations since 1998, was the most important benefit in the 2010 
determinations studied, with six determinations successfully raising it as 
an important factor. For example, in the Agsafe26 and Refrigerant Reclaim27 
authorisations, environmental benefits were accepted as important in granting 
authorisation, reflecting once again the manner in which regulatory decision-
making has to deal with the economic and social concerns of the day. 
Of the three less-considered factors (Figure 4.2), assistance to small business 
spiked in 1984, rising again in 2008, which reflects the political emphasis on 
a micro-economic reform program which began in the 1980s and was again 
raised after the widening scope of the Act to include deregulated industries 
18 StephenWilks and Ian Bartle, ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition 
Agencies’ (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 148, 167.
19 ibid, 170. See Bronwen Morgan, ‘The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial 




23 See: Paul Gretton, ‘Assessing the importance of national economic reform — Australian Productivity Commission 
experience’ in Conference on the Micro Foundations of Economic Policy Performance in Asia, (New Delhi, 2008).
24 Australian Dental Association (2008) A91094, A91095; Australian Medical Association (2008) A91100, 
A91088; CALMS Ltd (2008) A91092; and Rural Doctors Association of Australia (2008) A91078.
25 Australian Dental Association Inc A91094, A91095, 10 December 2008.
26 Agsafe A91234, A91242–A91244, 27 October 2010.
27 Refrigerant Reclaim Australia Ltd A91079, 14 May 2008.
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and the professions. Industry rationalisation was the fifth-most-cited economic 
efficiency public benefit, and it spiked up in 1984. This spike can be partly 
explained by the fact that a significant number of decisions dealt with industry 
associations, including the Master Locksmiths Association,28 the Real Estate 
Institute of Australia29 as well as those in Queensland,30 Australian Capital 
Territory31 and Victoria,32 the Stock and Station Agents Association,33 Queensland 
Motor Industry Association,34 groups within the newsagency industry35 and the 
Society of Auctioneers and Appraisers.36 The other factor in Figure 4.2 is growth 
in export markets, which was at its highest in 2006 and 1998. This factor was 
not present in 1976 or 1984 and was only recognised in 1998 reflecting the 
importance of globalisation and competition among nations.
Types of Efficiency Benefits 
The following discussion examines the main types of efficiency benefits that 
have been recognised in the commission’s authorisation decisions. Figures 4.2 to 
4.6 and Figures 4.8 to 4.13 show each of the public benefits, as they were raised 
in the authorisation application or determination, and the weighting given to 
them in the discussions,37 across seven years. 
Industry Cost Savings 
By providing evidence about cost savings, the applicant would be in a better position 
to satisfy the ‘future with or without test’ used by the ACCC, as well as provide the 
necessary casual link between the proposed conduct and claimed benefit that the 
ACCC seeks, improving the chances of a successful authorisation application.38 This 
factor has been consistently cited over the time studied (Figure 4.3), as is reflected 
by the 1976 determination in United Permanent Building Society in which the 
commission accepted there would be administrative cost savings that were ‘difficult 
28 Master Locksmiths Association of Australia Ltd A90377, A90388, 15 March 1984.
29 Real Estate Institute of Australia A90393, 12 January 1984.
30 Real Estate Institute of Qld A90393, A90397, 25 June 1984. 
31 Real Estate Institute of ACT A97, A98, 30 November 1984.
32 Real Estate and Stock Institute of Victoria A4432, A4433, 10 October 1984.
33 Stock and Station Agents Association of NSW A90404, 11 September 1984.
34 Queensland Motor Industry Association Ltd A40009, 24 October 1984.
35 NSW and ACT Newsagency System 26 April 1984; Mercury Newsagency System 9 May 1984.
36 Society of Auctioneers and Appraisers Inc A60009, 6 September 1984.
37 A determination could raise more than one benefit and it could be given a weighting of very important 
(4), important (3), minor importance (2) or minimal importance (1).
38 For a discussion of the future with or without test and for discussion on the causal link see Chapter 3.
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to quantify but of some magnitude’ brought by the proposed authorisation.39 
Similarly, in the Port Waratah determination in 1998, the ACCC accepted that there 
would be significant cost savings in the form of reduced demurrage costs.40 
Figure 4.3: Promotion of industry cost savings in ACCC authorisation 
determinations in the sample studied across seven years
Source: Author’s research.
This factor is essentially linked to economic efficiency and has the advantage of 
being open to quantification. In Qantas Airways and New Zealand, the tribunal 
was satisfied the proposed alliance would result in significant cost savings that 
the applicants could pass on to travellers by way of lower fares, depending on 
the competitive pressure it faced from other airlines in the industry. Cost savings 
would result from integrating technology and networks, management as well 
as crewing and maintenance.41 The tribunal was critical of the quantification 
methods used by certain experts to calculate tourism benefits.42 One interviewee, 
a senior staff member of the ACCC, stated that certain groups were ‘strong on 
quantification’, requiring staff to have ‘expertise in econometrics and statistical 
analysis’ and ‘it would be up to consumer groups to bring awareness of these 
issues that cannot be quantified, to the ACCC’s attention’.43 This factor was 
consistently referred to in 11 determinations in 2006, 2008 and 2010.
39 United Permanent Building Society (1976) ATPR 35-220, 16789, 16877.
40 Port Waratah A90650, 25 March 1998, 18.
41 Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004), para 648.
42 ibid, para 645.
43 Interview 10.
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Fostering Business Efficiency
The ability to increase efficiency via reduced costs has been consistently argued 
by applicants. Although it might be reasonable to expect that the promotion of 
competition and fostering business efficiency apply to the same set of facts, this 
is not necessarily the case, as is reflected in this empirical study and plotted in 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4. These diverse figures reveal that both these factors have not 
been given the same emphasis in the determinations by the ACCC. Promotion of 
competition and fostering business efficiency spiked in 1998: fostering business 
efficiency was important or very important in 16 out of the 35 determinations for 
that year whereas promotion of competition was important or very important in 
18 of the 35 determinations.
Figure 4.4: Fostering business efficiency in ACCC authorisation 
determinations in the sample studied across seven years
Source: Author’s research.
Both featured as ‘important’ or ‘very important’, however, in only two decisions 
that year — Vencorp44 and United Energy,45 which together accounted for six 
of the 35 decisions. Both these factors were only considered to be of ‘minor 
importance’ in the Australian Medical Association authorisation.46 
Fostering business efficiency was endorsed in the United Energy authorisation, 
where the applicant sought approval to enter a scheme for the provision of 
hedging cover to electricity retailers and generators during periods when the 
44 Victorian Energy Networks Corporation (Vencorp) A90646, A90647, A90648, 19 August 1998.
45 United Energy Limited A90665, A90666, A90670, 25 November 1998.
46 Australian Medical Association A90622, 31 August 1998.
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spot price for electricity was very high. The ACCC was satisfied the scheme 
provided a risk management tool that would provide for lower risk-management 
costs, that may translate to a benefit to the public through increased allocative 
efficiency.47 In the Victorian Energy Networks Corporation authorisation, the 
ACCC stated that, even without the proposed arrangement, competition would 
evolve over time. It was satisfied, however, that the proposed arrangement 
would promote economic efficiency and introduce competition in a sector of 
the deregulated energy market. Likewise, in the Australian Payments Clearing 
Association Limited authorisation, the commission accepted that a move from 
cheques to the High Value Clearing System would yield cost efficiencies.48 
Fostering business efficiency through structural reform was successfully argued 
in cases involving the deregulated sectors in 1998.49 It was the second-most 
important public benefit criterion among the authorisation decisions involving 
the deregulated sector, after the promotion of competition, across all the years 
studied. This is reflected in the Australian Medical Association authorisation, 
where the ACCC stated that ‘there is some public benefit in facilitating the 
transition to full compliance’50 with the Act and the authorisation would provide 
a transition phase to allow industry participants to adjust to a different system 
of negotiation, which would presumably lead to greater efficiency.51
Figure 4.4 shows that fostering business efficiency was again an important factor 
in 2008 with 10 determinations considering it to be an important public benefit. 
These authorisations allowed corporations to reach agreement on specific types 
of conduct with competitors. There were several determinations dealing with the 
authorisation of an interim system to manage demand for coal-loading services, 
which were aimed at reducing the queuing of ships waiting to be loaded52 and 
the authorisation of agreements between competitors for betting products.53 
Promotion of Competition in the Industry 
There has been a gradual recognition of the necessity for Australian industry to 
compete internationally. This is evident from the manner in which promotion 
of competition increased in importance from 1976 to 1998, before dropping 
back again (Figure 4.4). The spike for 1998 could be explained by the emphasis 
47 United Energy A90665, A90666, A90670, 25 November 1998, 15.
48 Australian Payments Clearing Association Limited A90617–A90619, 1 April 1998, 32.
49 See Australian Communications Access Forum A90613, 22 April 1998; Australian Performing Rights 
Association Limited A30186–A30193, 14 January 1998.
50 Australian Medical Association A90622, 31 July 1998, 51.
51 ibid.
52 These accounted for six of the 10 determinations. See: Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pty Ltd (2008), 
A91060–A91062; Donaldson Coal Pty Limited (2008) A91075–A91077.
53 Tabcorp Manager Pty Ltd (2008) A91065 – A91067.
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placed on deregulation, with the deputy commissioner pointing out that 
the ‘Commission has been given a significant regulatory role in relation to 
communication, energy and transport’.54 
In 1998, over a third of the decisions dealt with deregulatory industries, 
including Vencorp,55 the National Electricity Code56 and United Energy.57 For 
example, in the Gas Services Business authorisation, the commission accepted 
that the proposed arrangements were significant in bringing about an orderly 
transition to a restructured gas market.58 In Vencorp it was noted that the 
‘development of a truly competitive gas market on both the demand side and 
supply side is of vital concern to the Commission’ and it was recognised that 
‘the achievement of a more competitive market structure in the upstream gas 
production sector will be a difficult task’.59 
Figure 4.5: Promotion of competition in ACCC authorisation 
determinations in the sample studied across seven years
Source: Author’s research.
The spike in the 1998 determinations cannot be overestimated, as it can also 
be explained by the inclusion of the APRA determination in the study, which 
accounted for eight of the 18 decisions where this factor was rated, and a total 
of 35 studied in 1998. The promotion of competition in the industry was a ‘very 
important’ factor here, which means that it has been summed for eight cases 
leading to the spike in 1998 in Figure 4.5. As seen from this figure, this factor was 
54 Allan Asher, ‘Regulatory Risks’, (Committee for Economic Development of Australia — Infrastructure 
Deficiencies: The Strategic Imperatives Conference, 3 December 1998) 2.
55 Vencorp A90646, A90647, A90648, 19 August 1998.
56 National Electricity Code A90652, A90653, A90655, 19 October 1998.
57 United Energy A90665, A90666, A90670, 25 November 1998.
58 Gas Services Business Pty Ltd A90630–A90631, 19 August 1998, 16.
59 Vencorp A90646, 19 August 1998, 35.
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only raised in four decisions in 2006, but only accepted as of minor importance 
by the ACCC in one determination.60 In 2008 it was accepted as important in 
one determination and, in 2010, it was accepted as important or very important 
in four decisions. The Cuscal Limited & Ors authorisation accounted for three 
of the four decisions in 2010, and it dealt with an agreement between network 
members to not directly charge each other’s cardholders for ATM transactions.61 
Benefits Flowing from Import Substitution and 
Growth in Export Markets 
These are usually listed as two separate public benefits and addressed separately 
in the determinations. Although these two factors are likely to be related, import 
substitution was only cited as a public benefit in 1998 for all the determinations 
examined from 1976–2010. In the North West Shelf Project, both these factors 
were considered to be ‘very important’ by the ACCC. The applicants sought 
authorisation to discuss the terms, conditions and price at which gas was to 
be marketed. The ACCC noted that the applicants estimated an increase in 
Australia’s GDP by A$1.5 billion per annum as arising from the agreement.62 
This could be viewed as contrary to the predominant theory of the time. By 
the 1980s import substitution was discredited as a doctrine of manufacturing 
policy left over from the conservative era under Prime Minister Robert Menzies. 
This was a period of economic reform that included the floating of the currency, 
deregulating the financial markets and systematically reducing trade barriers to 
produce a ‘more flexible and outward looking economy’.63 As one interviewee 
stated, this could be viewed as a ‘triumph of practice over theory’.64 This is 
supported by the release of the white paper on the manufacturing industry 
in 1977, which endorsed the government’s commitment to reducing tariff 
protection and promoting competition in international markets, reinforced by 
the Commonwealth government’s economic statement in 1988.65
Growth in export markets is more frequently cited than import replacements 
(Figure 4.6). It has become more important, reflecting the greater emphasis on 
global business and trade. In the 1998 Ansett authorisation, the commission 
accepted that an expansion of services in the longer term would result 
60 It was raised in Qantas Airways and Air New Zealand A90862, A90863, A30220, A30221, 9 September 
2003 by the applicants but not accepted by the ACCC and it was raised and accepted as a public benefit by the 
ACCC in Australian Dairy Farmers Limited A90966, 24 April 2006 as being of minor importance.
61 A91175, A91176 and A91177, 27 January 2010.
62 North West Shelf Project A90624, 29 July 1998, 21.
63 See National Competition Council, ‘What is National Competition Policy and How Did It Come to Be?’, 
<http://www.ncc.gov.au/articleZone.asp?articleZoneID=16> at 20 October 2008.
64 Interview 6.
65 See Productivity Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Setting the Scene: Monitoring Micro Reform, 
Report 95/1 (1996) <http://www.pc.gov.au/bie/report/96-0> at 20 March 2008.
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in increased freight capacity being available to Australian exporters and, 
accordingly, was a trade benefit.66 In 2006, this was a ‘very important’ factor 
in the BHP Billiton authorisation, where the commission identified numerous 
public benefits including security of supply for Australian users, the prospect 
of substantial export earnings, and job opportunities, as well as the introduction 
of new technology and promotion of economic development.67 Growth in export 
markets was cited as being of minor importance, for much the same reason, in 
the Rio Tinto Aluminium authorisation in 2010.68
Figure 4.6: The summed weights of growth in export markets and the 
number of cases in ACCC authorisation determinations in the sample 
studied across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
In Re Australian Wool Growers Association Ltd, the applicants submitted 
that 95 per cent of the wool produced by association members was exported, 
and so they successfully sought authorisation for imposing a levy to fund an 
advertising campaign in the United States. The tribunal agreed with the ACCC 
finding and stated the provision of a properly supervised marketplace for the 
sale of wool in a competitive environment was a benefit to the public in the 
form of a significant contribution to Australia’s export earnings and a source of 
income for many persons in Australia.69
66 Ansett Australia, Ansett International, Air New Zealand and Singapore Airlines A90649, A90655, 22 July 
1998, 74.
67 BHP Billiton Iron Ore A90982, A90983, 1 February 2006.
68 Rio Tinto Aluminium Limited & Ors A91205–A91207, 2 June 2010.
69 Australian Wool Growers Association Ltd [1999] ACompT 4 (3 September 1999], para 71–72.
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Expansion of Employment in Efficient Industries
This issue is usually seen as a consequence of economic efficiency. It is generally 
linked to other issues, such as economic development, as acknowledged by the 
ACCC in the Australian Wool Growers Association70 and United Energy Limited71 
authorisations discussed above. The data suggest, however, that in practice this is 
not an important issue, with only 1976 and 2006 having employment expansion 
in efficient industries as important issues. In 1976 only one decision noted this, 
namely Australian Chamber of Shipping;72 in 2006 four decisions noted this factor, 
namely Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils73 and BHP Billiton,74 
which accounted for three of the determinations. While it was raised in BHP 
Billiton75 as an important factor, alongside numerous other factors, including 
export earnings and promotion of competition, it has never been the single most 
significant criterion in the decision-making process. A discussed below, where 
the employment is in regional areas, it is not necessarily linked to efficiency.
Industry Rationalisation 
This factor has not been very important in authorisation determinations (Figure 
4.6), and is more frequently cited in 1984 than in any other year studied. 
Figure 4.7: The summed weights of growth in industry rationalisation and 
the number of cases in ACCC authorisation determinations in the sample 
studied across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
70 ibid.
71 United Energy Limited.
72 Australian Chamber of Shipping A3193, 21 June 1976.
73 Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils A90980, 25 January 2006.
74 BHP Billiton A90981, A90982, A90983, 1 February 2006.
75 BHP Billiton A90982, A90983, 1 February 2006.
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
100
The spike in 1984 can be explained by the Re Australian Associated Stock 
Exchanges authorisation,76 in which this factor was considered ‘important’ in six 
of the total 35 determinations examined for 1984, and one of 14 determinations 
in which it featured as a factor in that year.77 
It was also in this year that the Button Car Plan was implemented by John 
Button as minister of trade in the Labor government. Prior to this plan, the 
local motor industry had been protected with a 57.5 per cent tariff, which left 
the consumer with a limited choice of 13 different models of cars from five 
manufacturers. Many saw this plan as the start of market reform in Australia.78 
The relatively high reading in 2006 was because industry rationalisation was 
raised in two decisions, the Queensland Turf and the Federation of Australian 
Wool authorisations, both of which accounted for four of the 35 authorisations 
studied for that year. In Queensland Turf, two turf clubs sought authorisation 
for a joint venture agreement to provide for the development of thoroughbred 
horse racing facilities among other activities, with the longer-term aim of 
developing a merger between the two clubs within five to seven years. The 
ACCC accepted these arrangements would allow the applicants to ‘centrally co-
ordinate and finance certain of their operations, allowing them to take advantage 
of operational synergies and other cost savings’ and assist ‘in the efficient co-
ordination and funding of capital works’.79 
In Federation of Australian Wool three applicants sought authorisation for the 
imposition of a levy per bale of wool sold in order to raise approximately US$2.8 
million which was to be used to partly fund a test marketing campaign for 
promotion of Australian wool in the United States. The ACCC noted that the 
levy would assist in funding the promotion campaign resulting in increasing 
consumer demand for Australian wool over the long-term and consequently 
also increase production of wool.80 Another example is in the International 
Air Transport Association decision, in which the commission accepted that 
the association’s tariff coordination, which provided the industry with the 
underlying basis for determining fares, was a public benefit.81
Economic Development
In the BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd authorisation, BHP had applied for authorisation 
to enter into exclusive dealing arrangements with two consumers of methanol. 
76 Re Australian Associated Stock Exchanges A90409, A30102, A30095, A30096, A30097, A30098, 4 October 1984.
77 ibid.
78 Peter Robinson, ‘The Man with the Plan’, Wheels Magazine, 15 April 2008, <http://www.wheelsmag.
com.au/wheels/site/articleIDs/9C2C51C8E6517ACDCA25742D0018FE70> at 20 April 2008.
79 Queensland Turf Club Limited & Brisbane Turf Club Limited A91000, 31 May 2006, iii.
80 Federation of Australian Wool Organisations A90984, A90985, 11 January 2006, 18–20.
81 International Air Transport Association (1984) ATPR (Com) 50-083, 55531.
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This arrangement was intended to allow BHP to build a pilot plant to test the 
viability of new technology. The commission accepted this contention and stated 
that the pilot plant was likely to have a beneficial impact on the Australian 
economy in terms of introducing a new technology that would allow value to be 
added to a resource that Australia has in plentiful supply, natural gas.82 
Economic development has not been cited often in the determinations studied, 
being referred to in one determination in 1976, three determinations in 1998 
and four determinations in 2006. The slight increase in the 2006 figures is 
attributed to the fact that the BHP Billiton decision accounted for three of the 
four decisions in which it was raised that year. Here, the ACCC authorised the 
joint venture agreement and cited economic development as important because 
this joint venture for mining, processing and sale of iron ore was likely to prove 
the viability of Lower Channel Iron Deposits ore and, with the aid of the shared 
technology, was going to be used in the manufacturing of steel. This was likely 
to establish a market for Lower Channel Iron Deposits ore and consequently 
bring a number of other benefits in the form of investment and employment.83 
Role of Non-efficiency-based Public Benefits
There are many reasons for recognising non-efficiency-based benefits. All are 
examples of market failure, be it because the good is a public good or because 
of externalities.84 Non-efficiency benefits have always featured in ACCC 
determinations, although the ones that have been relied on have changed. 
One instance of market failure is where the market may not be able to regulate 
certain activity, especially where it cannot be reflected in price. This is true of 
providing safe work practices, which is often associated with higher production 
costs. Another instance is where the good has the characteristics of a public 
good, such as security, or an improved environment. The market in such cases 
may not be ideally suited to rewarding individuals for producing such goods. 
Another example involves the undertaking of research and development 
in public hospitals. These benefits can be used by all parties in the industry 
(unless protected by intellectual property rights) and the parties carrying out 
the research may not be rewarded by the market. 
A third instance where market failure can occur is in situations where there may 
be certain types of conduct that are considered worthwhile but which may not be 
facilitated by the market because it does not necessarily yield high returns. For 
82 BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd (1992) ATPR 50-116, 56212, 56223.
83 BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd A70015–A70017, 5 March 2003.
84 Economists have identified four main causes of market failure, first, the abuse of market power; second, 
externalities; third, where the good is a public good and fourth, where there is incomplete or asymmetric 
information. See <http://www.economist.com/research/Economics> at 31 October 2008.
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example, promoting ethical practices may not be reflected by lower production 
costs or a higher product price. Indeed, this can also be said about deregulation of 
public enterprises, or the encouragement of self-regulation measures. 
Allan Fels and Tim Grimwade recognised multiple situations where non-
efficiency-related benefits equate to public benefits in the commission’s decision-
making and stated:
Less tangible benefits than economic efficiency gains may still be regarded 
as public benefits, such as gains to the environment or public health, 
which are of course valued by the community. That is, authorisation can 
be granted not only where there is market failure in the technical sense, 
but also where there is some wider inadequacy of market functioning in 
the specific case to address broader social values.85
It is clear that these less tangible benefits are generally much harder to measure 
and quantify. Another interviewee from the ACCC stated the process of 
assessing public benefit begins with economic efficiency factors and then moves 
to the non-efficiency factors.86 The Clay Brick and Paver Association of Victoria 
authorisation was used to illustrate the manner in which non-efficiency factors 
can have a role in the application of the public benefit test. In this decision the 
association lodged an application involving association members related to an 
arrangement to fund an industry-based training initiative for apprentice and 
trainee bricklayers, and to charge a common fee for the initiative. The aim of the 
scheme was to address the problem of the cyclical shortage of skilled bricklayers 
in Victoria. The commission accepted that the arrangements would have public 
benefits, which would result in improvements to project completion times.87 
Figure 4.8: Count of non-economic efficiency public benefits in 35 
authorisation determinations from the sample studied across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
85 Fels and Grimwade (2003) 201.
86 Interview 4.
87 Clay Brick and Paver Association of Victoria A90738, 12 December 2000, 10.
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Figure 4.8 gives an overall picture of the place of non-efficiency benefits in 
the determinations studied. Whereas such arguments were raised in 30 
determinations in 1976, of which four were granted (13 per cent success), 
this ratio changed rapidly. In 1984 and 2006, all the determinations in which 
such benefits were raised were sucessful (100 per cent success). In 1998, it was 
successful in 26 of 32 determinations (81 per cent success) rising to 28 out of 
29 in 2008 (97 per cent success) and 23 out of 24 in 2010 (96 per cent success). 
Clearly the place for non-efficiency public benefits is increasing.
Types of Non-efficiency-based Public Benefits 
The ACCC has consistently referred to non-efficiency-based benefits in its 
determinations (Figure 4.8). Assistance to small business and the safety and 
quality of goods and services were the main non-efficiency benefits cited in 
1976. These factors continued alongside the related benefit of supplying better 
information to consumers and businesses in 1984. A new factor also began to be 
commonly cited — promotion of equitable dealings; this has continued to be an 
important non-efficiency determinant in the subsequent years of the empirical 
study. It is interesting to note that this factor includes the authorisation of 
ethical dealings,88 which is a challenge facing regulators in the post Global 
Financial Crisis environment — how to use light handed regulatory techniques 
to promote ethical governance in a market-centred economy. 
Figure 4.9: The summed weights of each of the non-economic efficiency 
public benefits in ACCC authorisation determinations in the sample studied 
across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
88 For example see: Real Estate Institute of Australia 12 January 1984, NSW and ACT Newsagency System 
26 April 1984, Stock and Station Agents Association of NSW 11 September 1984 where it was weighted as very 
important (4) or important (3).
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By 1998 safety of goods and services was again the most cited factor and the 
importance of climate change was finding its place, reflected in the increasing 
number of authorisations related to industry-driven arrangements for reducing 
environmental damage. In 2008, the environment was cited in one determination 
as an important factor and in 11 as of minor importance. 
Again, industry was being co-opted effectively in the job of self-regulation, as 
reflected by Commissioner David Lieberman’s statement that many of the codes 
of conduct in place in 1998 were dated, ‘formulated in an environment of close 
government regulation of the industry in every jurisdiction’89 and needed to be 
reviewed to bring them in line with the changing forms of regulation, including 
the introduction of a code of ethics that could do more than promote honest 
behavior by reflecting ‘a greater recognition of the operating environment, a 
greater customer/client focus and focus on the industry's relationship with the 
community in general’.90 The place of each of these non-efficiency benefits is 
discussed below.
Safety and Improving Quality of Products and 
Services
At different times, the safety of employees, consumers and the wider public 
have been taken into account as constituting public benefits. The safety 
issue was important in the 1998 determinations (Figure 4.9). The Agsafe 
Limited authorisation91 is one such illustration where two companies sought 
authorisation for an accreditation scheme for the transport, storage and handling 
of farm chemicals, which could have attracted the application of third line 
forcing provisions and exclusionary conduct provisions. Here, the commission 
recognised that improved safety measures would benefit employees and users 
of the chemicals and noted the crossover between the anti-competitive conduct 
and the safety issues involved:
Under ACCC authorisation Agsafe trains industry participants in the 
understanding of relevant safety and regulatory requirements. Agsafe 
also inspects premises where agvet chemicals are stored to ensure that 
they comply with all relevant state and federal safety regulations. 
Where premises are found to be in breach of these regulations Agsafe 
is able to, as a last resort, impose trading sanctions … The ACCC would 
generally be concerned with arrangements whereby an organisation 
can impose trading sanctions on other businesses. However, the ACCC 
89 David Lieberman, Commissioner, ACCC, ‘Aspects of National Competition Policy’, (Speech presented at 
the Real Estate Institute of Australia, Annual Policy Conference, Hyatt Hotel, Canberra, 15 October 1998) 9.
90 ibid, 10.
91 Agsafe Limited A90680, A90681, 21 May 2003. See also Avcare Limited A30194, 2 September 1998.
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has examined the Agsafe program and is satisfied that it is an effective 
means of ensuring compliance with relevant safety requirements for the 
transport, handling, and storage of agvet chemicals.92
Authorisation for this conduct was granted in 2010 on the basis that Agsafe 
clarify on its website that it is not the only body offering such an accreditation 
scheme.93
Figure 4.10: The weights of enhancement of quality and safety of goods 
and services in ACCC authorisation determinations in the sample studied 
across seven years
Source: Author’s research.
International standards have been considered by the commission, as illustrated 
in Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers Inc.94 This 
application related to the industry participants reaching an agreement to 
reduce the production of ozone-depleting substances. The ozone layer protects 
human health and the environment from damaging ultraviolet B radiation and 
the term ozone-depletion refers to a thinning of the ozone layer in the earth’s 
atmosphere resulting from released depleting gases. The commission noted that 
international standards, established under the Montreal Protocol 1987, dealt 
with the introduction of quota systems for the phasing out of ozone-depleting 
substances.95 It pointed out, however, that there were no specific regulatory 
controls under Australian regulation.96 In this instance, industry were 
92 See ACCC, ‘ACCC Authorises Agvet Chemical Safety Program’ (Press Release MR 131/02, 28 May 2002).
93 Agsafe Limited A91234, A91242–A91244, 27 October 2010.
94 Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers Inc A90658, 26 August 1998.
95 ibid, 2.
96 ibid.
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cooperating with the Australian Government under the ‘National Greenhouse 
Response Strategy’ to set the cap at less than half of the level set under the 
Montreal Protocol for ozone-depleting substances.97 The commission accepted 
the public benefits proposed by the applicants to the authorisation, stating the 
proposal would contribute to limiting risk to human health:
The Commission holds the view that a scheme or arrangement which 
contributes to limiting the risk to human health and the improvement 
of the environment would benefit the Australian public, and may also 
benefit the total world population and environment.98 
Industry and professional groups may seek to improve the quality of the products 
or services supplied by engaging in improved training facilities or investing in 
research and development. The benefits of such investment are often classified 
as a public good, as other parties, who are not investing in such training or 
research and development expenditure, can use them. Further the benefits 
of such investment are often not realised over the short-term and may not be 
reflected in the price of the products or services. The community, however, 
generally benefits from such measures and the commission has recognised them 
as constituting public benefits. In South Australian Oysters Growers Association 
authorisation, the commission renewed the authorisation, first granted in 1999, 
to charge a levy which could be directed to research and development.99
Industry groups seeking to monitor the quality of their products and the skills 
of the persons supplying services may enter into accreditation schemes and 
apply for authorisation. One such example was Quilted Products Manufacturers 
Association of Australia,100 where the commission granted authorisation for a 
self-regulation scheme intended to cover 70 per cent of the market. The self-
regulation scheme aimed at improved labelling of products and monitoring of 
industry participants, all of which were intended to ensure the quality of the 
product supplied to the consumer. In the Australian Association of Pathology 
Practices decision, the tribunal examined the value provided by the larger 
teaching hospitals as natural locations for research, which they called a public 
good issue because the private sector and its customers also benefit from the 
research carried out in these hospitals. Although there were no exact figures, 
the tribunal accepted that research from the public hospitals would benefit the 
wider community and should be recognised in assessing public benefit.101 
97 ibid.
98 ibid, 9.
99 The South Australian Oyster Growers Association Inc  (SAOGA) (2010), A91229, 17 May 2010 and A91230, 
20 May 2010.
100 Quilted Products Manufacturers Association of Australia (1993) ATPR (Com) 50-130.
101 Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004) paras 192, 193. 
Similar concerns were expressed by the ACCC. See NSW Department of Health A90754–A90755, 27 June 2003, 27.
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In the Australian Tyre Dealers and Retreaders Association,102 the association 
applied for authorisation to enter into a voluntary program for organisations 
operating tyre-retreading processes. The commission recognised the public 
safety issue here and acknowledged there was no legislation specifically 
covering the retreading industry103 and that the proposed program went beyond 
the current standards and therefore delivered public benefits:
The ability of the … program to generate higher operational standards 
in participating factories goes beyond current legislation which only 
covers the production standard. The Commission accepts that such 
procedures may have the potential to contribute to efficiency gains in 
the factories’ operations, but considers that the procedures will lean 
towards the delivery of personal benefit to the factories rather than 
benefit consumers.104
Supply of Better Information to Consumers and 
Businesses
A certain degree of information is important for efficient markets. It has long 
been acknowledged that this may not be automatically provided by market 
forces. It may have to be mandated in order to enable informed choice by 
consumers; one example is found in the product safety provisions in the Act.105
Supply of information was an important criterion in the 1984 determinations 
(Figure 4.11) and in the Royal Australian Institute of Architects authorisation, the 
institute successfully sought authorisation of a professional code of conduct that 
included documents specifying the services provided and the bases of payment 
and fee guidance.106 Similar arguments were successfully made in Society of 
Auctioneers and Appraisers107 and International Air Transport Association.108 
Later determinations, until 2008, however, do not have supply of information 
as a prominent criterion (Figure 4.11), probably reflecting the fact that such 
information disclosure is dealt with under different regulatory regimes, such as 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or Credit Act 1984 (NSW).
102 Australian Tyre Dealers and Retreaders Association (1994) ATPR (Com) 50-162.
103 Note, however, that the parties were required to comply with the processing standard AS1973–1993 as 
well as other general occupational and safety standards. 
104 ibid. See also the earlier decision Australian Tyre Dealers and Retreaders Association (1991) ATPR (Com), 50115.
105 Schedule 3 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
106 Royal Australian Institute of Architects A58, 7 September 1984.
107 Society of Auctioneers and Appraisers A60009, 6 September 1984.
108 International Air Transport Association A3485, 31 October 1984.
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Figure 4.11: The summed weights of the supply of information in ACCC 
authorisation determinations in the sample studied across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
The increase in the number of authorisations in which supply of information 
was an important factor, rose in 2008 to three and, in 2010, to four. In 
Generic Medicines Industry Association, the ACCC stated that it is ‘important 
for consumers to have information available which helps to ensure that the 
dispensing decisions by pharmacists, acting in their capacity as health care 
professionals, have not been unduly influenced’.109
Improved Environmental Practices
The environment can be viewed as a public good and the market may not 
necessarily be responsive to environmentally sound practices. This has only 
become an important factor for granting authorisation since 1998 (Figure 4.12), 
where seven of the authorisation applications raised this factor, reflecting the 
growing community concern and awareness of environment issues. In the Agsafe 
decision the ACCC recognised that there is a public benefit in correcting such 
market failure:
The Commission is of the view, that where the market fails to take 
into account negative externalities of industry conduct, for example, 
the sorts associated with environmental protection, there may exist a 
public benefit in correcting such failure. In this case, the Commission 
accepts that absent the proposed arrangements, the pricing of the 
relevant chemicals fails to take into account the negative externalities 
109 Generic Medicines Industry Association Pty Ltd (2010) 37; see also SAOGA (2010).
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associated with the disposal or environmental impact of the packaging 
of those products. The Commission therefore believes arrangements 
which correct, or correct to a certain extent, these failures are likely to 
constitute public benefits.110
Figure 4.12: The summed weights of improved environmental practices in 
ACCC authorisation determinations in the sample studied across five years
Source: Author’s research.
In Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers,111 the environmental 
benefits resulting from the proposed agreement between industry participants 
was acknowledged by the commission: ‘a scheme which contributes to human 
health and the improvement of the environment would benefit the Australian 
public, and may also benefit the total world population and environment’.112 In 
Refrigerant Reclaim,113 the commission allowed authorisation of a scheme for a 
refrigerant-gas recovery program to cover synthetic greenhouse gases. It was 
also stated that the scheme would add only a negligible amount, of about $0.20c 
to the price paid by the consumer.114 
In the VENCORP decision115 the commission accepted the environmental 
benefits of using gas and stated: ‘the use of gas has environmental benefits when 
110 Agsafe Ltd A30194, 2 September 1998, 4. Also see: Agsafe Limited A90871, 18 September 2003, 16, para 6.5.
111 Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers Inc A90658, 26 August 1998.
112 ibid, 9.
113 Refrigerant Reclaim Australia Ltd A90854, 7 May 2003; for an earlier authorisation covering the same 
agreement see A90548, 29 July 1994. See also Australian National Retailers Association Limited A910939, 13 
August 2008.
114 ACCC, ‘ACCC Draft Decision Proposes to Allow Greenhouse Gas, Ozone Recovery Program’ (Press Release 
MR 042/03, 27 February 2003).
115 Victorian Energy Networks Corporation A90646–A90648, 19 August 1998.
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
110
compared with other carbon based forms of energy’.116 The weight attached to 
this public benefit was not significant, however, and the main public benefit 
was considered to be economic efficiency and facilitating structural reform.
It is interesting to note that this factor has been more relevant over the recent 
past with 11 decisions referring to it as a minor factor in 2008 and six considering 
it to be a major benefit in 2010. The Refrigerant determination in 2008 and the 
Agsafe determinations in 2010 raised this issue again, and the ACCC considered 
it to be of importance and the DP World Australia Limited & Patrick Stevedores 
determination prompted the ACCC to comment that the reduction of truck 
movement would lower carbon emissions and bring environmental benefits.117
Equitable Dealings and Empowering Small Business
Small business protection has been one of the concerns of Part IVA of the Trade 
Practices Act.118 There are a number of provisions in the Act, which directly or 
indirectly deal with small business interests.119 The authorisation process too 
has been used for the purpose of protecting small business interests. In 1976, 
such authorisations for collective negotiations were granted on the basis that it 
was of assistance to efficient small businesses. Collective bargaining is defined 
as an arrangement whereby multiple competitors in an industry come together, 
either directly or through the appointment of a representative to negotiate on 
their behalf, to negotiate the terms and conditions of supply with another, 
usually larger, business.120
The authorisation applications on collective negotiations fall into two groups.121 
The first group of authorisations relates to the negotiation of fees for service. An 
example of this is the Australian Medical Association Limited authorisation.122 
Here, the South Australian and federal Australian medical associations jointly 
applied to the ACCC for authorisation for its members to negotiate and give effect 
to a common service agreement for the remuneration of visiting medical officers 
practicing in 65 SA rural public hospitals. The main issue in the SA medical 
system was the difficulties in attracting doctors to rural areas. This application 
116 ibid, 26.
117 DP World Australia Limited & Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Limited (2010), 25.
118 Efforts made to provide greater protection to small businesses can be found in s 51AC in Part IVA of 
the Trade Practices Act. See Nagarajan, ‘The Accommodating Act: Reflections on Competition Policy and the 
Trade Practices Act’ (2002) 20(1) Law in Context 34, for a discussion of this point. 
119 See Graeme Samuel, ‘Big Business v Small Business’ (Speech delivered at the Australian Graduate Management 
School Dinner, Sydney, 4 November 2004). See also Business Council of Australia, ‘Submission to the Committee of 
Inquiry: Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974’, 9 July 2002, 25.
120 ACCC, ‘Authorising and Notifying Collective Bargaining and Collective Boycott: Issues Paper’ (July 2004) 2.
121 Rhonda Smith, ‘Authorisation and the Trade Practices Act: More about Public Benefit’ (2003) 11 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 21, 34.
122 Australian Medical Association Limited A90622, 31 July 1998.
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was successful.123 The second group is the authorisation applications by small 
business to jointly negotiate in order to increase their bargaining power. Such 
businesses are usually negotiating with large corporations to sell or buy goods 
and services. An example of this form of conduct is the recent authorisation 
of Tasmanian Vegetable Growers, which allowed these growers to collectively 
bargain with Tasmania’s two vegetable processors.124
Collective bargaining increases the bargaining power of small businesses 
because it makes possible a credible threat of a collective boycott.125 The Dawson 
Committee noted:
Collective bargaining at one level may lessen competition but, at another 
level, provided that the countervailing power is not excessive, it may 
be in the public interest to enable small business to negotiate more 
effectively with big business.126
Such conduct may bring about a wealth distribution from big business to small 
businesses. It does not necessarily increase efficiency or pass on the savings 
to the consumer. The ACCC has considered that certain public benefits may 
flow from collective bargaining. These include improved bargaining power, 
transaction cost savings, redistribution of monopoly profits and easing the 
transition to industry deregulation.127 These benefits, however, come at certain 
costs and the public detriment recognised by the ACCC includes lost efficiencies 
resulting from collusion, effect on competitors outside the bargaining group, 
reduced scope for new market entry, and increased potential for collective 
activity beyond that authorised.128 Figure 4.13 illustrates the importance of this 
factor in ACCC determinations from 1984 to 2003, where it has accounted for 
more than a quarter of the determinations in each of these years.
After considering concerns expressed to it, the Dawson Committee recommended 
a notification process for collective bargaining, which was introduced in 2006 
(discussed in Chapter 2). Notification of collective bargaining reinforces the 
recognition of non-efficiency-based benefits by the ACCC, and this amendment 
to the Act represents a step in strengthening the power to recognise such 
benefits. The new streamlined process was actively promoted by the ACCC. It is 
123 Other examples include: St Vincent’s Private Hospital (2001) ATPR (Com); St Vincent’s Private Hospital 
and Others A90679, 28 June 2000.
124 See Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association A90914, 17 November 2004. 
125 Smith (2003) 35. See also A Hood, ‘The Confused Case of Countervailing Power in Australian Competition 
Law’ (2000) 8(1) Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1.
126 [Dawson Review] (2003) 3.
127 ACCC, Guide to Collective Bargaining Notifications (March 2008) 28–32. Other public benefits include 
continuing viability of small business, opening up marketing opportunities, reduced risk of unconscionable 
conduct, improved industrial harmony and promotion of industry associations. 
128 ibid, 34–34. 
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likely that the fall in 2006 in this criterion being cited in determinations (Figure 
4.13) can be explained by applicants preparing to shift from the authorisation 
process to the notification process.129
Figure 4.13: The summed weights of the promotion of equitable dealings 
in ACCC authorisation determinations in the sample studied across five 
years 
Source: Author’s research.
These notification determinations were conducted on similar lines to the 
authorisation process in 2007 and there were four such notifications.130 Although 
it was referred to as being of minor importance in 2008, it is in 2010 that this 
factor was relied on again in three cases dealing with applications to collectively 
negotiate.131 
129 John Martin, ‘The ACCC & Small Business’, (Speech delivered at the Swan Chamber of Commerce 
Conference, Perth, 27 October 2005) <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/713033> at 31 
October 2008. See also Martin, ‘Trade Practices Issues for Small and Medium Enterprises’, (Speech delivered 
at the Law Institute of Victoria Commercial Law Conference, Melbourne, 18th November 2005) <http://www.
accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/715317> at 31 October 2008; Martin, ‘Racing, Sports Betting and 
the ACCC’, (Speech delivered at the Racing and Sports Betting Forum, Sydney, 12 December 2006) <http://
www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=776979&nodeId=a8da0e38e9e32a4aabae7582da16ae9a&fn=R
acing,%20sports%20betting%20and%20the%20ACCC.pdf> at 31 October 2008.
130 See Graeme Samuel, ‘Taking a Holistic Approach to Assisting Small Business’ (Speech delivered to the 
National Small Business Summit, 11 June 2008) 5, where it was stated that this process is still underutilised. 
For examples of collective boycott notifications see Nelson Enterprises Pty Ltd & Ors CB00001 & CB00002 
(23 August 2007); The Wangaratta Anaesthetic Group CB00006 (17 December 2007); Australian Newsagents’ 
Federation Limited CB00003 (13 September 2007).
131 See: Liquor Stax Australia Pty Ltd (2010) A91237; Premium Milk Ltd (2010) A91236.  
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Increased Employment in Particular Areas
Employment is sometimes addressed under two separate headings of public 
benefits, one referring to employment in efficient industries and the second 
referring to employment in particular geographic areas. Figure 4.14 deals with 
employment as one category. In the Ansett authorisation,132 it was claimed 
that the proposed conduct would result in increased employment. The ACCC 
concluded that it was unable to determine whether this was likely to occur 
on the available evidence (even though authorisation was granted on other 
grounds). Employment in particular areas was a ‘very important’ criterion 
in 2006 with BHP Billiton, as employment was likely to increase within the 
Pilbara region. The commission also stated that the royalties paid to the Western 
Australian Government were likely to be applied towards investment projects 
and infrastructure across Western Australia, resulting in short- and longer-term 
employment and investment.133 This factor was also cited as being of minor 
importance in the Federation of Australian Wool Organisations and Southern 
Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils authorisations.134 
Figure 4.14: The summed weights of the expansion of employment 
and employment growth in efficient industries in ACCC authorisation 
determinations in the sample studied across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
132 Ansett Australia, Ansett International, Air New Zealand and Singapore Airlines A90649, A90655, 22 July 1998.
133 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd A90981, A90982, A90983, 1 February 2006, 22.
134 Federation of Australian Wool Organisations A90984, A90985, 11 January 2006; Southern Sydney 
Regional Organisation of Councils A90980, 25 January 2006.
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In the Federation of Australian Wool Organisations authorisation, submissions 
by numerous bodies, including the Australian Superfine Wool Growers’ 
Association Incorporated, the New South Farmers Association and Australian 
Wool Exchange Ltd claimed the employment of wool classers, shearing and 
shed-hand contractors, as well as those employed in the brokerage and handling 
sectors, would increase if the proposed conduct was authorised.135 It was 
accepted by the ACCC only as a minor benefit, the major benefits being industry 
rationalisation, discussed above.136 Once again this benefit was considered in 
2010 in two determinations, namely Santos Queensland and Brisbane Marine. 
In the former, the ACCC accepted that the joint marketing arrangements would 
assist to maintain employment in the region,137 and, in the latter, the ACCC 
accepted that the authorisation of an exclusive agreement would guarantee, 
among other factors, the employment of pilots.138
Increasing Industrial Harmony
This benefit has not been a significant feature of the determinations, only 
being considered ‘very important’ in the Australian Rail Transport Federation 
authorisation in 1984,139 which accounts for its high rating as a summed weight 
in the graph (Figure 4.15). This authorisation was lodged by the federation, a 
registered organisation of employers for agreements made with the Transport 
Workers Union of Australia. The agreements were about the terms and conditions 
in long-distance road transportation and freight contracts of owners/drivers in 
the road transport industry. The federation had successfully submitted an earlier 
application and this application, which was also successful, sought to broaden 
the ambit of authorisation.140 In all the other determinations, including the 1984 
Australian Road Transport Federation authorisation,141 the 1998 Steggles142 and 
the Australian Medical Association Limited authorisations,143 as well as the 2003 
Australian Hotels Association authorisation144 and the CSR authorisation,145 this 
public benefit was only classed as being of ‘minor importance’.
135 ibid, 20–1.
136 See earlier discussion in this chapter.
137 Santos QNT Pty Ltd (2010) A91215–A91216, 2 June 2010, 12.
138 Brisbane Marine Pilots Pty Ltd (2010) A91235, 28.
139 A30103, 1 November 1984.
140 Re Australian Road Transport Federation A30103, 1 November 1984; for earlier application see Re 
Australian Road Transport Federation A90346, 4 March 1982, ATPR (Com) 50-031, 55355.
141 Australian Road Transport Federation A30103, 1 November 1984.
142 Steggles Limited A30183, 20 May 1998.
143 Australian Medical Association Limited A90622, 31 July 1998.
144 Australian Hotels Association (NSW) A90837, 27 July 2003.
145 CSR Limited A90808, 10 June 2003.
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Figure 4.15: The summed weights of increasing industrial harmony in ACCC 
authorisation determinations in the sample studied across five years 
Source: Author’s research.
Regulation of Illegal Activity
The ACCC has stated that attempts to control illegal activity would be viewed 
as a public benefit. Graeme Samuel acknowledged the importance of industry 
codes to ‘address the growing problem of the backyard manufacture of speed 
using commonly available over the counter cold and flu decongestants’.146 
This was the main reason for the authorisation of a code aimed at preventing 
common cold and cough medicines being obtained by backyard laboratories for 
the manufacture of amphetamines.147
Complex Sites of Public Benefit Analysis
Although many authorisation decisions can be straightforward, such as the BHP 
Billiton authorisation, which concentrated on efficiency benefits, other decisions 
are more complex and call for a detailed analysis. This section discusses six such 
sites, which have raised a myriad of issues that have, at times, been difficult to 
identify and prioritise.
146 ACCC, ‘ACCC Authorises Industry Code to Restrict Manufacture of Illegal Amphetamines’ (Press Release 
MR 229/03, 27 October 2003).
147 Australian Self-Medication Industry A30223, 22 October 2003. Also see Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers 
Association A80001 (86) ATPR (Com) 50127. 
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Health of Patients, Consumers and Workers
Regulating the health industry via competition laws has been controversial. This 
was partly explained by the tribunal when it stated that there are several things 
special about the health industry that results in market failure and, in such 
circumstances, more competition is not necessarily a good thing for efficiency.148 
One reason for the health industry needing special consideration is its delivery 
of a service that is considered to be an important right of persons in the 
community. The tribunal has termed this a ‘merit good’, where community values 
override consumer sovereignty and income is redistributed in part through the 
provision of merit goods on a free or subsidised basis.149 In The Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners authorisation, the College sought authorisation 
for general practitioners to agree on the fees they charged their patients. One 
of the benefits cited by the college was that such an agreement would provide 
continuity of patient care, as patients would be aware of the fees charged by all 
the general practitioners in the practice and would face no barriers to seeing 
another general practitioner when their preferred general practitioners was not 
available. The commission accepted that this benefit was likely to contribute to 
maintaining the quality of care provided by general practitioners.150 The ACCC 
recognised the importance of high quality health care and stated: 
The Commission recognises that the Australian community expects 
that high quality healthcare will be widely available. Successive 
Commonwealth governments have responded to this by subsidising 
the provision of healthcare in Australia, particularly by GPs through 
Medicare. This highlights the fact that GPs are a key foundation of the 
Australian health system. Consequently, the Commission recognised 
that maintaining or improving the quality of healthcare provided by 
GPs is an important public benefit.151
Further, the instances of market failure are common in many areas of the health 
industry. The tribunal examined the provision of services by pathologists for 
examples of market failure. Three main causes of market failure were discussed. 
These reasons are applicable to many services provided by the health industry. 
First, the provision of pathology services is characterised by the ‘moral hazard’ 
associated with the existence of insurance, since the existence of insurance cover 
148 Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004), paras 144, 158.
149 ibid, para 38.
150 Royal Australian College of General Practitioners A90795, 19 December 2002, para 5.32. The ACCC stated 
that this benefit was likely to be minimal because, even where general practitioners in the same practice begin 
by charging different fees, within a short period of time competition among general practitioners in a practice 
is likely to result in a common fee being charged. 
151 ibid, para 5.24.
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tends to make patients relatively insensitive to the price of medical services and 
hence consume too much.152 Price insensitivity is likely to be valid for all types 
of medical services. 
A second reason for market failure is classified as the principal-agent problem. 
The tribunal pointed out that the patient goes to the doctor and the doctor 
orders pathology tests. It is not the doctor who pays for these services and 
hence will not generally consider the marginal costs and benefits of them. Such 
a problem is likely to be common to all medical specialist services, as well as to 
general practitioners who may prescribe drugs, but usually do not inform the 
patient of the costs and alternative drugs available. 
Third, the tribunal pointed out that pathology services also have some 
characteristics of a public good, which is defined from an economic perspective 
as one in which there is no rivalry in consumption and everyone can consume 
the total output.153 The tribunal pointed out that there are a number of benefits 
derived from such a service, including the improved health of the population 
and productivity of the workforce. Further, the training of pathology registrars 
is a costly exercise that is usually borne by the public hospital system, involving 
the payments to registrars and their supervisors and the provision of materials 
and equipment. Once trained, the pathologists leave the hospitals where they 
have received their training and work for another laboratory, which receives 
the benefit of their training without paying for it.154 All these benefits were 
recognised as public benefits by the tribunal and the ACCC for the purposes of 
the authorisation decision.
The commission considered the health of the general public, consumers as well 
as employees, in its decisions.155 In 1998 Deputy Commissioner Allan Asher 
stated that the authorisation of collective bargaining agreements between 
doctors in rural South Australia and the SA Health Commission would benefit 
the consumer through access to professional health services at a lower cost than 
would otherwise have been available.156 In Tasmanian Oyster Research Council,157 
the authorisation application related to the imposition of a levy to fund scientific 
research aimed at producing disease-free oysters. The commission granted the 
authorisation stating that the maintenance of health and safety measures was a 
public benefit.158 
152 Australian Association of Pathology Practices [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004) para 33.
153 ibid, para 35.
154 ibid, para 39.
155 See, for example, Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation (1987) ATPR (Com) 50-061; Commonwealth 
Serum Laboratories Commission Novo Industries A/S and Novo Laboratories Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR 50-088.
156 Allan Asher, ‘Sustainable Economic Growth for Regional Australia’, (Speech delivered at the 
Competition Issues and the Regions, National Conference, Beaudesert, 3 November 1998) <http://www.accc.
gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/96907> at 1 November 2004.
157 Tasmanian Oyster Research Council (1991) ATPR (Com) 50-106.
158 ibid, 56-054.
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In the Abbott Australasia Pty Ltd and Nestle Australia authorisation,159 the 
application related to an arrangement to adopt a code of marketing between 
manufacturers and importers of infant formula, which could have breached the 
exclusionary provisions of the Act. Here the commission noted that the main 
benefits included the availability of information to health care professionals 
and consumers, particularly women who were determining whether or not to 
breastfeed.
In the Homeworkers160 authorisation, a code of practice was authorised by the 
ACCC on the basis that it would bring a number of societal and health benefits 
to the workers involved. The code regulated the employment entitlements 
of homeworkers and sought to assist them by promoting improved working 
conditions for workers and their families. These included lessening the risk of 
exploiting a less advantaged group, provision of information to homeworkers 
to assist them to understand their entitlements, and the provision of improved 
working conditions for homeworkers and their families. 
The application of the competition law to the medical profession and related 
health industries has caused confusion among the profession,161 as illustrated 
by the Australian Medical Association determination162 in which the association 
stated that the reason for making the application was to provide it with 
certainty and legal protection in its dealings with state and territory health 
departments.163 Similarly, in Australian Dental Association,164 the commission 
agreed that the accepted norm of having consistency of fees within a medical 
or dental surgery, although constituting exclusionary conduct, would ensure 
a shared responsibility for the continuity and quality of patient care to be 
maintained within a shared practice.165 In 2008 there were six applications 
dealing with the medical and dental sectors, all of which were authorised.166 In 
2010 there were three such determinations authorised.167
159 Abbott Australasia Pty Ltd and Nestle Australia Limited (1992) ATPR (Com) 50-123.
160 The Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia and the Council of Textile and Fashion Industries 
Limited (2000) ATPR (Com) 50-282.
161 See: Stephen G Corones (2005) ‘The uncertain application of competition law in health care markets’ 
33(6) Australian Business Law Review, 407–28.
162 Australian Medical Association Limited & Ors (2008) A91100.
163 ibid, 14, 33.
164 Australian Dental Association (2008) A91094 & A91095.
165 ibid, 20, see also Vision Group Holdings Limited (2010) A91217, 8.
166 Australian Dental Association (2008) A91094 & A91095; Australian Medical Association (2008) A91100, 
A91088; CALMS Ltd (2008) A91092 and Rural Doctors Association of Australia Limited (2008) A91078.
167 Generic Medicines Industry Association (2010), Vision Group Holdings (2010).
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Right to Due Process/Right to Justice
The right to access appeal mechanisms and have a fair hearing has been 
considered a public benefit. This issue has not presented itself to the commission 
in a direct manner, as access to due process is not the main point of authorisation 
applications. They are repeatedly encountered indirectly, however, in those 
applications dealing with the adoption of a code of conduct. The commission 
has often sought to strengthen governance processes, such as the access to 
appeal mechanisms, by using its conditions power under section 90(3). 
One reason for the imposition of such conditions is to curb any misuse of market 
power and increased market concentration, conditions that are addressing long-
term efficiency in the market. Another equally important reason is that the ACCC 
is facilitating the decentring of regulation. Doing so allows private enforcement 
by the participants in the scheme. When dealing with authorisations involving 
deregulated industries, the commission has imposed conditions primarily 
dealing with governance issues, such as incorporating the right to appeal 
against decisions made by associations. In 1998, out of the 36 decisions studied, 
the ACCC granted authorisation on the basis of conditions in 16 instances.
In the Steggles application,168 the ACCC reviewed a proposed arrangement 
between Steggles Limited, a purchaser of chickens, and a number of small 
chicken farmers, who were the sellers of the chickens. The arrangement would 
allow Steggles Limited to negotiate with the growers collectively concerning 
the rates and conditions for the raising of broiler chickens. The commission was 
satisfied that the proposed arrangements would assist in a smooth transition 
to deregulation for the SA chicken-meat industry.169 Other public benefits 
that the commission considered were likely to result from the arrangement 
included: addressing the inequality in the negotiating process for growers 
who would benefit from being able to negotiate collectively and a reduction in 
costs for both Steggles and the growers. The commission, however, expressed 
concern about a dispute resolution provision in the proposed agreement and 
granted authorisation subject to a condition that required this provision to 
be amended. The proposed dispute resolution provision allowed for the SA 
Steggles Consultative Committee to bind parties in dispute to a decision made 
unanimously by that committee. The commission considered the proposed 
dispute resolution to be insufficiently independent or fair and stated:
The Commission considers that the constitution of the committee 
would not always be sufficiently independent such that fairness of a 
decision made by the committee could be guaranteed. Consequently, 
168 Steggles, A30183, 20 May 1998.
169 ibid, para 8.32; see also para 8.15.
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the Commission considers that in order for Rule 13 not to contain a 
provision for conduct that may be likely to contravene provisions of the 
Act. Rule 13(b) should be amended to include provision for appeal to 
independent arbitration by a party mutually agreed to by the parties in 
dispute.170
The ACCC asked for the rule to be amended to include provision for appeal to 
independent arbitration by a party mutually agreed to by the parties in the 
dispute. Similarly, in Real Estate Institute of Australia Limited, the ACCC was 
asked to authorise a code of conduct. The ACCC agreed to the authorisation only 
if adequate provision was made for consumer access to the complaint-handling 
mechanism and for appeals to be made to an independent arbitrator. The ACCC 
stated:
The establishment of a complaint handling mechanism that provides for 
an avenue of appeal to an independent arbitrator and the making of 
decisions in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness as 
well as public reporting is important, therefore, not only to ensure that 
the Code is likely to result in a benefit to the public but also to act as a 
check against any attempt to use the complaint handling procedures in 
an anticompetitive manner.171 
Again, in the Agsafe determination, the commission asked for the code to be 
varied to ensure ‘independence and allow for natural justice and procedural 
fairness’.172 In Victorian Energy Networks Corporation,173 the application was 
made by a statutory gas company established by legislation and it sought 
approval for the terms and conditions on which access to transmission pipeline 
services would be made available to third parties. Here, the commission granted 
authorisation on the basis that the corporation report to the market on a prompt 
basis in order to make information available in a timely and transparent manner. 
Another example can be found in Australasian Performing Rights Association 
(APRA), in which authorisation was granted on the basis of a number of 
conditions, one of which required APRA to set up a new dispute-resolution 
mechanism to handle complaints between it and its users. The conditions 
required that disputes be heard before a panel of three adjudicators to determine 
the outcome and also required APRA to bear the cost of the dispute-resolution 
process. APRA contested this on the basis of the cost involved and proposed 
another model that saw APRA paying the cost of the mediator in the dispute-
170 ibid, para 8.14.
171 Real Estate Institute of Australia Limited (2000) ATPR (Com) 50-279, 53453.
172 Agsafe (1994) ATPR (Com) 50-150, 55261; see also Australian Communications Access Forum Inc (1998) 
ATPR (Com) 50-262, 55246; Australian Hotels Association (NSW) A90837, 27 June 2003, where the applicants 
agreed to develop a dispute resolution mechanism as a condition of the authorisation being granted.
173 Victorian Energy Networks Corporation A90646–A90648, 19 August 1998.
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resolution process, but proposing that the remaining administrative costs, such 
as the costs of the stenographers and room hire, should be shared between the 
parties. The ACT in its decision found a middle ground and commented that 
such a process was an essential avenue for dissatisfied members to air their 
grievances against APRA, which retained a monopoly position in the market.174 
The decision recognises that adequate dispute resolution mechanisms may be 
one way of monitoring the activities of monopolies. 
At times, these dispute-resolution processes are in addition to those available 
under the law. They offer, however, cheaper, quicker and less formal alternatives 
with more flexible remedies. In the Australian Amalgamated Terminals Pty Ltd 
(AAT) authorisation the ACCC required the incorporation of a dispute-resolution 
process, with provision for mediation and, ultimately, expert determination 
accessible by end users of AAT’s terminals.175 This was in addition to other 
dispute-resolution process in operation and was not intended to compromise 
the operation of these existing processes.176 Likewise, in the Victorian Egg 
Industry Cooperative authorisation, the conditions provided an independent 
appeal mechanism for producers in addition to the procedures provided under 
the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic).177 Similarly, in the Australian 
College of Cosmetic Surgery authorisation, the ACCC required the inclusion of 
a condition in the college’s code requiring that the member of the external 
appeals committee not be a member of the college.178 In the College of Surgeons 
authorisation, the conditions imposed required that a number of the members of 
the appeals committee had to be nominated by the Australian health ministers, 
reflecting the public interest issues involved in the determination.179 
Facilitation of Deregulated Industries
The commission dealt with an increasing number of authorisation applications 
from the deregulated sectors of the economy that came within the ambit of the 
Act after the amendments made to it in 1995. Accordingly, only the authorisation 
decisions studied in 1998 include applications from deregulated industries. Of 
the decisions studied, the largest number of applications were from previously 
state-owned enterprises, including electricity, water and gas industries. Others 
included industries that had received protection from statute, such as the Wool 
Board or the Egg Marketing Board, as well as the professions, including the 
medical profession, which has been subject to competition law since 1995.
174 Australian Performing Rights Association Ltd A30186–A30193, 14 January 1998, para 330.
175 Australian Amalgamated Terminals Pty Limited (2009) A91141, A91142, A91181, A91181.
176 ibid, 36–37.
177 The Victorian Egg Industry Co-operative (1995) A40072 29. This authorisation determination is not part 
of the empirical study. 
178 Australasian College of Cosmetic Surgery (2009) A91106, 56. 
179 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons (2003) A91106, 217.
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Both efficiency and non-efficiency arguments were advanced and accepted by 
the commission in many of these cases. The most commonly accepted efficiency 
criteria were fostering business efficiency and the promotion of competition 
in the industry. Equally important were the non-economic benefits. The two 
most important were the promotion of equitable dealings in the market and 
the enhancement of the quality and safety of goods and services. Evidence of 
these benefits being passed on to the public is not always present. The need to 
allow time for deregulated industries to operate within a competitive market 
was acknowledged by the commission:
The Commission is of the opinion that there is some public benefit in 
facilitating the transition to full compliance with the Trade Practices 
Act in certain circumstances. This will help minimise the adjustment 
costs that could result from too precipitous a change from the previous 
exemption. A public benefit arises because a transition phase may help 
to allow industry participants to adjust to new negotiation systems.180
This flexible approach is necessary in a time of transition and it would be 
difficult to bring about structural change and allow such industries to function 
in a competitive market with hard and fast rules. Further, the ACCC intends 
that, by adopting such an approach, it is building commitment to long-term 
compliance to the Act, which would be viewed as a public benefit. The most 
important non-efficiency benefits that featured prominently in 12 out of the 19 
decisions examined was the enhancement of quality and safety of goods and 
services. 
Encouraging Compliance and Self-regulation
Often, self-regulation, compliance and the encouragement of ethical practices 
are interrelated. For example, in the Medicines Australia Limited authorisation181 
the applicant was a national association representing the prescription medicines 
industry in Australia. It was seeking authorisation for its code of conduct, 
which had the likely effect of breaching section 45 of the Act. The applicant 
successfully argued that the code would encourage compliance and self-
regulation via, among other things, the inclusion of ethical practices.182 
180 Australian Medical Association and South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association 
Incorporated A90622, 31 July 1998, 51.
181 Medicines Australia Limited A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003.
182 In other cases, facilitating compliance with legislation has been considered to be a minor benefit. See 
ibid, para 5.32.
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John Braithwaite and Christine Parker discussed the new regulatory state’s 
move from command and control toward indirect governance.183 One way in 
which such governance can occur is by facilitating self-regulation, and the 
commission has played an active role in doing just that. Since the mid 1980s, 
self-regulation in the form of codes of conduct has been viewed as an efficient 
regulatory tool by the commission.184 The then Commissioner, Ron Bannerman, 
identified three broad influences which affect the pursuit of efficiency: market 
forces; rationalisation, meaning the efficient reorganisation of resources and the 
methods of using them so as to reduce the cost of production and distribution; 
and, self-regulation, which can be a lower-cost method than government 
regulation and can thus contribute to efficiency.185 Bannerman, however, voiced 
the main concerns expressed about self-regulation by saying: ‘a point sometimes 
overlooked is that particular sorts of self-regulation prevent the operation of 
market forces and may thereby actually reduce efficiency’.186 
Clearly, proposed self-regulation schemes can bring both benefits and detriments, 
and consideration of such proposals is usually complex. The importance of self-
regulation has been recently reinforced by Samuel, when he announced that 
the ACCC would introduce a system of endorsement for high quality industry 
codes of conduct because it ‘has the potential to provide effective industry 
codes that deliver real benefits to businesses and consumers with the least 
possible compliance costs placed on either’.187 This statement demonstrates 
the recognition that self-regulation can be more efficient and less costly than 
regulation, which relies on command and control strategies.
In Media Council of Australia (No. 2), the tribunal considered an appeal by 
the Australian Consumers Association about a commission decision to authorise 
four applications relating to a number of codes of conduct and asked the council 
to consider a number of variations. The tribunal acknowledged that such self-
regulatory strategies were achieving government policy. It recognised that 
there were some efficiencies of both a procedural and enforcement kind that 
would result from the proposed conduct. In refusing to grant the authorisation, 
however, the tribunal found, among other things, that the proposed codes 
were not reflective of community standards and values, and that the rights of 
appeal under the codes were inadequate. The tribunal went beyond economic 
183 John Braithwaite and Christine Parker, ‘Conclusion’, in Christine Parker, Colin Scott, Nicola Lacey and 
John Braithwaite (eds), Regulating Law (2004).
184 See, for example, Royal Australian Institute of Architects A58, 7 September 1984; NSW and ACT 
Newsagency System A30093, A30093, 26 April 1984; Mercury Newsagency System A4782, A4937, 9 May 1984; 
Master Locksmiths Association of Australia Ltd A90387, A90388, 15 March 1984. See also Homeworkers (2000) 
ATPR (Com) 50-282.
185 Ron Bannerman, ‘Points from Experience 1967–84’, in Trade Practices Commission, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Annual Report 1983–84 (1984) 157, 191.
186 ibid, 192.
187 See ACCC, ‘ACCC to Endorse High Standard Voluntary Industry Codes of Conduct’ (Press Release MR 
168/03, 11 August 2003). As far as the author is aware, this has not been fully implemented.
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efficiency matters to examine the best way to give effect to community values 
and stated the current proposals had inbuilt design faults that allowed biased 
conduct against the new entrant, the small advertiser and the novel product.188
 In Australian Communications Access Forum Inc, the forum’s primary role was 
the generation of recommendations on declared services and submitting such 
draft access codes for approval by the ACCC. This application dealt with the 
constitution and rules of governance of the forum. One of the primary benefits 
recognised by the commission was the facilitation of self-regulation, and 
authorisation was granted.189
Chief concerns about self-regulation schemes are that they may encourage 
anti-competitive conduct, or that they may allow members to be unfairly 
treated without any avenue to obtain relief. The ACCC has used conditions to 
address such concerns. Once again, the importance of an appeals process and 
the costs implementing one have also been explored in the determinations. 
In the Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy authorisation the ACCC 
recommended that ‘the introduction of an appeals process for applicants 
denied admission to the Institute and the enhancement of procedural fairness 
through the introduction of a requirement for the Board to give reasons for 
its decisions’.190 While the first of these two issues were dealt with by the 
institute following the draft determination, the second was dealt with by the 
ACCC through the imposition of a condition to the grant of the authorisation. 
Another concern has been the need to have external oversight of compliance 
and, in the North West Shelf authorisation, the condition required an ACCC 
approved independent compliance auditor to review compliance with the terms 
of the authorisation and the agreed protocol. The conditions also required the 
applicants to implement all of the auditor’s recommendations. The auditor was 
required to report annually on the finding of the review as well as reporting on 
any non compliance with recommendations of the review.191
In Medicines Australia Inc, the ACCC considered that the Medicines code of 
conduct may not have the deterrent impact it promised and granted authorisation 
on the basis of a number of conditions.192 These included increased reporting 
and monitoring of specific activities and that any amendments to the guidelines 
in the code were supplied to the ACCC. In the College of Surgeons authorisation 
the ACCC was concerned with the exclusive role of the college in setting the 
standards for accrediting hospitals and training positions within hospitals. The 
188 Media Council of Australia (No 2) (1987) ATPR 40-774, 48451. See also John Duns, ‘Competition Law and 
Public Benefits’ (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 245, 265.
189 Australian Communications Access Forum Inc A90613, 22 April 1998, 15.
190 Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (2004) A90824, 20.
191 North West Shelf (1998) A90220, A91221, A91222 & A91223, 90.
192 Medicines Australia A90779–A90780, 14 November 2003, 37, para 5.58.
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conditions imposed included a requirement that the college establish a public, 
independent review of the criteria for accrediting hospitals for the provision 
of various surgical training positions.193 This condition was supplemented by 
others involving the participation of the state health ministers in the nomination 
of hospitals for accreditation194 and another condition required the college 
to establish an independent chaired committee to publicly review the tests 
that medical colleges use to assess overseas-trained surgeons.195 In Agsafe the 
condition required the independent monitor to report on the progress that the 
company is making in complying with the conditions imposed by the ACCC in 
the authorisation annually.196 
Promoting Ethical Conduct
For some time, professional ethics provisions have been acknowledged as an 
important regulatory tool by the commission. It has recognised the value 
of industry codes and has stated that it considers codes to be an extremely 
effective and market-sensitive mechanism for delivering the detail of consumer 
protection rules, provided they are appropriately framed, administered and 
monitored.197 The commission examines codes to ensure that they contain rules 
encouraging appropriate conduct and internal and external dispute resolution 
procedures to monitor such conduct. 
Professional ethics arise in authorisations as a subsidiary issue where a code 
of conduct is being considered for authorisation. In The Mortgage Industry 
Association of Australia authorisation, concerns about unethical conduct in the 
form of fraudulent conduct engaged in by some brokers in the mortgage industry 
had been commented on in a number of reports, including those undertaken by 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the Consumer Credit Legal 
Centre.198
Ethical conduct has at times arisen in the context of conditions subject to which 
authorisation has been granted. In Real Estate Institute of Australia Limited,199 
the ACCC granted authorisation to a real estate agents’ code of conduct on a 
number of conditions. One of these conditions required changing a clause in 
the code that required a member not to engage in conduct that was detrimental 
193 College of Surgeons (2003) A90765, 166.
194 ibid, 167–68.
195 ibid, 172.
196 Agsafe (2002) A90680 and A9068, 61.
197 ACCC, ‘Submission to the Financial System Inquiry (Wallis Inquiry)’, September 1986.
198 Mortgage Industry Association of Australia A90880, 18 February 2004, 10–1, paras 2.16, 2.18.
199 Real Estate Insitute of Australia Ltd (2000) ATPR (Com) 50-279. See also Real Estate Institute of Australia 
(1981) ATPR (Com) 50-013 for an earlier decision on the code of ethics.
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to the reputation or interests of the profession, the institute or its members. The 
ACCC saw such a clause as being at odds with the promotion of ethical standards 
and stated:
In the Commission’s view, clause 1.3(b) may lead to the Code being 
interpreted in a manner that is focussed on the interests of the REIA 
[Real Estate Institute of Australia], its affiliated institutes and the real 
estate profession rather than being interpreted in a manner that is 
primarily focussed on promoting ethical standards or real estate practice 
in the public interest.200
In the Mortgage Industry Association of Australia decision the ACCC did not 
impose any conditions on the basis that the proposed arrangements met the 
authorisation test. It did, however, suggest that the association consider adopting 
proposals made by interested parties, including Consumer Affairs of Victoria, on 
how the code could be improved and thereby enhance the standing of mortgage 
brokers.201 In Australasian College of Cosmetic Surgery a condition required the 
code to be amended so as to provide for an independent auditor to be appointed 
to report findings of checks on the manner in which the complaints panel of the 
college dealt with complaints made to it. The results of these audits are to be 
reported to the ACCC, as well as the college’s code administration committee.202
Protecting Certain Sectors of the Community
At different times the commission has viewed protection of specific sectors of the 
community as a public benefit. In the Homeworkers authorisation, lessening the 
risk of exploitation of a less advantaged group was seen as a public benefit.203 In 
the Agsafe authorisation the benefits flowing to the rural sector were considered 
important and the chairman stated in a press release:
The ACCC considers that the Agsafe program is of particular benefit to 
rural and regional Australia where agvet chemicals are predominantly 
used. Through its accreditation and training scheme, the Agsafe 
program has significantly increased knowledge and understanding of 
existing regulatory requirements for the safe transport, handling, and 
storage of agvet chemicals.204
In Job Futures, the ACCC recognised that a public benefit resulted from assisting 
people with physical or intellectual impairment to gain employment. The ACCC 
200 ibid, 50-279, 53455.
201 Mortgage Industry Association A90880, 18 February 2004, 27, para 6.32.
202 Australasian College of Cosmetic Surgery (2009) A91106, 57, 79.
203 The Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia and the Council of Textile and Fashion Industries 
(2000) ATPR (Com) 50-282, 53550.
204 ACCC, ‘ACCC authorises Agvet chemical safety program’ (2002).
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stated that the statement of values adopted by Job Futures reflected a focus 
upon the delivery of services to people who are most disadvantaged in relation 
to employment as a consequence of long-term unemployment or physical and 
intellectual disabilities.205 The commissioner stated:
The ACCC also recognises the public benefit in having smaller community 
based organisations participating in the Job Network, particularly as 
a result of their diversity in approach and local focus in delivering 
these services. These smaller non-profit organisations often provide 
employment services to disadvantaged people in places where larger for-
profit organisations do not operate.206
In the Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia authorisation, conditions 
imposed required an independent review to be conducted of the effectiveness 
of the Retailer Alert Scheme, which was a system for regulating inappropriately 
named or packaged alcohol products from the market. The ACCC noted that this 
scheme was weak as it did not contain a mechanism to enforce compliance and 
required the association to report to it on the findings of the review.207
In Summary …
This chapter has categorised public benefits from ACCC determinations across 
four decades. The determinations themselves have become more detailed, longer 
and transparent with the public benefits being much more clearly emphasised. 
The commonly held view that the ACCC’s decisions have become focused on 
economic efficiency is not supported by the empirical study, which shows 
that both efficiency and non-efficiency benefits have always had a place in the 
determinations. It also shows that non-efficiency benefits are more often and 
more successfully argued today than in 1976 or 1984. The study also shows that 
varying benefits have been emphasised at different times. 
The place of non-efficiency benefits is even more intriguing. Although some of 
these benefits, such as safety and quality, had long been acknowledged, others 
have become more important over time, and environmental benefits is one such 
example of this. The advantages of self-regulation had been recognised since 
205 Job Futures A90625, 8 April 1998, 12. This was again authorised in 2008. See Job Futures Limited 
A91084, A91085 (18 September 2008). See also Australian Medical Association Limited and South Australian 
Branch of the Australian Medical Association A90622, 31 July 1998, where the ACCC recognised the importance 
of attracting doctors to rural sectors. It should be noted that this reason came within Industry Rationalisation 
because it resulted in a more efficient allocation of resources. 
206 ACCC, ‘ACCC proposes to authorise employment services collective tendering arrangements’, (Press 
Release MR 183/08, 26 June 2008) <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/833255> at 30 
September 2008.
207 A91054 & A91055, 31 October 2007, 34–35, 48.
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the 1980s, with the commission encouraging it by approving codes of conduct 
that were, in effect, self-governance systems. Promotion of equitable dealings 
has become more important and has often been used as a way of monitoring 
powerful players in the deregulated market. This was also the explanation for 
the increasing incorporation of dispute-resolution mechanisms and appeal 
processes, which the commission sought to incorporate using the conditions 
power in granting authorisations. We might conceive this as a meta-regulatory 
shift towards procedural regulation of self-regulation by the ACCC.208
208 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002). 
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5. Discourses on Discretion and the 
Regulatory Agency
The authorisation process is a complex one that relies on the exercise of discretion. 
Those of the epistemic trade practices and competition policy community will 
understand how this discretion may be used and the outcomes it can deliver. 
But for others, the process is opaque. While legal and institutional factors can 
limit the exercise of discretion, so too can the regulatory strategies relied on. 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) strategies have 
embraced many of the principles of responsive regulation, which rest on wide 
discretionary powers, and which, although difficult to contain, deliver many 
positive outcomes. 
Discretion as a ‘Tube of Toothpaste’ 
Discretion here is considered from an interdisciplinary perspective.1 The degree 
of discretion granted to regulatory agencies has increased significantly over the 
last century.2 As the work of government extended in the second half of the 
twentieth century, so too did the work undertaken by government departments 
and agencies that relied on administrative discretion. The growth of discretionary 
powers in Australia has been largely a product of increased state regulation, 
which was direct during the 1960s and 1970s, and more indirect in the last three 
decades.3 Discretion has been examined in different ways and the two groups 
of significance in this discourse have been legal philosophers and sociologists. 
Legal philosophers, while focusing primarily on the manner in which judges 
use discretion, have looked at the manner in which discretion can be curtailed. 
Sociologists, on the other hand, see discretion as all pervasive and are more 
sceptical about controlling its use.
Discretion can be simply defined as allowing the decision maker or official to 
choose from a number of legally permissible options. Discretion can be viewed 
both positively and negatively. Where an official uses discretion to pursue 
commonly acknowledged goals, it can be viewed positively and where the 
official’s discretion is for the most part strictly determined by rules, discretion 
1 DJ Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (1986); Keith Hawkins (ed), The Uses 
of Discretion (1992); M Adler and S Asquith (eds), Discretion and Welfare (1981); Carol Harlow, ‘Law and Public 
Administration: Convergence and Symbiosis’ (2005) 79(2) International Review of Administrative Sciences 279.
2 Harlow (2005) 284.
3 Margaret Allars, Introduction to Australian Administrative Law (1990) 9. See also Allars, ‘Public 
Administration in Private Hands’ (2005) 12 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 126, 126; Harlow (2005). 
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is a residual concept and can be viewed negatively as a ‘lacuna in a system of 
rules’.4 Both these views have coloured the way in which discretion is viewed 
and controlled. Nielsen has pointed to the Danish regulatory inspectors whose 
work is characterised by a high level of dialogue and where discretion is likely 
to deliver positive outcomes.5 Alternatively discretion can be used negatively 
and Elaine Campbell has cited studies that examined the power of the police 
to stop and search.6 The circumstances where this power is used is open to 
interpretation and Campbell pointed out that the power can only be exercised 
where police have reasonable suspicion before doing so. Simply being known to 
the police, however, or fitting a stereotype of suspicions through appearance or 
lack of conformity can also be sufficient to attract police attention.
Discretion has been described by Kenneth Culp Davis, the American legal 
academic, in the context of a public official within an administrative agency, as 
‘a public official [having] discretion whenever the effective limits of his power 
leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction’.7 
Davis was concerned with the arbitrary use of discretion and favoured rule-
making, so forcing administrators to work inside a framework of rules. ‘Rule-
making, Davis hoped, ‘could fill the gap by moving discretion up the hierarchy 
and containing the line bureaucracy inside a framework of “tick-this-box” type 
of rule.’8 Davis’s contribution has been criticised as an over-legalistic approach 
and the ability of rules to constrain discretion has been queried.9 Robert Goodin 
pointed out that discretionary power can exist within rules, and that some 
kinds of discretion are not eliminable and the problems with discretion are 
insurmountable.10 Facts can be interpreted differently by officials and different 
legitimate outcomes can result, indicating the presence of discretion. Different 
outcomes can arise because different weights are attached to the relevant factors 
or because different facts are emphasised, again pointing to the importance of 
discretion.11 It has long been acknowledged that all rules require interpretation 
and all interpretative work involves discretion.12 
The argument that the more vague a rule the greater the discretion, and the 
more specific and compelling the rule the less room there may be for discretion, 
4 Robert Goodin, ‘Welfare Rights and Discretion’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 232, 233, 234.
5 Vibeke Nielsen, ‘Are Regulators Responsive?’ (2006) 28(3) Law and Policy 396, 401.
6 Elaine Campbell, ‘Towards a Sociological Theory of Discretion’ (1999) 27(2) International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law 79, 86.
7 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969).
8 See Harlow (2005) 285.
9 See Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995) 21; Goodin (1986) 232.
10 Goodin (1986) 233.
11 Administrative Review Council, Parliament of Australia, Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision 
Making, Report No 46, (2004) 12.
12 Galligan (1986) 260, See Baldwin, ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’ (1990) 53(3) Modern Law Review 321.
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has been discounted by many.13 It has been contended that discretion and rules 
are not ‘in a zero sum relationship such that the more rules there are the less 
the discretion there is and visa versa.’14 A mass of detailed rules can in fact 
increase discretion rather than reduce it and may be too complex to facilitate 
compliance.15 Julia Black has stated the presence of rules alone is not sufficient to 
limit discretion and the exercise of discretion will be governed by bureaucratic 
and organisational norms, as well as broader political and economic pressures 
and moral and social norms.16 It is generally agreed that both rules and discretion 
have a place in regulation and ‘it is not a choice between discretion and rules, but 
rather a choice between different mixes of discretion and rules’.17 Discretion can 
be regulated procedurally as well as by rules, for example, by requirements to 
render the exercise of discretion accountable to others by reporting requirements 
and transparency that enables the appealability of discretion. 
The notion that discretion can be managed in order to confine its exercise to 
certain actors and to limit the way in which those actors use it, has been widely 
discredited. Discretion is always present.18 John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai 
and Valerie Braithwaite, in their study on regulating aged care, looked at the 
relationship between rules and discretion. They examined the historical shift in 
the United States from broad, vaguely defined standards to specific ones, which 
resulted in the Illinois code for nursing homes having over 5000 quality-of-
care regulations in the 1980s.19 This shift from broad-based standards to specific 
ones was intended to improve reliability, which the authors, using empirical 
studies, found did not eventuate. Having an impossible number of standards 
has meant inspectors tend to concentrate on some issues while neglecting others 
for a variety of reasons, including the institution’s enforcement history or the 
inspector’s professional background; this causes endemic unreliability.20 The 
authors argued that, hand in hand with a paradox of reliability, is a paradox of 
discretion and stated:
More and more specific standards are written by lawmakers in the 
misplaced belief that this narrows the discretion of inspectors. The 
13 Julia Black, ‘Managing Discretion’ (Paper presented at the Australian Law Reform Commission 
Conference, Penalties: Policy, Principles and Practice in Government Regulation, Sydney, June 2001) 2; see 
also Goodin (1986) 232–34, Baldwin (1990) 16; Lorraine Gelsthorpe and Nicola Padfield (eds), Exercising 
Discretion: Decision-making in the Criminal Justice System and Beyond (2003) 5–16.
14 Black (2001) 2.
15 ibid, 7; see also Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, ‘Making a Success of Principles-based 
Regulation’ (2007) 1(3) Law and Financial Markets Review 191. 
16 Black (2001) 2; see also Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) 
Modern Law Review 59, 70.
17 Carl Schneider, ‘Discretion and Rules: A Lawyers’ View’, in Hawkins (1992) 49; Black, Rules and 
Regulators (1997) 20; Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (1984) 105.
18 Black (2001) 2; see also Goodin (1986) 238.
19 John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valerie Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New 
Pyramid (2007) 222–23.
20 ibid, 224–25.
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opposite is true: the larger the smorgasbord of standards, the greater 
the discretion of regulators to pick and choose an enforcement cocktail 
tailored to meet their own objective. A proliferation of more specific 
laws is a resource to expand discretion, not a limitation upon it.21
Sociologists have argued that an officer’s own sense of discretion can shape the 
way it is exercised, and also that discretion is shaped by various external social, 
economic and political factors.22 Sociologists see discretion as existing at every 
stage of administration: policy creation, policy implementation, and problem 
identification.23 Even the manner in which evidence is gathered may be based 
on discretion.24 Discretion is not just attached to rules and ‘can be a property 
of rules, a property of behaviour, or a sense the people have of their freedom 
to act.’25 Nicola Lacey has argued the sociologists’ contribution will inevitably 
shape the strict legal construction of discretion today. 
Anthony Giddens proposed a link between action and structure. The law 
as a structure can be enabling and permissive; it can provide a language of 
communication and signification of legally relevant incidents and it can establish 
norms for officers.26 Giddens proposed that day-to-day life is a continuous flow 
of intentional action and many acts have unintended consequences which may 
also become conditions of action.27 Christine Parker’s study on cartels provides an 
example of the intended and unintended consequences of exercising discretion. 
Here Parker examines the effect that media attention, which accompanies a win 
in a cartel case, can have on the industry. The ACCC had been able to use this 
attention to inform and motivate business to comply with the Act, to shame 
business convincing them to rehabilitate and also as a dialogue for persuasion.28 
Publicity for the ACCC’s actions was relied on heavily during the years when 
Allan Fels was chairman and it has been stated that ‘In effect this became the 
shield for Fels’ ACCC, creating an aura of power and public support that protected 
the agency from attacks by politicians and business.’29 This is much like the 
approach of open dialogue combined with censure in the annual reports adopted 
21 ibid, 226.
22 Hawkins (1992) 20; Nicola Lacey, ‘The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm’, in 
Hawkins (1992) 360, 364; Campbell (1999).
23 Lacey, ibid, 364. 
24 See Administrative Review Council (2004) 14 where the Social Security Appeals Tribunal noted that 
decisions ultimately rest on assessing the evidence and making a judgment.
25 Richard Lempert, ‘Discretion in a Behavioural Perspective’, in DJ Galligan (ed), A Reader on Administrative 
Law (1996) 393.
26 Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Legal Theory (1982) 30–31; see also discussion in Campbell 
(1999) 81–84.
27 Giddens (1982) 30–31.
28 Parker, Christine, Ainsworth, Paul and Stepanenko, Natalie, ‘ACCC Compliance and Enforcement Project: 
The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity on Cartel Cases’ (Working Paper, Centre of Competition and 
Consumer Policy, Australian National University, May 2004) 96–97.
29 Fred Brenchley, Allan Fels: A Portrait of Power (2003) 279.
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by Chairman Ron Bannerman, discussed in Chapter 2, which was successful in 
motivating a culture of compliance, as has been evident through the ACCC’s 
history. There could, however, be unintended consequences flowing from such 
actions, as Parker illustrates of the Fels period — the adverse media attention 
given to one alleged price-fixing investigation involving oil companies resulted 
in many lawyers and compliance officers losing faith in the ACCC; this led to the 
development of attitudes of resistance, defiance or disengagement towards the 
regulator.30 These events shaped the agency future trajectory — it made sectors 
of the trade practices community critical of the ACCC; many, including Fels, 
did not expect to be reappointed which created an atmosphere of uncertainty 
and undermined the assuredness of the ACCC and the officials within it; and 
the regulator faced review of its powers, including its use of discretion in the 
Dawson reviews that followed. Clearly, the manner in which the ACCC exercised 
its discretion in this area, before the raids on the oil companies which alleged 
had breached the law, by the regulator to gain evidence and adverse media 
coverage, was quite different to the manner in which it exercised its discretion 
after the raids.
Any examination of discretion must acknowledge Ronald Dworkin’s categorisation 
of discretion. Dworkin characterised discretion as the ‘hole in the doughnut’ 
— discretion does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt 
of restrictions.31 Dworkin distinguished three senses of discretion, two ‘weak’ 
and one ‘strong’. Strong discretion occurs where a person is not bound by the 
standards set by the authority in question.32 For Dworkin, discretion in this 
sense does not exist as there are always existing principles, such as rationality 
and fairness, that govern any such decision.33 Weak discretion is said to exist in 
two forms, the first where discretion requires some form of choice or judgment 
to be exercised by the decision-maker, even though standards exist; the second 
where the official has final authority for making a decision, which thereafter 
cannot be altered. For my purposes, strong discretion would not usually apply 
to regulatory agencies because their decisions are generally governed by 
principles in the form of internal guidelines and internal review mechanisms. 
This is the case with the ACCC and its interpretation of public benefit, governed 
by principles developed both by the ACCC in its guidelines and the Australian 
Competition Tribunal (ACT) in its decisions. The second type of weak discretion 
would not apply to most regulatory agencies because the decisions of such 
agencies are reviewable. The decisions of the ACCC in the authorisations area 
30 Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko, (2004) 98. Also see Valerie Braithwaite (ed), ‘Responsive Regulation 
and Taxation’ (2007) Special Issue Law and Policy 3; Valerie Braithwaite, Kristina Murphy and Monika Reinhart, 
‘Taxation. Threat, Motivational Postures and Responsive Regulation’ (2007) 29(1) Law and Policy 137.
31 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (2005) 31.
32 ibid, 31–33.
33 Galligan (1986) 20.
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are reviewable by the ACT. It is the first type of weak discretion that would 
apply — that the officials in the ACCC have to interpret the standard of ‘public 
benefit’. 
Denis Galligan has been critical of Dworkin categories of discretion arguing 
‘discretion occurs at a variety of points within any exercise of power’34 and it 
is shaped by other factors. Galligan argued discretion is a way of characterising 
power in respect of a certain course of action. In the case of discretion by officials 
in a regulatory agency, it begins with the official being aware of the purpose of 
the discretionary power and then determines the manner in which the purpose 
will be exercised. It can include the process of creating standards; settling what 
can come within existing standards; individualising and interpreting loose 
standards and assessing the relative importance of conflicting standards. It can 
also include choosing the policies, strategies, standards or procedures that may 
suit a particular situation.
Galligan proposed that discretionary power is based around two variables. The 
first is the scope that the official has for the assessment and judgement of the 
issues. In connection to this, Galligan stated there is discretionary power when 
there is a relative absence of guiding standards, accompanied by the inference 
that it is for the authority to establish its own.35 Further, Galligan pointed 
out that, even where there are standards, they may require further exercise 
of discretion in the creation of more specific, individualised standards. This is 
clearly applicable to the ACCC’s determination on the meaning of public benefit. 
The phrase itself is not defined, nor are there any guiding standards in the 
legislation, leaving it for the regulator to determine its meaning. The choice of 
the term itself caused considerable controversy and its inclusion was criticised 
(discussed in Chapter 3). Jeffrey Jowell stated that the use of standards, such 
as ‘public interest’ or ‘fair and reasonable’, usually give decision-makers a 
high degree of discretion.36 In the case of the ACCC, this is certainly true and 
it is left to the regulator to decide whether non-efficiency-based benefits, such 
as sustainability or improved safety conditions, will be recognised as public 
benefits. The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that many efficiency-based, 
as well as non-efficiency-based benefits have been recognised at various times. 
One controversial example is the empowering of small businesses; something 
ACCC officials have been recognising as a public benefit for some time has now 
been codified by virtue of the collective bargaining provisions.37
The second variable is the surrounding attitudes of officials as to how the issues 




37 See Sections 91AA–91AF Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
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disincentives for people to make decisions in particular ways.38 Here it is the 
institutional arrangements and the attitudes they engender that are important.39 
The mere existence of discretion does not necessarily mean that it is used. As 
Galligan has pointed out, ‘what may be discretionary from an external, legal 
point of view, may be anything but discretionary from the internal point of 
view of officials within the system’.40 Other institutional arrangements likely to 
influence the manner in which the decision will be exercised come from both 
within and outside the agency. Galligan stated that the official’s own attitude 
to his powers, to the institutional framework, are important considerations in 
understanding how powers are exercised and reflexively shape the nature of the 
institution.41 
All these factors apply to the ACCC. At different times, the officials within the 
organisation have focused on raising awareness and encouraging compliance 
rather than simply falling back to rule ritualism.42 The regulator itself has, 
by and large, engaged in a dialogue with business, leading one study in 1987 
to classify it as a ‘modest enforcer’ that used its discretion responsively to 
incorporate prosecution, fines and compliance.43 External scrutiny has always 
been important to regulators and this comes in different forms, the most obvious 
form being the appeals to the ACT.44 For example, in the Qantas decision, the 
ACCC did not approve the authorisation on the basis that the benefits were 
primarily going to the applicant and were not passed on to consumers. This 
decision was overturned by the ACT, which did not require that the benefit be 
passed on to the consumer.45 Although ACCC staff indicated their concern at 
the decision of the ACT, they nevertheless accepted that all further decisions 
would be governed by the ACT’s interpretation of public benefit.46 Another 
form of scrutiny, usually regarded as particularly demanding, is the Senate 
Committee Hearings, at which senior officials of a regulatory agency are subject 
to strenuous questioning on the conduct of the agency by members of the 
committee. All these factors will shape the manner in which officials within the 
regulator exercise their discretion. These limits and constraints on discretion are 
discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
38 Hawkins (1992) 6.
39 Galligan (1986) 13.
40 ibid.
41 ibid, 12.
42 Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, ‘Do Businesses take Compliance Systems Seriously? An 
Empirical Study of the Implementation of Trade Practices Compliance Systems in Australia’ (2006) 30(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 441.
43 John Braithwaite, Peter Grabovsky and John Walker, ‘An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies’ 
(1987) 9 Law and Policy 323.
44 See Karen Yeung, ‘Does the ACCC Engage in “Trial By Media”?’ (2005) 27(4) Law and Policy 549.
45 See Re Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004).
46 Interview 2.
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The metaphor of a ‘tube of toothpaste’ has been used to describe discretion 
— squeezing it from one area does not remove discretion; it merely moves 
the bulge to another area. The example of the use of conditions by the ACCC 
illustrates this point. An authorisation is determined on the basis that public 
benefit outweighs public detriment. In numerous cases, however, authorisation 
is granted on the basis of conditions that commonly address anticompetitive 
practices.47 This illustrates that the ACCC’s use of discretion is moving from 
the area of identifying and balancing public benefit and public detriment to 
imposing conditions to restrict public detriment and is aimed at gaining positive 
outcomes. In other words, it is difficult to control the amount of discretion and 
the direction in which that discretion may move.
The Constraints to Discretion
The traditional constraints on administrative power were expounded by AV Dicey 
in the late nineteenth century as part of his analysis of the rule of law. Dicey’s 
view on the rule of law clearly recognised the need to make agencies accountable, 
and one of the key features of the rule of law is the need to curb conferral of 
discretionary power to government officials in the interests of certainty and 
predictability. This approach views officials as being accountable to the courts.
The shortcomings of this construction of the rule of law have been discussed by 
many scholars.48 Dicey’s main concern was the arbitrary exercise of discretionary 
powers and his emphasis upon those areas of personal liberties concerning arrest, 
search, seizure and detention.49 The Diceyan view was to rely on the courts as 
the protectors of a person’s liberty against the arbitrary exercise of power by 
officials.50 This approach, categorised as the red light theory of administrative 
law,51 can be contrasted with the ‘green light’ theory of administrative law, 
which relies on the ‘realist’ and ‘functionalist’ jurisprudence that developed in 
the United States in the late nineteenth century. Rather than relying on judicial 
control of executive power, green light theorists rely on the political process. 
Whereas red light theorists are focused on external controls, the green light 
theorists would see the control of administrative activity as both internal, such 
as hierarchical supervisory measures, and external, such as being responsible 
to parliament. For red light theorists, the control is retrospective, green light 
theorists favour prospective control achieved through decision-making with 
administrative bodies, articulation and revision of policy, participation by 
47 Examples of such authorisations include: Mercury Newsagency System, 9 May 1984, NSW and ACT 
Newsagency System, 26 April 1984. See Chapter 6 for further discussion.
48 Allars (1990) 9–10; Harlow and Rawlings (1984) 38–40; Galligan (1986) 199–202.
49 Galligan (1986) 201.
50 Allars (1990) 9.
51 Harlow and Rawlings (1984) 29–66.
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interest groups in policy formulation, and establishing internal review/s.52 In 
Australia, as a result of the statutory reforms, compendiously referred to as ‘the 
new administrative law’,53 there was a shift away from the Diceyan approach in 
the 1970s. Today a combination of factors, including legal, practical and moral 
constraints, influences the exercise of discretion.54
Although the notion of discretion carries connotations of the freedom to choose 
how to act, it also has a negative characterisation directed at constraining the 
exercise of discretion.55 Much of the research concentrates on the manner in which 
discretion is constrained, the most fundamental being that the use of discretion 
must be for the purpose for which it is granted — it must constitute a lawful 
exercise of power. Discretion, however, may be constrained by non-legal factors, 
which include the amount of available resources, time, professional norms, and 
the political pressures to which the decision-maker perceives it to be subject.56
There have been numerous attempts to categorise the range of limits imposed 
on the exercise of discretion. I have distilled the main arguments on constraints 
on discretion in Table 5.1 which instills both the legally recognised constraints 
as well as the institutional constraints. The first three factors can be grouped 
together as legal constraints, widely accepted as necessary for a democratic 
society, governed by the rule of law, namely: authorised by law, procedural 
fairness, accountability, and rationality. The remaining six factors can be grouped 
together as institutional constraints, namely: nature of the task, efficiency and 
effectiveness, organisational issues, political and economic considerations, the 
overall attitudes of officials and, finally, a catch-all category titled ‘other factors’.
Table 5.1: Constraints to discretion
Authorised by law
Legal constraints Procedural fairness
Accountability








52 Allars (1990) 10.
53 ibid.
54 Galligan (1986) 30.
55 Goodin (1986) 232; Dworkin (2005) 31.
56 See Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion’ (1973) Public Law 180; see also 
Imelda Maher ‘The Rule of Law and Agency: The Case for Competition Policy’ (Working Paper No 06/01, 
International Economics Program 2006) 8; Black (1997) 246.
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Discretion in the authorisation arena is framed by the legal limits. 
The institutional factors are, however, equally important — for example, a 
regulator and its officials who are receptive to the concerns of all stakeholders 
and able to negotiate with business will be more successful in gaining overall 
support and commitment for its actions from the wider community, including 
government, the trade practices community and consumers. Such a regulator 
will be much more successful in harnessing support than a regulator who goes 
by the book and whose officials are simply timekeepers. 
Legal Factors Constraining Discretion
Authorised by Law
Clearly an officer exercises discretion over thousands of matters in a working 
day, including when to work and when not to work and what pictures to hang 
on the office walls. The discretion that concerns us in this discussion is that 
attached to giving effect to a rule. The exercise of discretion in this sense has the 
goal of advancing the purposes for which the powers have been granted.57 Much 
of the delegation of discretion to an agency is through legislation, for example, 
the discretion given to the ACCC to determine the manner in which the term 
‘public benefit’ may be interpreted. But discretion can also be called upon in 
other circumstances.
The discretion of police officers is an example of some of these other circumstances. 
An individual officer’s discretion can dictate how they will respond to complaints 
of crimes, who they decide to release and who they decide to prosecute, and 
how they will intervene in conflicts between members of families, employees or 
landlords.58 All these circumstances are ways of interpreting the objects of the 
law. This may include determining how specific powers, for example, the power 
to investigate a robbery, can be used. Sometimes determining the objects of the 
law may not be a simple matter. Where the objects and/or purpose are a matter 
of conjecture, discretion must be exercised in determining the objects of the 
legislation. In effect, determining the objects and/or purpose becomes part of 
the discretionary assessment that has to be made.59 
Matters which have become important to officials over a course of decisions 
or over a period of time may also be important in deciding the way in which 
the objects and purposes of the legislation should be determined. For example, 
information that officials in the immigration department have about the 
57 Galligan (1986) 30; Yeung, Karen, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (2004) 37; Baldwin and 
McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (1987) 33; Administrative Review Council, above, n 14. 
58 Schneider in Hawkins (1992) 53; Campbell (1999) 81–84.
59 Galligan (1986) 31; Campbell (1999) 81–84.
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political condition of various countries will necessarily be taken into account in 
determining an application by an individual seeking refugee status. Likewise, 
the kinds of matters that may be taken into account by courts empowered to 
hear appeals will also be important in deciding the way in which the objects and 
purposes of the legislation should be determined.
Social scientists have pointed out the shortcomings of concentrating on whether 
discretion is authorised rather than the manner in which it is used. They argue 
discretion cannot always be identified in terms of explicit or implicit legal grants 
of discretionary power. While officials may be seen to have discretion, they may 
not in fact exercise it.60 Studies indicate that officials probably behave in a more 
routine way than is generally acknowledged. The study by John Braithwaite, 
Peter Grabosky and John Walker pointed to some Australian regulators as being 
token enforcers. Conversely, it has also been noted that officials who appear to 
have little discretion may in fact exercise considerable power. Goodin’s description 
of manipulation of discretionary powers by the gentry in connection with the 
penal sanction in eighteenth century England points to the misuse of these 
powers.61 It is not uncommon for the receptionist of an organisation to play an 
important role in directing callers and, subsequently, on whether the complaints 
proceed and the manner in which such complaints are resolved. The first port of 
call in deciding whether to apply for authorisations is to approach the officials 
within the ACCC informally to discuss the potential anticompetitive effects of 
the conduct being proposed. This is often an informal telephone conversation, 
but it may be crucial in determining whether an authorisation application has 
to be made or whether immunity is going to be effectively granted.
In deciding authorisation applications, officers are required to determine the 
kind and the amount of public benefit in the context of section 90.62 The object 
and purpose of the legislation was introduced via an amendment into the Act in 
1995 in the form of section 2:
The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer 
protection.
On the matter of statutory interpretation, McHugh J in Visy Paper Pty Ltd v 
ACCC stated: ‘Questions of construction are notorious for generating opposing 
answers, none of which can be said to be either clearly right or clearly Wrong. 
Frequently, there is simply no "right" answer to a question of construction’.63
60 Baldwin and McCrudden (1987); Goodin (1986) 239–40.
61 Goodin (1986) 239–40.
62 See discussion in Chapter 3.
63 Visy Paper Pty Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 1.
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The ACCC has addressed the issue of the scope of its discretion to the ACT in the 
Medicines authorisation and stated:
1. A factor which does not constitute an anti-competitive or public detriment 
because it is not causally related to the proposed conduct but is relevant in 
all the circumstances of the application. So a Voluntary Industry Code may 
regulate some, but not all, aspects of a certain area. Insofar as the Tribunal 
considered that a detriment arose from failure to regulate the remaining 
aspects of that area, it might consider that omission a reason not to exercise 
its residual discretion or to do so conditionally notwithstanding that the 
reason would not be causally related to the proposed conduct. 
2. A factor which constitutes a public detriment which is neither an anti-
competitive detriment nor a detriment entailed by a purported benefit 
(leading to the discount of that benefit) which is or is not causally related to 
the proposed conduct but which is relevant in all the circumstances of the 
application. This could include a morally offensive provision in an otherwise 
net beneficial code of ethics such as a provision that involved inappropriate 
discrimination.64
In stating the above, the ACCC is emphasising the need to show a causal 
connection between the proposed conduct and the public benefit or detriment. 
It is also acknowledging the power to grant authorisations based on conditions 
by virtue of section 91(3).65 Regarding the scope of this discretion, the ACT 
stated:
The discretion conferred on the ACCC and on the Tribunal by s 88(1) 
is enlivened upon satisfaction of the necessary conditions as to public 
benefit set out in s 90. It is not in terms limited other than by the subject 
matter, scope and purpose of the TPA [Trade Practices Act] and the 
statutory context in which it appears: Water Conservation and Irrigation 
Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 
505; Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 
72 at 84. The discretion is not narrowly confined given the enormous 
variety of circumstances to which it may have to be applied. It is neither 
necessary nor desirable to try to define its outer limits. It is sufficient to 
say that considerations relevant to the objectives of the Act may play a 
part in the exercise of the discretion even where the public benefit test 
has been satisfied.66
64 See Medicines Australian Inc (2007) ACT.
65 See discussion in Chapters 2 and 6.
66 See Medicines Australian Inc (2007) ACT.
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The importance of translating such objects and purposes into specific policies is 
clearly recognised by the regulator, which has issued policy guidelines on the 
types of benefits that will be considered and the process that will be employed. 
My analysis shows that the types of benefits recognised during the different 
decades is more a reflection of the political, social and economic concerns that 
permeate the regulator and its officials’ actions, rather than the guidelines 
themselves. For example, although the role of the public benefit ‘enhancement 
of quality safety’ has never been high on the regulator’s lists, it has featured as 
important in the empirical study. Out of a list of 16 public benefits analysed for 
importance, it ranked top of the list in 1976 (Figure 3.3), third in 1984 (Figure 3.4), 
second in 1998 (Figure 3.5), sixth in 2003 (Figure 3.6), tenth in 2006 (Figure 3.7), 
sixth in 2008 and eighth in 2010 (Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Further the consideration 
given to both the non-economic efficiency benefits in authorisation applications 
reflect a flexible approach aimed at providing time to bring about structural 
change and proceduralisation of self-regulation.67 This flexibility is not clearly 
expressed in the guidelines and indeed may be very difficult to achieve when 
the event has not yet occurred. This illustrates the importance of practice over 
lists and guidelines. 
Manuals that list the types of authorisation decisions made have been maintained. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, some of these manuals categorised the decisions into 
types of industry, bringing together the historic knowledge of the market 
structure within which such industries operated. The ACCC regularly uses the 
conditions power under section 91(3) to grant authorisations under specific 
conditions. The most commonly imposed conditions are aimed at enhancing 
compliance and incorporating appeal processes with codes of conduct.68 
Today, this is process is specialised and there are officers dealing with specific 
types of authorisations; for example, officers develop an expertise in merger 
authorisations or in the aviation industry or collective bargaining applications 
within the dairy industry. 
Procedural Fairness
The concept of procedural fairness is recognised as a guiding principle by most 
lawyers and is connected to the notion of natural justice. It has been translated 
into two main principles, usually in the context of judicial decision-making. 
The first principle is that the parties to a dispute should be given a fair hearing, 
the second that they should be heard by an impartial adjudicator.69 Likewise 
67 See Chapter 6 for discussion on the manner in which conditions are used for this purpose.
68 See Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘Co-Opting for Governance: The Use of the Conditions Power by the ACCC in 
Authorisations’ (2011) 34(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 785.
69 Galligan (1986) 32; Administrative Review Council (2004); Baldwin and McCrudden, (1987), 45.
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an official’s exercise of discretion is constrained by these principles because 
officials are required to act in an unbiased manner and allow those affected by 
decisions the opportunity to be heard.70
Studies undertaken by social scientists support the proposition that, whereas 
this notion may be well entrenched in judicial decision-making, it may not 
be applied with the same degree of consistency by officials deciding matters 
in independent statutory authorities.71 Others have also argued the notion of 
procedural fairness is too broad and requires further clarification. Guiding 
principles that explain who should participate in the decision-making process 
and the manner in which they should do so have been called for.72 
Black’s contribution on regulatory conversations is useful here. She has painted 
a picture of some regulatory processes where communicative interactions are 
actively pursued, stating that this is more likely where ‘regulators are given 
broadly defined and conflicting objectives to fulfil or principles to follow, where 
they operate in a dynamic context in which problem definitions are complex 
and the consequences of regulatory action uncertain’.73 All of this appears to 
query the notion that procedural fairness can only be seen to operate where 
there are standard procedures and set guidelines. Rather Black saw regulatory 
conversations as vehicles through which new interpretive communities could 
grow with a view to ultimately changing behaviour.
Parker’s work on the ACCC and compliance gives a clear example of the manner 
in which interpretative communities may be developed. Moving away from the 
strict concept of procedural fairness, the ACCC has utilised a range of strategies, 
including nurturing compliance professionals in the industry,74 and coaxing the 
courts to go further in ordering companies to rectify the damage done and to 
put in place systems to prevent it happening again.75 It was also able to use 
the undertakings power in section 87B to incorporate compliance procedures 
into corporate governance. For example, in the AMP case discussed by Parker, 
the company undertook to change its own standard contracts to incorporate 
provisions aimed at resolving future disputes.76 Indeed the comments of the first 
chairman of the competition regulator are supportive of the notion of creating 
interpretative communities:
70 Yeung (2004) 41.
71 Sainsbury in Hawkins (1992) 305.
72 Baldwin and McCrudden (1987), 45.
73 Black (1997) 172, Nielsen (2006).
74 Christine Parker, ‘Compliance Professionalism and Regulatory Community: The Australian Trade 
Practices Regime’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 215, 227.
75 ibid, 221.
76 ibid, 222; see also John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002) 22.
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Business groups and professional groups or institutes, particularly 
umbrella bodies, are a good means of reaching their members, whether 
companies or individuals, in an attempt to achieve compliance with 
the law by consultation and education instead of having to rely 
disproportionately on compulsion through courts. I have always engaged 
a lot in this process of open discussion, and so have my colleagues and 
the senior staff. I acknowledge at once that the TPC is not so much 
teaching as engaging in two-way contact from which it also is learning.77
Procedural fairness has been recognised as important by regulatory agencies and 
the ACCC clearly emphasises these notions in all its notices.78 The procedures for 
authorisations are clearly spelt out in the Guide to Authorisations and the steps to 
be followed are available both in soft and hard copies.79 Interviews with current 
staff and lawyers indicate that most authorisations involve legal or professional 
advice and these advisers are well versed with the procedures and processes in 
place. The processes and documentation related to authorisation are all available 
online and include formal as well as informal procedures. The formal processes 
include: applications for authorisations, submissions by interested parties and 
responses by the applicants, draft determinations by the regulator, provision 
for further submissions, and the opportunity to seek a public hearing. The 
informal processes include: the preliminary discussions that the applicants and 
their advisers, including lawyers and compliance officers in the trade practices 
community with experience on how the ACCC has used its discretion in the 
past, and with the officials in the ACCC; the manner in which officials may 
verify the assertions made in the submissions, which may include the hiring of 
consultants to study the particular industry or scenario, or by calling for the 
quantification of the alleged benefits that are likely to result for the proposed 
conduct; and, the advice that officials may seek from experts in the field that 
may include other members of the trade practices community or from consumer 
groups with whom the official has developed a relationship. 
Accountability 
Accountability, in its simplest conception, means being required to give an 
account of one’s actions — it can also be viewed as the ability to give account. 
The most commonly cited form of accountability is political accountability, 
where voters make elected representatives accountable for their actions 
and legislators make regulatory agencies accountable for their activities. 
Richard Mulgan has argued that this type of political accountability has been 
extended beyond its external focus. It has been applied to internal aspects of 
77 Trade Practices Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Annual Report 1982–83 (1983) 166.
78 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Annual Report 2004–05 for a discussion 
on accountability.
79 ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2002); ACCC, Authorisations and Notifications: A Summary (2007).
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official behaviour, including controlling the activities of officials within an 
organisation, making officials responsive to public wishes beyond simply being 
called to account and to democratic dialogue between citizens, in which no-
one is being called to account.80 Accountability is relevant to both the public 
and private sectors. In the public sector, it is important within the activities of 
public sector departments, as well as public sector commercial activities. In the 
private sector, accountability is relevant to commercial activities as well as non-
profit activities.81
Accountability is a central tenet of administrative law scholarship, inquiring 
into the manner in which a public body and the officials within it, who have 
been given a good deal of discretion, can be held responsible for the manner in 
which the discretion is applied. The dominant view comes from Dicey’s concept 
of the rule of law. It is geared to protect the rights of the citizen and requires 
the state and regulatory institutions within the state to be responsible for its 
exercise of power. It recognises the need to make regulators accountable and 
one of the key features of the rule of law is the need to curb the conferral of 
discretionary power of government officials in the interests of certainty and 
predictability.82 As Jody Freeman has stated, this is usually done by rendering 
agencies indirectly accountable to the electorate via legislative or executive 
oversight and judicial review.83
Many have been critical of this model of accountability, arguing that it is 
not a true representation of agency decision-making.84 Colin Scott proposed 
traditional accountability can involve both ‘upwards’ as well as ‘horizontal’ 
mechanisms.85 Before proceeding any further, it is also worth bearing in mind 
the two key accountability questions in relation to this study: to whom is 
the accountability owed,86 and for what is the ACCC accountable? Both these 
questions are addressed in Table 5.1. 
Upward mechanisms of accountability are widely accepted (Table 5.1). It makes 
agencies such as the ACCC accountable to a variety of bodies. First the ACCC 
80 Richard Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”: An ever-expanding concept?’ (2000) 78 Public Administration 555, 555–56.
81 See Neil Carter, Rudolf Klien and Patricia Day, How Organisations Measure Success: The Use of Performance 
in Government (1995); see also James Cutt and Victor Murray, Accountability and Effectiveness Evaluation in 
Non Profit Organizations (2000). 
82 The other two key features are the ability to seek a remedy in courts should the government act illegally 
and the importance of equality before the law.
83 See Jody Freeman, ‘The Private Role in Public Governance’ (2000) 75(3) New York University Law Review 543, 
546; see also Harlow and Rawlings (1984); Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 115.
84 Colin Scott, ‘Accountability in a Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38; see also 
Colin Scott, ‘Spontaneous Accountability’, in Tony Prosser et al (eds), ‘Law, Economic Incentives and Public 
Service Culture’ (Working Paper Series No 05/129, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of 
Bristol 2005); see also Freeman ‘The Private Role in Public Governance’ (2000).
85 Scott (2000) 42.
86 These questions along with ‘Who is accountable?’ are referred to by Scott (2000) 38. 
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is accountable to the courts in a number of ways. Judicial review proceeds in 
the Federal Court, as can matters involving defamation,87 breach of confidence, 
abuse of process,88 or contempt of court proceedings.89 Second, the ACCC is 
also accountable to parliament and is required to submit an annual report to 
the Commonwealth parliament. It is also required to appear each year before 
parliamentary committees, such as the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration and, on an 
irregular basis, before other committees, such as the Dawson Committee.90 
Third, and most important for this study, the ACCC is accountable to the ACT, 
which repeatedly reviews its decisions involving authorisations and regulated 
industries.
Horizontal mechanisms of accountability also impact on the ACCC’s actions 
(Table 5.2). Many of these horizontal mechanisms developed in the 1980s in 
Australia, reflecting the dissatisfaction with the ‘upward’ mechanisms of 
accountability. The dissatisfactions stemmed from these systems becoming 
overloaded, being inordinately costly, and being too formal. By comparison, the 
horizontal mechanisms were informal, cost-free alternatives that possessed the 
advantage of allowing the freedom to access or scrutinise information closely, 
to arbitrate or negotiate an outcome and to settle on a range of non-adversarial 
alternative remedies.91
Horizontal mechanisms include complaints to the Commonwealth ombudsman by 
persons who believe the commission has treated them unfairly or unreasonably. 
The ACCC is subject to the Freedom of Information Act that allows parties to 
seek access to documents about investigations or complaints. External audits 
are another accountability mechanism, and these have been undertaken by the 
auditor-general, the Department of Finance and Administration in the past.92
Today, lawyers widely acknowledge the inadequacy of these traditional 
accountability measures. First, it has been pointed out that those traditional 
administrative law principles, with their gaze firmly on the public arena, 
are inadequate to fulfil a public interest mission in mixed economies where 
governments and private capital play shared productive roles.93 Second, it has 
been noted that deregulation has resulted in regulators being given wider 
discretion to make determinations and negotiate compliance,94 while little 
87 See Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC (1999) ATPR 41-178. 
88 See Gardiner v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190. 
89 See ACCC, Annual Report 2004–05 (2005) 172.
90 ibid, 167.
91 See generally Harlow and Rawlings (1984) 401–04.
92 ibid, 172.
93 Mark Aronson, ‘A Public Lawyer’s Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing’, in Michael Taggart (ed), 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 40, 63, 69. 
94 For example, see Royal Australasian College of Surgeons A90765 30 June 2003 and The Victorian Egg 
Industry Co-operative (1995) A40072.
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attention is being given to the accountability process that may be necessary in 
these circumstances.95 Third, the regulators have been criticised as not making 
their decisions in a totally transparent manner because they operate on the basis 
of vague criteria responding more to overall economic objectives, where there 
may be confusing division of responsibilities between regulators and other 
government agencies.96
Table 5.2: Traditional accountability mechanisms
To whom is the 
ACCC accountable?
For what is the ACCC 
accountable?
Upward mechanisms Internal review Manner in which each officer has dealt 
with the investigation
Courts Manner in which ACCC exercises its powers
Tribunals Authorisation decisions can be reviewed
Parliamentary 
committees
ACCC could be accountable for specific 
or general activities
Horizontal mechanisms Ombudsman Decision where complaints are made
External audit Manner in which it has been carrying out 
its functions




Introduction of national competition policy
Source: Author’s research.
Scott argued that such regulatory institutions have long been subject to less 
transparent accountability mechanisms than merely formal ones, such as 
parliamentary accountability. These may have included being accountable to 
Treasury, which controls the purse strings, or being accountable to consumer 
committees, which have an important say in decision-making.97 Scott’s contention 
that a regulatory institution is accountable to many other parties beyond those 
suggested by the traditional accountability mechanisms is undoubtedly true. 
Freeman pointed out that formal legal procedures and agency oversight may 
provide the appearance of adequate accountability, but informal mechanisms 
can play an important and undervalued role in the process.98
95 Cosmo Graham, ‘Is There a Crisis in Regulatory Accountability?’, in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and 
Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (1998) 471.
96 Christine Parker, ‘Restorative Justice in Business Regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s Use of Enforceable Undertakings’ (2004) 67(2) The Modern Law Review 209.
97 Scott (2000).
98 Jody Freeman, ‘Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative State’ (2000) 52 
Administrative Law Review 813, 854. For a different view proposing that self-regulation mechanisms could 
clash with the rule of law in France and Germany, see Jan Freigang, ‘Is Responsive Regulation Compatible 
with the Rule of Law’ (2002) 8(4) European Public Law 463.
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Unlike those who advocate the development of a new administrative law to apply 
to these changing times,99 Scott suggested extended accountability will develop 
in different ways depending on each policy domain.100 I wish to explore one of the 
models developed by Scott — the interdependence model. This model identifies 
and maps out the manner in which actors are dependent upon each other in 
their actions. Scott argued this interdependence is a result of the dispersal 
of key resources of authority, information, expertise and capacity to bestow 
legitimacy, such that each of the principal actors has to constantly account to 
others for some of its actions within the space as a precondition of action. Scott 
applied this model to the telecommunications sector in the United Kingdom and 
examined the relationship between British Telecom (BT), the privatised telco, 
and OFTEL, a semi-independent regulator created in 1984. Interdependency 
explains why OFTEL is being constantly scrutinised by a number of players and 
is itself daily scrutinising these same players. Scott stated:
The accountability of BT to the regulator, OFTEL, is also more focused, 
in the sense that OFTEL has a considerable stake in getting its regulatory 
scrutiny right, being itself scrutinised closely by BT, by other licensees, 
and by the ministers, in additional to the more traditional scrutiny by 
the courts and by public audit institutions. OFTEL’s quest for legitimacy 
has caused it to develop novel consultative procedures, and to publish 
a very wide range of documents on such matters as competition 
investigations and enforcement practices.101
In Scott’s view, OFTEL’s accountability under the interdependency model would 
include both traditional and extended accountability measures. Traditional 
accountability measures would see OFTEL being accountable to parliament, the 
courts, the ombudsman, and the Auditor as well as to BT. The interdependency 
model would mean that OFTEL is dependent on and affected by the actions of 
a much wider group, including: the minister for an annual report; the Mergers 
and Monopolies Commission which has the power to scrutinise some of OFTEL’s 
actions; other licensees; the European Court of Justice; and consumers via the 
Telecommunications Consumer Council.
Applying this model to the ACCC gives a different picture of accountability 
(see Table 5.2). The ACCC is accountable to other industry participants in 
order to ensure that competition in the long-term either remains unchanged 
or is enhanced. Other industry participants are active in the authorisation 
process, either submitting individual comments or comments via an industry 
association on the proposed application. The names of all those parties are 
99 See Taggart (1997).
100 Scott (2000) 50.
101 ibid.
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usually listed in the determinations. The interests of consumers, employees and 
the community are represented in many authorisation decisions over the recent 
past, particularly in the wake of deregulation. In the Gas Services authorisation 
decision,102 it was the Victorian Council of Social Services that challenged the 
application querying the contention that major benefits have resulted from the 
Victorian gas reform process.103 The ACCC was careful in handling this claim, 
stating that it shared the concerns expressed and allowing the authorisation on 
other grounds.104
The actions of one regulator may impact on the activities of other regulators, 
and this is particularly likely where there is an overlap in their regulatory 
functions. One such example appeared in the decision involving the Australian 
Stock Exchange, which was seeking authorisation of its business rules because it 
could have breached section 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974.105 The Australian 
Securities Commission, as it was then known, made its concerns known to the 
ACCC. It stated that it was necessary for the proposed rules, which were the 
subject of the authorisation application, to meet the tests of market efficiency 
and investor protection required under the corporations law.106
The ACCC addressed these concerns via the imposition of conditions that it 
stated ‘are likely to limit the anticompetitive use of such subjective and 
undefined rules.’107 Another case involved the EFTPOS authorisation,108 dealing 
with the regulation of payment systems, including interchange systems, which 
was eventually taken over by the Reserve Bank of Australia, which saw itself as 
the regulator of this space.109 
102 Gas Services Business Pty Ltd A90630–A90631, 19 August 1998.
103 ibid, 8–9.
104 ibid, 14.
105 Australian Stock Exchange Limited A90623, 1 April 1998.
106 ibid, 26.
107 ibid, 37.
108 EFTPOS interchange fees A30224, A30225, 11 December 2003, Re EFTPOS Interchange Fee Agreement 
[2004] ACompT 7 30.
109 The Reserve Bank of Australia, Reforms of Australia’s Payment Systems: Conclusions of the 2007/08 
Review (September 2008).
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Table 5.3: Extended accountability mechanisms
To whom is the 
ACCC accountable? For what is ACCC accountable?
Parties directly affected by the 
proposed conduct (eg other 
industry members)
For its decision, as it may affect the level of competition 
in the market
Parties indirectly affected by 
the proposed conduct (eg 
consumers)
To all parties who may be affected by the availability, 
price or quality of the product or for employment in an 
industry
Courts Accountable for its actions, which may be in breach of 
legislation and common law
Australian regulators 
(eg Australian Securities 
Commission, Australian 
Prudential Authority and 
Reserve Bank of Australia)
Certain decisions may affect the way in which other 
regulators operate and the ACCC may be accountable to 
these regulators 
Ministers Particularly relevant where the minister may have 
discretion, eg access regime
Parliament For actions to parliament and specific parliamentary 
committees
Overseas regulators (eg New 
Zealand)
Where the ACCC’s actions may impact directly or 
indirectly on the competition elsewhere
Governments and governmental 
bodies (eg state governments)
Authorisation decisions may have ramifications for other 
sectors of the economy which are managed by separate 
government departments
Private regulatory bodies (eg 
Standards Australia)
Decisions may have serious consequences for the 
activities of the association which is regulating the 
conduct of its members
International regulatory bodies 
(eg UNCTAD, Standard and 
Poor’s)
Increasingly accountable for regulation of global regulation 
of business activity
Trade practices professionals (eg 
lawyers, compliance officers, 
economists and other experts)
To comply with the objectives of the legislation and 
the spirit of the law as well as to show a loyalty to the 
regulator
Non-government organisations 
(eg Australian Consumers 
Association
To ensure that the groups represented by such non- 
government organisations and a range of public interest 
issues are taken into account in deliberations
Media Accountable to the media which disseminates information 
and evaluates the performance of the ACCC’s decision
Source: Author’s research.
The ACCC is aware of the impact that its decisions may have on the deliberations 
and actions of both state and federal governments as well as on the functions 
of government departments. This is illustrated by the Steggles authorisation, 
which involved an application in relation to the collective negotiation of chicken 
growers’ contracts, where submissions were received from the SA Department 
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of Primary Industries, and the Queensland Department of Primary Industries as 
well as the SA minister for primary industry.110 The interdependency model is 
useful in understanding the relationship between the ACCC and governments. 
Not only is the ACCC listening with care to these bodies, but governments are also 
dependent on the ACCC. This was explained by the commission in its decision 
regarding the SA Government’s moves to deregulate its poultry industry:
The Commission understands that debate of the Bill in the Upper House 
had been adjourned until the receipt of the Commission’s determination 
on application for authorisation A90595 lodged by Inghams Enterprises 
Pty Ltd … The Commission has now been informed that since elections 
in late 1997, the SA Government is reviewing its priorities, and that in 
all likelihood the Bill would be reconsidered by the SA Lower House in 
late 1998.111
Whereas references to other regulators have been infrequent in the past, with 
the ACCC referring on occasion to New Zealand, such references have become 
more common in the age of global competition.112 Links between different 
competition agencies are growing and there is a recognition that, without 
concerted international effort, the attempt at regulation will not be effective.113 
With the increase in privatisation and greater reliance on self-regulation, 
professional associations have been playing an increasingly important role in 
regulation.114 The ACCC has been facilitating this by closely examining the 
manner in which these bodies have governance mechanisms in place and by 
requiring certain safeguards to be incorporated. This is well illustrated by the 
number of instances in which the ACCC has incorporated dispute resolutions 
into the constitutions of associations, thereby ensuring that any member is able 
to have its/their grievances heard.115 Although it may not be accountable to such 
bodies under the traditional accountability mechanisms, it is clear that they 
110 Steggles A30183, 20 May 1998, 15.
111 ibid, 3.
112 See, for example, Ansett Australia, Ansett International Limited, Air New Zealand and Singapore Airlines 
Limited A 90649, A90655, 22 July 1998; Australian Performing Rights Association Limited A30186–A30193, 14 
January 1998. A further example of the greater notice being paid to the manner in which other competition 
agencies function is illustrated by the recent ACCC, Cracking Cartels: International and Australian Developments 
(Paper presented at the Law Enforcement Conference, Sydney, 24 November 2004), which involved overseas 
representations including presentations by Canadian, US and Japanese authorities. 
113 For example, this was emphasised at the ACCC ‘Cracking Cartels’ Conference, 2004. 
114 This has been happening since the 1980s in Australia. See Parker (1999) on self-regulation and compliance.
115 See New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory Newsagency System (1984) ATPR (Com) 50-
070, A30092–A30093, 26 April 1984; Royal Australian Institute of Architects (1984) ATPR (Com) 50-077, 7 
September 1984.
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are an important consideration in the decision-making process. By ensuring 
such mechanisms are in place, the ACCC is reducing the possibility of misuse of 
market power116 and is facilitating the decentralisation of regulation.117 
Non-government organisations (NGOs) have always been an important force in 
holding the competition regulator accountable. The private action launched 
by the Australian Federation of Consumers Organisation (AFCO) and Action on 
Smoking Health in the Federal Court against the Tobacco Institute Australia 
(TIA) is a vivid example of their influence. These NGOs successfully argued that 
a remedial advertisement, negotiated by the TPC and the TIA was misleading.118 
Justice Morling held in this case that the remedial advertisement was misleading 
and deceptive, breaching section 52 of the Trade Practices Act as nonsmokers 
were likely to be misled into believing that passive smoking is not harmful 
to health. Similar examples of the role of NGOs in holding the competition 
regulator accountable can be seen from the appointment of Allan Asher from the 
Australian Consumers Association to the TPC and the subsequent appointment 
of Louise Sylvan as deputy chairman of the ACCC.119
The role of the epistemic community has always been important, and more so 
with shifts in self-regulation. Compliance officers, competition lawyers, experts 
in aviation or shipping, all types of economists — including behavioural 
economists — are all part of this community and are responsible for giving 
effect to the law and working with the regulator to do so. So, for example, if an 
ACCC officer is criticised for how she has exercised discretion in the presence of 
many or most of the kinds of actors in Table 5.2 at a meeting of the Australian 
Compliance Institute, then this may be a powerful form of accountability 
because of its very multiplexity.
The role of the media in providing a positive spin has long been appreciated,120 
and the ACCC has been actively using the media for a number of purposes, 
including the dissemination of information and gaining positive publicity 
for itself.121 The manner in which the ACCC has used the media in the past 
has been the subject of debate, including discussion in the Dawson Report.122 
116 See Black (1997).
117 ibid, 165.
118 Australian Federation of Consumers Organisation v Tobacco Institute of Australia [1991] FCA 137. See also 
John Braithwaite, ‘Thinking Laterally: Restorative and Responsive Regulation of OHS’ (Working Paper No. 
13, Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), ANU, August 2003) 4.
119 See Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism 1930–2004 (2006) 356.
120 See Michael Schudson, ‘The News Media as Political Institutions’ (2002) 5 Annual Review of Political 
Science 249; see also Jonathan Moses, ‘Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion’ 
(1995) 95(7) Columbia Law Review, 1811.
121 For criticisms on the manner in which the ACCC has used the media, see Electricity Supply Association 
of Australia v ACCC (2001) ATPR 41-838 [Dawson Review]. 
122 Dawson Report Committee of Inquiry, Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Competition Provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act [Dawson Review] (2003) [Dawson Review]; see also Brenchley (2003) 249–51.
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In relation to authorisations, however, the ACCC has made use of the media in 
less controversial ways. It has issued media releases in relation to authorisation 
decisions, particularly in areas that are either politically sensitive, such as 
collective negotiations123 and medical services,124 or areas of community concern, 
such as protection of the environment.125 
Traditional accountability mechanisms do not acknowledge the manner in which 
the ACCC is influenced by and accountable to the diverse range of interests 
contained in Table 5.2. In a sense, it is possible to summarise the disparate 
accountabilities by describing the ACCC as accountable to a competition and 
consumer policy epistemic community.126 The community constitutes a diffused 
and pluralised networking of accountability. This should be the first step in 
rethinking the process by which the ACCC determines an authorisation decision. 
Rationality
Rationality requires that decisions are based on reason and can be fully 
explained. Economic rationality is just one kind of rationality against which the 
ACCC is evaluated. Legal rationality is another master narrative against which 
ACCC discretion is recurrently evaluated. Four reasons for requiring officials to 
exercise their discretion rationally have been identified within that more legal 
discourse.127 
• It is intended to reduce biased, capricious or arbitrary decision-making. 
• The reasons for the decision must be capable of being explained in connection 
with the purpose for which the discretion is granted. 
• It ensures that the official acts impartially. 
• It ensures that there is consistency in the decision-making. 
The ACCC, as with all administrative agencies, is scrutinised by a range of 
interested parties. It emphasises the logical and transparent manner in which it 
makes decisions, as set out in its guides and website. 
123 The ACCC authorised Inghams to continue collective negotiations with SA Chicken Growers, see ACCC, 
‘ACCC Proposes to Allow Inghams to Continue Collective Negotiations with SA Chicken Growers’ (Press 
Release MR 312/02, 9 December 2002); see also ‘ACCC Allows Tasmanian Vegetable Growers to Collectively 
Bargain’ (Press Release MR 257/04, 18 November 2004).
124 See ACCC, ‘ACCC Proposes Surgical College Reform to Help Address Surgeons Shortage’, (Press Release 
MR 016/03, 6 February 2003).
125 See ACCC, ‘ACCC Draft Decision Proposes to Allow Greenhouse Gas, Ozone Recovery Program’ (Press 
Release MR 042/03, 27 February 2003).
126 Peter M Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 46(1) International 
Organization 1.
127 Galligan (1986) 140; Yeung (2004) xx; Goodin (1986) 244–46.
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Factors Influencing Discretion
The Nature of the Task
Galligan has drawn attention to the exercise of discretionary powers and the 
kinds of tasks undertaken in using them. Tasks that are complex, involving 
many interests, may be suited to an approach that allows consideration of 
various possibilities and ensures the maximum representations of interests. 
On the other hand, decisions of a complex kind that are made regularly may 
be better governed by relatively settled, if oversimplified standards. In such 
cases, complexity is compromised in order to gain in efficiency and consistency. 
Galligan illustrated this proposition with two examples. Where the regulator is 
using its discretion to determine the site of an airport, it would be necessary to 
adopt an approach that allows for the maximum representation of interests. On 
the other hand, the decision on granting licenses to conduct public houses, which 
are being made regularly, could be determined by straightforward standards.128 
This issue has been examined by the Administrative Review Council, which 
concluded that full automation of decision-making is not appropriate where the 
decision-maker is required to exercise discretion once the facts are established.
In the authorisations area, the decisions are varied, and some are much more 
complex than others. The ACCC has adopted different strategies depending 
on the matter lodged. Preliminary enquiries are often directed to officials to 
determine whether an authorisation application may be necessary. Other 
officials develop expertise in specific areas and deal with those authorisation 
applications. Where the matters are complex, such as aviation or mergers, they 
may be handled by a group of officials who have developed expertise in the area. 
Where matters require further scrutiny, the power to call a pre-determination 
conference can be utilised to canvass the complex issues that may arise and 
benefit from open discussion.129 There are, however, benign matters which raise 
the same issues and benefits, such as collective bargaining, which is now dealt 
with via a new and more efficient process.130
Clearly, the allocation of funds to the agency will affect its operations.131 It will 
determine the types of strategies the agency will adopt — lesser funds will mean 
that the agency will have to be selective in deciding the cases it may enforce. 
Although a limited budget may not bar an agency from developing its role, 
it can impede effective enforcement, in particular when there are insufficient 
128 Galligan (1986) 137; Yeung (2004); Nielsen (2006) 402–03.
129 Section 90A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
130 Allan Fels and Tim Grimwade, ‘Authorisation: Is it still Relevant to Australian Competition Law?’ (2003) 
11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 187, 200.
131 Galligan (1986) 290; Goodin (1986) 241; see also Richard Grant Politics and Public Administration 
Section, Department of Parliament Services, Australia’s Corporate Regulators — the ACCC, ASIC and APRA 
(Research Brief No 16, 14 June 2005) 23.
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resources to deal with the number of cases.132 The manner in which an agency 
can seek to deal with a limited budget is illustrated by the manner in which the 
European Union has sought to deal with its equivalent to authorisations. The 
exemptions process was abandoned in May 2004 mainly because of the cost 
burden placed by the system on the regulator. Now the regulator can challenge 
an agreement in court and the onus would be on the parties to the agreement to 
show that their agreement is not in breach of Article 81(3).133 This amendment is 
moving away from a regulator-centred, prospective-approval-based regulatory 
approach to a court-based adversarial approach.
Efficiency 
Efficiency is often defined as the ability to accomplish a job with a minimum 
expenditure of time and effort. It refers to the relationship between resources 
and results.134 More specifically there are two aspects of efficiency — productive 
efficiency and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency refers to producing a 
good or service at the lowest cost. Allocative efficiency refers to resources being 
allocated in a way that maximises the net benefit gained through their use. Thus 
it refers to a situation in which the limited resources of a country are allocated 
in accordance with the wishes of consumers.
Whereas business organisations have acknowledged efficiency as an important 
goal, since the 1970s in the United Kingdom and the 1990s in Australia this 
has become more important in the context of government agencies.135 Efficiency 
became the rationale for outsourcing and deregulating many government 
activities. The term New Public Management was coined to describe the shift 
in the way government agencies functioned,136 with many scholars evaluating 
the consequences this shift has brought for administrative law.137 It has meant 
that public administration is monitored by reference to the overriding criteria 
of value for money, illustrated by the establishment of the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation, which has a central role in assisting departments and agencies to 
meet the Australian Government’s regulatory impact analysis requirements, 
and in monitoring and reporting on their performance, with an emphasis on 
quantification and cost benefit analysis.138 
132 Maher (2006).
133 Official Journal of the European Communities, ‘Introduction’, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, (16 
December 2002) para 3. 
134 Galligan (1986) 129; Yeung (2004) 30.
135 Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, 
National Competition Policy [Hilmer Report] (1993); [Dawson Review] (2003).
136 Christopher Hood, ‘A Public Management for all Seasons’ (1991) 69 Public Administration 3.
137 Harlow and Rawlings (1984) 141.
138 Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth of Australia, Office of Best Practice Regulation 
(OBPR) ‘Cost Benefit Analysis’, which emphasises cost benefit analysis. <http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/
cost-benefit-analysis.html> at 15 October 2008.
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Organisational Issues 
The design of the organisation, the ethos of the agency as well as its leader 
will have an influence on discretion. The organisational design of the regulator 
will determine the discretionary power granted to officials within it, as well 
as the manner in which the discretion is used. Detailed guidelines on how 
discretion should be exercised may do away with discretion completely and has 
been discussed in the context of automated expert systems.139 For example, the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs has an automated expert system that guides 
the officer’s decisions and ability to exercise discretion. The officers’ ability to 
override the ultimate result of the expert system is limited, reducing the manner 
in which the officer could ultimately act.140 Another example is the office of 
National Legal Aid which had a different take on its officers’ use of discretion. 
Because the guidelines for legal aid are flexible and the range of circumstances 
that individuals find themselves in are not easily reduced to business rules, 
the officer’s role becomes important and such decisions are not easily made 
by automated decision-making format.141 Further, it may be possible for the 
guidelines to limit discretion. For example, the guidelines may prescribe certain 
modes of communication or certain language to be used for the communication 
and this might be difficult for some groups to engage with. Whereas in some 
agencies the guidelines may allow the officers to adopt a conciliatory stance, in 
others they could force officers to ‘go by the book’.142 Similarly, requiring all 
submissions to be made by lawyers or economists may reduce participation by 
groups without access to resources to employ professionals.
The ethos of the organisation, although difficult to define, is crucial to the manner 
in which the regulator functions. Here the dominant language and knowledge 
of discourse within the organisation will influence the exercise of discretion. 
This point has been illustrated by the manner in which doctors use discretion. 
Rather than using the term discretion, doctors use terms such as professional 
judgment and the exercise of clinical freedom.143 Scientific knowledge is used by 
the profession to assert its position and the manner in which such information 
is regarded by the community. Likewise, the ACCC’s emphasis on compliance 
rather than enforcement reflects its current ethos.144 Similarly, emphasis by the 
ACCC on economic efficiency and its quantification has been a way to assert 
the rationality of decision-making. This is further driven by the need for such 
139 G Smith, ‘Discretionary Decision-making in Social Work’, in Adler and Asquith (1981) 47, 48.
140 Administrative Review Council (2004) 13.
141 ibid.
142 Black (2001) 13.
143 T McGlew and A Robertson, ‘Social change and the shifting boundaries of discretion in medicine’, in 
Adler and Asquith (1981) 200, 201.
144 Parker and Nielsen (2006); Nielsen (2006).
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agencies to be accountable for their actions and expenditures. This may, however, 
have the impact of ignoring non-efficiency benefits, such as improvements in 
health or promotion of healthy lifestyles.
The manner in which this discretionary power is communicated within the 
agency is important. Some regulatory agencies have broad guidelines aimed 
at increasing awareness and compliance. In a study on nursing homes, John 
Braithwaite and Toni Makkai looked at whether trust nurtures compliance — if 
treating regulated groups as worthy of trust would be repaid with voluntary 
compliance.145 The study found that, although there was a correlation between 
trust and compliance, regulatory institutions should be able to deal both with 
cases where trust is respected and where trust is abused. Such practices, where 
implemented, would give officials within the regulatory institution wide 
discretion.
Where there are comprehensive standards and strict guidelines as matters of 
policy, strategy as well as procedure, the officials themselves may have little 
discretion. The study by Richard Lempert on the adjudicative discretion that 
Hawaiian state law provided to a public housing eviction board showed changes 
in the eviction process from 1969 to 1987. Lempert identified a number of 
behavioural factors that affected the exercise of discretion by the board. These 
included training sessions for board members in order to promote legalistic 
decision-making; not reappointing members with views regarded as too pro-
tenant and new appointments to the board. Changes to the board size and the 
hearing process to allow more eviction action to be heard, use of lawyers in 
presenting the views of the Hawaiian Housing Authority, amendments to the 
legislation which provided further grounds on which appeals could be made 
could also affect discretion.146 
Braithwaite, Grabosky and Walker conducted a study on enforcement approaches 
in enforcement agencies, which illustrates that many factors determine 
enforcement practices, including regulatory policy, enforcement practices 
and the attitudes of officials. Thus officers’ use of discretion is a determinant 
of enforcement practices. The authors examined 101 Australian regulatory 
agencies and identified seven dominant enforcement types: conciliators, 
benign big guns, diagnostic inspectors, detached token enforcers, detached 
modest enforcers, token enforcers, and modest enforcers. The authors found 
most Australian enforcement agencies to be token enforcers that performed 
145 John Braithwaite and Toni Makkai, ‘Trust and Compliance Administration’ (Working Paper No. 9, 
Compliance and Governability Program, February 1993) 11.
146 Lempert (1996) 373–76.
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perfunctory rulebook inspections.147 The TPC in this study was classified as a 
modest enforcer, which made use of a variety of enforcement methods including 
prosecution, fines, injunctions and adverse publicity.148
Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen examined business’ opinions of the ACCC, 
which is of interest here. They used three indices to measure this: a strategic 
sophistication index, the procedural and substantive justice index and the 
flexibility index. The authors reported that opinions of businesses tended to 
be neither extremely negative nor extremely positive. Businesses saw the ACCC 
most positively in relation to its strategic sophistication. They also viewed the 
ACCC as an effective regulator, whose activities were beneficial to the Australian 
economy, but they were critical of the ACCC’s use of the media.149
The leadership within the organisation will influence its operations as well as the 
operations of the officials within it. In discussing the enforcement style adopted 
by regulatory officials, leadership has been pointed to as an important factor.150 
Leadership style can determine the approach to regulation, the intra-agency 
commitment and competence, the networks that may be actively used, and the 
relationship that may develop with other agencies. The ACCC has had leaders 
with diverse personal styles, who have shaped the organisation. For example, 
the operational style of Bannerman was based on dialogue, as demonstrated by 
the following statement:
The TPA has always been a very public body, and I hope it remains so. 
It must often talk softly, sometimes talk firmly, and reach for the third 
alternative rather rarely. It needs to earn and retain respect in order to 
do its work effectively. The Commissioners have to be publicly known. 
They have to go onto platforms and into groups. They have to respond 
to urgent calls for conferences. While avoiding the risk of being remote, 
they have to avoid the opposite risk of being thought to identify with 
those whose conduct they must scrutinize.151
The leadership style will be important in defining the organisation in the public 
eye. This was an issue that was brought to the fore by Fels, whose use of the 
media kept the chairman and the regulator in focus. Explaining/defending his 
use of the media, Fels stated:
I have sought and maintained a high media profile because I believe 
my statements and media interviews help build a general culture of 
understanding and support for competition law. Accusations from some 
147 Braithwaite, Grabovsky and Walker (1987) 323. 
148 ibid, 340.
149 Parker and Nielsen (2006) 160.
150 Yeung (2004) 188.
151 Trade Practices Commission, (1983) [211].
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quarters of being a media tart are a small price to pay for raising business 
and consumer confidence in competition law. The more people who 
realise their obligations and rights, the greater the degree of genuine 
competition within the economy.152
The background of the leader is also important, as demonstrated by the discontent 
among four of the state governments that refused to support the appointment of 
Graeme Samuel to the position of commissioner in 2003.153 Samuel’s track record 
was described as having been ‘forged more in the boardrooms of corporate 
Australia than with the tens of thousands of small businesses who look to the 
ACCC as a buffer against the bigger players’.154 There was, however, bipartisan 
support for the appointment of Ron Sims, an experienced regulator, to this 
position in 2011.
Political Considerations 
Institutional design can give politics an important role and can have an influence 
on discretion. Reliance on discretion, rather than rules, could provide an escape 
route for governments seeking to avoid difficult decisions.155 This is certainly 
true of the Australian Trade Practices Act, which has relied on the granting of 
discretion to the regulator and left appeals in the hands of the tribunal rather 
than the courts. 
Tony Freyer’s analysis of antitrust regulation in Britain and the United States 
shows the different considerations faced by policy makers in the two countries 
that shaped the manner in which restrictive practices were regulated.156 Paul 
Craig pointed out that the structure of the British antitrust legislation during 
the 1980s gave ultimate control to the political arm of government. He argued the 
important role played by the secretary of state in the initiation of monopoly and 
merger references, the preference given for public enforcement of competition 
policy rather than private enforcement, and the limited role provided to the 
judiciary all resulted in giving the government of the day an important role.157
152 Allan Fels, ACCC Update, 13 June 2003, <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=349239
&nodeId=34326161a1928dde07b97cf4878b8390&fn=Update_13.doc> at 10 December 2007; see also Parker, 
Ainsworth and Stepanenko, (2004).
153 See ABC Radio, ‘States block ACCC appointment’, The World Today 13 November 2002 <http://www.
abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s726027.htm> at 8 February 2008.
154 ABC Television, ‘Controversy surrounds ACCC appointment’, The 7.30 Report 29 May 2003 <http://
www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2003/s867709.htm> at 6 January 2008.
155 Tony Prosser, ‘The Politics of Discretion: Aspects of Discretionary Power in the Supplementary Benefits. 
Service’, in Adler and Asquith (1981) 148, 149. 
156 See Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America 1880–1990 (1992).
157 Paul Craig, ‘The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Competition and Administrative Rationality’, in 
Baldwin and McCrudden (1987) 197, 217.
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The role of politics can be overt but is commonly more indirect or subtle. An 
example of direct influence can be by virtue of the legislative design. This is 
illustrated by the access regime that provides for ministerial approval of certain 
access applications on the grounds of public interest.158 Today, federal and 
state governments make submissions to the ACCC in relevant authorisation 
deliberations.
The Attitudes of Officials
The outlook of officials working within the agency will shape the exercise 
of discretion. Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite pointed to the manner in 
which the professional background of the inspection team can frame which 
standards they choose to enforce. In their study on aged care, they reported 
that if a nurse is inspecting the aged care premises it will be nursing deficiencies 
in the survey report, if a pharmacist, pharmacy deficiencies are the focus; a 
sanitarian, sanitary deficiencies; a lawyer, patient rights.159
Galligan pointed out that the manner in which officials apply their moral 
policy is complex. Here, there may well be defining national and institutional 
characteristics which shape this discretion. For example, it has been pointed out 
that in the American regulatory tradition businesses are treated with distrust 
whereas, by contrast in Japan, business executives are treated as honourable 
citizens.160 This may well affect the way officials operate in making decisions. 
But it is likely to affect the official’s perceptions of statutory purposes and 
to influence the interpretation put on them, as well as the formation of the 
subsidiary goals that are set in achieving overall purposes. It may also influence 
the agency's approach to enforcement. Galligan cited the example of pollution 
control. His study suggested that wilful or negligent rule breaking will influence 
whether the officer decides to take enforcement action. Enforcement in this 
study depends on the officer’s moral judgement.161 A study by David McCallum 
on the 1890s policy of removing Aboriginal children from their homes again 
demonstrates the important role of the official. In this case the manager of each 
mission station was empowered to make representations about whether the 
child could stay with the family or be removed by the Office of the Board for 
Protection of Aborigines. The author reported that ‘some managers were more 
pressing than others in ensuring that children who were sickly were able to 
remain on the mission with their families’.162 Interviews with ACCC staff support 
158 See Nagarajan, ‘The Accommodating Act: Reflections on Competition Policy and the Trade Practices 
Act’ (2002) 20(1) Law in Context 34.
159 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite (2007) 224.
160 Braithwaite and Makkai (1993).
161 Galligan (1986); Black (2001) 15.
162 David McCallum, ‘Informal Powers and the Removal of Aboriginal Children: Consequences for Health 
and Social Order’ (2007) 35 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 29.
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the proposition that the officer’s own attitudes influence the manner in which 
authorisations are conducted. For instance, officers from a consumer advocacy 
background asserted the need for giving attention to consumer’s interest in the 
deliberations.163 
The manner in which the decisions of officials are scrutinised shapes discretion. 
Of particular significance to lawyers is the manner in which decision-making 
can be constrained to ensure that discretion is exercised in accordance with the 
rules and for the overall proper legal purpose.164 In this context, Galligan paid 
particular attention to the role of the courts, which, in many such instances, hear 
appeals to determine the amount of discretion that the decision maker possesses 
and whether this discretion has been exceeded. Clearly, over-emphasising such 
appeal decisions by courts, or other equivalent bodies, can give a distorted view 
of the activities in such regulatory agencies. It focuses more on their pathology 
rather than their day-to-day activities.165 It does, however, ensure that there is 
outside scrutiny of the agency and allows an enquiry into whether the agency’s 
activities are legal, whether the agency is competent, and whether it is exercising 
its powers in a proper manner.
Interviews with ACCC officers indicate that they have guidelines on the types 
of public benefits to be considered. Staff have specialties and are allocated tasks 
in specific areas, for example, mergers, electricity, or aviation. Flexibility exists 
on the manner in which staff go about gathering further information. Existing 
relationships with groups, such as consumer groups or expert witnesses, 
and advice obtained on submissions made by applicants will depend on the 
particular official.166
Other Factors
Numerous other factors can also shape discretion, including the customs 
and norms in the nation and within the agency. The importance attached to 
the specific regulatory area will be reflected in the position that the agency 
occupies. Imelda Maher pointed out that the status of competition law varies 
from nation to nation in the European Union. While competition law has a high 
constitutional status in Germany, this has not historically been the case in the 
United Kingdom and reflects on the status and legitimacy of the agency. Further, 
the constraints can be cultural. Maher gave the example of a farmers’ association 
where the association ignored the injunction secured under competition law 
163 Interview 8.
164 Allars (1990) 9; see also Allars, ‘The Rights of Citizens and the Limits of Administration Discretion: The 
Contribution of Sir Anthony Mason to Administrative Law’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 197; Schneider in 
Hawkins (1992) 47, 53. 
165 Baldwin and McCrudden (1987) 55.
166 Interview 6.
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and chose instead to pay a fine, and continue its prohibited boycotts.167 These 
constraints are not necessarily fixed and can change as demonstrated by the 
cultural shifts experienced during the Bannerman years (discussed in Chapter 
2).168 Similarly the importance attached to competition law, clearly articulated 
by the adoption of the competition principles, has also been significant for the 
ACCC in giving it the status it had previously lacked.169
Relational distance has also been discussed as a relevant factor in regulation 
as ‘the quantity of law will vary directly with relational distance, the more 
law will be used in cases of disputes and visa versa’.170 It has been argued that 
relational distance is important in offences affected by the relationship that 
the regulatory agency has with the offender. In cases where the conduct is 
continuing and offences are a result of a set of circumstances, such as cartel 
conduct, the relational distance is likely to be important. In cases, however, 
where the conduct is a one-off, discrete and relying on specific facts that can be 
communicated with ease, relational distance is likely to be less important.171 In 
the case of the ACCC and authorisations where the public benefits claimed are 
quantifiable with ease, relational distance is likely to be of minor importance. 
Where the public benefits are not easily quantifiable, however, such as improved 
working conditions or increased work safety, relational distance may become 
more important. 
Discretion and Regulatory Strategies 
Determining an authorisation application is a complex issue that can have long-
term consequences. The ACCC, as with many other large regulatory agencies, 
faces many challenges in responding to the demands of governments, business, 
competitors, consumers, and other regulators. Regulatory theory has addressed 
the issue of how regulators can rise to these challenges. It may be trite to say 
that law is not static, but neither are the regulatory theories and regulatory 
approaches adopted by regulators. Carol Harlow’s description of the changing 
nature of administration, law and regulatory scholarship provides a lucid, ‘big 
picture’ explanation of these changes and it is far from trite.172 It is relevant to 
an examination of regulatory agencies and regulatory scholars. Harlow pointed 
out the law’s contribution to public administration varies according to time 
and place. As the role of government has changed, so too has the direction 
167 Maher (2006) 8–9.
168 See Chapter 2.
169 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition: The Bureaucratic Politics of Regulatory 
Justification (2003).
170 Black (2001) 11.
171 ibid, 5, 11.
172 Harlow (2005) 279.
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of administrative law, which is concerned with making administrators and 
regulators accountable. Regulatory scholars tend to be from a multidisciplinary 
background, which has added to the diversity and richness of the scholarship.
Harlow suggested that the dominance of administrators in the twentieth century 
saw regulatory scholars seeking to develop strategies of controlling the manner 
in which regulatory agencies used their discretion.173 Considerable scholarship 
was devoted to the manner in which rules could be used and whether they 
constrained discretion or, rather, whether discretion flourished within such 
rules.174 The rise of New Public Management in the 1970s in the United 
States and Europe, and a decade or so later, in Australia, with its emphasis on 
output oriented values, saw regulatory scholars beginning to push the case for 
procedural fairness and accountability. Regulators were asked to identify their 
objectives and look at different ways of achieving them. Responsive regulation 
and the development of ‘soft law’ were particularly influential, favouring 
informal dispute resolution.175 The importance of human rights as a discourse 
has also influenced public administration, which is required to deliver services 
economically, efficiently and without violating human rights.176 The final episode 
Harlow discussed is global governance, referred to by regulatory scholars as 
global administrative space, where international organisations, such as the 
World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), have a pivotal role in governance. They rely on national or international 
enforcement machinery, such as the European Commission, for enforcement and 
implementation.177 Many of these discourses described by Harlow are evident 
in the ACCC’s determination of authorisations. This change in the regulatory 
environment is illustrated by the role played by state and federal governments, 
which now make submissions and comment on authorisation applications just 
like any other private party. Likewise, the accountability push has witnessed 
much documentation providing maps of processes and a proliferation of specific 
rules.178
173 ibid, 284–85. 
174 ibid, 282–83. Also see the discussion on Discretion and its Meaning in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
175 Harlow (2005) 291; see also Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992).
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177 Harlow (2005) 288–91: John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000); Imelda 
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There are a number of contributions by regulatory scholars that are particularly 
relevant to the process of authorisation determinations by the ACCC. Responsive 
regulation has influenced the manner in which the ACCC has directed much of 
its regulatory activity. A core idea of responsive regulation is that regulators 
should be responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding 
whether a more or less interventionist response is needed; they should be 
responsive to how effectively citizens or corporations are regulating themselves 
before deciding whether to escalate intervention.179 Scholars have proposed a 
variety of regulatory strategies in the form of a regulatory pyramid developed 
by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (reproduced in Figure 6.1). The amount of 
space at each layer reflects the amount of enforcement activity at that level.
	  Figure 5.1: Example of the regulatory pyramid and regulatory strategies 
Source: Modified from Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (1992).
The base of the pyramid is persuasion — a responsive, dialogue-based approach. 
This includes encouraging compliance and relying on self-regulation. Moving 
up the pyramid are more demanding and punitive approaches, including 
warnings, civil and criminal penalties, and licence suspensions. The model is a 
dynamic one that does not specify the types of matters needing consideration or 
the point in time when the regulator sees fit to move up the pyramid away from 
persuasion to penalties. 
179 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992); Braithwaite Restorative Justice (2002) 231; Valerie Braithwaite (2007) 3.
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This model has been criticised on many levels.180 Some studies have found that, 
although persuasion may be a cheaper regulatory strategy, it is also more often 
subject to failure.181 Many of these criticisms have been taken on board and the 
model has been reworked considerably given changing contexts, specifically 
the changing role of the state in regulation.182 
Robert Baldwin and Julia Black sought to develop some of these ideas in their 
article ‘Really Responsive Regulation’.183 To be really responsive, it is not 
only the regulators’ point of view but also the regulatee’s points of view that 
matter and this is a continually reflexive process. They argued that to be really 
responsive, ‘regulators have to [be] responsive not only to the compliance of 
the regulatee, but in five further ways’184 — the firms’ own operational and 
cognitive frameworks (their attitudinal setting); the broader institutional 
environment of the regulatory regime; the different logics of regulatory tools 
and strategies; the regime’s own performance; and, the changes in each of these 
elements.185 Baldwin and Black also argued this approach needed to be applied 
across all the different tasks involved in the regulatory activity. They proposed 
five elements for this approach: detecting undesirable or non-compliant 
behaviour; developing tools and strategies for responding to that behaviour; 
enforcing those tools and strategies on the ground; assessing their success or 
failures; and modifying approaches accordingly.186 This holistic approach is 
challenging for the regulator, requiring it to have clear objectives, to know all 
there is to know about the regulatee and its changing environment, to be fully 
equipped to develop the necessary rules and tools, to be sensitive to all changes 
and be continuously reflexive. It is a big call and perhaps represents an ideal 
that regulators should always aim for while accepting that it may be difficult to 
attain.
The responsive regulation model has been further developed by linking it to 
restorative justice. Here, John Braithwaite sought to examine the changing 
regulatory landscape and integrate three theories of a justice system: restorative 
justice, deterrence, and incapacitation. It is recognised that all of these three 
theories are flawed and the weakness of one is addressed by the strength of the 
others. The greatest emphasis, however, should be placed on restorative justice, 
reflected by its position at the base of the pyramid with the largest space devoted 
to it. Stepping up the pyramid are deterrence strategies, including litigation 
and revocation of licences. These may be used by the regulatory institution 
180 Two examples of these critiques can be found in Parker (1999) 223–25; and Baldwin and Black (2007) 59.
181 See Fiona Haines, Corporate Regulation: Beyond ‘Punish or Persuade’ (1997) 15–16.
182 See John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it works, Ideas for Making it Work Better (2008) 94–100.
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where restorative practices are not effective. At the top of the pyramid are 
punitive sanctions, including criminal penalties and imprisonment (Figure 
6.2). The middle level consists of deterrence strategies including enforceable 
undertakings, formal settlements and restricted licenses which have been 
important to the ACCC’s approach and which it has described as ‘an integrated 
approach’.187
	  Figure 5.2: Strategies available to the regulatory institution
Source: Modified from John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002) 231.
Restorative justice is described as an approach where all the stakeholders affected 
by an injustice have an opportunity to discuss how it has hurt them, to discuss 
their needs and what might be done to repair the harm. Its greatest attribute 
is that it is an approach informed by a ‘set of values that defines not only a 
just legal order, but a caring civil society.’188 Restorative justice, it is proposed, 
works best with a spectre of punishment in the background, but never in the 
foreground. It is claimed to deepen democracy as it moves away from being a 
coercive imposition of responsibility upon citizens to responsibility as something 
autonomous that citizens take after listening to a democratic conversation that 
includes concerns, harms and duties.189 
187 Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism 1930–2004 (2006), 361.
188 Braithwaite (2008) 91.
189 Braithwaite, Restorative Justice (2002) 10.
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The democratic notions on which this is based come from the deliberative 
democracy discourse, summarised as ‘inclusive, reasoned debate in public 
which creates decisive working agreements on any matters of collective concern, 
accountable to the people subject to those agreements, and conducted among 
equals’.190 Parker has used deliberative democracy principles in developing 
a model that ‘gives the state a role in facilitating the permeability of private 
organisational systems and social power directly to civil society and the public 
sphere’.191 John Parkinson and Declan Roche point to a number of deliberative 
democratic features that should be considered in attempts at implementing 
restorative justice practices; these could include regulatory bodies. Their study 
examined restorative justice programs involving criminal offences, but which 
apply equally to other areas. The features they pointed to are: inclusiveness 
of all people affected by certain decisions; equality between participants; 
the transformative power of deliberative process which can create genuine 
bridges of understanding; scope and decisiveness, as individuals appreciate 
the scope for participation that democracy offers; and, decisiveness that such 
discretionary programs bring, as well as accountability which can be to a much 
wider population than is traditionally expected.192
Another group of scholars on regulatory capitalism are also relevant to this 
discussion.193 They highlight the power exercised by global corporations in 
this field, as well as the lack of any coherent regulatory structure that can 
regulate such entities. In this arena, many states have little influence. Rather it 
is webs of influence operating in place of the regulatory structures, as we know 
them. These webs include webs of coercion and webs of dialogue, providing 
both a disparate and complex regulatory panorama. Corporate power today is 
more influential than the power of many states. This power has been clearly 
recognised by the increasing role of partnership approaches to governance, 
where both corporations and NGOs have been mobilised to participate in 
collective governance processes.194 The importance of networked systems, 
where regulators can network with corporations to bring about compliance 
or monitoring or reform, is recognised by Peter Drahos.195 This group of 
190 John Parkinson and Declan Roche, ‘Restorative Justice: Deliberative Democracy in Action?’ (2004) 39(3) 
Australian Journal of Political Science 505, 507.
191 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002) 40.
192 Parkinson and Roche (2004) 511–15.
193 See, for example, Braithwaite (2008); Michael Kempa, Clifford Shearing and Scott Burris, ‘Changes in 
Governance: A Background Review’ (Paper presented at the Global Governance of Health Seminar, Salzburg, 16 
December 2005) <http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/phrhcs/salzburg/Global_Health_Governance_Review.pdf> at 
18 December 2007; David Levi-Faur and Jacinta Jordana, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 
598(1) The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (AAPSS) 12.
194 Kempa, Shearing and Burris (2005). See David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (2005) 3. See also Parker (2002).
195 Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77(2) 
Temple Law Review 401; see also Michael Castels, The Rise of the Network Society (1996). Also see Parker, ‘The “Compliance” 
Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement’ (2006) 40(3) Law and Society Review 591.
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scholars pointed to the inadequateness of national laws and advocated being 
more creative about responsiveness. This has been utilised by the ACCC in 
granting authorisations on conditions which often has the effect of increasingly 
compliance and providing appeal processes and complaints mechanisms.
To this scholarship has to be added the contributions of New Governance which 
sees the potential to nurture meaningful processes of cultural change within 
institutions that are decentred, experimental and founded on participation. 
These scholars see an expanded role for regulatory institutions.196 Their proposal 
sees power as decentralised, to enable citizens as well as other actors to utilise 
their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual circumstances. It also 
envisages coordinating bodies — including regulatory institutions — taking 
on new roles, such as assisting in benchmarking activities — the setting up of 
regulatory standards for market actors and requiring these actors to share their 
knowledge with others facing similar problems. 
This new role is not a one-off regulatory strategy. Rather, under this proposal, 
the regulatory institution engages in continuous monitoring and cumulative 
self-scrutiny, leading to reviewing existing approaches and formulating new 
regulatory standards. These regulators must learn to contend with evasive 
and deceptive conduct, as well as other acts that prevent participation by 
those who may be affected. They must also learn to contend with those who 
use participation to frustrate, obstruct and paralyse. The description of the 
Bannerman style of chairmanship, discussed in Chapter 2, could be categorised 
as experimental — every technique from cajoling to public shaming (by being 
included in the annual reports) was utilised with the objective of bringing out 
the extent of cartel and collusive conduct prevalent in the Australian economy 
during the 1960s. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, scholars of the new governance 
vareity, proposed that such agencies engage in experimentalist regulation 
— which would connect rule-making to monitoring, followed by regulatory 
improvements.197 The regulator’s role would be an active one, responsible for 
scrutinising the effect of the rule and changing the rule as necessary. This is 
indeed a dramatically different role for regulatory agencies, which takes note of 
the shifting regulatory landscape and takes us beyond the familiar but flawed 
concepts of accountability to which we are accustomed.198 Others who have 
contributed to new governance include commentators on management-based 
196 Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia 
Law Review 267. 
197 ibid, 345.
198 See also Graine De Burca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (2006); 
Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘From “Command to Control” to “Open Method Coordination”: Theorizing the Practice of 
Regulatory Agencies’ (2008) 8 Macquarie Law Journal 63; David Trubek and Louise Trubek, ‘New Governance 
& Legal Regulation’ (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 540; Neil Gunningham, ‘Environmental Law, 
Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law 179. Also see 
the discussion in Chapter 5.
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regulation, meta regulation, principle-based regulation, hybrid regulation, 
decentered regulation, really responsive regulation, nodal governance and 
polycentric governance.199
Defining discretion is not an easy task and neither is it an easy task to show 
how discretion is perceived, used, constrained or limited. It is clear, however, 
that discretion exists within strict rules, broad principles and everything 
in between. The authorisation process is a complex one and, as this chapter 
illustrates through the empirical study, it represents an arbitrary exercise of 
discretion. 
199 See See Parker, ‘Meta Regulation: Legal Accountability for CSR’ in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu 
and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law 
(2007); Elinor Ostrom, ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change’ (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No 5095, World Bank, 2009; Drahos (2004); Cristie Ford and Natasha Affolder, Responsive 
Regulation in Context, Circa 2011 Preface’ (2011) 44(3) University of British Columbia Law Review 463; 
Nagarajan, ‘Regulating for Women on Corporate Boards: Polycentric Governance in Australia’ (2011) 39 
Federal Law Review 255. 
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6. Discretion, the ACCC and 
Authorisation Determinations
This chapter examines the use of discretion by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC), which, it argues, comes in many forms. Four 
types of discretion are conceptualised: epistemological, procedural, outcome 
weighting and immunity discretion. While epistemological discretion is 
related to the information considered, procedural discretion focuses on who is 
participating in these deliberations, outcome-weighting discretion looks at how 
discretion can be directed to specific results, and immunity discretion relates 
to the variety of ways to manage the issue at hand without necessarily making 
a specific decision. Although the ACCC has used all these forms of discretion 
to operate innovatively, it has at times silenced voices and views. To become 
a truly responsive regulator, the ACCC needs to show greater commitment to 
encouraging dialogue among the stakeholders and enhancing inclusivity.
Epistemological Discretion
There has been an ongoing cross-jurisdictional debate as to how to weigh public 
benefits, and whether they are quantifiable. The approaches taken vary, which 
illustrates the presence and exercise of discretion in deliberations. Different 
approaches have been adopted in different jurisdictions, also, thus illustrating 
the exercise of discretion.
Quantification of Public Benefits
Use of quantification, that is, statistical or econometric analysis and computer-
simulated economic modelling, to estimate or quantify the outcome of strategic 
interactions between industry players in competition and antitrust cases, is 
increasing. This is partly because of the sophisticated economic-modelling 
packages that are available and because of the increase in economic experts who 
provide a seemingly objective, value-free basis for regulatory decision-making.1 
Quantification provides three main benefits. First it provides clear guidelines 
for business. Business groups, when aware that possible benefits need to be 
expressed in dollar terms, are able to make their submissions on that basis. 
Second, it provides a platform for interested parties as well as regulators. Parties 
1 Lewis Evans, ‘Economic Measurement and the Authorisation Process: The Expanding Place of Quantitative 
Analysis’ (1999) 13 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 99, 99.
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seeking to make a submission are able to address specific matters and, where 
necessary, query specific benefits. Regulators find quantification useful to 
explain the process for exercising their discretion, interpreting the evidence 
and negotiating possible outcomes. Finally, quantification adds transparency to 
the decision-making process.
Four main problems commonly arise in requiring quantification of all benefits. 
First, there is no single quantification method and parties use this diversity 
in strategic ways. For example, in the Qantas Airways and Air New Zealand 
authorisation, economics experts submitted that the proposed arrangement 
between airlines would lead to a saving of A$670 million in five years. Expert 
evidence by Professor Henry Ergas for the airlines claimed that this benefit 
would result in the form of cost savings, including removal of duplicative 
capacity, and from a projected increase in tourism. The applicants claimed some 
of the cost savings would be passed on to the consumer, while other benefits, 
such as increased tourism, would benefit a wider section of the market. Other 
competitors, particularly the Gulliver Group, did not accept this evidence and 
argued that it was an overestimate and queried the claimed ‘pass-through effect’. 
The ACCC found that, rather than saving money, the proposed arrangement 
would lead to an increase in fares and decrease the capacity and quality of 
service of routes involving Australia where both airlines are present.2 The ACCC 
also found co-operation between Qantas and Air New Zealand, without an 
authorisation, was possible and would yield some of the claimed benefits. The 
Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT) found it was unlikely that all the cost 
savings asserted would be passed on to travellers, although it accepted that 
a significant, albeit indeterminate, amount would be passed on.3 The tribunal 
also accepted that not all the benefits claimed necessarily flowed from the 
authorisation and accordingly placed little weight on certain claimed benefits.4 
The tribunal noted that in the intervening eight months, the market had changed, 
as had the number of players in the market, and found that there were sufficient 
public benefits to warrant authorisation.5 It is also relevant to note here that 
the New Zealand Commerce Commission considered the same arrangement and 
reached a different decision, accepting the econometric modelling evidence and 
granting authorisation. 
Quantification of changing consumer demand is also a difficult area. 
Behavioural economists have suggested that the notion of the rational consumer 
is too simplistic and a more complex understanding of consumer behaviour is 
necessary. A consumer making a decision to take up an insurance policy will 
2 Qantas Airways and Air New Zealand A30220–A30222, 9 September 2003, ii.
3 Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004), paras 14, 211, 652.
4 ibid, 654.
5 ibid, 770.
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decide the issue depending on the manner in which the terms are framed. 
Framing the product in terms of risks that may be incurred by not taking up an 
insurance policy will appeal to a different category of consumers than framing 
the production terms of the gains that may result in taking up an insurance 
policy.6 Thus the forecasts of consumer demand and sales that are usually used 
in determining the future with/without the authorisation and the quantification 
used in this process would not be a straightforward task.
Second, adopting quantification in all cases will increase the expense incurred 
by applicants, who will have to avail themselves of econometric modelling 
in preparing their submissions. This would add to the concern expressed by 
non-profit organisations about the high costs of preparing such applications. 
It may also deter interested parties from making submissions because of the 
level of expertise that would be required. Third, the difficulties of quantifying 
certain benefits, particularly of a non-efficiency nature, cannot be ignored. Such 
problems have been discussed in other fields and are particularly evident in 
relation to environmental cases where the claims are hard to quantify because 
they require judgements to be made not only about the product, but also about 
hidden factors regarding its use, production and disposal.7 Many non-efficiency 
benefits, such as product safety, promotion of ethical business practices or 
facilitating the right to justice and due process, may defy easy quantification 
and this could lead to them being discounted. In the Australian Association of 
Pathology Practices Incorporated, the tribunal acknowledged the difficulties in 
quantifying the impact of certain conduct.8 Likewise, benefits that are likely to 
be delivered over a longer period may also be difficult to quantify.9 
Finally, relying heavily on quantification would require ACCC staff to be skilled 
in handling such data. Use of consultants may be costly. One of the economists 
interviewed was critical of the level of skills of the ACCC staff, stating that 
they do not have a broad range of persons with expertise in economic matters.10 
Another economist compared the ACCC with its counterpart in the United States, 
stating that the Federal Trade Commission had dozens of staff with PhDs in 
econometrics.11 Having staff capable of generating confidence is important and, 
6 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Roundtable on Demand-side Economics for 
Consumer Policy: Summary Report 2006 (Report by Ian McAuley declassified by the Committee on Consumer 
Policy, 71st session, 29–30 March 2006) 11; see also Joshua Gans, ‘“Protecting Consumers by Protecting 
Competition”: Does Behavioural Economics Support this Contention?’ (2005) 13 Competition and Consumer 
Law Journal 3.
7 See Amanda Cornwall, ‘Regulating Environmental Claims in Marketing’ (1996) 3 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 1, 1.
8 Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT 4 (8 April 2004).
9 See European Union (EU), ‘Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty’ (2004) Official 
Journal of the European Union C 101/08, 34 para 70.
10 Interview 10.
11 Interview 11. 
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in the absence of this, it may not serve the ACCC well to opt for quantification 
as a general rule for authorisation decisions. Such a strategy may be good in 
theory, but unrealistic given the world of public sector staffing.
In authorisation cases, public benefits and anti-competitive detriments can be 
quantified. This is commonly done in New Zealand in relation to authorisations. 
The New Zealand Commerce Commission has acknowledged that not all the 
elements that go to make up the judgement are equally capable of quantification. 
But quantification is the norm and the Commerce Commission has stated:
The Commission encourages applicants to make submissions on, and 
to quantify as far as is possible, projected detriments because this 
ensures better-focussed submissions. This does not necessarily mean 
that the Commission itself will rely completely on quantification as a 
determinative measure of detriments, nor that it will accept any one 
party’s estimation. The Commission will take each case on its own merits 
and use quantification to the extent that it is appropriate and not likely 
to distort the weighing process.12 
Although the provision of quantified information has been acknowledged as 
useful by the ACCC, which has stated that ‘the submission gives an indication 
of the likely costs to industry’ and estimates the savings at ‘over $100 million’,13 
it has not sought to go down the path of the New Zealand regulator. A number 
non-efficiency-related benefits have been increasingly recognised in ACCC 
decisions (Figure 4.8). Michael Pusey’s arguments that economic rationalism 
has led to an increasing emphasis on efficiency at the expense of many other 
values14 can be directly contradicted by this evidence, which points to an early 
awareness on sustainability issues that have been given attention since 1976 
and, particularly so, since 2003. 
Measuring Public Benefits
As use of quantification has steadily increased in Australia there has been some 
pressure on the ACCC to adopt a uniform policy on the issue.15 As discussed 
earlier, however, the claim that specific rules can constrain discretion is untrue16 
and discretion can simply move to another area. Rule ritualism may further 
12 Government of New Zealand, Commerce Commission, Guidelines to the Analysis of Public Benefits and 
Detriments (revised ed, 1997) 11.
13 Newcastle Port Corporation A91072, A91073, A91074, 23 April 2008, 37. See also CEMEX Australia Pty 
Limited A91082, 2 July 2008.
14 See Michael Pusey, The Experience of Middle Australia: The Dark Side of Economic Reform (2003). 
15 Interview 2; see also Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth of Australia, Office of Best 
Practice Regulation (OBPR) ‘Cost Benefit Analysis’, which emphasises cost benefit analysis. <http://www.
finance.gov.au/obpr/cost-benefit-analysis.html > at 15 October 2008.
16 Julia Black, ‘Managing Discretion’, (Paper presented at Australian Law Reform Commission Conference, 
Penalties: Policy, Principles and Practice in Government Regulation, Sydney, June 2001), 2.
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exacerbate the problem.17 The main issue facing regulators is which test to adopt 
for the purpose of quantification in competition law cases. There have been four 
possible tests or standards mooted: the total welfare standard, the consumer 
welfare standard, the price standard and, the balancing weights standard. 
Total Welfare Standard 
The total welfare standard considers the economy-wide welfare effects, 
requiring that if/when one person is made better off, others are not made worse 
off. The focus is on efficiency.18 The standard does not concern itself with 
wealth redistribution and does not require that benefits be passed on to the 
consumer.19 Although not couched in these terms, the total welfare standard 
has been adopted in Australia in a few cases where the conduct is occurring 
at an intermediate level of production. One such example is the Port Waratah 
case, where the producers were the main beneficiaries of the authorisation. An 
ACCC staff member pointed to this decision as an example of the total welfare 
standard at work.20 An economist, interviewed for this study, argued that 
the total welfare standard may result in making poorer shareholders better 
off, something which may be just as worthwhile as making consumers better 
off.21 The same economist preferred the total welfare standard to any other and 
argued strongly that competition policy should not concern itself with wealth 
redistribution; wealth redistribution should be left to tax policy.22 In the context 
of mergers, the ACT has stated it would adopt a total welfare standard subject 
to a caveat regarding the weight to be given to public benefits to the extent to 
which they are not shared generally among members of the community.23 It has 
stated that there should be no difference in the weight attached to benefits or 
costs, irrespective of the beneficiaries or bearers of the detriments.24 
17 John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valerie Braithwaite,  Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New 
Pyramid (2007) 220.
18 Robert Officer and Philip Williams, ‘The Public Benefit Test in an Authorisation Decision’, in Megan 
Richardson and Philip Williams (eds), The Law and the Market (1995) 157–66. See also Suzanne Loomer, 
Stephen Cole and John Quinn, Quantifying Efficiency Gains in a Competition Case: Sustaining a Section 96 
Defence (Paper presented at Canada’s Changing Competition Regime, National Conference, Toronto, 26–27 
February 2003) <http://www.coleandpartners.com/pdf/Quantifying_Monograph.pdf> at 30 February 2004.
19 The Canadian Competition Tribunal applied this standard in the Superior Propane 1 case. The case dealt 
with a merger application and the tribunal found there were $29.21 million of efficiency gains that offset the 
deadweight loss of $3 million, which the commissioner of the Competition Bureau had established. The decision 
of the tribunal was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Superior Propane 2. The Federal Appellate Court in 




23 Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004), paras 190–91.
24 VFF Chicken Meat Growers [2006] AComp Tribunal, para 75.
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Consumer Welfare Standard 
The second standard is the consumer welfare standard, which is the sum of the 
individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods and services.25 This 
standard looks at the effect of a proposed authorisation on the consumer. It 
disregards the benefits experienced by producers or shareholders and requires 
the benefit to be passed on to consumers. The Canadian Competition Bureau 
preferred this approach in interpreting the efficiencies defence within section 
90 of the Competition Act 1985 (Canada), although recent guidelines show it 
has now changed its approach.26 In the context of mergers, Michal Gal pointed 
out that this standard requires substantial efficiency gains to ensure that there 
is no wealth transfer.27 Michael Trebilcock argued that this standard is the most 
economically sound and tractable approach for small market economies.28 A 
number of ACCC staff stated that they usually look at consumer welfare and 
are impliedly applying this standard.29 It is evident that this is not always the 
case, as demonstrated by the discussion on collective bargaining, in which 
the main concern was to facilitate negotiations by small business.30 Past ACCC 
staff members indicated that authorisation decisions made in the 1980s used 
the consumer welfare standard, albeit impliedly, and cited the examples of the 
Kuring-gai Building Society insurance cases.31 The cost as well as the benefit that 
may reach the consumer has been considered in cases including the Refrigerant 
authorisation,32 and the determinations appear to be paying greater attention to 
the issue of pass-through (Figure 3.2).
Price Standard 
The third standard is the price standard, which examines the effect of the 
proposed authorisation on the price of the goods or service. If the likely result 
from the authorisation is that the downward pressure on price is greater than the 
upward pressure, the conduct should be allowed to proceed. The price standard 
25 Rhonda Smith, ‘Authorisation and the Trade Practices Act: More about Public Benefit’ (2003) 11(1) 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 21, 23.
26 Canadian Competition Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines, (March 2001) <http://www.competitionbureau.
gc.ca/internet/index.cfm?itemID=1673&Ig=e> at 15 May 2005. See also the recent Canadian Competition 
Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines (September 2004) <http://www.competitionbureay.gc.ca/internet/index.
cfm?itemID=1245&Ig=e> at 15 May 2005. For a fuller discussion of the total welfare standard see this paper, 69.
27 Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies (2003) 226.
28 Michael Trebilcock, ‘The Great Efficiencies Debate in Canadian Merger Policy: A Challenge to the Economic 
Foundation of Canadian Competition Law or a Storm in a Teacup?’ (Paper presented at the New Zealand 
Competition Law Conference, Auckland, 13–15 August 2004) 37. For an alternative view, see Gal (2003).
29 Interview 2; Interview 4; Interview 5; see also Smith (2003).
30 Konrad von Finckenstein,‘Remarks to the 2002 Competition Law Invitational Forum’ (Speech delivered 
at the Competition Law Invitational Forum, Langdon Hall, Cambridge, Ontario, 9 May 2002) <http://
competition.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/en/ct02361e.html> at 28 February 2004.
31 Re Kuring-gai Building Society (1978) 2 ATPR 40-094. See also Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
A90765, 30 June 2003. 
32 Refrigerant Reclaim Australia Ltd A91079, 14 May 2008.
6 . Discretion, the ACCC and Authorisation Determinations
175
examines the effect of the proposed conduct on the price paid by the consumer. 
Gains to producers, shareholders, employees or any other group is given little 
weight, whereas consumer gains are accorded a much larger weighting. It has 
been argued that there is no rationale to disregarding the benefits flowing to 
shareholders simply because they are shareholders.33 Suzanne Loomer and 
Stephen Cole, and Treblicock have pointed out that this standard is harder to 
satisfy than the consumer welfare standard, since the proven efficiency gains 
must be so significant the post-authorisation price will be set at a level lower than 
the pre-authorisation price.34 The European Commission’s guidelines state that, 
although it requires the calculation of cost efficiencies, it does not require this 
for qualitative efficiencies.35 It has also pointed out that qualitative efficiencies, 
such as improved products, may create sufficient value for consumers but may 
nevertheless be accompanied by a price increase,36 illustrating the difficulties of 
relying on prices as a sole guide to determine efficiency or indeed public benefit. 
In Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated, the tribunal 
recognised that, in certain circumstances, price may not necessarily reflect 
efficiencies. In this case, market failure was due to the principal–agent problem 
intrinsic to the asymmetry of information in the patient–doctor relationship,37 
in which the doctor, who does not pay for them, orders the necessary tests from 
a medical rather than consumer perspective.
Balancing Weights Standard 
The balancing weights standard is sometimes used in Canadian merger cases. 
It gives a weighting for all effects, including the redistribution that may result 
from a merger. Applying this test to authorisations sees a weight attached to all 
benefits and detriments. Further, where a particular benefit results in regressive 
wealth transfers, for example, from poor consumers to wealthy producers, this 
net welfare loss is also measured.38 In the context of mergers, Gal supported this 
standard because it is not limited to efficiencies but also looks at subsidiary 
issues such as market power.39 The Federal Appellate Court in Superior Propane 
2 suggested this would be the appropriate test to apply to the case, sending it 
back to the tribunal to do so. The tribunal was required to take into account all 
33 See Trebilcock (2004).
34 Loomer, Cole and Quinn (2003) 7, discusses this standard in the context of mergers in Canada. See also 
Trebilcock (2004) 33, where the author rejects this standard on the basis that the requirements of the price 
standard are too demanding and would largely vitiate the rationale for an efficiencies defence in the context 
of Canadian merger law.
35 See EU (2004); EU, ‘Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which do not Appreciably Restrict 
Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (de minimis)’, (2001) Official 
Journal of the European Union C 368/13. See also EU, ‘White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules Implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty’, (1999) Official Journal of the European Union C 132/01, paras 56–57.
36 EU (1999) para 102.
37 Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT (8 April 2004), para 34.
38 Loomer, Cole and Quinn (2003) 7.
39 Gal (2003) 224–28.
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of the effects of the merger, including the negative effects on resource allocation. 
The tribunal found that it was difficult to quantify the net welfare loss. The 
approach of the European Commission also shares much in common with this 
approach. The European Commission adopts what it has termed the balancing 
test, which involves a careful consideration of the anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects of proposed undertakings or conduct.40 The European 
Commission, however, has stated that efficiency gains may not necessarily 
affect the cost structure of the firm and has also acknowledged that qualitative 
efficiency gains may be hard to estimate.41 Clearly, quantification of all the 
factors would be one of the drawbacks of this standard. To apply the standard, 
information must be available on the distribution of income between different 
consumer, shareholder and producer groups, which may easily be estimated 
incorrectly. One of the interviewed economists suggested that the ACCC’s 
approach to authorisation determinations is best described as the balancing 
weights approach.42 Another suggested that the approach of the ACT in the 
Qantas authorisation saw the application of a balancing weights standard rather 
than the total welfare standard because the tribunal did allocate weightings 
to the benefits. This argument is supported by the following statement in the 
decision:
[W]e have also given due weighting to the fact that … benefits will 
accrue initially to Qantas, and its shareholders, and that not all the 
benefits will necessarily flow through to foreign shareholders in Qantas, 
we have not attributed any weight to those benefits …43
Given that there is no further clarification, however, it remains unclear as to 
whether this could definitely point to the balancing weights standard.
Trebilcock pointed out the main problems with this standard when he noted 
that, while it is more politically palatable than the total welfare standard, it is 
difficult to apply in practice and requires the competition authorities to make 
value judgements about who is more worthy of a dollar.44 Such a standard may 
be much easier to justify politically than a total welfare standard, which permits 
conduct resulting in potentially regressive wealth transfers.45 He criticised this 
standard on the basis that it does not take into account ‘trickle down’ effects 
and efficiency improvements introduced for private gains that will often have 
significant spill-over effects benefiting consumers. Further, this standard may 
not consider the manner in which certain conduct (in Trebilcock’s case mergers) 
40 See EU (2004) para 92.
41 ibid, paras 92, 100.
42 Interview 10.
43 Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9 (12 October 2004), para 770.
44 Trebilcock (2004) 36.
45 ibid, 20.
6 . Discretion, the ACCC and Authorisation Determinations
177
speeds up innovation and induces technological diffusion. Thus, he argues, 
these gains cancel out some of the negative effects of the wealth transfers from 
consumers to producers.46 
The Dawson Committee impliedly advocated the total welfare standard because 
of the emphasis it places on the importance of achieving efficiency gains.47 
The ACT appears to advocate a total welfare standard, although it has been 
suggested that there would be scope to give different weightings to different 
benefits. Interviews with ACCC staff indicated that one particular test is not 
used consistently. Two interviewees stated the consumer welfare standard was 
used in the College of Surgeons decision48 and was commonly used in older 
decisions in the 1980s and 1990s. One staff member stated the total welfare 
standard was used in the Port Waratah decision,49 while another staff member 
argued the Port Waratah decision illustrated the application of the balancing 
weights standard. One interviewed economist favoured the total welfare 
standard, while two other economists were equivocal about its application to all 
circumstances. In interviews with consumer groups, there was a general feeling 
that non-efficiency-based benefits would be harder to quantify than efficiency 
benefits and, accordingly, no standard may adequately reflect the non-efficiency 
benefits or detriments of proposed conduct. Another interviewee, however, 
pointed out that bad quantification could occur with both efficiency and non-
efficiency data. Another lawyer interviewed contrasted the Australian approach 
with the New Zealand approach, saying the Australian approach was much more 
flexible and recognised a variety of benefits.
Until 2007 the ACCC did not publicly advocate any particular standard in non-
merger authorisations.50 It has been argued in the past that the commission 
favoured a consumer welfare standard, even though it also acknowledged 
private benefits in a number of its determinations.51 Following the Qantas 
Airways application, however, the ACCC has been careful to point to this 
tribunal decision and refer to it as a public benefit standard,52 stating: 
The term ‘total welfare standard’ has a variety of uses and meanings 
in economic and legal literature. To avoid any potential confusion, the 
46 ibid, 30.
47 David Round, ‘W(h)ither Efficiencies: What is in the Public Interest? A Commentary on “The Great 
Efficiencies Debate in Canadian Merger Policy: A Challenge to Economic Foundations of Canadian Competition 
Law or a Storm in a Teacup?” by Michael Trebilcock’ (Paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Workshop of 
the Competition and Policy Institute of New Zealand, Auckland, 13–15 August 2004) 12.
48 Royal College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003.
49 Port Waratah A90650, 25 March 1998.
50 See ACCC, Merger Guidelines (June 1999) 69–71, paras 6.39–6.45. Here, the commission states that 
resource savings not passed on to the consumers in the form of lower prices can constitute a public benefit.
51 Smith (2003), 5; Alan Fels and Tim Grimwade, ‘Authorisation: Is It Still Relevant to Australian Competition 
Law?’ (2003) 11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 187, 200–02.
52 ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2007) 34.
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ACCC proposes to refer to the approach taken by the tribunal in Qantas 
Airways as the application of a ‘public benefit standard’. The ACCC 
will apply a public benefit standard when determining the weight to 
be given to productive efficiency savings in considering authorisation 
applications.53
This section illustrates the manner in which discretion can exist in giving effect 
to rules, reinforcing the concerns discussed in Chapter 5 that specific rules can 
increase discretion, rather than constrain it. It also illustrates the manner in which 
such exercise of discretion can vary over time within one regulatory agency, as 
well as the manner in which the exercise of discretion can be constrained by 
the tribunal. Methodologies can be much easier to apply in some contexts than 
others. I have attempted to show that choices of quantification methodologies 
can be fundamental drivers indeed of how discretion is exercised. Although 
outside the scope of this study, it is possible to apply a Foucauldian critique 
to these methodologies, that can see the use of quantification as a technology 
of control, which normalises certain practices while enabling new skills and 
capabilities. Certainly the use of quantification does just that while, at the same 
time, aligning itself to dominant neo-liberal discourses. 
Procedural Discretion 
The ACCC, in making authorisation determinations, has processes in place for 
collecting information and consulting with parties. This section looks at the 
main steps of the process before examining the ways in which participation is 
facilitated within the process and, by so doing, discretion is being exercised.
Steps in the Process
Information relevant to the authorisation application is obtained by the ACCC in 
a variety of ways. The authorisation application addresses in detail the proposed 
conduct, as well as the public benefits and possible detriments contended as 
likely to arise. This allows the ACCC to set the authorisation process in motion 
on the basis of significant information. After receiving the application, the ACCC 
invites interested parties to make submissions in response, and has stated that 
the nature of the authorisation will determine the parties it may seek to consult:
The range of interested parties consulted by the Commission depends 
upon the nature of the conduct for which authorisation is sought and the 
types of persons likely to be affected. Typically, interested parties can 
53 ibid, para 5.29.
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include competitors, customers, suppliers and other persons affected by 
the conduct; relevant government bodies, including regulators; relevant 
industry associations, consumer groups and community associations; 
and industry experts. When appropriate, the Commission may also 
seek submissions from the community by advertising in newspapers 
and trade journals. As well as inviting submissions, the Commission 
conducts its own market inquiries and research.54
The first and most accessible information source is the formal submissions made 
to the ACCC by parties with an interest in the process. These can include other 
competitors in the market; other parties who may be affected by the conduct, 
be it upstream or downstream; industry groups; government bodies; and, 
independent bodies and non-industry groups. These submissions may either 
favour the application or refute the claims made in the application. Some of 
the submissions examined simply state that the party has no objection to the 
application. Others are lengthy, containing a significant degree of analysis. The 
majority of such submissions are briefer than the application itself, focusing 
on the viewpoint of the particular business. Most of this information, with 
the exception of submissions in which a confidentiality claim is accepted, is 
publicly available on the ACCC website.55
A draft determination is distributed to the applicant and all parties making 
submissions, and copies of the draft determination are placed in the public 
register on the ACCC website. Further formal submissions may also be made to 
the ACCC after the release of a draft determination. There are generally fewer 
submissions made at this stage. Here, the parties specifically address the ACCC’s 
decision. In a number of cases, this stage provides the opportunity for a dialogue 
and, with the approval of the ACCC, the applicant may introduce changes to 
the application.56 In other cases, the draft determination may be altered by the 
ACCC following consideration of the submissions made;57 yet, in others, the 
draft determination remains unchanged.58 Stakeholders rarely have the attitude 
that because the ACCC has taken a certain line in a draft determination, this 
sets the framework for the decision in concrete, because the commission has a 
track record of moving in response to critiques of its draft. The procedure of 
draft followed by revisions is at the heart of claims the ACCC can make to being 
genuinely responsive.
54 ACCC, ‘Submission to the Commission of Inquiry: Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Dawson Review)’ (2002) 248.
55 Section 89 Trade Practices Act.
56 See Port Waratah Coal Services Ltd A90906–A90908, 9 July 2004; Steggles Limited A30183, 20 May 1998; 
Showmen’s Guild of Australasia A90729, 25 February 2003.
57 Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations A11909, 12 September 1984; Medicines Australia 
Ltd 90779, A90780, 14 November 2003. 
58 Port Waratah A90906–A90908, 9 July 2004.
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
180
Information relevant to the deliberations is also collected informally. This may 
include telephone calls to lawyers, applicants or interested parties to discuss 
certain claims made in the application.59 It can also include site visits and 
meetings to discuss the application. For example, in the Australian Dairy Farmers 
Association authorisation, ACCC officials met with members of the association 
in Adelaide to discuss the application further.60 The process of recording such 
meetings has been finalised since 2006. File notes briefly stating the matters 
discussed, date and persons attending are now systemically used and placed on 
the website. Decisions prior to 2006 did not include such a systematic keeping 
of file notes with the materials publicly available. 
Another step in this information-gathering process is the pre-decision 
conference. Following the draft determination, the ACCC invites applicants and 
interested parties to a pre-decision conference, which provides them with the 
opportunity to discuss the draft determination and to put their views directly 
to a commissioner.61 Conferences are only called on matters involving diverse 
interests and, in some cases, these conferences can be perfunctory.62 In certain 
complex cases, however, such as in the aviation industry where there are many 
counterfactuals proposed, the pre-decision conference may be an opportunity 
for an inclusive dialogue.63 Such conferences are chaired by a commissioner and 
conducted informally, acting as a venue for all attendees to have a reasonable 
opportunity to express their views. The ACCC takes into account these views in 
making its decision. The record of the conference, which is on the public register, 
gives an outline of the issues raised and the persons in attendance. Following 
the pre-decision conference, it is usual practice for the ACCC to invite interested 
parties to lodge final written submissions. After this, a final determination 
is made and sent to the applicant as well as all interested parties and is also 
placed on the public register. The final determination usually mirrors the draft 
determination in its structure, although the substance will differ depending on 
the preceding consultative process. Applications for review of the authorisation 
may be lodged to the ACT by the applicant or a party with sufficient interest.64
59 Australian Brick and Blocklaying Training Foundation A90993, 26 April 2006.
60 Australian Dairy Farmers Limited A90966, 26 April 2006. Also see Port Waratah A90650, A90651, 25 
March 1998; BHP Billiton Iron Ore A90981, A90982, A90983, 1 February 2006.
61 See section 90A; see also ACCC (2002) 249.
62 Interview 9.
63 See, for example, Re International Air Transport Association — International Air Transport Association 
A3485, A90408, 31 July 1984; Re Qantas Airways Limited and British Airways Plc Applications for authorisation 
A30226, A30227, 8 February 2005.
64 Sections 101, 102.
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Participation in the Process
Section 90A requires the ACCC to consult, although it does not prescribe the 
process or the parties who should be consulted. The ACCC attempts to collate 
relevant information and consults widely. The authorisation process allows for 
a range of interested parties to be heard, including private parties, industry 
groups, governments, other independent bodies and non-industry bodies. 
Parties can be heard in both a formal and informal manner. It is easier to gauge 
the level of participation and its impact when examining formal submissions. 
The informal processes are harder to evaluate as they do not provide access 
to data or refer in detail to this process in the determinations. The ACCC is 
becoming more evidence-based on procedural fairness and undertakes survey 
research on business attitudes to their treatment by the ACCC. 
Formal Submissions
The data are used to illustrate how the authorisation process has changed over 
the last 30 years by specifically examining the weight given by the ACCC to 
the submissions made to an authorisation application. Certain authorisation 
applications attract numerous submissions, often because a wide section of 
the community may be affected. For example, the Federation of Australian 
Wool Organisations authorisation attracted 25 submissions, with seven from 
industry associations and five from government departments.65 In other cases, 
the ACCC seeks submissions from affected parties, as was the case in the EFTPOS 
authorisation, in which the ACCC sought public submissions from numerous 
bodies, including consumer organisations as well as other competitors in the 
market.66 Although most submissions either favour or oppose the authorisation 
application, there are some that do not take any particular stance.67 Formal 
submissions from five different groups — private parties, industry groups, 
governments, non-industry bodies and independent bodies — are examined 
below.
Submissions from Private Parties 
Submissions by private parties provide the ACCC with important information 
about industry structure and practices. Robert Baldwin and Julia Black pointed 
to the importance of being responsive to the firm’s operational and cognitive 
frameworks. Often this information is hard to obtain and such submissions 
65 Federation of Australian Wool Organisations A90984–A90985, 11 January 2006.
66 EFTPOS Interchange Fee Reform A30224, A30225, 11 December 2003.
67 See, for example, Association of Australian Bookmaking Companies A30243, 30 March 2006, where 15 submissions 
prior to the draft decision were received. Here many of the parties simply indicated that they had no objection to the 
application or that they would not be making a submission and would simply like to be kept informed.
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may present one opportunity to obtain such valuable information, allowing 
the regulator to facilitate competition and ethical practices in the industry. The 
participation by private actors making submissions has increased significantly 
since the Act’s introduction. In 1976 business had little interest in engaging with 
the authorisation process and few submissions were made.68 The commission was 
criticised for its adversarial approach by business.69 This antagonism towards 
the commission’s perceived intrusion into business was vividly expressed in the 
North Queensland Forest Products Association Ltd decision in which the parties 
were seeking authorisation of a recommended price list. Here the applicants 
refused to furnish the further information sought by the commission, saying 
that it did not have the time and finance to furnish the additional information 
sought and requesting that the commission rely on information previously 
supplied.70 Business treated the law and the commission as restrictions on its 
freedoms. The practice was for the commission to make its own enquiry into the 
conduct rather than to rely on submissions by the applicant or other parties.71 
The 1976 review committee commented on this and recommended increased 
dialogue between the commissioners and the regulatees.72 The committee’s 
advice was ‘taken on board’ and the picture changed with the ACCC seeking to 
harness business involvement in the authorisation process. By 1998 there was 
commonly more dialogue between interested businesses and the commission on 
such matters. This shift reflects the commission’s use of a variety of regulatory 
practices and, as John Braithwaite stated, a ‘willingness to broker a new kind 
of conciliation between the conflicting parties’.73 There was also an attempt 
by the commission to reinforce the value of business involvement by clearly 
stating the influence such submissions had on its decisions. Such practices are 
important in gaining confidence and they are, perhaps, further evidence of the 
ACCC being responsive to the firms’ own operating and cognitive frameworks.74 
In the Air New Zealand authorisation the airline sought authorisation to set 
up a joint agreement with all of its members to offer discounts on published 
fares to corporate customers.75 Qantas made a submission staunchly opposing 
the application, arguing that it did not present a correct view of the market; 
the price-fixing conduct was unnecessary as multi-layered contractual 
relationships, which could be used to offer similar discounts already existed; 
the proposed conduct would lessen competition as the agreement would allow 
68 North Queensland Forest Products Association Ltd A15536, A16527, A16528, 31 August 1976.
69 See Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Report to the Minister for Business 
and Consumer Affairs (1976) 39, where this criticism is leveled in the context of public hearings.
70 North Queensland Forest Products Association Ltd A15536, A16527, A16528, 31 August 1976.
71 ibid, 101, where the process for making applications is discussed.
72 ibid, 103.
73 Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, (2002) 231; see also Marshall Breger and 
Gary Edles, ‘Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies’ (2000) 52 
Administrative Law Review 1111, 1115.
74 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) Modern Law Review 69–70.
75 Air New Zealand on behalf of all members of the Star Alliance A30209–A30213, 4 September 2003.
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the participants to understand and utilise their competitor’s pricing methods 
and strategies; and, the proposed arrangements were unlikely to give rise to 
public benefits.76 The ACCC authorised the conduct subject to an undertaking 
that it negotiated with Air New Zealand to cease participation in the agreement 
and conventions program if it entered into an alliance with Qantas Airways.77
Submissions by Industry Groups 
Industry groups have always been active in making formal submissions to the 
ACCC. After all, they have knowledge of the industry, their own interests to 
protect and the necessary skills to put together such submissions, and their 
participation is increasing. Many in the ACCC are aware of the allegation of 
being captured by industry groups, and many of the past and present officials 
interviewed pointed to the transparency and accountability mechanisms in 
place that would counter any such influence.78
Figure 6.1 collates the instances where submissions were made by industry 
bodies and categorises them on the basis of their success. In the 35 determinations 
studied for 1976, there were eight submissions made by industry bodies; 
authorisation was granted in six of these cases. By 1984 there were submissions 
made by industry bodies in 12 out of 35 cases. In 1998, 26 submissions from 
industry bodies were received and, of these, 20 were successful. This indicates 
that participation by industry groups in the authorisation process has been 
increasing steadily.
Figure 6.1: Influence and success of submissions by industry groups in 
authorisation determinations 
Source: Author’s research.
76 See submission by Qantas, Air New Zealand A30209, A30210, 4 September 2003, 15–16. 
77 ibid, i.
78 Interview 2; Interview 3.
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Groups such as the Australian Gas Users Group were able to exert an influence 
on the ACCC in the decision involving the North West Shelf Project. They raised 
concerns about the joint venture that prompted the ACCC to grant authorisation 
subject to conditions.79 
The increasing participation by such groups is an example of the ascendency 
of New Public Management and consequent changes in public administration, 
including the deregulation of government businesses. As Michael Power pointed 
out, this is in part due to the creation of quasi-markets and the introduction of 
contracting between newly separated service providers and purchasers.80 The 
empirical study shows that in 2003 and 2006, industry bodies made submissions 
in 26 out of 35 decisions. During these years, submissions by industry groups 
were made in authorisation applications involving section 45 including collective 
agreement,81 industry groups seeking approval for a code of conduct,82 as well as 
other agreements made within a professional or business association.83
Not all industry groups share the same view. This is illustrated by the Australian 
Brick and Blocklaying Training Foundation authorisation, where four industry 
bodies made submissions on an application that sought to impose a levy on 
the sale of bricks and concrete masonry products to fund a national program 
designed to alleviate the shortage of skilled bricklayers in the industry. Of these 
four industry bodies, two made brief but supportive submissions, whereas 
the other two were dubious of the benefits that such a scheme would bring, 
pointing to the duplication of resources as well as the existence of alternate 
training programs that may fulfil similar goals.84 In 2008 and 2010, industry 
groups exerted influence in 20 and 13 cases respectively, with all being granted 
authorisation. Again, diverse industry bodies were represented and the industry 
groups related to the health industry that made submissions in 2008 included 
the Rural Dental Action Association,85 Victorian Hospitals Industry Association, 
Victorian Health Care Association, Rural Doctors Association of Australia, Rural 
Doctors Association of Victoria,86 Australian Medical Association Limited,87 
79 See North West Shelf Project application by participants in relation to co-ordinated marketing, determined 
on 29 July 1998, 35. 
80 Michael Power, The Audit Society (1997) 43.
81 See Qantas Airlines A90963, A 9 September 2003; Air New Zealand A30209, A30210, A30211, 4 September 
2003; Inghams A90825, 22 January 2003; Australian Dairy Farmers A90961, A90962, 20 February 2006.
82 See Re Medicines Australia Ltd A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003; Australian Direct Marketing 
A90876, 29 June 2006.
83 See NSW Health A90754, A90755, 4 September 2003; Refrigerant A90854, 24 September 2003; Agsafe 
A90871, 18 September 2003; Showmen’s Guild A90729, 25 February 2003; College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 
2003; Australian Swimmers Association (2006), Federation of Wool Organisers (2006).
84 Australian Brick and Blocklaying Training Foundation Limited A90993, 25.
85 Australian Dental Association Inc (2008).
86 Australian Medical Association Limited & Ors (2008).
87 CALMS Ltd (2008).
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Australian Society of Anaesthetists, Rural Doctors Association of Victoria88 and 
the Complementary Healthcare Association of Australia.89 This reflects the the 
complex and diverse interests that are present in the market and which have to 
be considered in decision-making by any regulator.
Submissions by Governments
In the Keynesian welfare state, the state played an important role in the 
provision of public services, such as telecommunications, electricity, gas and 
many forms of transport. These services were exempt from competition law and 
the worldwide competition commissions were focused on policing the activities 
of private corporations. Today the deregulation of government businesses has 
meant that these businesses are subject to competition law.90 This has meant that 
both state and federal governments are now participating in the authorisation 
process by making submissions to the commission, attending pre-decision 
conferences and commenting on the final decision. 
Many of these changes bring to the fore the significance of the historical, social 
and political context which shape the institution’s response (in this case the 
regulatory agency’s response). Fiona Haines referred to this as ‘regulatory 
character’, whereas Baldwin and Black called it the institutional environment.91 
Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger have adopted a critical political 
economy perspective, linking the development of competition policy to the 
wider regulation of capitalism and the take up of competition principles in 
Europe as reflecting a shift to neoliberal discourses dominant in the 1980s.92 
In doing so they alert us to the political nature of competition law and policy 
which is undoubtedly also relevant to its development in Australia, where 
the notions of liberalism and state centric governance was displaced by the 
neoliberal discourse leading to the deregulation of government businesses and 
state enterprises in the mid nineties. This is demonstrated in the role played by 
government in making submissions on authorisation determinations where the 
state is now subject to market forces and the notions of economic efficiency take 
88 Rural Doctors Association of Australia Limited (2008).
89 ACT Health Food Co-Operative Limited (2008).
90 See s 2A of the Trade Practices Act 1974, which opened Commonwealth Government businesses to the Act.
91 Fiona Haines, Globalisation and Regulatory Character: Regulatory Reform after the Kader Toy Factory 
Fire (2005) 36–37; Baldwin and Black (2008) 70–77; see also Julia Black, ‘New Institutionalism and Naturalism 
in Socio-Legal Analysis: Institutionalist Approaches to Regulatory Decision Making’ (2002) 19(1) Law and 
Policy 51–93; Michael Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the 
Public Sector (1995) 42–43; Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle, ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating 
Independent Competition Agencies’ (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 148, 153–54.
92 See  Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger, The Politics of European Competition Regulation: A 
Critical Political Economy Perspective (2011), Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger, ‘Revisiting 50 years 
of market-making: The neoliberal transformation of European competition policy’ (2010) 17(1) Review of 
International Political Economy 20 – 44.
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prominence.93 Figure 6.2 illustrates the changing role of the federal government 
and Figure 6.3 looks at the submissions made by the state governments in this 
process. The submissions by both federal and state governments have increased 
dramatically from 1984 to 1998 adding the Australian evidence to the bigger 
story told by Buch-Hansen and Wigger.
There were no submissions by either federal or state governments in 1976, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. The period from 1998 onwards, however, 
saw a greater role for these governments. This is partly explained by the 
substantial degree of deregulatory activity and microeconomic reform taking 
place in Australia. For instance, in 1998 federal government departments made 
submissions in support of the deregulation of the electricity industry as well as 
the wool industry, while the state governments were involved in decisions about 
the restructuring of the egg and milk industries.94 
Figure 6.2: Moderately and highly influential submissions by federal 
government in authorisation determinations 
Source: Author’s research.
The Qantas authorisation is an interesting example of the different considerations 
involved in a highly regulated market for international travel. Here Qantas 
Airways Limited was applying for authorisation of a cooperation agreement with 
Orangestar Investments Holdings Pty Ltd to co-ordinate their flying operations 
in and out of Australia to predominantly Asian and Pacific locations and on 
routes in and out of Singapore to Asian locations. The Federal Department of 
Transport and Regional Services was strongly supportive of the application 
stating that the international aviation market has many barriers to entry, such 
93 Buch-Hansen and Wigger (2010) 40. See Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘The Paradox of Australian Competition Policy: 
Contextualizing the Coexistence of Economic Efficiency and Public Benefit’ (2013) 36(1) World Competition: 
Law and Economics Review 133-164.
94 National Electricity Code A90652; Australian Wool Exchange Limited (1998); Steggles Limited (1998).
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as the government imposed ownership restrictions that require carriers remain 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by their nationals. Such barriers 
restricted the access by airlines to certain markets. The Department noted: 
the ‘proposed cooperation agreement will enable Qantas to take advantage of 
Orangestar’s overseas networks that have been gained by Valuair and JA as 
Singaporean carriers’.95 The Department suggested that the authorisation be 
granted for a period of 3–5 years. The ACCC granted authorisation for five years, 
stating that it retained the power to review the authorisation prior to expiry in 
case of any material change.96 In the Tasmanian Forest Contractors authorisation 
in 2006 the applicants were not successful in their application. Figure 6.4 shows 
that there were two unsuccessful authorisations applications in 2006. Both of 
these were connected to Tasmanian Forest Contractors applications. Here the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations made a submission stating 
that it was generally supportive of collective bargaining arrangements that 
are in the public interest, but disputed a number of benefits claimed in this 
particular case. The queries raised by the Department were noted by the ACCC 
although it rejected the application.97 This was also the case with the support 
shown by the Federal government for the application. It is interesting to note 
that the ACCC saw fit to clearly refuse to be persuaded by the position of both 
government departments illustrating the changing role of the regulatory agency 
in the regulatory state.
On the other hand, a good deal of influence was exerted on the ACCC in the 
7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd authorisation decision.98 The ACCC was revoking an 
earlier authorisation under section 91(4) on the basis that several material 
changes had occurred. That decision had allowed for certain anti-competitive 
practices to continue in relation to the distribution system of newspapers. One 
of the material changes the ACCC cited for revoking the authorisation was that 
there had been far-reaching changes in competition policy, which required re-
evaluation of the modes of newspaper distribution. Two Federal government 
submissions strongly argued that the maintenance of an efficient home 
delivery system for newspapers generated numerous public benefits. These 
benefits included the provision of business opportunities for small business; 
the distribution of information important for the functioning of a democratic 
society; assistance to vulnerable consumer groups such as the elderly and 
disabled; as well as the efficiency considerations arising from reduced wastage 
and better planning for publishers. The ACCC considered these submissions 
and concluded that the existence of an efficient home delivery service was in 
95 Qantas Airways Limited A40107, A40108, A 40109, 26 April 2006, 19.
96 ibid, 40.
97 Tasmanian Forest Contractors A9073, A90974, 22 February 2006.
98 Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, Australian Association of Convenience Stores Incorporated; Queensland 
Newsagents Federation (1994) ATPR 41-357, 42658.
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
188
the publishers’ interests and that they were likely to ensure that it continued. 
The tribunal was sympathetic to the ACCC’s position and stated that it ‘is clear 
that the submissions of the government to the commission played a very large 
role in the deliberations of the commission in reaching its conclusions to grant 
authorisations’.99 
Figure 6.3: Moderately and highly influential submissions by state 
government and authorisation determinations in the sample studied
Source: Author’s research.
The ACCC has received submissions from federal government departments where 
the authorisation involved deregulated industries. The detailed and considered 
submission made by the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries 
and Energy in the Australian Wool Exchange Limited authorisation is a good 
example of these actors seeing their role as one of assisting the commission 
to reach its decision, rather than relying on the commission to cater to their 
interests.100 This submission lists a number of reasons for supporting the self-
regulating scheme the ‘old’ Australian Wool Corporation sought to implement.
State governments too are actively participating in this process. Issues involving 
benefits for the community, employment in industries based in the state, as well 
as maintaining professional standards aimed at protecting community rights 
99 ibid; see also Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd; Independent Newsagents Association; Australasian Association 
of Convenience Stores Incorporated [1998] ACompT 3, 18 November 1998, in which the tribunal had the 
opportunity to consider the ACCC’s revocation of an earlier authorisation. Here, the tribunal reiterated its 
earlier comments on the consideration given by the commission to the federal government’s submissions 
in this matter. These submissions contained a detailed analysis of the public benefits derived through the 
newspaper distribution system.
100 Australian Wool Exchange Limited in relation to its business rules, 30 December 1998, 28.
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attract such participation. At times the response of the state governments can 
be adversarial as the ACCC activities may directly impinge on their autonomy. In 
Re Australian Medical Association Limited the applicant sought approval for a 
fee agreement in rural South Australian public hospitals. This was a particularly 
controversial decision as it had the potential of directly impacting on the 
conduct of state public hospitals. The Queensland, Western Australian and 
Victorian governments all expressed concern about how the arrangement would 
affect costs and the operation of hospitals within their state.101 In the Australian 
Dental Association authorisation102 three state bodies and a federal body made 
submissions in favour of the application and in Refrigerant the importance 
of supporting industry initiatives was recognised by the Western Australian 
Department of Environmental Protection, which supported the application and 
stated that it believed it will result in a favourable environmental outcome.103 
In the Ansett, however, the response from the two federal departments and six 
state departments was specifically directed at the proposed authorisation. Here 
a number of airlines sought to enter into an agreement to coordinate airline 
services and argued that increased tourism would be a resultant public benefit. 
The West Australian ministers for transport and tourism, the chief minister 
of the Northern Territory, the premier of Tasmania, as well as spokespersons 
for the Queensland Government, South Australia Government and Victorian 
Government all provided varying degrees of support for the authorisation.104 
Submissions by Non-industry Bodies
The main criterion for belonging to this category is that the parties are not-for-
profit bodies representing the interests of a societal sector. It does not include 
industry bodies that may be not-for-profit but which nevertheless pursue specific 
interests, for example, the Gas Users Group. Consumers Federation of Australia, 
Australian Council of Social Service, Victorian Council of Social Service and the 
Farmers Federation would fall into this category of non-industry bodies. 
The short-lived effort to empower consumer groups at the inception of the Act 
resulted in a good deal of participation by these groups in the authorisation 
process. 
101 See A90622, 18–19. 
102 Australian Dental Association Inc  A91094, A91095, 10 December 2008.
103 Refrigerant (2003) 13; for other 2003 decisions where such submissions were made see EFTPOS 
interchange fees  A30224, A30225, 11 December 2003; The Australian Self-Medication Industry A30223, 8 
January 2003; College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003. 
104 Ansett Australia Limited and Others A90649, A90655, 22 July 1998; for other 1998 decisions where such submissions 
were made see National Electricity Code A90652, A90553, A90654, 19 October 1998; Association of Fluorocarbon 
Consumers and Manufacturers Inc A90658 26 August 1998; Port Waratah A90650, A90651, 25 March 1998.
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Figure 6.4: Moderately and highly influential submissions by non-industry 
groups and authorisation determinations 
Source: Author’s research.
This is reflected in Figure 6.4 which shows a relatively higher degree of 
participation by the not-for-profit sector in 1976. Out of the six authorisation 
decisions in which such submissions by non-industry bodies were made, 
however, only two were successful. In every year after 1976, participation was 
accompanied by a grant of authorisation. The manner in which the participation 
by non-industry groups has played out is not straightforward. In a minority 
of determinations studies, the non-industry groups supported the application 
and authorisation was granted.105 In some other determinations studied, 
certain concerns were discussed in the draft determination and/or pre-decision 
conference and subsequent amendments were made to the authorisation 
application.106 In the majority of the determinations studied, where concerns 
were raised by non-industry groups, some of these concerns were addressed 
through the imposition of conditions. This occurred in 12 out of a total of 
17 determinations in which non-industry groups participated in the samples 
studied in 1984,107 1998,108 2003109 and 2006.110 
105 This only occurred in two determinations studied, both occurring in 2006: Federation of Australian 
Wool Organisations A90984 and A90985, 11 January 2006.
106 This occurred in the sample studied in the following determinations: in 2006 in Australian Direct 
Marketing Association (ADMA) A90984 and in 2003 in the EFTPOS A30224 and A30225, 11 December 2003.
107 Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations A11709, A21265, 12 September 1984.
108 Gas Services Business Pty Ltd: Service Performance Contracts A90630, A90631, 19 August 1998.
109 College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003; Medicines Australia Ltd A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003; 
Australian Self-Medication Industry A30223, 22 October 2003.
110 Community Care Underwriting Agency A90997 and A90998, 6 July 2006.
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In the United Permanent Building Society authorisation, the applicants sought 
authorisation for an agreement to allow for property to be insured with a 
nominated insurer. The Canberra Consumers Incorporated and Australian 
Federation of Consumers Organisations made submissions opposing the 
application on the basis that it was a restraint of competition between insurance 
companies, it resulted in a denial of choice of insurers and policy benefits and, it 
also led to unsatisfactory premiums.111 The ACCC took note and did not authorise 
the tying agreements, although it did authorise other proposed agreements in the 
application.112 In Re Herald Weekly Times & Ors, the submissions of Canberra 
Consumers Incorporated did not have the same degree of sway. The commission 
noted that the demands by the consumer body for the codes of conduct to go 
beyond the legislative requirements and be more responsive to the needs of the 
public was ‘a natural attitude for a consumer body and one that it is useful to 
have expressed publicly,’ but the commission did not accept the arguments.113
This participation dwindled in 1984 primarily due to funding cuts for such 
groups. Another reason for the decreased participation was the enormous 
complexity of the authorisation decisions and the materials submitted by 
the applicant to such proceedings. Making sense of the data, undertaking 
independent research in order to verify or deny the claims of the applicants, 
and presenting a persuasive case involves a good deal of time and expertise, 
all of which involves high costs. There is limited participation by such groups 
in the determinations in 1984 and 1998, increasing again in 2003 and 2006. In 
1984 only one case in the study had participation by non-industry bodies. This 
was in the FACTS authorisation, where the Federation of Australian Commercial 
Television stations sought authorisation for the rules, guidelines and procedures 
of the federation, which was charged with self-regulating advertising on 
commercial television. Three consumer groups, the Australian Federation of 
Consumers Organisation, the Australian Consumers Association (ACA) and 
Canberra Consumers Incorporated, made submissions critical of the guidelines, 
reflecting the public issues raised in the application. The main criticisms were 
that: the system being operated by the industry did not always interpret or 
apply laws and codes according to their purpose, the system was not open to 
external scrutiny and, there was insufficient public access to and knowledge of 
the system.114 The ACA had undertaken a survey of 902 television commercials 
to support their arguments.115 The commission stated of the ACA’s submission:
The importance of ACA’s criticism is that it represents the perception 
of the largest consumer organisation in the country ... Even if the 
111 United Permanent Building Society (1976) 16874.
112 It authorised the compulsory life insurance schemes, which was/were the content of A21059.
113 Herald & Weekly Times & Ors (1976) 16572.
114 Re Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations A11709, A21265, 12 September 1984, ATPR 50-076, 55399.
115 ibid, (1984) ATPR 50-076, 55401.
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perception is wrong, or partly wrong, that does not dispose of the 
matter, [I]t still seems evident that regulation of an industry so closely 
affecting consumers, when the regulation is done largely by the 
industry itself and purports to serve not primarily the industry itself 
but the community at large, needs community confidence rather than 
opposition. The criticisms, concerning [the]... way matters such as 
complaints are handled, represents a signal that the system is seen to 
be more industry-oriented than the industry itself perceives, or perhaps 
even deserves.116
In 1998 the role for non-industry groups to participate in decisions involving 
deregulation of essential services is demonstrated by the involvement of the 
Victorian Council of Social Services in Gas Services Pty Ltd.117 This trend 
continued in later years with such groups becoming active in authorisations 
involving deregulated markets and professions, such Re College of Surgeons,118 
Re EFTPOS interchange fees,119 and Re Federation of Australian Wool 
Organisations.120 The non-industry groups that made submissions in successful 
authorisation decisions included:
• Australian Consumer Association (ACA)
• Australian Federation of Consumers Organisation 
• Breast Cancer Action Group
• Canberra Consumers Incorporated
• Cancer Voices NSW
• Centre of Law and Genetics 
• Consumer Credit Legal Centre NSW Incorporated
• Consumer Law Centre Victoria
• Consumers Federation of Australia
• Consumers Health Forum of Australia
• Council of Social Services of New South Wales
• Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre
• Financial Services Consumer Policy Centre, University of New South Wales
• Royal Institute for Deaf and Blind Children
• Volunteering Australia
116 ibid, 55405.
117 Gas Services Business Pty Ltd A90630, A90631, 19 August 1998, 8.
118 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003.
119 EFTPOS Interchange Fee Reform A30224 and A30225, A30224, A30225, 11 December 2003.
120 Federation of Australian Wool Organisations A90984, A90985, A90984–A90985, 11 January 2006.
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The ACA made the most submissions. The non-industry groups have been 
making more submissions since 1998 and the rate of success has been greater 
after 1976. The changes in this area should be viewed against the backdrop of a 
shift in the practice of government.121 Power stated that the success of political 
discourses has demanded improved accountability from public services, not 
only in terms of their conformity to legally accepted process but also in terms of 
their performance.122 So, citizens are now the consumers of public services and 
are entitled to monitor them. But it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on the 
increasing emphasis given to ‘the consumer’ in all statements by the ACCC and 
the call by the ACCC for such not-for-profit groups to participate in its decision 
process.123 It could be seen optimistically as an indication that the commission 
is ready to consider submissions if they are made or, more pessimistically, as an 
example of rhetoric by the ACCC. 
Submissions from Independent Bodies
The influence of reports, directives, memoranda and general policy drives 
cannot be ignored. The recent past has seen a growing interdependency 
between government departments, all of whom may be actors within the 
regulatory space.124 This interdependency is both implied and expressed. The 
most obvious example of implied interdependency will occur because the bodies 
share responsibility for the regulatory space. Express interdependency may be 
mandated by co-operative agreements or memoranda of understanding. For 
example, in September 1998 the ACCC and the Reserve Bank of Australia entered 
into a memorandum of understanding that set out an agreed basis for policy 
co-ordination and information sharing and, in 2001, the ACCC recommended 
that the Reserve Bank use its powers to regulate credit card schemes.125 Many 
independent bodies make formal submissions to the ACCC where there is an 
overlap in responsibilities or where the decisions may affect the conduct of others 
associated with the same domain. Figure 6.5 shows that such involvement has 
changed over the past three decades and illustrates where the submission has 
either a moderate or high degree of influence on the ACCC’s decision. From there 
121 See Colin Scott, ‘Accountability in a Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38, 44.
122 Power (1997) 44.
123 As was done in the Vodaphone A90681, 22 April 1998, where the ACCC called on the Australian 
telecommunications users group for comments.
124 Here I am restricting my discussion to the state actors. By doing so, I am not discounting the role of 
non-state actors, whose participation I have discussed above, under Submissions by Non-industry Bodies. 
See also Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design’ (2001) (Summer) 
Public Law 329, 337.
125 ACCC, ‘Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Recommends Reserve Banks Using Powers to 
Reform Credit Card Schemes’ (Press Release, 21 March 2001).
Discretion and Public Benefit in a Regulatory Agency
194
being no submission made by another independent agency in 1976, the scene 
changed in 1984 when there were nine submissions, many involving capital and 
financial markets as well as approvals for codes of conduct.126
Figure 6.5: Moderately and highly influential submissions by independent 
groups and authorisation determinations 
Source: Author’s research.
In Re Australian Associated Stock Exchange — one of the ACCC decisions 
that engendered a transformation of an economically critical market — the 
authorisation was for an amendment of the Australian Stock Exchange rules, 
which resulted in placing restrictions on who could carry on the business of 
stockbroking. This arrangement had the effect of breaching section 45. The new 
membership rules had been scrutinised by the National Companies and Securities 
Commission while the business rules had been drawn up in consultation with 
the National Companies and Securities Commission. The role of this independent 
body was noted by the Trade Practices Commission in its determination.127 
Again in 1998, the Re Australian Stock Exchange authorisation was sought for 
business rules which governed the operation of the Stock Exchange Automated 
Trading system for the trading of securities in the stock market conducted by the 
Australian Stock Exchange. Here the Australian Securities Commission’s views 
on the manner in which the facility would meet market efficiency and investor 
protection were accepted by the ACCC.128 Likewise, it was the stability of the 
126 The 1984 authorisation decisions, where independent bodies made submissions, included Master 
Locksmiths Association of Australia Ltd A90387, A90388, 15 March 1984; International Air Transport 
Association, A3485, A90408, 31 July 1984.
127 Re Australian Associated Stock Exchange (1984) 55468.
128 Re Australian Stock Exchange (1998) 26–27, 37.
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financial market that was important in the EFTPOS authorisation in 2003,129 
the Investment & Financial Services authorisation in 2006,130 and the Suncorp 
Metway131 determination in which both the Reserve Bank and the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission supported the application.
Informal Participation
In numerous authorisation cases it is clear that participation and influence can 
be indirect or informal. This section explores such participation under three 
headings: indirect influence of policies and past decisions, submissions and 
discussions following the draft determination, and public consultations and pre-
decision conferences which can facilitate participation and influence outcomes.
Indirect Influence Evidenced by Reference to Policies and Past 
Decisions
Influence can be exerted in both a direct and indirect manner. General government 
policy is of concern to the ACCC which makes mention of it in its decisions. 
This has included reference to the Wallis Report,132 national competition policy 
(Hilmer Report),133 government ozone strategy,134 and Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) initiatives.135 In the Australian Medical Association 
authorisation, the ACCC discussed the manner in which the medical profession 
came to be regulated by the Act and so was seeking authorisation here. It 
referred to the Hilmer Report and the COAG agreement to enact legislation to 
achieve universal application of competition laws to all businesses throughout 
Australia.136 Government policy is clearly being given effect in this process. 
Another example is in Re Australian Communications Access Forum Inc, where 
the authorisation dealt with self-regulation via a constitution; the ACCC made 
reference to the second reading speech which accompanied the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Telecommunications) Bill 1996: ‘It is a clear policy intention that 
... both the determination of access rights and terms and conditions of access be 
the result of commercial processes and industry self-regulation.’137
In Re Investment and Financial Services Association the ACCC granted 
authorisation to the association for its draft policy on genetic testing for two 
129 EFPTOS A30224, A30225, 11 December 2003.
130 Investment and Financial Services Association Ltd A90986, A90989, 8 March 2006.
131 Suncorp Metway Limited & Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Limited A91232, A91233, 13 September 2010.
132 Australian Payments Clearing Association Limited A90617; A90618, A90618.
133 Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited A90825, 22 January 2003.
134 Refrigerant A90829, 7 May 2003; Agsafe Limited A90871, 18 September 2003.
135 See Vencorp A90646, A90647, A90648, 19 August 1998.
136 Australian Medical Association Limited and South Australian Branch of the Australian Medical Association 
Incorporated A90622, 31 July 1998, 3.
137 Australian Communications Access Forum Inc A90613, 22 April 1998, 15.
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years. This was to allow the issues surrounding testing to be debated and 
for the development of government and industry policy, including ‘further 
development of self-regulatory and legislative safeguards’.138 
While the ACCC also makes reference to its own decisions and investigations 
from time-to-time, it is worth noting that this has decreased over time, perhaps 
pointing to the growing sophistication of the decision-making process and the 
acute awareness of the scrutiny of its decisions by others, including the Dawson 
Review in 2003. Although the reference made by the ACCC to its own decisions 
looks particularly large in the 2008 and 2010 determinations, as seen in Figure 
6.6, it can be explained by the fact that there were many repeat authorisation 
applications in which reference to earlier decisions would be expected; the 
Refrigerant determination in 2008 and the Agsafe determination in 2010 are 
examples of this.
Figure 6.6: Moderately and highly influential reference by ACCC to its 
own decisions
Source: Author’s research.
Submissions, Discussions and Reassessments after the Draft 
Determination
As discussed earlier, the draft determination is an important step in the 
authorisation process and the period after the draft determination is one 
where there can be a dialogue between the applicant, interested parties and 
the ACCC. This is a useful process for the ACCC, allowing it to discuss the issue 
with the applicant and other actors at greater length. The important role such 
138 ACCC, 2000–2001 Annual Report (June 2001) 84.
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exchanges can have in developing new interpretative communities has been 
examined by Black in her work on regulatory conversations.139 In a number of 
instances, interested parties have only sought to make submissions after the 
draft determination: Coalition of Major Professional Sports, 1984, FACTS, 1984, 
Golden Casket Agents' Association Ltd, 2003, Medicines, 2003 and Australian 
Self Medication, 2003. In the Australian Self-Medication authorisation, which 
involved gaining approval for a code of conduct, there were 12 submissions 
from interested parties before the draft decision and three submissions after the 
draft decision. All the submissions supported the application for authorisation. 
In Re Medicines Australia Incorporated, the ACCC had imposed three conditions 
it had proposed in the draft application. Medicines Australia had accepted two 
of the conditions that had been proposed. The third condition required members 
of Medicines Australia to provide the association with various details about 
educational meetings that were organised or sponsored by these respective 
members prior to the event . Medicines Australia was required to make these 
details available to the public through its website.140 Medicines Australia made 
a submission containing 10 points stating why this condition could not be 
accepted by its members.141 They argued the condition would create a significant 
anti-competitive effect by requiring disclosure of confidential information. This 
would: inhibit pharmaceutical companies, reduce new membership, place an 
onerous administrative burden on Medicines Australia, and be largely irrelevant 
as most consumers were unaware of the name of the manufacturer of their 
medication and so unlikely to be able to assess whether their medical treatment 
may have been influenced by the provision of benefits.142 The ACCC accepted 
these arguments and dropped the third condition in its final determination.
Public Consultation and Pre-decision Conferences 
In certain complex cases, the ACCC has adopted a long public consultation and 
negotiation process. This was the case in the authorisations involving the dairy 
industry, which was being deregulated. Here, a year-long national consultation 
process was instituted to gain industry information and gauge measures that 
were likely to be effective. John Braithwaite would see this as developing a 
shared understanding, and Baldwin and Black would see this as one step toward 
really responsive regulation because it may constitute an attempt at increasing 
awareness and compliance and indicates a broader institutional awareness of the 
139 Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (1997) 172; see also discussion in Chapter 5.
140 Medicines, A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003, 23.
141 ibid, 23.
142 ibid, 24.
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regulatory regime.143 Parker may well see this dialogue as nurturing compliance144 
and it may also be viewed as an attempt at developing a commitment to the 
regulatory agenda, that is, in this case the implementation of deregulatory 
policies.145
The pre-decision conferences are informal: a variety of groups contribute to the 
decision-making process by attending pre-decision hearings and making oral 
or written submissions. In the FACTS authorisation, many of the advantages 
of such a conference were brought to the fore. Here the consumer groups took 
the view that there were inadequate complaints mechanisms in place. The 
federation had responded to these objections by stating that complaints bodies 
were already established in the form of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal 
and the Australian Securities Commission. These bodies responded to these 
comments and a consensus was reached between the parties; the commission 
altered its proposed conditions accordingly.146 This highlights the very points 
made by the proponents of responsive and restorative regulation.147 
In another such pre-decision conference, in 2004, that I attended, the Qantas 
Airways and British Airways joint venture,148 there were representatives of the 
parties to the proposed agreement as well as representatives from other competitors 
and state government departments.149 The meeting had been called by Virgin 
Airlines, a competitor of the applicants to the authorisation. It was presided over by 
a Commissioner John Martin who was assisted by two ACCC staff and an aviation 
consultant employed by the ACCC. The meeting ran for more than four hours, and 
provided the opportunity for written submissions and oral presentations. Legal 
representatives of the parties were present but did not make any presentations. 
Numerous suggestions were raised by Virgin Airlines on alternative approaches, 
including the possibility of including conditions to the grant of authorisation. 
Questions by the ACCC officials at the meeting on the different air routes and market 
share as well as hypothetical scenarios were addressed. Others at the meeting did 
not participate but did state that they would make written submissions prior 
to the final determination if they thought it necessary. A representative from 
South African Airlines commented to me that, although he had not made any 
submissions, he had found the conference and presentations by Virgin Airlines 
informative and would inform others in the industry on the developments. 
143 Baldwin and Black (2008) 69.
144 See Christine Parker, ‘Compliance Professionalism and Regulatory Community: The Australian Trade 
Practices Regime’ (1999) 26(2) Journal of Law and Society 215.
145 Valerie Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Taxation’ (2007) 29(1) Special Issue, Law and Policy 3.
146 Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations A11709, A21265, 12 September 1984, ATPR 50-076, 55429.
147 See Baldwin and Black (2008); Black (1997). 
148 See Re Qantas Airways Limited and British Airways Plc applications for authorisation, A30226, 
A30227 for pre-decision conference <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/744636/
fromItemId/401858/display/preDecisionConference> at 30 December 2005.
149 The pre-decision conference was held on 1 November 2004.
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Martin asked for further information to be provided in writing to the ACCC and 
agreed to the confidentiality claimed by Virgin Airlines. Overall, the conference 
was conducted in a semi-formal atmosphere where there was opportunity to ask 
questions and discuss issues as they arose, providing the right environment for 
restorative practices to be implemented.
There is a good deal of scholarship on the importance of allowing interested parties 
to come together to deal with an offence.150 According to Tom Tyler, procedural 
justice is important in legitimising legal authority and process-based regulation 
results in greater compliance, co-operation and empowerment.151 Tyler emphasises 
four significant elements of procedural justice: interpersonal respect, where parties 
are treated with dignity and respect and have their rights recognised and protected; 
neutrality, which requires decision-makers to be honest, impartial and base their 
decisions on fact; participation, whereby opportunity to express one’s view to the 
decision-makers is provided; and trustworthiness, requiring decision-makers to 
treat people fairly.152 This has been developed by Valerie Braithwaite in her work on 
motivational postures. These findings support the need for any regulator to consider 
how democratic principles of inclusion and participation can be incorporated into 
their processes.153 In the trade practices area of enforceable undertakings, Parker 
argued that multi-party deliberation of well-facilitated restorative justice may be 
able to redress inequalities of bargaining power in a way that cannot be achieved 
otherwise.154 
Interviews with ACCC staff suggested that, in certain cases, staff rely on 
consumer groups to bring specific issues to their attention.155 Many consumer 
bodies, however, feel that they are at a disadvantage when faced with complex 
submissions and time constraints within which to respond. Further, the 
funding of such bodies is limited and the staff available to concentrate on such 
issues are few. One interviewee (14) representing a consumer group stated 
that some authorisation applications are unclear and rather than requiring 
the applicants to the authorisation to make sense of it, the consumer groups 
were required to respond.156 There was a general consensus among consumer 
groups that the ACCC should provide more information in order to enable 
better participation. Currently, consumer groups are participating in certain 
public hearings but interviews with members indicate that there is a fear 
150 Braithwaite (2002); Parker, ‘Restorative Justice in Business Regulation? The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission’s Use of Enforceable Undertakings,’ (2004) 67(2), The Modern Law Review 209, 220.
151 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 283, 316.
152 Tyler, ‘Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What do Majority and Minority Group 
Members want from the Law and Legal Institutions’ (2001) 19(1) Behavioural Sciences and the Law 215.
153 Valerie Braithwaite (2007). 
154 Parker (2004); Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen, ‘What Do Australian Businesses Think of the ACCC 
and Does It Matter?’, (2007) 35(2), Federal Law Review, 187, 187.
155 Interview 4.
156 Interview 14.
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that their concerns are dismissed as they ‘do not speak the right language in 
order to get taken seriously’.157 This is in contrast with consumer groups in 
the United Kingdom, which have adopted the necessary language only to find 
that important considerations are being left out of the deliberations.158 Another 
interviewee (13) talked of the ACCC adopting a ‘slow or stall process’, whereby 
further information could be obtained and put in a digestible form which made 
it possible for consumer groups to participate in a meaningful way.159 
Outcomes Weighting Discretion 
The decision to grant or refuse an application is a straightforward exercise 
of power by the ACCC. In a number of cases, however, the ACCC grants the 
authorisation on certain terms that are incorporated as conditions and, on rare 
occasions, as undertakings. This section looks at the possible outcomes of an 
authorisation application that illustrates the exercise of discretion.160 
Granting or Refusing the Authorisation Application
The ACCC can grant or refuse the authorisation. Authorisations are usually 
granted for a fixed period after which the parties have to reconsider their 
positions.
The percentage of successful applications has increased from 25 per cent in 1976 
to 94 per cent in 1984, remaining reasonably constant after that, reaching the 
highest level in 2008 and 2010 at 97 per cent (Table 6.1). This is most likely 
because the ACCC has matured as an institution since its inception in 1976 and 
has a clear process in place with adequate staff to deal with enquiries at an 
early stage. This decreases the number of applications that are not likely to 
meet the public benefit test. This is evident from the Guide to Authorisation, 
which encourages people to contact and speak with staff prior to making an 
application. Further, the inclusion of a checklist in the guide, the payment of 
a reasonably large fee, as well as a trade practices community — including a 
legal fraternity well versed in the process — is likely to weed out unsuccessful 
applications at an early stage.161
157 ibid.
158 See Business in the Community, ‘Response to the Conservative Party Commission on Waste and 
Voluntary Agreements’, December 2008, in which the need for laws to accommodate voluntary agreements 
among business is discussed and the manner in which laws should be reformed to accommodate this is mooted.
159 Interview 13.
160 It should be noted that at times applications are withdrawn and do not proceed to determination. Such 
cases are not discussed here and the discussion is limited to those that reach final determination, although it is 
acknowledged that regulatory discretion is likely to have been exercised in all these instances.
161 See ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2001); ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2007).
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Table 6.1: Success of authorisation applications, 1976 to 2006 (total of 
35 authorisations studied in each year)
Year Successful applications Success rate (%)
1976 9 (out of 35) 25
1984 33 (out of 35) 94
1998 29 (out of 35) 82
2003 31 (out of 35) 88
2006 32 (out of 35) 91
2008 33 (out of 34) 97
2010 34 (out of 35) 97
Source: Author’s research.
Granting Authorisations on the Basis of Undertakings
Section 87B gives the ACCC the power to accept a written undertaking in 
connection with a matter in which it has power, with the exception of Part X.162 
The ACCC has stated that this provision does not give it the power to demand 
an undertaking, but only to raise it as an option during negotiations with the 
parties to the conduct or proposed conduct.163 Generally, this power has been 
used in the context of mergers and consumer protection offences.164 The aim 
of such an undertaking is to reduce the likely public detriment or ensure that 
there is a net public benefit deriving from th e proposed action.
In the context of mergers, it has been argued that the ACCC’s considerable 
discretionary powers are in practice only constrained by the bargaining power 
of the merging parties. Although the lack of a merits review and the absence 
of any obligation to publish clear and comprehensive reasons for accepting 
the enforceable undertakings could be understood on the basis of allowing 
a flexible and fast system, it has come at too high a cost, tending to reduce 
transparency, certainty and accountability in the decision-making process.165 
On the other hand, Parker examined the use of restorative justice in enforceable 
undertakings. She argued that this gives a place for participation within the 
formal accountability mechanisms as well as the informal mechanisms:
Informal, deliberative accountability could include first, participation of, 
and consultation with, affected parties during and after the negotiation 
of the undertaking, second, internal decision making processes within 
162 Section 87B, Trade Practices Act.
163 Section 87B of the Trade Practices Act: A guideline on the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s use of enforceable undertakings, August 1999, 5.
164 See Parker (2004); Parker (1999); Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (2004) Chapter 7. 
165 Yeung (2004) 227, 228, 232; see also Dawson Report Committee of Inquiry, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act [Dawson Review] (2003).
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the regulator that give the consumer and public interest an adequate 
voice in deciding whether to accept undertakings, third, making 
enforceable undertakings publicly available after they are agreed, and 
fourth, dialogic reviews or audits of compliance with the enforceable 
undertaking.166
In the Air New Zealand authorisation,167 the members of the Star Alliance applied 
for authorisation to enter into a joint agreement and a conventions program 
that were in the form of guidelines, aimed at offering discounts on airfares 
for employees of the members as well as discount fares for certain convention 
delegates. Star Alliance had 20 airlines as members and was formed in 1997. 
Other such entities included One World (with Qantas Airlines as a member), 
Sky Team and Wings. The ACCC granted an authorisation subject to two 
undertakings to the effect that Star Alliance would cease entering into similar 
agreements with Qantas Airlines, which was not a member of this alliance and 
was a major competitor in the domestic market, with over 75 per cent of market 
share. These undertakings were proposed in the draft determination on 30 May 
2003. The ACCC was of the view that the proposed agreement and conventions 
program generated a net benefit only if similar agreements were not made with 
Qantas, thereby ensuring that there was competition from Virgin Airlines and 
Qantas Airlines in the domestic market. In doing so, the ACCC was exercising its 
discretion in determining the manner in which to manage adequate competition 
in the market.
Granting Authorisations Subject to Conditions
Section 91(3) provides for the ACCC to grant authorisations subject to 
conditions. This power is used when there is uncertainty about whether the 
authorisation test is met. One example is the Surgeons authorisations, where 
the ACCC, although satisfied as to the significant public benefits generated, was 
concerned about the potential public detriments. Here a number of conditions 
were imposed, aimed at ensuring the public benefits were achieved. These 
conditions included increasing external involvement in the college’s activities 
and increasing the transparency of the college’s processes.168 The ACT has stated 
that even in circumstances where a net public benefit results, authorisation can 
be granted on condition that changes are made to the arrangements so as to 
remove or lessen the potential for detriment, without impairing their essential 
166 Parker (2004) 243.
167 Air New Zealand A30209, A30210, A30211, A30212, A30213, 4 September 2003.
168 ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2007) 44.
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components.169 In the past, the ACCC has used the period following release of 
the draft determination as a period to negotiate amendments to the authorisation 
application, agree on undertakings, or consider the imposition of conditions. 
The primary objective of conditions is to address anti-competitive detriment 
or to increase the likelihood of the public benefit claimed.170 This remains 
the purpose for which the power under section 91(3) was granted. In the 
Application by Medicines Australia Inc appeal, the ACT stated that the purpose 
of the condition is to increase the likelihood that the public benefit claimed 
for the code is realised in respect of the provisions dealing with the conferral 
of such benefits to doctors.171 Therefore, authorising a collective bargaining 
arrangement, on the condition that the parties can only make limited use of the 
shared information, is aimed at addressing potential anti-competitive practices, 
such as price-fixing.172 Further, with respect to the limits on the discretion to 
impose conditions, the tribunal stated:
There is no express limit upon the kinds of conditions that may be 
imposed. This does not mean that there is an unconfined discretion 
to impose whatever conditions the ACCC or the Tribunal on review, 
considers appropriate. The power to impose conditions is constrained, 
like the discretion discussed above, by the subject matter, scope and 
purpose of the statute.173
One of the persons interviewed expressed concern about the manner in which 
the ACCC has used conditions to manipulate the market, often only guessing at 
the effects that the conditions are likely to have on the market.174 The North West 
Shelf Project authorisation was cited as an example where onerous conditions, 
which intruded into the market unnecessarily, were incorporated into the grant 
of authorisation.175 These conditions included the price at which the product 
was to be marketed.176 Dorf and Sabel may well see this as an example of 
democratic experimentalism where the regulator is setting standards for actors 
in the market, while others may be critical of the use of such powers on the 
grounds of certainty and accountability.177
169 APRA (1999) ATPR 41-701, 42997; See also ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2007) 45.
170 See Medicines A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003. 
171 Application by Medicines Australian Inc [2007] Australian Competition Tribunal 4 (27 June 2007) 7. 
172 See Australian Hotels Association (2006) A90987; Inter-hospital agreement between Friendly Society 
Private Hospital Bundaberg etc. A50019, 1 September 1999.
173 Medicines Australian Inc [2007] 31. 
174 Interview 9.
175 Interview 9.
176 See North West Shelf Project application by participants in relation to coordinated marketing, 
determined on 29 July 1998, 35. 
177 Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia 
Law Review 267.
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At times, conditions fulfil other collateral objectives, such as setting up external 
and voluntary regulatory structures that allow appeal processes, complaints 
mechanisms, external monitoring and reviews of business practices or codes of 
conduct, and independent representation on industry committees. These types 
of conditions do more than address anti-competitive conduct. They are steps 
in managing markets, market conduct, and the actions of individual market 
actors. Below, I examine three collateral purposes served by conditions that go 
to managing the market.178
Enhancing Compliance 
Compliance is addressed through increased monitoring, auditing and 
participation of conduct by business. Often this is in the context of codes of 
conduct and examples include: T imber and Building Materials Merchants 
Association,179 FACTS,180 Re Australian Self-Medication Industry,181 Australian 
Performing Rights Association Limited (APRA)182 and Re Australian Direct 
Marketing Association,183 in which codes were authorised by the ACCC. In 
these cases, the ACCC considered whether the code of conduct is likely to 
provide a public benefit that might exist beyond authorisation.184 The role of co-
regulation and the manner in which voluntary codes regulate areas of conduct 
beyond the scope of law has been widely acknowledged by a variety of sources 
including the ACCC, which has published guidelines for the development of 
such codes.185 In Re Australian Direct Marketing Association, the ACCC stated 
that it is appropriate for self-regulatory codes to replicate or exceed legislative 
requirements if they encourage better practice and behaviour from industry 
members.186 
The adoption of a code does not, however, in itself guarantee effective 
compliance or enforcement and may require regular review and monitoring of 
how the codes operate. At times, the ACCC has been able to use conditions to 
improve compliance and incorporate review. In Re Australian Direct Marketing 
Association, the ACCC granted authorisation on the basis that the association 
178 For further detailed discussion of this see Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘Co-opting for Governance: The Use of the 
Conditions Power by the ACCC in Authorisations’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 785–810.
179 Timber and Building Materials Merchants Association A3483, 16 August 1976.
180 FACTS A11709, 1984.
181 Re Australian Self-Medication Industry (2003).
182 Australian Performing Rights Association Limited (APRA) (2006).
183 Re Australian Direct Marketing Association (2006).
184 Re Australian Direct Marketing A90876, 29 June 2006.
185 See ACCC, Guidelines on Codes of Conduct (2005); See also Medicines ACT 58–60; Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC ), Parliament of Australia, Compliance with the Trade Practices Act 1974, Report ALRC 68, 
(1994) at 3.7, Introduction of Part IVB of the Trade Practices Act in 1998.
186 Australian Direct Marketing A90876, 29 June 2006, 17–18.
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conduct regular internal reviews of its code of practice. It also required the 
association to obtain an annual assessment of the findings of its internal reviews 
from an appropriately independent legal advisor.
In the Re Medicines Australia authorisation, the Australian Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association sought authorisation of a code of conduct seeking to 
regulate the promotion of prescribed medicines by pharmaceutical companies, 
which was likely to breach section 45 of the Act. This code included the 
provision of information about prescribed medicines to health care professionals 
and the public by pharmaceutical companies and the regulation of the provision 
of financial and other benefits to health care professionals by pharmaceutical 
companies. The ACCC pointed out that for the code to work effectively and 
generate public benefits, appropriate enforcement would be required. It 
expressed concerns about how effectively the enforcement procedures were 
implemented, stating that seven relevant complaints over the past three 
years appeared very low.187 It imposed a number of conditions on the grant 
of authorisation, including an expanded role for the association’s monitoring 
committee. This condition required each member company of the association 
to provide full details of all educational symposia and meetings held by the 
company; the details of any hospitality or entertainment offered; the number, 
description and professional status of attendees; and, a copy of the material 
provided to attendees. It also provided for the monitoring committee to, in 
certain circumstances, make a complaint to the conduct committee, for example, 
where the code may have been breached. Further it required that details of 
this report, including the concerns raised and the manner in which there 
concerns were dealt with, be published on the Medicines website and in the 
association’s annual report.188 The ACT upheld the imposition of this condition 
and stated that it was designed to enhance compliance with and enforcement 
of the relevant provisions of the code consistent with the statutory scheme for 
authorisations, and with the objects of enhancing the welfare of Australians 
through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provisions for 
consumer protection within section 2 of the Trade Practices Act.189
Compliance can also be enhanced by the involvement of other interest groups 
and close analysis of the determinations show that the conditions incorporate 
different forms of external oversight: changing the composition of decision-
making committees within the corporation to include parties outside the 
corporation, thereby increasing external oversight; mandating independent 
review and reporting on processes internal to the corporation; and, requiring the 
corporation to consider and implement the recommendations of the independent 
187 Medicines A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003, 37.
188 ibid, 40.
189 ibid, 69.
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review. Often the ACCC requires that it be informed of the outcome of the 
reviews. It is clear that each of these types of review is aimed at encouraging 
the participation of wider stakeholders while, at the same time, accompanied by 
a less direct involvement by the regulator. The regulator is choosing to regulate 
indirectly by co-opting others in regulation. 
Altering the composition of committees by involving external stakeholders 
can bring about a cultural shift in decision-making, which was what was 
clearly articulated in an early decision of FACTS authorisation where the ACCC 
noted that the likelihood of achieving effective self-regulation by industry 
organisations is improved ‘where consumer or consumer groups are drawn into 
the consultation process so that not only is the result better-tailored but there is 
less risk of resentment’.190 In this authorisation the ACCC imposed a condition 
requiring annual consultations with consumer organisations and other relevant 
health and safety authorities in order to decide whether to extend or revise the 
guidelines.191 In the Medicines authorisation, the ACCC noted that the members 
of the monitoring committee included industry, professional and consumer 
representatives, which added a level of independence to its decision-making.
Conditions have directed the corporation to conduct an independent review. In 
the Australian Associated Brewers authorisation, conditions imposed required 
an independent review to be conducted of the effectiveness of the Retailer 
Alert Scheme, which was a system for regulating the entry onto the market of 
inappropriately named or packaged alcohol products. The ACCC noted that this 
scheme was weak because it did not contain a mechanism to enforce compliance, 
and required the association to report on the findings of the review.192 In 
Australasian College of Cosmetic Surgery, a condition required that the code 
be amended to allow for the appointment of an independent auditor to report 
findings of annual audit checks including the manner in which the complaints 
panel of the college dealt with complaints. The results of these audits are to be 
reported to the ACCC as well as the college’s code administration committee.193
Some of the conditions go further by getting companies themselves to be reflexive 
about the way they consider and internalise compliance, and the manner in 
which they relate to both internal and external stakeholders. In a number of 
determinations, the reviews were directed at evaluating the level of compliance 
among the participants after consultation with stakeholders and making the 
results available to both corporation and the ACCC. In Grain Corp Operations, 
the corporation, in conjunction with an independent person, was required to 
develop and implement measures that ensured confidential information was not 
190 Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations (1984) A11709, 55427. 
191 ibid.
192 The Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia  A91054 & A91055, 31 October 2007, 34–35, 48.
193 Australasian College of Cosmetic Surgery A91106, 18 June 2009, 57, 79.
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used improperly.194 Similarly, in the International Air Transport Association 
authorisation, the independent consultant had to view the standard form 
contracts (that were the subject of authorisation) and consider whether these 
contracts could be improved in any way and the company was required to act 
on the recommendations of this review and report to the ACCC.195 
Promoting Fairness and Justice
The ACCC has also used conditions to introduce independent and effective appeal 
processes or complaints mechanisms. These will have the effect of ensuring that 
anti-competitive practices will be scrutinised through the appeal or complaints 
process and these may also have the effect of introducing specific types of just 
practices and ethical conduct into specific sectors of the market. 
In Re Allianz Australia Insurance Limited, the ACCC granted authorisation to 
three large insurance companies to set up a single co-insurance pool specifically 
for the provision of public liability insurance to not-for-profit organisations, 
which would otherwise contravene section 45. The conditions included a 
complaints-handling procedure consistent with the Australian standard 
AS4269-1995, as well as a requirement that all complaints and their outcome/s 
are reported to the ACCC on a quarterly basis.196 In the Australian Payments 
Clearing Association authorisation, similar conditions were required for fair 
treatment of both members and non-members of the association, as well as 
providing equal access to facilities.197 
Appeal mechanisms have been introduced via conditions since 1984, when 
there were numerous codes of conduct being authorised. For example, in 
Mercury Newsagency System,198 NSW and ACT Newsagency System,199 Master 
Locksmiths Association of Australia Ltd200 and Royal Australian Institute of 
Architects,201 the commission required the inclusion of an appeals process. In Re 
Australian Stock Exchange, the ACCC granted authorisation on the condition 
that the exchange provide an adequate appeal mechanism for individuals whose 
registration as a trading representative was refused, suspended or withdrawn 
by the exchange board. It required that the constitution be amended to make 
provisions for such a procedure.202 In the Surgeons authorisation, the conditions 
addressed the composition of the appeal committee. The condition required that 
194 Grain Corp Operations, AWB and Export Grain Logistics A30233, A30234, A30235, 15 April 2005, 80.
195 International Air Transport Association (2008) A91083, 28 August 2008, 20.
196 Allianz Insurance Ltd, QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd, NRMA Insurance Ltd A30217, A30218, 24 March 2004, 55.
197 ibid; See also Re Australian Payments Clearing Association A30176, A30177, A90620, 24 March 2004; 
Australian Direct Marketing A90876, 29 June 2006.
198 Mercury Newsagency System 9 May 1984.
199 NSW and ACT Newsagency System 26 April 1984.
200 Master Locksmiths Association of Australia Ltd 15 March 1984.
201 Royal Australian Institute of Architects A58, 7 September 1984.
202 Re Australian Stock Exchange (1998) A90623, i–ii.
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the appeal committee be comprised of a majority of members, including the 
chairman, be nominated by the Australian health minister, and only a minority 
of members be fellows of the college.203 Likewise, in the Victorian Egg Industry 
Cooperative authorisation, the conditions provided an independent appeal 
mechanism for producers in addition to the procedures provided under the 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic).204
At times, these dispute-resolution processes are in addition to those that are 
available under the law. They offer, however, cheaper, quicker and less formal 
alternatives with more flexible remedies. In the Australian Amalgamated 
Terminals Pty Ltd authorisation, the ACCC required the incorporation of a 
dispute-resolution process, with provision for mediation and, ultimately, expert 
determination which can be accessed by end-users of AAT’s terminals.205 This 
process was in addition to the dispute resolution process that may be available to 
the parties to the contract, as well as those available to port authorities’ dispute-
resolution processes and were not intended to compromise the operation of 
these existing processes.206 Likewise, in the Victorian Egg Industry Cooperative 
authorisation, the conditions provided an independent appeal mechanism 
for producers in addition to the procedures provided under the Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic).207
Another means of incorporating fair practices into an industry is by requiring 
independent review. In the Surgeons authorisation, the ACCC was concerned 
with the exclusive role of the college in setting the standards for accrediting 
hospitals and training positions within hospitals. The conditions imposed 
included a requirement that the college establish a public independent review 
of the criteria for accrediting hospitals for the provision of various surgical-
training positions.208 This condition was supplemented by others involving 
the participation of the state health ministers in the nomination of hospitals 
for accreditation.209 Another condition required the college to establish an 
independently chaired committee to publicly review the tests that medical 
colleges use to assess overseas trained surgeons.210
Providing information to interested parties and increasing transparency of 
decision making is also a way of promoting ethical conduct. A number of 
conditions are directed at making information widely available. In Re Medicines 
203 Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003.
204 The Victorian Egg Industry Co-operative A40072, 13 September 1995, 29.
205 Australian Amalgamated Terminals Pty Ltd  A91141, A91142, A91181, A91181, 3 December 2009.
206 ibid, 36–37.
207 Victorian Egg Industry (1995) A40072 29. This authorisation determination is not part of the empirical study. 
208 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003, 166.
209 ibid, 167–68.
210 ibid, 172.
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the information was required to be posted on the association’s website and, in Re 
Surgeons, the college was required to publish annually a range of information 
about its selection processes, training and examination processes.211
The information gathering process has been used to check on the rate and quality 
of compliance. In the Generic Medicines Industry Association, discussed above, 
the ACCC stated that it would seek further information from the association 
on how the code had been enforced and whether the association had been 
effective in encouraging compliance.212 In Phonographic Performance Company, 
the ACCC required the company to monitor compliance with the guidelines 
it had developed, and to report to the ACCC the manner in which licensor’s 
complied with the guidelines.213 The ACCC is steering companies to enforce the 
law, sometimes with the help of independent consultation and staying informed 
about the process through the discretionary power granted under section 91(3). 
The threat that non-compliance may lead to litigation is always present in the 
grant of authorisation.214
Facilitating Deregulation 
Conditions have been included in authorisation decisions involving both 
deregulated and other industries. Deregulatory policies took effect in Australia 
in the mid 1990s. In the 1998 authorisations, six applications from such 
groups were responded to with conditions. This was the highest number of 
authorisations in which conditions were imposed. This illustrates the important 
role of the regulator in giving effect to policies, which can be a difficult exercise 
where the outcomes may not be always predictable.
Four of the six applications were from previously government-owned and 
run service providers: National Electricity Code,215 United Energy Limited,216 
Vencorp217 and Gas Services Business Pty Ltd.218 State-run businesses came 
under the jurisdiction of the Act in 1995.219 There was one application from the 
Australian Medical Association, which became regulated by the Act as a result 
of amendments in 1995,220 and another from the chicken industry, seeking 
authorisation for collective bargaining.221 
211 Medicines A90779, A90780, 14 November 2003; Surgeons A90765, 30 June 2003, 177–80.
212 Generic Medicines Industry Association Pty Ltd (2010) A91218 & A 91219, iv.
213 Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Ltd (2007) A91041, A91042, 54-55.
214 For example see: The State of Queensland Acting through the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (2010) 
A91224 and A91225.
215 National Electricity Code A90652, A90653, A90654, 19 October 1998.
216 United Energy Limited A90665, A90666, A90670, 25 November 1998.
217 Vencorp A90646, A90647, A90648, 19 August 1998.
218 Gas Services Business Pty Ltd A90630, A 90631, 19 August 1998.
219 See sections 13–15 of the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995.
220 See section 8 of the Competition Policy Reform (New South Wales) Act 1995.
221 Steggles Limited and Others A30183, 25 May 1998.
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Immunity Discretion 
Many enquiries about anti-competitive conduct never proceed to an 
authorisation application. They may be circumvented, with the parties satisfied 
that there is unlikely to be any prosecution should they follow the proposed 
course of action. Alternatively, discussions with the ACCC may present other 
pathways previously not considered. In other words, enquirers may receive a 
form of ‘de facto’ immunity, granted in an informal manner and demonstrating 
the exercise of discretion. 
The Guide to Authorisation states that the ACCC encourages applicants to 
contact the ACCC for informal discussion and guidance before lodging an 
application. It also states that the ACCC will provide guidance on whether the 
proposed conduct is likely to raise concerns under the competition provisions 
of the Act, the type of public benefit claims that might be considered by the 
ACCC, the type of detriment, including anti-competitive detriment that might 
be taken into account, and the overall authorisation process.222 This includes 
hypothetical scenarios, which companies may be considering, that the ACCC 
will discuss off the record. Clearly, this is cost effective and, further, it is 
acknowledged by the ACCC that these negotiations may themselves facilitate a 
commercially satisfactory outcome.223 Further, the ACCC may ask the potential 
applicant to raise such issues in the relevant industry forum and gauge whether 
there may be any opposition to the proposed conduct before proceeding with 
the application. Alternatively, the ACCC may direct the organisation to consult 
non-industry bodies to ascertain their views on the proposed conduct. By doing 
so, the ACCC is doing what scholars have described as nodal governance or 
partnerships approaches to governance.224 
In certain instances, the ACCC has held prolonged consultation in order to 
increase familiarity with the legislation and its effect on different sectors of 
industry. One such example was in relation to the medical profession, which 
became subject to the Act. Here, the ACCC undertook a long consultation 
process, which, while sharing many features with a pre-decision conference, 
was a distinctive strategy — not prescribed by the Act — and was aimed 
at encouraging awareness and compliance with the law. The advantages of 
nurturing compliance, increasing institutional awareness, and being responsive 
222 ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2007) 6; see also ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (1999) 2–3.
223 T Thomson and H Croft, ‘Authorisations in Australia and New Zealand: Neighbours with Different 
Backyards’ (2003) 19(4) Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Law Bulletin 37, 38.
224 See Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77(2) 
Temple Law Review 401; Michael Kempa, Clifford Shearing and Scott Burris, ‘Changes in Governance: A Background 
Review’ (Paper presented at the Global Governance of Health Seminar, Salzburg, 16 December 2005) <http://www.
temple.edu/lawschool/phrhcs/salzburg/Global_Health_Governance_Review.pdf> at 18 December 2007.
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are discussed earlier in the public consultation and pre-decision conference 
section and apply equally here. By so doing, the ACCC would be granting a 
period of grace or immunity from prosecution. 
In summary … 
This chapter has illustrated the complex task of the authorisation process and 
the manner in which discretion is used in practice. Discretion is like the tube 
of toothpaste — when squeezed it simply shifts to another place. This chapter 
has illustrated that the ACCC has exercised its discretion in many ways — by 
giving informal immunity guarantees to parties; by the choices of quantification 
methodologies it prefers; the parties it has consulted in the determination 
process and how much weight it has attached to their participation; and, the 
conditions under which authorisation has been granted. These bring to life the 
‘tube of toothpaste’ analogy about discretion: discretion cannot be controlled — 
it simply is squeezed to another area in the tube. 
Second, the chapter makes a link between current regulatory theories and how 
they can be used to explain the practice of this regulatory agency. The need 
to assure the applicants and members of the trade practices community and 
the officials within the regulator of the ways in which the regulator is both 
predictable and accountable, saw the description of public benefit in the form 
of a list. This was always viewed by the regulator, however, as a non-exhaustive 
list. The ACCC has used its discretion by operating at multiple levels of the 
regulatory pyramid (Figure 5.1). The draft determinations, public consultation 
processes and the use of pre-decision conferences aimed at facilitating wide 
participation can be termed restorative justice practices that fall within 
the base of the pyramid. Promising immunity from authorisation in certain 
circumstances, prosecuting those who continue with unlawful conduct without 
seeking authorisation, granting authorisation on the basis of undertakings not 
to engage in anti-competitive conduct, or the granting of authorisations on 
the basis of conditions that enhance self-regulation or incorporate procedural 
regulation of self-regulation can be classified as deterrence strategies that fall 
within the middle tier of the regulatory pyramid, as they are aimed at preventing 
future breaches of the Act. Finally the revocation of authorisation or the denial 
of authorisations fall into the top tier of the pyramid and can be considered as 
punitive because it is banning conduct that has either been taking place (in the 
case of revocation) or suspending plans for conduct which was the objective of 
the authorisation application.
In conclusion, the ACCC has been an innovative regulator from its inception, 
using its discretion in an experimental manner with an eye on the outcome, 
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which has always been to create workable competition in the market. This is 
illustrated during the early days of the Act, where significant energies were 
expended in educating business, activating consumer advocacy and informing 
the wider public. More recently, it is illustrated by the manner in which the 
ACCC has used conditions to enhance compliance, promote fairness and facilitate 
deregulation. The ACCC itself has been reasonably responsive to the needs of 
industry, governments, independent bodies and non-government bodies. By 
not mandating quantification, it has been sensitive to the manner in which it 
has exercised epistemological discretion. It has used its discretion inclusively by 
having prolonged consultations to implement sensitive policies, such as those 
involving professional groups that came within the Act as well as effecting 
deregulatory policies in primary industries. The manner in which the ACCC 
has functioned can be best explained by the expanded model of accountability. 
This expanded model involves the ACCC being accountable to a wide trade 
practices community, including lawyers, economists, compliance officers, non-
government organisations, other regulators, ministers, governments, the media 
and other networks, which makes for a diffused network of accountability.
As the regulatory scholarship on responsive regulation and restorative justice 
suggests, however, procedural justice requires that people are aware of their 
rights and given the opportunity to participate. The empirical study shows that 
participation by state governments and the federal government has increased 
significantly since 1984, demonstrating the changing nature of the market 
and regulation. The participation by independent groups, too, has increased, 
although not to the same extent as involvement by government. The participation 
by non-independent groups, however, has not increased in the same manner — 
Figure 6.6 shows that there were six submissions in 1976 and seven in 2006 in 
the sample studied for those yeas. Although the ACCC consistently refers to its 
consumer-oriented focus to regulation, this is not reflected in the authorisations 
arena. Although the ACCC has been experimental and outcome driven, it must 
give greater consideration to furthering procedural fairness by encouraging 
participation, to notions of restorative justice by enhancing inclusivity, and 
becoming really responsive by reflecting on its own performance.
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7. Experiments in Discretion: How 
Effective is the Regulator?
This chapter acts as a conclusion by bringing together the earlier discussions 
on discretion and public benefit in the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) and directly addressing the central question of how 
effective the ACCC has been in exercising its discretion to determine public 
benefit. The data have been interpreted to reveal two areas where there have 
been limits to this effectiveness: first, the current ad hoc approach could be 
improved by developing a broader framework for determining public benefit; 
second, strategies to increase the participation of non-industry groups in the 
decision process could be refined and developed. This chapter addresses these 
two problem areas and proposes a set of nine principles toward a solution. These 
principles are aimed at thinking about how the ACCC might become a more 
responsive regulator. The discussion in this chapter is in five parts. 
The first part consolidates earlier discussion on the use of discretion by the 
ACCC in determining public benefit over the last four decades. It concludes that 
these experiences demonstrate the regulator has been experimental in its use of 
discretion, often achieving desired outcomes. This is conceived as representing 
a triumph of practice over theory. The main criticism with the present approach 
is that there is no overarching set of principles to assist regulators, regulatees 
and other interested parties. The current ad hoc approach gives rise to numerous 
concerns. Three main ones are: What is the role of economic efficiency? Does the 
public benefit have to reach a small or wider group? What weighting is given to 
the different benefits? It is suggested that a less ad hoc approach to determining 
public benefit can be conceived from this experience. Currently, the ambit of 
public benefit remains unclear, with the ACCC relying primarily on a list of 
non-exhaustive categories that it has recognised.1 It is proposed that it would 
be preferable to define public benefit in terms of a principle rather than a list of 
non-exhaustive categories. Such a principle is best founded on a discourse that 
is more universal than economic efficiency. It should also take into account the 
practice of the ACCC to date. The set of heuristics employed in this section aims 
to identify public benefits using human rights and ACCC practice. This is then 
articulated as one principle in a set of nine principles.
The second part of the chapter looks at the main challenges facing regulators, 
such as the ACCC, when making a decision: the regulator has to be responsive to 
the regulatee and anyone else who may be affected by its decision. This is a wider 
concept going beyond the confines of traditional or expanded accountability, as 
1 See the discussions in Chapters 1 and 3.
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discussed in Chapter 5. Here it is argued that the regulator should be responsive 
to the needs of all stakeholders and to the business community. Two methods 
for increasing the regulator’s use of responsive strategies are explored: it could 
be mandated by legislative design; or, it could become part of the regulator’s 
practice. It is acknowledged that, given Australia’s history and regulatory 
architecture, legislation can be designed or redesigned to mandate such 
involvement. The focus of competition regulation in Australia has been the use 
of responsive practices demonstrated by the creation of a powerful independent 
agency. Accordingly, this section explores the manner in which the ACCC can 
become more responsive. A set of seven principles is developed, aimed at 
increasing the regulator’s responsiveness. This is a contribution to grounding 
the theorising of responsiveness in regulatory scholarship. 
The third part brings together the discussion in the first two sections to 
formulate nine principles, incorporating the eight developed earlier. These 
principles respond to the need for a less ad hoc approach to identifying public 
benefits and the need to facilitate greater participation by all stakeholders. The 
fourth part discusses the need for reflection by the regulator in implementing 
these principles. The upshot is a principle-based approach to reflective practice 
for increasing the responsiveness of the ACCC.
The fifth part proposes that a successful regulator has to move far away from 
lists and rule books to a storybook, which, like all good stories, contains morals 
that can be called upon time and again to underpin, inform and shape conduct. 
The nine principles form some of the morals of this storybook. Unlike a rule 
book, which sets itself up for failure, a supple storybook has wide applicability, 
where meaning can be extracted by new actors and wider networks, in known 
terrain and unforeseen crisis. 
Experimental Governance
The ACCC was established in 1975 with the aim of linking consumer welfare and 
competition principles. The legislative design leaves a good deal to the discretion 
of the commission, allowing for different levels of consultations. These include 
formal and informal exchanges that are crafted to allow a range of interchanges. 
The formal exchanges include the submissions of authorisations by applicants, 
draft determinations by the regulator and pre-decision conferences prior to final 
determination. The informal discussions and exchanges with affected parties 
and requests by the regulator for interest groups to make submissions are also 
part of ACCC practice. This design was no accident. It was part of Australia’s 
distinctive approach to regulating the entrenched, club-like environment in 
which cartels thrived in Australia’s heavily concentrated and geographically 
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distant market. This distinctive approach has given Australia a number of 
lasting legacies, one being the creation of a regulator, which, from its early 
days, has operated in an environment where business was oppositional, and 
where multiple strategies have been used, including soft and hard approaches 
such as education and enforcement. The ability to tread softly has been central 
to the determination of public benefit, where the regulator has demonstrated 
that it is aware of the need to be open to a range of discourses and interest 
groups. This pattern was laid down in the early days of the regulator under the 
leadership of Ron Bannerman, who founded and led the Australian competition 
regulation regime for 19 years — an unusually long time compared to other 
domains of Australian public administration and to competition enforcement in 
other nations.2
The ACCC has recognised diverse public benefits over the last four decades 
(Chapter 4). Efficiency benefits in the form of promotion of cost savings and 
industry rationalisation have always had a place, as have certain non-efficiency 
benefits, such as ensuring safety and improving the quality of products and 
services. The marketplace, however, is becoming more complex and regulation 
more open-textured. Many more benefits are being claimed by applicants. The 
role of non-efficiency benefits is increasing and newer benefits are popping 
up in determinations. These include improved environmental practices, better 
working conditions, superior information supply to targeted groups and 
promoting ethical conduct. The ACCC has recognised many of these diverse 
benefits, both in granting authorisations and in imposing conditions. There 
has always been a focus on achieving a reasonable outcome and of facilitating 
workable competition (Chapter 6). 
Philosophically, the outsider could characterise the regulatory practice 
of Bannerman as in the tradition of American pragmatism in the vein of 
Philip Selznick’s responsive law, though no claim to such theoretical terms 
was made. Integrity, political nuance3 and being a slave to duty,4 together 
with a conversational form of regulation being central to the authorisation 
process, characterised the practice of this commissioner. Even though 
subsequent chairmen were associated with different changes in emphasis and 
different pluralisations of the regulatory conversations, the regime remained 
fundamentally, conversationally and pragmatically path dependent. Many of 
the commissioners who followed emphasised different points. For example 
the Allan Fels and Allan Asher team have been labelled as ‘Mr Inside’ and 
‘Mr Outside’ and, as chairman, Fels utilised his media skills to communicate 
2 Ron Bannerman was commissioner of trade practices under the Trade Practices Act 1965 from 1965 to 1974 
and chairman of the Trade Practices Commission from 1974 to 1984. 
3 David Merrett, Stephen Corones and David Round, ‘The Introduction of Competition Policy in Australia: 
The Role of Ron Bannerman’ (2007) 47(2) Australian Economic History Review 194–95.
4 ibid.
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the consumer message, Asher as ‘Mr Inside’ tuned up the ‘Commission’s 
enforcement into an outcomes approach’.5 Similarly, Graeme Samuel was seen as 
part of corporate Australia, able to talk to business, while Ron Sims is regarded 
as an experienced regulator, who will operate quietly and efficiently. All these 
leaders have their own pragmatic approaches that can operate at all levels of the 
regulatory pyramid and they have been successful in increasing their powers 
and budget.6 The path pioneered by Bannerman persisted partly through the 
agency of many of his protégés, most notably the CEO Hank Spier, who was 
important in shaping the agency.7 The agency was continuously shaped by the 
chairmen and officials that followed.8
Simultaneously, as the numbers of benefits claimed was becoming more and 
more varied, the ACCC was faced with enormous pressure to explain its 
decisions and account for its actions. Rules such as the total welfare standard 
or the consumer welfare standard have been mooted as appropriate tools for 
such accounts. At a time when regulators are facing increasing scrutiny from 
many sources, the temptation to adopt bright line rules such as the total welfare 
standard is high, as they are seen as offering answers that are easy to apply. 
The solution prescribed by the ACT, and closely adhered to by the ACCC, is the 
public benefit standard, which appears to be a hybrid between the more widely 
accepted total welfare standard and the balancing weights standard. The public 
benefit standard is not what can be termed a bright line rule. It calls for the 
weighing of different benefits, with little guidance about the actual weighing 
process. This weighing up is left to the commission. Using the definitions of 
rules and principles, the public benefit standard is best classified as a principle. 
Julia Black has described the difference between rules and principles: rules are 
detailed and prescriptive, while principles rely on more high-level, broadly 
stated standards.9 I would argue that the public benefit standard is less like a 
rule and more like a principle, as the weighing-up process, which is central to 
any examination, is impossible to spell out with precision.
Black has argued that principles can be used to refer to general rules or to rules 
that are implicitly higher in the hierarchy of norms.10 Using this definition, the 
public benefit standard, which involves determining the weight to be given to 
productive efficiency savings, is a principle or higher-level norm, rather than 
a rule.11 John Braithwaite has discussed the circumstances in which principles 
5 Fred Brenchley, Allan Fels: A Portrait of Power (2003) 119.
6 ibid.
7 Interview 5; see also the role of other ACCC officers and commissioners including Asher, Ross Jones and 
Sitesh Bhojani in Brenchley 2003 279.
8 See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (1984).
9 Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, ‘Making Sense of Principles-based Regulation’ (2007) Law 
and Financial Markets Review 191, 192.
10 ibid, 192.
11 ACCC, Guide to Authorisation (2007), para 5.29; see Chapter 6 discussion.
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and rules may be appropriate. When the type of action to be regulated is 
simple, stable and does not involve huge economic interests, rules regulate with 
certainty.12 But, when the type of actions that are being regulated are complex 
and occurring in changing environments, where large economic interests are at 
stake, principles are more likely to enable certainty than rules.13 Braithwaite’s 
proposals have immediate relevance here. These proposals explain the reason for 
the difficulties faced by current ACCC staff and the ACT in articulating simple, 
stable rules to regulate authorisations in a complex changing environment.
Principle-based Regulation 
Black’s contribution to principle-based regulation brings together much of the 
earlier debates in the area and is used here to assess whether principle-based 
regulation can be used to determine public benefit. Black, in her examination of 
financial services regulation, has pointed out there are eight key pre-conditions 
for making principle-based regulation work.14 Many of these are relevant to the 
discussion on public benefit in ACCC authorisations, as discussed below:
1. Developing criteria to identify the appropriate balance between principles and 
rules. Black argues that there is a place for both rules and principles. Fixed 
points, which set out in more detailed form the conduct that is required, 
providing safe harbours from charges of non-compliance can often be just 
and effective.15 These concrete fixed points are most likely to be served 
by rules. Applying this to the determination of public benefit may be 
appropriate for the ACCC to articulate the categories of public benefits as well 
as the weighing up of benefits and detriments as principles. Rules may be 
appropriate to describe the manner in which submissions may be called for, 
how draft determinations are made, when pre-decision conferences can be 
called, setting precise expiry dates for authorisations, as well as the manner 
in which an appeal can be mounted. As discussed in Chapter 3 the ACCC 
has included a non-exhaustive list of benefits in its guidance documents. 
The discussion in Chapter 4, however, illustrates that there are many more 
public benefits that have been recognised in the determinations. These are 
responses to changing political, global and economic contexts, supporting 
the notion that the ACCC’s approach represents a triumph of practice over 
theory. 
12 John Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27, Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 47, 52. For further discussion of the principles of responsive regulation see: John Braithwaite, 
‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’ (2011), 44, University of British Columbia Law Review 474–520.
13 ibid, 53.
14 Black, Hopper and Band (2007) 200–04.
15 ibid, 200–01.
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2. Discipline and restraint in provision of guidance documentation. Here Black 
argues that there is a need to strike the right balance between providing 
useful information and bombarding firms with overly complex, prescriptive 
and inaccessible material.16 For example, case studies to illustrate good or 
bad practice and guidance documentation, where kept concise, can be a 
useful resource. The ACCC guidance to authorisations does a helpful job of 
balancing such materials (discussed in Chapter 3).
3. Meeting the needs of different firms. This recognises that one size does not fit 
all. Any guidance should target firms of different sizes and with different 
needs.17 As discussed in Chapter 6, outcome-based discretion demonstrates 
the ACCC understands the needs of different-sized firms operating in 
different, and distinctively Australian, contexts. The use of conditions in 
granting authorisations is a key example of how this has been done.
4. Ensuring an appropriate style of supervision and enforcement and a balance 
between the two. Black emphasises the importance of dialogue between 
the firms and the regulator, stating dialogue in turn is shaped by the 
enforcement context.18 The authorisation process is strong on dialogue, with 
preliminary meetings being followed by formal and informal submissions by 
applicants and other interested parties. Certain informal participation can 
promote responsive regulatory practices and nurture compliance (discussed 
in Chapter 6: Procedural Discretion). At the front-end, informal enquiries are 
encouraged by the commission and, at the back-end pre-decision conferences 
can be the means of furthering such dialogue. This process of dialogue was 
initiated very early on, preceding the passing of the legislation. It stands as 
one of the legacies of the critical juncture (discussed in Chapter 2). In this 
case, the ACCC has been successful in adopting a balanced style.
5. Redefining the role of decided cases. Here Black recognises the important role 
that precedents can have and calls for greater consideration to be given by 
the regulator to the status of its own earlier decisions, both enforcements 
and settlements.19 My empirical study of authorisation decisions illustrates 
that the ACCC does make reference to its past decisions, and is doing so 
increasingly (discussed in Chapter 6). Reference to the status of the tribunal’s 
decisions is less clear, however, with the website recording that the appeal 
has been finalised and including a statement such as ‘On 12 October 2004, the 
Australian Competition Tribunal granted authorisation for the arrangements 
between Qantas and Air New Zealand for a period of 5 years commencing on 
12 October 2005’.20 This does not provide further information as to the status 




20 Re Qantas and Air New Zealand A90962, A90963, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003; see also Re Medicines 
Australia A909894, A90995, A90996, 30 November 2005; Re NSW Pathology A90754, A90755, 1 November 2000.
7 . Experiments in Discretion: How Effective is the Regulator?
219
of the ACCC decision, or the impact of the tribunal’s decision on the ACCC’s 
decision-making process.
6. Ensuring accountability mechanisms in the regulatory rule-making process 
are not bypassed. Here Black warns of the UK Financial Service Authority’s 
intention of relying on industry to produce guidance to elaborate on 
principles, which could amount to outsourcing, raising concerns about how 
the guidance may be interpreted, the regulator’s accountability and the status 
of such guidance documents.21 In the authorisations area, public speeches are 
made by ACCC staff to industry groups22 and the wider epistemic community, 
sometimes called the trade practices mafia,23 and some guidance documents 
are prepared by industry bodies.24 The ACCC acknowledges, however, that 
it must remain accountable.
7. Changing the skills and mindset of regulators and firms. Black has pointed out 
that the regulator has to change its supervisory and enforcement culture.25 
This includes the regulator adopting an educative role and encouraging firms 
to adopt a more strategic approach to regulation. Boards of directors have to 
encourage senior levels of management to develop the firms’ business in line 
with regulatory requirements.26 The ACCC has been adopting an educative 
role, focused on encouraging compliance. This is a continuous challenge, 
however, requiring the ACCC to be reflexive, and assessing its strategies 
constantly.
8. Developing and maintaining a constructive dialogue. Black builds on the 
contributions of scholars on the importance of trust, arguing it is critical to 
have an ongoing dialogue between the regulator and firms, which develops 
shared understandings of what is required by the principles.27 An extensive 
study, carried out by Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen on the views of 
Australian businesses of the ACCC, found that the majority of the respondents 
to their questions ‘were moderately positive about the ACCC’s level of strategic 
21 Black, Hopper and Band (2007) 203.
22 For example, see Michael Cosgrove ‘Regulation and the Australian Broadband sector’ (Paper presented 
at the 3rd Annual Broadband Australia Conference, 24 July 2008) <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.
phtml/itemId/837276/fromItemId/8973>; see also Peter Clemes, ‘The Trade Practices Act Implications for 
the seafood industry’ <http://proceedings.com.au/seafood2007/presentations/thursday/Thur%201345%20
GB23%20Clemes.pdf> at 30 April 2009. 
23 Christine Parker, Paul Ainsworth and Natalie Stepanenko, ‘ACCC Compliance and Enforcement Project: 
The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity on Cartel Cases’ (Working Paper, Centre of Competition and 
Consumer Policy, Australian National University, May 2004) 69.
24 See, for example, guidance documents prepared by the Construction Material Processors Association that 
provides guidance to the members on a variety of matters including standard form contracts: Construction 
Material Processors Association, ‘Cartage Contractors in Extractive Industry’ (2008) < http://www.cmpavic.
asn.au/downloads/F-PAS-96.pdf> at 30 April 2009.
25 Black, Hopper and Band (2007) 203.
26 ibid.
27 ibid, 204–05; see Valerie Braithwaite, Kristina Murphy and Monika Reinhart, ‘Taxation. Threat, 
Motivational Postures and Responsive Regulation’ (2007) 29(1) Law and Policy 137. 
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sophistication and how accommodating the ACCC is.’28 Business executives, 
however, were most negative about the ACCC’s dogmatism, and many saw 
the ACCC as having an inflexible preference for taking organisations to 
court, a view that the ACCC did not have of itself.29 Although this study is 
extremely useful in gaining an overview of the ACCC’s regulatory strategies, 
it is of limited relevance here as it does not examine authorisations in 
detail. The authors found the ACCC performed poorly in relation to matters 
concerning mergers and acquisitions, where it was heavily criticised for 
lack of transparency and accountability and for adopting a commercially 
unrealistic application of the law.30 For reasons that past commissioners 
would justify in terms of the commercial secrecy sensitivity of proposed 
mergers, the ACCC has indeed been less transparent and accountable in its 
mergers than its authorisations work. These complaints were addressed in 
the amendments made to the legislation via the introduction of a clearance 
process.31
From the above discussion, it is the first criterion that has to be addressed in 
deciding the applicability of principle-based regulation to determine public 
benefit within authorisations. This criterion points to the need to have a 
balance between rules and principles. Here, it is contended that public benefit 
defies encapsulation as a rule and is better explained as a principle or a set 
of principles. The ACCC performs poorly on this criterion because it has not 
developed a broader framework to articulate the concept of public benefits.
The ACCC currently states that both economic efficiency benefits and other 
general benefits will be considered in the process of granting an authorisation. 
This is a broad canvas and applicants would need further information before 
deciding whether the benefits they seek to claim would be accepted. The 
guidance documents incorporate a non-exhaustive list of public benefits that 
are important for parties seeking to make such an application. It may have the 
effect, however, of deterring or confusing parties who seek to claim benefits 
not included in this list. To date, the ACCC has seen public benefits as it finds 
them, rightly recognising health, environmental benefits, safety and equitable 
dealings. This process can best be described as both ad hoc and inclusive in 
the types of benefits it recognises. This does not provide sufficient guidance 
for applicants. Likewise, it poses a problem for those who may not be able to 
predict the kinds of benefits that may be acceptable to the ACCC. Developing 
a broader framework capable of accommodating the types of non-efficiency 
28 Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen, ‘What do Australian businesses think of the ACCC and does it 
matter?’ (2007) 35(2) Federal Law Review, 187, 232. 
29 ibid, 233.
30 ibid, 217.
31 See s 50(4) and (5).
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benefits as they arise is the challenge. Human rights literature, together with 
the data collated on the ACCC deliberations, can be combined to develop this 
framework. 
A Broader Framework for Public Benefits 
Human rights discourse is being recognised as an important regulatory tool 
for global corporations.32 Consumer law scholars, particularly in the European 
Union where the human rights discourse has always thrived, are emphasising 
the need for all public regulation undertaken in the consumer interest to be 
human rights proof.33 This is a way of ensuring that it does not contravene the 
European Convention on Human Rights as well as any national legislation. It 
means that care should be taken in ensuring both business and consumer rights 
are not compromised, thus striking a balance between economic freedoms of 
traders and social rights of consumers, both of which are protected by the 
convention.34 In Australia, the only relevant legislation is the Human Rights Act 
(ACT) 2004, which provides that, so far as it is possible to do so consistently 
with its purpose, a Territory law must be interpreted in a way that is compatible 
with human rights.35 Although this does not have the same reach or impact as 
the convention, it does support the need to consider human rights discourse 
more widely.
As deputy chair of the ACCC, Asher signalled the important role of human 
rights. He proposed that the UN Consumer Protection Guidelines, an elaboration 
of the fundamental rights first articulated by US President John F Kennedy in 
1962, which call on governments to develop, strengthen or maintain measures 
relating to the control of restrictive and other abusive business practices that 
may be harmful to consumers, be extended to include a specific elaboration of 
competition policy measures that governments can adopt in a way that enhances 
consumer welfare.36 Although it may be more obvious to rely on consumer rights 
32 See Amy Sinden, ‘Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should Address Corporate 
Environmental Wrongs’, in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (2007) 501; David Kinley, Justine Nolan, and Natalie 
Zerial, ‘Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25(1) Company and 
Securities Law Journal 30; David Kinley, ‘Human Rights Fundamentalisms’ (2007) 29(4) Sydney Law Review 
545; Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley, ‘Minding the Gap: Global Finance and Human Rights’ (2011) 25(2) 
Ethics & International Affairs 183–210.
33 Geraint G Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (2005) 94–97.
34 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the fundamental right of the freedom of 
expression, is now being relied on by businesses to argue that certain advertising restrictions may be void. 
See Howells and Weatherill (2005) 97. 
35 Section 30.
36 Allan Asher, ‘Consumers 2000: Updating the UN Guidelines’ (5 January 1997) <http://www.accc.gov.au/
content/index.phtml/itemId/96009> at 1 November 2004. The four consumer rights articulated by President 
John F Kennedy were the right to redress, the right to consumer education, the right to a healthy environment 
and the right to satisfaction of basic needs; see David Edward O’Connor, The Basics of Economics (2004) 146.
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in dealing with competition issues, it is contended that, as consumer rights 
is a subset of human rights, the human rights framework is to be preferred. 
Whereas consumer rights may provide for the right to a safe product, they may 
not provide for a right to a safe workplace or a right for competitors to receive 
a fair hearing, or a right for freedom of expression for journalists, for example, 
in the media regulation cases.37 The cases studied here have shown that these 
non-consumer rights issues come up regularly. Human rights would be the 
starting point, and conduct that enforces human rights would be viewed as 
a public benefit. Therefore, conduct that concerns the health of patients, the 
safety of goods, and the right to a healthy environment or the right to a fair 
trial can be couched in terms of human rights and can be viewed as public 
benefits. Alternatively, where conduct appears to adversely affect human rights, 
it should not be approved unless the effect could be remedied via the inclusion 
of conditions. 
The use of human rights will shift the focus away from the current tensions 
between economic efficiency and non-efficiency factors. Rather than referring 
to issues of product safety and improved health services in negative terms by 
calling them non-efficiency factors or other factors, there is much to be gained in 
viewing them in the positive language of human rights. Asher has examined the 
types of rights that need to be examined when dealing with the deregulation 
of utilities to ensure the potential adverse impact of competition is minimised.38 
These include the facilitation of participation by consumers in decisions 
that affect them, inclusion of accountability measures that provide sufficient 
information and redress for consumers, and enhancing transparency in decision-
making in the utilities sector.39 This demonstrates the wider applicability of the 
human rights discourse.
Specifically, human rights can be used as a lens for authorising codes of 
conduct. When doing so, it is necessary to recognise the right to be heard 
and ensure consumer groups are represented in the authorisation process and 
their participation is facilitated in a meaningful way. Likewise, it is necessary 
to ensure the right to a fair hearing or procedural justice, which may mean 
appeal processes in the codes should be examined and, where necessary, any 
adverse effects reduced via the use of conditions. Further, it is necessary that 
the parties involved, be they consumers or other competitors, be informed on a 
regular basis; this may be effected by providing monitoring procedures within 
the codes. As the discussion on codes of conduct in Chapter 6 demonstrated, 
37 See Abbott Australasia Pty Ltd and Nestle Australia Limited (1992) ATPR (Com) 50-123, The Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia and the Council of Textile and Fashion Industries Limited (2000) ATPR 
(Com) 50-282, Steggles Limited and Others A30183, 20 May 1998, all of which dealt with improved workplace, 
safer products and the right to appeal respectively.
38 Asher, 12.
39 ibid, 11–12.
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the ACCC is currently considering such factors, either in the context of public 
benefit or via the imposition of conditions aimed at lessening the detriment that 
may flow from such proposed conduct. 
Many organisations, such as the NSW Office of Fair Trading, adopt the human 
rights framework to explain their mandate. In this office, eight international 
consumer rights are used as a starting point: the right to safety, the right to be 
informed, the right to choose, the right to be heard, the right to satisfaction 
of basic needs, the right to redress, the right to consumer education, and the 
right to a healthy environment. Recently, a former deputy chair, Louise Sylvan, 
argued for a firmer connection between competition policy and consumer 
policy and has urged that consideration be given to the outcomes certain 
types of actions may have on both consumers and competition.40 Thinking of 
the manner in which authorisations can benefit consumers may be one way of 
doing so. Many of the ACCC determinations can be cast in terms of such rights. 
In Abbott Australasia Pty Ltd and Nestle Australia Limited,41 manufacturers 
and importers of infant formula applied for authorisation for its marketing 
obligations, which included exclusionary provisions. The commission granted 
authorisation and cited the Australian Government’s commitment to the World 
Health Organisation International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, 
adopted by Australia in 1981. In 1983 Australian manufacturers and importers 
adopted a voluntary code based on this. 
Not all issues involve human rights and this cannot be dismissed in developing 
an appropriate framework. The Qantas and Air New Zealand, the Port Waratah 
and the Australian Payments Clearing Association authorisations are three 
examples where the reasoning of the decisions did not involve human rights.42 
In such cases the benefits cannot easily be couched in terms of human rights, 
as enunciated in the international covenants. The Qantas and Air New Zealand 
authorisation concerned a proposed alliance between Qantas and Air New 
Zealand over specific routes as a response to competition from other airlines, in 
Port Waratah the authorisation involved an agreement between producers of coal 
to establish a distribution system for loading ships for export and, in Australian 
Payments Clearing Association, the authorisation dealt with membership of the 
body responsible for the implementation of effective payments clearing and 
settlement systems. Human rights are applicable, however, in the vast majority 
of cases and, here, the manner in which human rights are understood has to be 
40 Louise Sylvan, ‘Activating Competition: The Consumer–Competition Interface’ (2004) 12(2) Competition 
and Consumer Law Journal 191. See also Jeremy Tustin and Rhonda Smith, ‘Joined-up Consumer and 
Competition Policy: Some Comments’ (2005) 12(3) Competition and Consumer Law Journal 305.
41 Abbott Australasia Pty Ltd and Nestle Australia Limited (1992) ATPR (Com) 50-123. See also Sitesh Bhojani, 
‘“Public Benefits” under the Trade Practices Act’ (Paper presented at the Joint Conference: Competition Law 
and the Professions, Perth, WA 11 April 1997) 4–5.
42 See Qantas and Air New Zealand A90862, A90863, A30220, A30221, 9 September 2003, Port Waratah 
A90650, 25 March 1998 and Australian Payments Clearing Association Limited A90617–A90619, 1 April 1998.
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explored. It is widely accepted that human rights remain an incomplete idea 
because they are indeterminate and nearly criterion-less.43 James Griffin points 
to the example of the right to health, which gives no indication of whether 
this refers to health or health care.44 Does it mean it is a right to welfare that 
supports health, such as antibiotics, or education about medicines and disease-
prevention measures. Could it mean, as some argue, every child living in the 
tropics has a right to a mosquito net to protect them from malaria? What it 
means will depend on the society in which it is being considered and the other 
priorities it is being considered alongside.45 On the other hand, a right to health 
will universally mean more than a right to health care: for example, it will mean 
a right to clean air and clean water. Griffin proposes there are two ways to use 
philosophy to supply a more substantive account of human rights: the top-
down and the bottom-up approach:
There is the top down approach: one starts with an overarching 
principle, or principles or an authoritative decision procedure — say, 
the principle of utility or the Categorical Imperative or the model of 
parties to a contract reaching agreement — from which human rights 
can be derived. Most accounts of rights in philosophy these days are 
top-down. Then there is a bottom-up approach: one starts with human 
rights as used in our actual social life by politicians, lawyers, social 
campaigners, as well as theorists or various sorts, and then sees what 
higher principles one must resort to in order to explain their moral 
weight, when one thinks they have it, and to resolve conflicts between 
them.46
One clarification is required at this point — to distinguish between primary 
duties and secondary duties. Griffin points to this distinction and proposes 
that, while primary duties have the same content as the human right, secondary 
duties are those duties more loosely connected to the human right. The example 
used by Griffin is the duty to ensure compliance with human rights. Here it is 
clear that institutions populated by legislators, judges and police are necessary 
to create a just legal system to ensure compliance with human rights., The duty 
to create a just legal system, however, is not identical to a primary duty. Griffin 
calls this a secondary duty. Because this secondary duty is necessary for the 
primary duty to be given effect, the two duties are close enough to be treated 
for practical purposes as one. With the determination of public benefits, the 
duty to ensure that any person whose rights are violated shall have an effective 
remedy by virtue of Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
43 James Griffin, On Human Rights (2008) 14.
44 ibid, 14, 99–101.
45 ibid, 99–100.
46 ibid, 29.
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Political Rights (ICCPR) will be a primary duty. But setting up appeals systems 
within codes of conduct and prescribing the constituency of the appeals panels 
will be a secondary duty. The setting up of compliance systems to circumvent 
the breach of this duty is one further step removed from setting up appeals 
mechanisms. But, it too is linked to the human right and is called a called a 
controversial secondary duty. The discussion below examines both the primary 
and secondary (including controversial secondary) duties attached to the human 
right. 
I explore both these approaches to evaluate their applicability to determining 
public benefits. In the following discussion I have first considered public 
benefits that have been acknowledged in practice (in Chapters 3, 4 and 6) and 
categorised them into a list of 22 separate public benefits (Table 7.1). Next, I 
have looked at how many would be accommodated by the top-down approach 
to human rights; 13 do not have a place. Then, I have applied the bottom-up 
approach to human rights, which is more accommodating, but still leaves out 
11 public benefits. I then created a set of heuristics, which recognise ACCC 
practice, while also being faithful to human rights and can accommodate the 15 
public benefits contained in the ACCC lists. 
Using the Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches
All the public benefits (PB) discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 have been collated 
and assessed to see if they can be accommodated by Griffin’s top-down and 
bottom-up approach to human rights. Before doing so, I want to briefly refer to 
the public benefits to be considered. Chapters 1 and 3 noted 15 specific examples 
of public benefits that the ACCC considers as a non-exhaustive list (Table 7.1, 
column A).47 Chapter 4 added seven further public benefits that have been 
recognised by the ACCC in practice to the non-exhaustive list (Table 7.1, column 
B). In the discussion on outcome-based discretion in Chapter 6, it was noted 
that the ACCC imposed conditions related to enhancing compliance; promoting 
fairness and justice (by requiring increased transparency and incorporating 
complaints mechanisms within codes of conduct); and related to facilitating 
deregulation. These were also public benefits recognised by the ACCC when it 
granted authorisations (Table 7.1, column C). There are three overlaps (indicated 
in Table 7.1 with data on same row): the right to due process and the right to 
justice overlaps with promoting fairness and justice, facilitating deregulation 
is in both columns B and C, and encouraging compliance and self-regulation 
overlaps with enhancing compliance. Of the 22 public benefits recognised in 
earlier chapters (Table 7.1), 15 are recognised by the ACCC in its lists (PB1–PB15) 
and seven are recognised by the ACCC in its practice (PB16–PB22).
47 Note that the category of ‘Other’ is not included here.
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A. Public benefits 
recognised by the 
ACCC in its lists 
and discussed in 
chapters 1 and 3 
B. Public benefits 
recognised by the 
ACCC in practice 
and discussed 
in chapter 4
C. Public benefits 
resulting from the 




PB2 Industry rationalisation 
PB3 Expansion of employment 
or prevention of 
unemployment in 
efficient industries
PB4 Expansion of employment 
in particular areas
PB5 Attainment of industry 
harmony
PB6 Supply of better 
information to  
consumers and 
businesses 
PB7 Promotion of equitable 
dealings in the market
PB8 Promotion of industry 
cost savings 
PB9 Development of import 
replacements
PB10 Growth in export  
markets
PB11 Steps to protect the 
environment
PB12 Fostering business 
efficiency
PB13 Assistance to efficient 
small business
PB14 Enhancement of the 
quality and safety of 
goods and services 
PB15 Promotion of  
competition in the 
industry
PB16 Regulation of illegal 
activity
PB17 Health of patients, 
consumers and 
worker







A. Public benefits 
recognised by the 
ACCC in its lists 
and discussed in 
chapters 1 and 3 
B. Public benefits 
recognised by the 
ACCC in practice 
and discussed 
in chapter 4
C. Public benefits 
resulting from the 




Right to due process 
and right to justice
Promoting fairness and 
justice (through complaints 
mechanisms and increased 
transparency)








PB21 Promotion of ethical 
conduct
PB22 Protection of certain 
vulnerable sectors in 
society
Source: Author’s research.
Top-down Approach to Human Rights in Determining Public Benefits
Here I use the international bill of rights as constituted by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, ICCPR 1966 and the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), to derive the main human 
rights that can be linked to public benefits.48 I begin with an explanation of the 
main instruments of international human rights, followed by an examination of 
how public benefits in practice may fit into the human rights enshrined in these 
instruments. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provides the starting point 
for any discussion of human rights. It defines human rights as basic rights that 
form the foundation for freedom, justice and peace and which apply equally 
and universally in all countries. The two major instruments of international 
human rights that derive from the declaration are the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
Both have been ratified by Australia. The ICCPR is often referred to as the first 
generation of human rights — such as the right to life, the right to liberty and 
security, the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly 
and association. The ICESPR is referred to as the second generation of human 
rights and covers such rights as the right to work, the right to an adequate 
48 Griffin (2008) 29. See also Tom Campbell, ‘Introduction’, in Tom Campbell and Seumas Miller (eds), 
Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector Organisations (2004) 12. 
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standard of living (food, clothing and housing) and the right to physical and 
mental health. The third generation of human rights that has emerged in recent 
years covers collective rights, such as the right to self-determination and the 
right to economic and social development. These rights have been championed 
primarily by developing nations within the United Nations, but have ‘been only 
cautiously accepted by the mainstream international human rights community 
because of their challenge to the western, liberal model of individual rights 
invocable against the sovereign’.49 While briefly touched on in the ICCPR, these 
rights have not yet been incorporated into any legally binding equivalent 
covenant or treaty.
These covenants do not deal with specifics but rather provide the framework for 
reform agendas within different nation states. They comprise non-exhaustive 
lists that are criterionless, leaving it to states and other bodies to fill in the 
details.50 Some of these rights may not be considered as rights at all. Griffin 
argues that many statements in the international covenants are unlikely to be 
human rights and gives the example of Article 12 in the declaration, which deals 
with the rights to protection against attacks on one’s honour and reputation, or 
Article 20, which states that any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by 
law.51 Griffin proposes that practicalities need to inform the content of many 
human rights. By this he is referring to local conditions in the relevant country, 
as well as global considerations about human nature, which will inform the 
content of such rights.52
Often, national laws are not cast in terms of human rights even though it may 
be possible to do so, as illustrated by the development of industrial laws in 
Australia. Industrial laws could be hung on the human rights hook using articles 
6 and 7 of the ICCPR, which are extremely general and provide for the right to 
work and the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work. 
In many countries, however, including Australia, there has been a tendency to 
separate the developments in the workplace from the more recent developments 
of human rights jurisprudence.53 More recently the focus has turned to the link 
between global finance and human rights and the need to ‘close the gap’ so as 
to ensure that global finance does not undermine human rights protections, but 
49 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘What are “Women’s International Human Rights”?’, in Rebecca J Cook (ed), 
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 58, 75.
50 Griffin (2008) 29–56.
51 ibid, 194–95.
52 ibid, 316.
53 For a discussion of some of the reasons for this in the area of industrial laws, see Peter Bailey, Human 
Rights: Australia in an International Context (1990) 360–62; see also Christine Williams, ‘Sexual Harassment 
and Human Rights Law in New Zealand’ (2003) 2(4) Journal of Human Rights 573, where it is argued that 
human rights may provide the appropriate vehicle to regulate sexual harassment. 
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rather can be used in ways to enhance human rights ends.54 In support of this 
argument, it is possible to consider the ICESCR and other initiatives, such as the 
UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative.
Ratification of international instruments creates the basis for a legitimate 
expectation that administrative decision-makers will act in conformity with 
these instruments. Accordingly, the ACCC must take the international covenants 
into account in its decision-making. There remains, however, the problem of 
defining the kind of activities that are protected by the covenants.55 In the past, 
the ACCC paid attention to what can be conceived of as human rights obligations 
in its authorisation decisions. In Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and 
Manufacturers Inc,56 it was recognised that the commission could consider 
not only state and national legislation but also international obligations and 
standards. Here there was no relevant and applicable national or state legislation, 
and the relevant international standards on emission of ozone-depleting 
substances had been established under international protocols. The control of 
hydrocholorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) gases was dealt 
with by the Montreal Protocol 1987 and Kyoto Protocol 1997 respectively. The 
Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers argued that one of 
the public benefits would be to encourage industrial activity consistent with 
Australia’s domestic ozone protection policies and Australia’s international 
obligations.57 The commission accepted this proposition and stated: ‘a scheme 
or arrangement which contributes to limiting the risk to human health and 
the improvement of the environment would benefit the Australian public’.58 
Further rights recognised in the ACCC’s decision-making include the right to 
health and the right to ethical treatment by professionals.59
Table 7.2 links recognised human rights, as expressed in the international 
covenants that Australia has signed, to recognised public benefits detailed in 
Table 7.1. Public benefits are separated into three categories: public benefits 
that can be linked to a primary human right; public benefits that can be linked 
to a secondary human right or controversial secondary human right; and public 
benefits that cannot be linked to any human right. 
54 Dowell Jones and Kinley (2011) 203–04.
55 See Ian Forrester, ‘Modernization of EC Competition Law’ (2000) 23 Fordham International Law Review, 1028, 
1070, for a discussion on how human rights could be used in the European Union in cases of breaches of competition.
56 Association of Fluorocarbon Consumers and Manufacturers Inc A90658, 26 August 1998. 
57 ibid, 4.
58 ibid, 10.
59 For a discussion of the right to health see the discussion on Health of Patients, Consumers and Workers in 
Chapter 4 of this book. For an example of professional ethics in codes see ACT Law Society authorisation A75 
(1977) ATPR (Com) 16,615 where the society adopted a ruling that solicitors were prevented, except in certain 
circumstances, from acting for both the vendor and purchaser in the sale of land.
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Table 7.2: Public benefits linked to human rights
Human right (where relevant) Public benefit
Public benefits 
that can be linked 
to recognised 
human rights
ICECSR, Article 7 — the right of everyone to 








ICECSR, Article 7 — the right of everyone to 





ICECSR, Article 12 — the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health 
including the improvement of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene . Widely 
accepted as a third generation right
Steps to protect 
the environment 
(PB11)
ICECSR, Article 12 — the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health, which can include 
increased consumer safety
Enhancement of the 
quality and safety of 
goods and services 
(PB14)
ICECSR, Article 12 — the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health including 
provision of medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness and 
ICECSR, Article 7 — the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions 
of work, including safe and healthy working 
conditions




that can be linked 
to a secondary 
or controversial 
human right
ICCPR, Article 2 — ensure that any person whose 
rights are violated shall have an effective remedy 
and to ensure that any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority 





ICCPR, Article 2 — ensure that any person whose 
rights are violated shall have an effective remedy 
and to ensure that any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority 







ICCPR, Article 2 — ensure that any person whose 
rights are violated shall have an effective remedy 
and to ensure that any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the state
Rights to due 
process and 
justice/Promoting 
fairness and justice 
(secondary right)
(PB18)
ICECSR, Article 12 — the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health
Protection of 
certain vulnerable 
sectors in the 
society (secondary 
right) (PB22)
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Human right (where relevant) Public benefit
Public benefits 
that cannot 

























competition in the 
industry (PB15)











As seen from Table 7.2, only five public benefits, four that have been included 
in the ACCC lists and one in ACCC practice, can be linked to recognised human 
rights, namely Article 7 and Article 12 of the ICESCR. There are seven public 
benefits that can be termed secondary or controversial secondary rights, all 
dealing with Article 2 of the ICCPR and Article 12 of the ICESCR. Of these, 
three can be found in the ACCC lists and four have been recognised by the ACCC 
in practice. 
Of these four public benefits, two are secondary human rights, as they are 
creating mechanisms or pathways to give effect to the primary human right: right 
to due process and justice/promoting fairness and justice and the protection of 
vulnerable sectors of society. The former is creating pathways to the primary 
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right enshrined in Article 2 of the ICCPR because they can be seen as creating a 
competent authority for ensuring that any person whose rights are violated has 
an effective remedy. The later public benefit of protecting vulnerable sectors of 
society is creating a pathway to the right enshrined in Article 12 of the ICESCR, 
as it is an attempt to provide for a reasonable standard of mental and physical 
health.
The two remaining public benefits are less clear-cut than the above four, and are 
classified as controversial secondary rights: promotion of equitable dealings and 
assistance to efficient small businesses. All these public benefits are linked to the 
right to freedom of association. We know restrictions on trade union activities 
will be clearly an infringement on the freedom of an association. It is not so 
easy, however, to make the same conclusions about competition law, which at its 
very core strikes at different types of associations such as cartels. These public 
benefits recognise that certain forms of association are appropriate — thus the 
promotion of equitable dealings, aimed at empowering smaller companies and 
not afforded to companies with market power, should be allowed. They are not 
constraints and they do not apply to all types of businesses or companies. They 
are means of facilitating associations by certain businesses or companies and, 
although controversial, they can be linked to the right to freedom of association. 
The same logic can be applied to the assistance to efficient small businesses that 
can engage in conduct that would not be countenanced by businesses with 
market share. Accordingly they are classified as controversial secondary human 
rights in Table 7.2.
There are 13 public benefits that cannot be linked to human rights (Table 7.2), 
nine of which are in the ACCC lists and four that come out of ACCC practice. An 
argument could be made to classify the regulation of illegal activity, supply of 
better information to consumers and business, and encouraging compliance, as 
secondary rights. This would be on the basis that, like the discussion on access 
to justice, providing countervailing power, enabling equitable dealing and 
empowering small business, these three above-mentioned rights may be viewed 
as secondary human rights, as they are necessary to give effect to a primary 
human right. I have not classified them in this manner, however, because they 
cannot be as directly linked to recognised human rights. Accordingly, I have 
placed them under the heading ’Public benefits that cannot be linked to a 
human right’ (Table 7.2).
It is difficult, by any stretch of the imagination, to include benefits flowing from 
import substitution and the promotion of cost savings into any of the categories of 
human rights. Some of these may be, however, in specific circumstances, capable 
of being linked to a human right. For example, economic development in certain 
circumstances may be linked to the human right of the right to development.60 
60 This right was proclaimed by the United Nations in 1986 in the Declaration on the Right to Development, 
which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/128. The preamble states 
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It is difficult to see, however, these circumstances existing in Australia, which is 
generally regarded as a developed nation. Likewise, encouraging compliance, if 
it is aimed at the provision of an appeal process or improving the safety of goods 
produced, may be linked to a human right of access to a fair hearing or the 
attainment of the highest attainable standard of physical health. Compliance is 
usually encouraged for other purposes, however, such as the promotion of self-
regulation or improving consumers access to information. Although, in some 
circumstances, some of these public benefits may be linked to a human right, 
this is unlikely to occur often and drawing such linkages is tenuous at best. In 
conclusion, although the top down approach to human rights can accommodate 
some public benefits, it does not easily accommodate the majority of public 
benefits that have been recognised. 
Bottom-up Approach to Human Rights in Determining Public Benefit
Griffin’s bottom up approach starts with human rights as used in our actual 
social life by politicians, lawyers and social campaigners and then sees what 
higher principle to resort to in order to explain their moral weight.61 This 
approach may be better suited for the purpose of determining public benefit. 
It also comports with the real world of philosophical pragmatism in which 
authorisation evolved. It might be said in the same spirit that the case method 
of the common law is a device for discovering such benefits in a way that is 
philosophically bottom-up. The 22 public benefits collated in Table 7.1 are a 
combination of ACCC lists and practice and I have categorised these benefits 
under broad headings, which I have called immanent rights. Where relevant 
I have matched up the public benefit to an existing international covenant, as 
discussed in Table 7.2. 
Of the 22 public benefits, 11 cannot be linked to an immanent right, related 
to either the functioning of the market or the promotion of ethical conduct 
(Table 7.3). There are nine dealing with the functioning of the market: economic 
development, industry rationalisation, attainment of industry harmony, 
promotion of industry cost savings, development of import replacements, growth 
of export markets, fostering business efficiency, promotion of competition in 
the industry, and facilitation of deregulation. There are two public benefits 
dealing with the promotion of ethical conduct: promotion of equitable dealings 
in the market and the promotion of ethical conduct. The remaining nine public 
benefits are linked to six immanent rights: right to quality of life; right to just 
treatment and just procedure; right to freedom of association; right to security; 
right to know; and right to securing rights. 
‘development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free 
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting there from.’
61 Griffin (2008) 29.
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human rights Immanent right
PB1 Economic development
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB2 Industry rationalisation 
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 












ICECSR, Article 7 Improve quality of life 
PB5 Attainment of industry harmony
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB6




Cannot be linked to 
a human right Right to know
PB7
Promotion of 





No clear immanent right (related 






Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB9 Development of import replacements
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB10 Growth in export markets
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB11 Steps to protect the environment ICECSR, Article 12 Improve quality of life
PB12 Fostering business efficiency
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 








Right to freedom of association
PB14
Enhancement of 
the quality and 
safety of goods and 
services 
ICECSR, Article 12 Improve quality of life 
PB15
Promotion of 
competition in the 
industry
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB16 Regulation of illegal activity
Cannot be linked to 
a human right Right to security
PB17
Health of patients, 
consumers and 
worker
ICECSR Article 12 Improve quality of life 











human rights Immanent right
PB18




and justice (eg 
through complaints 
mechanisms)
ICCPR, Article 2 
(secondary right) 
Right to just treatment and just 
procedure
PB19 Facilitation of deregulation 
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the functioning of the market)
PB20 Encouraging compliance 
Cannot be linked to 
a human right Right to securing rights
PB21 Promotion of ethical conduct
Cannot be linked to 
a human right
No clear immanent right (related 
to the promotion of ethical 
conduct) 
PB22
Protection of certain 
vulnerable sectors 
in society
ICECSR, Article 12 
(secondary right) Improve quality of life
Source: Author’s research.
This bottom-up approach (Table 7.3) works better than the top-down approach 
(Table 7.2) because it is able to link many more public benefits to human rights 
as they are widely understood in the broader community. Nevertheless, a 
total of 11 public benefits, related to the functioning of the market and the 
promotion of ethical conduct, do not have a natural home within an accepted 
immanent right. It is foreseeable that many more public benefits related to the 
promotion of ethical conduct are likely to arise in the future. Examples include 
voluntary agreements between corporations or associations reflecting climate 
change or environmental concerns, initiatives related to greater corporate social 
responsibility, increased disclosure of information to the public by corporations, 
and greater consideration given to specific sectors by corporations. It is possible 
that corporations decide to adopt a code of conduct that only allows them to 
deal with corporations that have the backing of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) or a non-government organisation (NGO) 
such as Amnesty International.62 Likewise, corporations in the post-financial 
crisis market may wish to incorporate greater disclosure of financial information 
or make agreements among industry members on salary caps for senior executives. 
Other corporations, responding to the needs of the neighbouring Pacific states, 
may decide to give preferential treatment to workers from these states, to the 
62 Doreen McBarret, ‘Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and the New Accountability’ in Campbell 
and Miller (2004) 71.
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exclusion of all others.63 Such agreements could require authorisation and bring 
considerable public benefits. A framework that can accommodate all these 
benefits is necessary and is explored below.
Creating a Framework Based on Human Rights and Empirics
It is proposed that a set of heuristics can be developed to accommodate all 
the 22 public benefits. While recognising ACCC practice, these heuristics 
would be faithful to human rights principles, as generally accepted by the 
community. This set of heuristics consists of seven groupings: quality of life, 
market integrity, equitable dealings among market actors, economic efficiency 
and economic welfare, procedural fairness, increased enforceability and human 
security (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4: Locating public benefits based on rights and empirics
Public benefit (PB) Immanent rights or recognised human rights Heuristic 
Enhancement of 
the quality and 
safety of goods and 
services (PB14)
Immanent right (improve quality 
of life)
Also top down human right 
(Article 12 ICESR)
Improve quality of life
Expansion of employment 
or prevention of 
unemployment in efficient 
industries (PB3)
Immanent right (improve quality 
of life)
Also top down human right 
(Article 7 ICESR)
Health of patients, 
consumers and 
worker (PB17)
Immanent right (improve quality 
of life)
Also top down human right 
(Article 12 ICESR)
Steps to protect the 
environment (PB11)
Immanent right (improve quality 
of life)
Also top down human right 
(Article 12 ICESR)
Expansion of employment 
in particular areas (PB4)
Immanent right (improve quality 
of life)
Also top down human right 
(Article 7ICESR)
63 See Manjula Luthria, ‘Guest Workers: A Pacific Solution that Benefits All’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 
June 2008, 11; see also Allan Fels and Fred Brenchley, ‘Black Jobs Gap Still a Chasm After Decades’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 13–14 December 2008, 39.
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Public benefit (PB) Immanent rights or recognised human rights Heuristic 
Promotion of 
equitable dealings in 
the market (PB7)
Immanent right (right to 
freedom of association)
Also a secondary right
Provide for equitable 
dealings among market 
actors
Assistance to efficient 
small business (PB13)
Immanent right (right to 
freedom of association)
Also a secondary right
Attainment of industry 
harmony (PB5)
No clear immanent right
Supply of better 
information to consumers 
and businesses (PB6)
Immanent right (right to know)
Increase market 
integrity
Promotion of ethical 
conduct (PB21)










No clear immanent right
Promotion of industry 
cost savings (PB8)
No clear immanent right
Development of import 
replacements (PB9)
No clear immanent right
Development of import 
replacements (PB9)
No clear immanent right
Growth in export 
markets (PB10)
No clear immanent right
Fostering business 
efficiency (PB12)
No clear immanent right
Facilitating 
competition (PB15)
No clear immanent right
Regulation of illegal 
activity (PB16)
Immanent right (right to 
security)
Also a secondary right
Provide human security
Right to due process and 
right to justice/promoting 
fairness and justice 
(eg through complaints 
mechanisms) (PB18)
Immanent right (rights to just 
treatment and just procedure)
Also a top down right (Article 
2 ICCPR)
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These groupings make it possible to express public benefit as a principle in the 
following terms:
Principle: A public benefit can fall into one of the following categories: 
secure a basic human right, improve quality of life, provide for equitable 
dealings among market actors, increase market integrity, encourage 
economic efficiency and economic welfare, provide for human security, 
enhance procedural fairness and increase enforceability.
It is proposed that this framework for public benefits, based on both the empirical 
data as well as the recognised human rights, will work more effectively than the 
present ad hoc approach, which has been described as a triumph of practice 
over theory. This framework is grounded on a widely accepted discourse as 
well as reflecting practice; it is inclusive while providing greater guidance to 
applicants and all stakeholders; it will allow both efficiency-based benefits 
as well as non-efficiency benefits; it will be flexible enough to accommodate 
new public benefits as they arise without adding to the existing list of public 
benefits; and it will reflect an approach which is universally understood both by 
applicants as well as all other interested parties. 
Promoting Responsiveness
The manner in which regulatory agencies have changed the way in which 
they function reflects the changes in the wider society including the role of 
governments and the increasing importance of local and global networks. 
Chapter 6 examines the manner in which regulatory agencies today do the 
complex business of regulating. It also discusses the strategies available to 
these agencies and ties them to the theory underlying the strategies. The ACCC 
has been an innovative regulator, using a great variety of strategies from its 
inception, as demonstrated in the discussion in Chapter 2 on the distinctive 
trajectory that is the authorisation process. The ACCC has been quick to adapt 
to the changes in the wider society, as demonstrated in Chapter 6 by the manner 
in which it has used its discretion to facilitate desired outcomes. As one of 
Australia’s main corporate regulators, the ACCC has faced considerable scrutiny 
(discussed in Chapter 5). It has been conscious of the scrutiny and has addressed 
it, sometimes with military precision, illustrated by the format closely followed 
in the determinations,64 the consistent references to accountability65 and the 
websites which have been redesigned to provide minutes of all meetings.66 This 
64 See the section on Causal Link — The Benefit Must Flow from the Conduct, in Chapter 3.
65 See the discussion on Accountability in Chapter 5.
66 See the discussion on Procedural Discretion in Chapter 6.
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is further supported by a recent study that points to overall business satisfaction 
with the ACCC’s strategic sophistication and how procedural and substantive 
justice is accommodated.67
As discussed in Chapter 6, however, there remains at least one important criticism 
— the participation by certain non-industry groups has fallen. This issue 
becomes more important in a deregulated market and a decentred regulatory 
environment, where there is an important role for non-industry groups to bring 
relevant information to the regulator and to contest settlements that are ‘cosy’ 
for the regulator and regulatee but not for civil society. It is connected to the 
notion of procedural justice and how the regulator is perceived (discussed in 
Chapter 6).
Figure 7.1: Two methods for promoting institutional responsibility
Source: Author’s research.
Advocates of responsive regulation and restorative justice would see the 
importance of welcoming the voice of dissidents, engaging in an ongoing 
dialogue and incorporating mechanisms for facilitating participation, all of 
67 Parker and Nielsen (2007). 
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which foster principles of democracy.68 Here, I want to canvas two methods to 
improve responsiveness of the regulator in increasing participation: participation 
by design and the art of practice (Figure 7.1). These methods are not mutually 
exclusive; rather they work together and the catalytic mix will depend on the 
conduct and the context, as discussed below.
Participation by Design
One way to increase the regulator’s responsiveness is through legislative design. 
This is a top-down process where the legislature allows for a new and more 
consultative process of administration. Law that enables consultative process, as 
does the Trade Practices Act, will provide a sound foundation for the institution 
to develop channels of communication with the groups it seeks to regulate. Law 
that relies more on broad principles rather than concise rules, providing the 
regulatory institution with the fiat for formulating specific policy in consultation 
with regulated groups, may be more successful in allowing the institution to 
assume responsibility for its actions. 
Design alone is not sufficient to allow for participation. Discretion exercised in 
interpreting the provision is also necessary. For example, lodging authorisation 
applications previously incurred a standard fee of $7500, which was particularly 
onerous for not-for-profit organisations.69 Following an amendment to the Act, 
the ACCC is now provided with the power to waive the lodgment fee if it is 
satisfied that its imposition would impose an undue burden on the applicant.70 
Schedule 1B of the regulations lists the concessional fee for these non-merger 
applications at $1500, and the ACCC Guide to Authorisations 2007 provides that 
the fee for such groups will be $2500, illustrating the effect of practice within 
a minor rule.
Designing specific pathways for non-industry groups to participate is one way 
of creating a level playing field where all the parties affected by a decision are 
heard. The main pathways are represented in Figure 7.2. While the first and 
second pathways are relevant to ACCC determinations of authorisations, the 
third pathway is less so. It has been included to provide a complete picture of 
how participation can be incorporated via legislative design.
68 Valerie Braithwaite (ed), ‘Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction’ (2007) 29 (1) special issue 
Law and Policy 5; see also Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002) 40; 
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002) 10; Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, 
‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) Modern Law Review 59.
69 See Committee of Inquiry, Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Competition Provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act [Dawson Review] (2003) 113, for discussion on waiver of such fees for particular types 
of applicants.
70 Regulation 75, Trade Practices Regulations 1974.
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The first pathway is to equip the general regulator with the power to take 
the interests of different parties into account. The main interest considered 
is the consumer or the public. As discussed in Chapter 2, the design of the 
Trade Practices Act provides for consultation and participation. It requires 
the commission to take into account submissions made by the applicant, 
Commonwealth, state or any other person.71 The legislation also prescribes that 
a draft determination has to be issued,72 that an interested party may call a 
pre-determination conference,73 and the procedure for such conferences.74 The 
legislation also provides a place for the National Competition Council, which is 
required to promote competition in the public interest, thereby giving effect 
to the Competition Principles Agreement.75 As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
paradox of discretion is that it can exist within strict rules as well as vague 
phrases. The interpretation of the vague phrase ‘public benefit’ has given the 
ACCC considerable scope to exercise its discretion. This reiterates the point 
made above, that design alone may not be sufficient to ensure participation. The 
regulator has to use the discretion well.
Creating specific regulators for certain areas and empowering them to consider 
the interests of other groups that may be poorly represented is also an option. 
Such regulators gain an understanding of the industry and its participants, 
which is important in decision-making. As discussed in Chapter 6, such bodies 
make submissions and are part of the expanded accountability model that is 
recognised by the ACCC. For example the Australia Energy Regulator, which 
was created in 2005, is responsible for the regulation of the wholesale energy 
market. It prepares market reports and analysis on energy issues which informs 
the ACCC in its decisions. Likewise, the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, a regulator of the Australian communications industry, also formed 
in 2005, performs a similar role informing debate. Through its Consumer 
Consultative Forum, the authority gains understanding of the manner in which 
consumers are affected by its functions. It consults with the ACCC about the 
possible impact new technology may have on its determinations. Such bodies 
are able to participate by making a formal submission (discussed in Chapter 
6), or more informally, particularly when the ACCC gives effect to broader 
government objectives.
Legislation can be focused on a specific group. One example of legislation that 




74 Sections 90A(7) and 90A(8).
75 See National Competition Commission mission statement <http://www.ncc.gov.au/> For a discussion 
on the interpretation of the phrase ‘public interest’ in the context of this commission see John McDonald, 
‘Legitimating Private Interests: Hegemonic Control Over “the Public Interest” in National Competition Polity’ 
(2007) 43(4) Journal of Sociology 349.
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Communications Act 2003. Ofcom, the telecommunications regulator established 
by this Act, is mandated to represent consumers. This legislation provides 
that it shall be the principal duty of Ofcom, in carrying out their functions, to 
further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and to 
further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by 
promoting competition.76 In 2006 after an assessment of the manner in which 
consumer interests were addressed, Ofcom established a consumer policy team 
to address the manner in which it can improve its performance, illustrating the 
recognition given to the consumer voice.77 This English regulator has a more 
specific mandate than its Australian counterparts. 
Figure 7.2: Participation by design
Source: Author’s research.
The second pathway in Figure 7.2 is for legislation to create consumer 
advocacy bodies. Consumer advocacy groups historically have given voice for 
underrepresented and disadvantaged groups, enabling their interests to be 
considered as part of the consultative process. The Productivity Commission has 
recognised that consumer advocates have a role in providing a counterbalance to 
producer groups seeking to maintain anti-competitive arrangements that lead to 
76 Section 3(1) Communications Act 2003 (UK).
77 Ofcom, ‘Taking Account of Consumer and Citizen Interests’ <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/accoun/
interests.pdf> at 28 February 2007.
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higher prices, reduced service quality or less market innovation.78 Establishing 
consumer advocacy bodies to actively participate in decision-making requires 
political commitment and funding. The Trade Practices Act made a conscious 
link between consumer protection and competition issues (discussed in Chapter 
2). Although the Australian Consumers Association (Choice) was started in 1963, 
many other groups originated later, in the 1970s. The government of the day 
solicited consumer involvement, giving impetus to the consumer movement, 
which continued to play an important role until the mid 1990s. Funding for 
such groups dried up and their role has diminished over the last decade. This 
is in contrast, however, to the numerous interest groups representing large 
consumers, such as the Business Council  of Australia and small businesses, 
such as the Energy Users of Australia, that have been started. Such groups 
feel that their interests are ignored and have been actively participating in the 
authorisation process (discussed in Chapter 6).
The diminishing role of consumers has been acknowledged in the energy industry 
where user participation is much lower than supplier participation.79 Currently, 
the chief consumer advocacy group is the Consumers Federation of Australia, 
which consists of more than 100 member groups, including: community legal 
centres, health rights groups, local consumer organisations and public interest 
bodies.80 Although previously funded by government, it now relies on donations 
and voluntary work , hence its role has decreased. Its participation is restricted to 
making submissions in relation to key authorisation determinations.81 Another 
body that is considered a leader in national consumer debate is the NGO Choice, 
which is funded by its membership. It too has made a number of submissions 
to the ACCC on authorisation determinations. It is second to the Australian 
Consumers Federation in making submissions on authorisation determinations 
included in the empirical study.82 Other bodies exist at state level and include: 
the Public Interest Advocacy Centre in New South Wales, Consumer Utilities 
Advocacy Centre Ltd in Victoria and the Consumer Law Centre in Victoria. Some 
states, such as Victoria, have increased funding for advocacy bodies, including 
the Consumer Law Centre, the Consumer Credit Legal Service and the Financial 
78 Productivity Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms 
— Discussion Draft (2004) 301.
79 Ministerial Council on Energy, (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism), Commonwealth of 
Australia, Reform of Energy Markets (Report to the Councils on Australian Governments, 11 December 2003) 11.
80 See Consumer Federation of Australia <http://www.consumersfederation.org.au/> at 1 November 2008.
81 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the instances where submissions were made by Consumers Federation of 
Australia or its predecessor. They include United Permanent Building Society (1976); Re Surgeons A90785, Re 
EFTPOS interchange fees A30224, A30225. Also see Cash Convertors Pty Ltd N70435 for a detailed submission 
to the ACCC <http://www.consumersfederation.org.au/documents/CLCV-FAsub171105reACCCauthorisation.
pdf> at 30 April 2009. 
82 See the discussion on Submissions by Non-industry bodies in Chapter 6.
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and Consumer Rights Council. Smaller bodies dealing with specific issues, such 
as the Communications Law Centre, Consumers Health Forum of Australia and 
the Breast Cancer Action Group, have made submissions in their areas. 
Unlike Australia, consumer advocacy groups have had a resurgence in the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. Specific bodies include energywatch, 
Postwatch and the National Consumer Council. These bodies were all merged, 
however, to form one, well-funded, national consumer council with extensive 
legislative powers called Consumer Focus.83 The concern that the expertise that 
industry specific regulators have built up may be lost in this unified body has 
been voiced by energywatch.84 The powers it has been given include the right 
to investigate any consumer complaint if they are of wider interest, the right 
to publish information from providers, the power to conduct research and the 
ability to make an official super-complaint about failing services.85 Perhaps the 
strongest power of this body, which was also possessed by its predecessors, is 
the power to make a super-complaint. This power is given to specific consumer 
bodies via the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK) and it is intended to provide a fast 
track process of resolution.86 To date, six such complaints have been filed, 
demonstrating the role of such organisations in participating in enforcement 
and monitoring the market. The European approach has also been to provide 
financial support for the activities of consumer organisations.87 It is important 
to acknowledge the advantages of having well-funded consumer bodies that 
can participate in consumer policy debates and advocacy and have a research 
facility with the expertise to make submissions on highly technical issues. To 
streamline such participation, the European Union has started a register of 
lobby groups.88 Unlike the United Kingdom and the European Union, consumer 
and citizen representation is left in the hands of regulators in Australia. This 
places greater responsibility on the regulator to be responsive to the needs of 
such groups, and to be facilitative.
The third pathway in Figure 7.2 is a legislative requirement to incorporate 
participation by industry. This is usually via a variety of mechanisms, such as 
dispute resolution or complaints systems being included in codes of conduct. 
83 This body is created by virtue of the Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 (UK).
84 Asher, ‘The National Consumer Congress; In Pursuit of World-class Consumer Policy’, paper presented to 
Third Annual Consumer Congress, Consumer Affairs Victoria, Melbourne, 15–17 March 2006.
85 See Consumer Focus website <http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/en/content/cms/About_Us/About_
Us.aspx> at 1 December 2008.
86 Section 11 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK).
87 See Article 2(b) Decision 283/1999/EC and 2003/C 132/04. Also see the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK). The 
Dawson Committee looked at the possibility of introducing a super complaints procedure designed to enable 
consumer bodies to make complaints about conduct that may be significantly harming consumers; see [Dawson 
Review] (2003) 175. A super complaints body is looking at the role of consumer groups in enforcement rather 
than participating in the process of decision making on authorisation.
88 Leigh Phillips, ‘Major Lobby Firms set to join EU register’, EUobserver <http://euobserver.com/9/26744> 
at 30 October 2008.
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Such measures are usually funded by a levy on industry members and it has 
been important in Australia, with examples including the Energy and Water 
Ombudsman of New South Wales89 and the Banking and Financial Ombudsman. 
The main issue here is that such bodies can have difficulty balancing the 
competing interests of the industry that appoints its members and the consumers 
that make the complaint. Although this pathway is important to understanding 
the regulatory picture, it does not directly affect participation within the 
authorisation process and is not discussed further. It can, however, indirectly 
create accountability networks, which take better care of consumer and public 
interests.
In conclusion, there are numerous ways of designing legislation to provide 
for participation. The two main options relevant to this study are to design 
legislation mandating the regulator to consider the interests of all stakeholders 
or, alternatively, to give this power to government-funded consumer advocacy 
groups. The former is preferred in Australia, whereas both have a role in the 
European Union and the United Kingdom. There have been numerous calls for 
a national consumer council in Australia. Such a council would be expected 
to be funded by government but remain independent from it, while being a 
centre for a network of consumer advocacy and service agencies to connect in 
initiating debate, carrying out research and advocating policies.90  These calls 
have not received any support from government to date in Australia. Thus, it 
is the Art of Practice, discussed below, that offers greater scope for increasing 
responsiveness in the current Australian socio-political environment.
The Art of Practice
As concluded in Chapter 6, the ACCC has exercised its discretion in an 
experimental manner, accommodating a variety of interests and giving effect to 
changing objectives at different times. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
manner in which it has used the conditions power in granting authorisations, 
and developing networks of governance structures among the private actors 
in the market. It has also been reasonably inclusive in its decision–making, 
demonstrated by its use of formal and informal mechanisms for participation. 
The major query raised in Chapter 6 is whether it has been responsive enough 
to non-industry groups. Three main tactics for becoming more responsive were 
canvassed in earlier chapters. First, interpreting the term ‘public’ to include the 
interests of a variety of constituencies, including consumers and community, 
will increase inclusivity. Second, processes that encourage participation by 
all groups should be facilitated. Third, a variety of benefits going beyond 
89 See <http://www.ewon.com.au/> at 30 March 2008.
90 David Tennant, ‘Australia’s Desperate Need for a National Consumer Council’ <http://
www.consumersfederation.org.au/documents/NCCPaperbyDavidTennantMarch05.doc> 15 October 2008.
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efficiency-based benefits have to be recognised. Another strategy that should 
be added to the above three is that the ACCC should set in motion a reflective 
process whereby it examines its own performance, makes an assessment and 
revises its approach as a result. 
Chapter 4 discussed the meanings that can be attached to the term ‘public’ and 
the manner in which the ACT and ACCC had tackled this issue. It has a direct 
impact on the type of public benefits that will be accepted. The ACCC has made 
it clear that it will accept benefits accruing to a sectoral group, or to a wider 
group. This approach could be articulated as three principles in the following 
manner:
Principle: Anticompetitive conduct may be authorised if it results in a 
benefit to a specific group. 
Principle: Anticompetitive conduct may be authorised if there is some 
consumer benefit. 
Principle: These benefits will be weighed by the ACCC, bearing in mind the 
size of the benefits and the parties who are likely to benefit.
The empirical findings demonstrate that the manner in which the state and 
federal governments influence ACCC decisions has changed over the last 
four decades. Rather than directing the institution, these governments now 
participate in a more reserved manner, making written submissions like any 
other private actor, indicating their views on the matter under consideration. 
State and federal governments also send representatives to attend pre-decision 
conferences, and ministers have frequently commented on draft decisions. 
Particularly extensive submissions were made in relation to deregulated 
industries and the Australian Wool Exchange Limited authorisation. The 
Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy supported the 
self-regulating scheme that the deregulated industry was seeking to implement. 
In many of these cases, government departments and ministers see their role as 
one of assisting the ACCC to reach its decision rather than relying on it to cater 
to their interests.91
The empirical findings also illustrate that business groups and industry bodies 
have harnessed this consultative process most effectively. Formal written 
submissions by such groups to the ACCC have increased considerably from 
1976 to 1998 when deregulatory policies were given effect. They have remained 
stable since. The ACCC had been able to facilitate business involvement in 
the authorisation process. There has been an attempt by the commission to 
reinforce the value of business involvement by clearly stating the influence such 
91 Australian Wool Exchange Limited in relation to its business rules, determined on 30 December 1998, 28.
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submissions had on its decisions. Such practices became important in gaining 
business confidence and support. As has been noted, lore can be as important 
as law and often agency practice becomes embodied in law.92 The ACCC must, 
however, attend to accusations of capture and safeguard its independence. The 
following principle would have such an effect:
Principle: Assessing public benefits in authorisations involves assessing 
total welfare, while being mindful of the risk of concentrated business 
interests capturing debate to undervalue consumer welfare.
The empirical study demonstrates that participation by business groups, 
industry bodies as well as state and federal governments has risen steadily. 
It also demonstrates, however, that participation by the not-for-profit groups 
has not been similarly and consistently increasing. Here, participation varies 
significantly. Whereas the participation by some not-for-profits, such as those 
representing specific interest groups, has increased, this has not been the case 
across the board. For example, representatives of consumer interests or the 
economically disadvantaged have not increased. Many of the NGOs that were 
funded during the 1970s and early 1980s have not retained government funding 
and their participation has dwindled. Furthermore, the discourse has become 
more technical, relying significantly on econometrics and expert views. Even 
though the ACCC has not mandated quantification of public benefits, parties are 
regularly making use of such methods. This has increased the need to participate 
using the same language, thereby increasing the cost of participation. This 
technocratic factor has adversely affected participation by such groups, which 
find written submissions take too much time and quantification of benefits 
that rely on expert reports are too expensive to compile. These groups feel that 
many important benefits are not adequately considered because they either 
cannot be measured or have not been measured. While acknowledging the need 
to incorporate efficient processes, the ACCC must ensure that it considers the 
position of all interested parties and allows them the chance to put their views 
forward. The following two principles provide a proper place for quantification, 
while asserting the commitment of the ACCC to consider all benefits, including 
those that can be measured and those that cannot. These two principles could 
be phrased as follows:
Principle: Benefits should be quantified where this can be done validly and 
cost-effectively.
Principle: The more measurable should never be allowed to drive out the 
more important in assessing public benefit.
92 Marshall J Breger and Gary J Edles, ‘Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent 
Federal Agencies’ (2000) 52 Administrative Law Review 1111, 1115.
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Scholarship on procedural fairness and restorative justice point to the importance 
of incorporating mechanisms allowing for participation by affected groups. 
Without the presence of well-funded, active advocacy groups to bring the 
views of consumers and citizens to the attention of the regulator, the task lies 
with the ACCC to become responsive to the broader institutional environment 
of the regulatory regime.93 The call is for the ACCC to be ‘really responsive’ to 
the need of all the stakeholders in the market, including consumers. Becoming a 
responsive regulator can be both a top-down and a bottom-up process. The top-
down strategy would call for the ACCC to incorporate more responsive measures 
into its existing practices, by instigating the changes necessary to nurture 
greater participation and involvement. Alternately, it can also be a bottom-up 
process: the ACCC can be more responsive to criticisms and protest from other 
sources including the media, the public and advocacy groups, re-evaluating its 
practices as it opens its doors to critics. 
One domain in which the ACCC incorporates top-down responsive practice 
is the pre-decision conference. These multi-party deliberations facilitate a 
limited form of restorative justice, redressing inequalities of bargaining power 
and allowing for a more inclusive decision-making framework. Within the 
authorisation process, the inability of disadvantaged groups, such as consumer 
groups, to participate could also be addressed by changing the process and 
language of the discourse which currently constrains participation. Rather than 
relying exclusively on quantification of benefits as a matter of course, it may be 
fruitful to include more general notions that introduce factors, such as increased 
product safety, improved access to justice, enhanced environmental policies or 
enhancing ethical practices, into the equation when they are relevant. The seven 
public benefit principles based on rights and empirics, discussed earlier in the 
chapter, encompass this proposition. Using universally accepted language, by 
its very nature, changes the rules of the game, creating a more inviting playing 
field. As discussed earlier this could be phrased as follows:
Principle: A public benefit can fall into one of the following categories: 
secure a basic human right, improve quality of life, provide for equitable 
dealings among market actors, increase market integrity, encourage 
economic efficiency and economic welfare, provide for human security, 
enhance procedural fairness and increase enforceability.
Further, it is crucial to nurture meaningful participation. This may be achieved 
by accepting informal submissions from consumer groups rather than requiring 
written submissions in all cases. It may also be achieved by allowing such 
groups to have discussions with corporations and other interested bodies in a 
process of consensus-building. The current Consumer Consultative Committee 
93 Baldwin and Black (2008) 59, 61. See also John Braithwaite (2011) 476. 
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is one step along the road towards such consensus-building.94 Another example 
of such top down practices is the UK Office of Fair Trade, which has stated that 
all its actions are guided by whether consumer welfare will be optimised. While 
there is the possibility that such statements are bald assertions with little follow 
through, there is also the possibility of them being much more.95 By doing so, it 
can also be placing the consumer interest at the centre of any decision, including 
all enforcement activities.
As discussed earlier, the bottom-up process, where change is called for by 
outsiders, requiring the regulator to really respond by listening to different 
points of view, reflecting upon them and re-evaluating its own practices, is 
also relevant here. Braithwaite calls for the regulator in such circumstances to 
engage those who resist with fairness; show them respect by construing their 
resistance as an opportunity to learn how to improve regulatory design.96 Such 
calls from outsiders can be either suppressed by the regulator or can lead to 
a shift in the regulator’s position.97 The Medicines authorisation was one in 
which there was such a shift in position.98 Here, authorisation was sought for 
a code of conduct, developed by Medicines Australia, the industry's national 
association which governs the activities of pharmaceutical companies when 
they promote prescription medicines to doctors. This code regulates matters 
such as drug company sponsorship of medical conferences, the payment of 
travel and accommodation expenses of doctors attending such conferences, 
and the provision of other forms of hospitality. The code had been subject to 
considerable media scrutiny and criticism on the basis that it did not provide 
sufficient safeguards against potential abuse.99 The ACCC gave due consideration 
to these complaints and granted authorisation on the basis of a number of 
conditions. The aim of the conditions was to assist scrutiny of sponsorship 
activities of pharmaceutical companies by the general public. The ACCC was 
responding to concerns and enlisting others to its regulatory project. This 
bottom-up process requires the regulator to be humble and open. It expands on 
the current notions of procedural justice and accountability and it demands a 
regulator that has been reasonably responsive to be even more responsive. It has 
94 The Consumer Consultative Committee was established in 2001 by the ACCC as way of providing an 
opportunity to comment on issues affecting consumers that fall within the scope of the ACCC administration. 
See <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/800732> at 30 May 2008.
95 Office of Fair Trade, 27.
96 Braithwaite (2011) 476.
97 For an example of such a call to shift position see Choice, ‘Choice opposes CBA’s move on Bank West’, 3 
November 2008 <http://www.choice.com.au/viewArticle.aspx?id=106593&catId=100570&tid=100008&p=
1&title=Calling+for+BankWest+buyers> at 3 November 2008.
98 <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/744908/fromItemId/278039> at 4 January 2008; 
also see Elisabeth Sexton, ‘Papers Must Be Released, ACCC Told’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 2008, 2.
99 David A Newby and David A Henry, ‘Drug Advertising: Truths, Half-truths and Few Statistics’ (2002) 
177(6) The Medical Journal of Australia 285; Viola Korczak, ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Code of Conduct 
is Not Working’, July 2006, Edmund Rice Centre, Newsletter, <http://www.erc.org.au/goodbusiness/page.
php?pg=0607inprofile0> at 4 January 2008.
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suggested that this can be done by the regulator improving existing practices 
to be more inclusive, and being more receptive to criticism as an opportunity 
for reflexivity. The commitment to responsiveness can be expressed as follows:
Principle: Openness to all public benefits, even where they are complex 
public benefits that have not been considered in previous authorisations, 
should be assured by an ACCC culture of dialogue with stakeholders.
The Nine Principles for Determining Public 
Benefit in Authorisation Determinations
The two main concerns expressed about the public benefit test within the 
authorisation process are that the approach is ad hoc and does not facilitate 
sufficient participation by non-industry groups. This chapter has proposed that 
principle-based regulation might be useful in addressing these criticisms. It goes 
about addressing the first concern on the current ad hoc approach, proposing a 
principle of immanent rights, which is based on an amalgam of recognised top-
down human rights, accepted bottom-up human rights and ACCC practice. It 
proposed that this principle could be framed as follows:
Principle: A public benefit can fall into one of the following categories: 
securing a basic human right, improving quality of life, provide for 
equitable dealings among market actors, increase market integrity, 
encourage economic efficiency and economic welfare, provide for human 
security, enhance procedural fairness and increase enforceability.
Then the chapter addressed the second criticism on the need to facilitate 
participation by non-industry groups. Here it assessed the manner in which 
this could be done: by design or by practice. It is concluded that the design is 
unlikely in the Australian regulatory climate and context. The preferred and 
more pragmatic option is the art of practice whereby the regulator becomes 
more responsive to the needs of such groups and adopts strategies for inclusion. 
Such strategies will deal with the types of people consulted, the variety of 
information considered, the manner in which the dialogue that may start at the 
beginning of an authorisation determination can continue, and the stakeholders 
who can be co-opted into the regulatory game. Earlier chapters have discussed 
the different ways in which discretion can be exercised for inclusivity. This 
includes the need to look beyond measurable public benefits to consider all 
types of public benefits using a widely accepted language. It also includes the 
incorporation of practices that encourage participation by stakeholders: both 
formal and informal submissions and pre-decision conferences. Further, it points 
to the need to clearly acknowledge the expanded accountability model which 
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sees the ACCC being accountable to a variety of stakeholders and give effect to it 
by including their views in deliberations. And it acknowledges that there may 
be a variety of experimental ways in which such stakeholders can become part 
of the process. Accordingly a set of nine principles that can be put into practice 
by the ACCC has been developed as discussed.  These principles take on board 
current ACCC practice, the need for providing fixed points to the applicants 
and the importance of developing and maintaining a constructive dialogue. 
They also increase the participation of all stakeholders in decision-making. 
These principles are aimed at making the ACCC more effective in exercising its 
discretion to determine public benefit within the authorisation process.
These are broad principles that have to be brought to life by concrete examples 
by way of authorisation determinations by the ACCC, which can then become 
part of the shared understanding among the members of the trade practices 
community.100 The use of public speeches; guidance documents; the public 
registers on authorisation applications, submissions and determinations; 
informal meetings; the pre-decision conferences; and, the soliciting of views 
from NGOs are all examples of how the ACCC has nurtured the trade practices 
community. But, as demonstrated in this study, the regulator could become even 
more responsive by adopting an inclusive language to define public benefit that 
can accommodate a range of future potential benefits; by providing access to 
past decisions going back before 1999 online, and by giving greater direction on 
the status of the Australian Trade Practices Tribunal’s decisions.
The Place for Reflection in the Art of Practice
As discussed in Chapter 5, the manner in which rules are interpreted or discretion 
is exercised is constrained and influenced by multiple factors that come from 
both within and outside the regulator. A list of nine principles can be nothing 
more than a list of rules that can be read either up or down, producing radically 
distinct outcomes. They can become either bald assertions without substance, 
or they can do what they are intended to — they can make the regulator more 
responsive. We can consider this in the context of Principle 4, which requires 
the ACCC to weigh benefits, bearing in mind the size of the benefits and the 
parties likely to benefit. This principle means nothing unless the regulator 
adequately explains the weighting used. The explanation will articulate how 
the weighing-up practice works, making the regulator accountable to all 
stakeholders for its actions. The explanation has to be clear, simple and, most 
importantly, understood by all those to whom it matters. It cannot simply be 
100 See Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko (2004) for a discussion on the understandings of the trade 
practices community on the cartel leniency policy and the cartel cooperation policy, 69–70.
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speaking to some with the technical knowledge to interpret the information, and 
it cannot be obscured by professional mystique.101 Likewise Principle 8, which 
states that the more measurable should never drive out the more important, 
means little unless there is commitment by the regulator to the values this 
principle embodies, namely that all types of public benefits will be considered, 
irrespective of whether they have been measured or not. It embodies inclusivity 
both by considering all types of public benefits and by being open to different 
types of exchanges and communication. Similarly, Principle 9, which promises 
a culture of dialogue with stakeholders, is pointless if it is interpreted to be no 
more than talking to all the parties that are routinely consulted. What is required 
of the ACCC is that it should become a reflective regulator that examines its own 
performance and learns from it. This type of reflective regulator will be able to 
engage in single loop, double loop and triple loop learning. 
‘Single loop’ learning is the act of giving effect to the written word rather than 
the underlying values inherent in the principles.102 It is an operationalised act 
rather than one that is thought about, questioned and then undertaken. As 
discussed earlier, giving effect to rules, without a commitment to the underlying 
values, may introduce new processes without having any effect on the end 
result. For example, making available all the submissions in an authorisation 
determination on the ACCC website may make it clear that the views of different 
stakeholders have been considered. A commitment to the underlying values 
means that the ACCC will take on the responsibility of determining whether 
there are other stakeholders who should be considered and actively pursuing 
them prior to making a decision. Thus, where the institutional values and norms 
haven’t changed, the end result won’t either. 
Double loop learning requires a further commitment by the regulator to 
the principles and its underlying values. Double loop learning occurs when 
an error is detected and then corrected in ways that involve modification of 
the organisation’s underlying norms, policies and objectives.103 It requires a 
regulator to consider the success of the strategies it has employed and evaluate 
its performance and failures. As Parker has stated, it involves ‘being able to 
detect and correct errors in policies, procedures, cultures and traditions of the 
whole organisation’.104 Here, the regulator commits to the values embodied in the 
principles and will take it on itself to consider how the principles are applied. 
If required it may have to re-evaluate the strategies used and reconsider the 
best processes to adopt in order to give effect to these values. Consequently, the 
institutional values and norms are changing, leading to a change in outcomes.105
101 Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner; How Professionals Think in Action (1995) 301.
102 Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning II (1996) 20.
103 Argyris and Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action in Perspective (1978) 2–3.
104 Parker (2002) 239. 
105 ibid, 21; see also Braithwaite (2011) 514.
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In authorisation determinations, the ACCC may seek to check whether the 
conditions it attached to a grant of authorisation are delivering the outcomes 
sought. If such conditions are successful, the ACCC may seek to use them 
as a standard clause in similar determinations. Conditions are a flexible and 
useful tool, as discussed in Chapter 6. They can be used to manage markets by 
providing information and processes to stakeholders who can then use them 
to hold corporations to account. Currently, however, conditions are rarely 
monitored by the ACCC.106 By doing so, the ACCC will be evaluating its own 
performance. 
Where submissions in relation to an authorisation application are scant, the ACCC 
may seek to investigate the reasons for this further. It may then seek to consider 
how the policies could be varied: Should officials be given the responsibility to 
speak with representatives of all stakeholders? Should telephone conversations 
be substituted for written submissions in certain circumstances? Should non-
industry groups be consulted as a matter of course? If there were systematic 
performance evaluation, the ACCC would be bound to consider whether pre-
decision conferences are effective and why? Such evaluations would tell us if, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, such conferences present the possibility of encouraging 
the development of a shared ethos and opens channels of communicating 
between stakeholders.
Triple loop learning goes even further, requiring the regulator to be able to 
assess the manner in which it functions and change as necessary; this is likely 
to include the creation of new structures and strategies. Parker’s examination 
of triple loop learning and the regulator in the context of self-regulation is 
also relevant here. She has proposed that regulators must collect information 
on the problems they are supposed to solve and evaluate their performance 
by reference to impacts on those problems; they must report the data to all 
stakeholders including government and industry; and use the information and 
feedback to adjust regulatory strategies and objectives.107 There is much in 
common between triple loop learning and really responsive regulation, which 
sees the need for performance sensitivity through assessment procedures and 
fostering the capacity of regimes to change regulatory direction.108 All this is 
possible only where the regulator has an on-going dialogue with stakeholders 
and a shared understanding of what is required. Trust is the essential ingredient 
for any such dialogue and understanding to flourish. Using the universally 
accepted language of human rights to determine the meaning of public benefit 
is one step in developing such a dialogue. Developing this trust involves the 
106 See ibid, 251 for a discussion of similar issues in the context of undertakings under section 87B of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974.
107 Parker (2002) 290, Also see: Braithwaite (2011) 514.
108 Baldwin and Black (2008) 75.
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accommodation of all stakeholders and being accountable to all interested parties. 
Accommodating such diverse interests leads to more complex deliberations, 
such as consultation with consumers and community groups, on how public 
benefits can flow through to them, including the kinds of conditions that may 
be needed to ensure such flow through.
Once there is this trust, the regulator can be innovative in how it regulates, 
engaging in democratic experimentalism.109 For example, the regulator may 
see a greater role for the presence of civil society on the boards of industry 
associations, acting as scrutineers on how codes of conduct, which have been 
authorised, are working in practice. The regulator may also be experimental 
enough to set up benchmarking by making one industry association’s practices 
a benchmark for all other industry associations to compare against, with the aim 
of improving governance practices in the market generally. This benchmarking 
may be aimed at increasing accountability and self-reporting and could include 
the use of websites for greater disclosure to all interested parties, inclusion 
of consumer and NGO representatives on boards of the association, regular 
monitoring and annual reporting to the ACCC of the resulting public benefit 
and the parties whom it reached. These strategies would continue changing, co-
opting all the stakeholders in regulating through changing times.
Conclusion 
The ACCC has, in general, been a responsive regulator. It has performed 
reasonably well in determining public benefit within the authorisation process. 
There are, however, two main areas that require re-evaluation: first, the current 
approach of the ACCC lacks a theoretical foundation; and, second, as this study 
over three decades reveals, there has been an increasing inclusivity deficit. 
This study has addressed these criticisms in proposing that the ACCC should 
develop a set of overarching principles founded on a combination of human 
rights and immanent rights recognised by the regulator in practice, which is 
immediately more universal than the language of economic efficiency. This 
book addresses the manner in which the principles, informed by responsive 
regulation and restorative justice, addresses the inclusivity deficit. 
This approach relies on creating a shared understanding, founded on these 
principles among the trade practices regulatory community, which will continue 
to shape and reshape these principles. The regulator will need to nurture these 
understandings, bringing on board as many members of the community as it 
109 Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia 
Law Review 267, 345; also see the discussion on Regulatory Theories and Regulators in Chapter 6.
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can. These principles will not be a rule book, but, rather, valued objectives that 
all commit to. These principles will not be fixed, but, rather, flexible, being able 
to bend and reshape themselves while always loyal to the core objectives. When 
faced with a new type of challenge, whether a global financial crisis or a new 
environmental dilemma, these members of the regulatory community will be 
able to break from the past and engage their community in a new solution to the 
problem, while still being committed to these principles. They will know that 
the regulator will be predictably responsible when faced with a fresh challenge 
in terms of the principles. The regulator will be accountable to all these members 
with shared sensibilities on human rights, competition policy and the meaning 




Selecting the Determinations for the Empirical 
Study
The determinations were selected from a pool in order to allow a general 
picture to emerge of how determinations are made from year to year. Each 
of the authorisation determinations was read and information from them 
coded systematically using the same method. A total of 244 authorisation 
determinations were used. 
Weights Attached to the Benefits and Detriments
Each public benefit and public detriment was weighed and the following table 
explains the weights used in analysing the determination.
Table 1: Weights attached to public benefit and public detriment
Weight Public benefit Public detriment 
1 Not important . The commission has accepted such a 
benefit can be classified as a public benefit, however, 
the commission did not accept the applicant’s 
assessment of the benefit in this case or that the 
benefit is likely to be of such a small magnitude that 
it will be given minimal weight in the determination or 
because it was unlikely to result in this case . Either 
this is explicitly stated by the commission or the  
author has decided that, given the context, it should 
be considered not important .
Not important . Although 
this public detriment 
was acknowledged, the 
commission did not regard 
it is as important . Either 
this was explicitly stated 
by the commission or the 
reader decided that, given 
the context, it is not an 
important public detriment .
2 Minor importance . The commission acknowledged 
that this public benefit may result from the 
conduct claimed . The commission, however, 
only regards it of minor importance . Either this is 
explicitly stated by the commission, or the reader 
has decided that, given the context, it has only 
warranted minor importance status .
Minor importance . 
The commission 
acknowledged that 
such a public detriment 
may result from the 
proposed conduct, but 
only regards it to be of 
minor importance . Either 
this is stated by the 
commission, or the reader 
has decided that given 
the context it has really 
only warranted minor 
importance status .
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Weight Public benefit Public detriment 
3 Important . The commission accepted that this 
claimed public benefit is important in making its 
determination and this is usually expressly stated 
in the authorisation determination .
Important . The 
commission accepted 
that this is an important 
public detriment and it is 
usually expressly stated 
in the authorisation 
determination .
4 Very important. This public benefit is critical in the 
determination . It is generally expressly recognised 
as such by the commission in the determination . 
Very important . This 
detriment is of critical 
importance in the 
determination . It is 
generally expressly 
recognised as such by 
the commission in the 
determination .
Other Factors that were Collated 
A number of factors that impacted on the commission’s decision-making were 
collated. There were seven such factors as follows: 
1. The section that the conduct or proposed conduct was likely to breach — 
the conduct could potentially breach the price-fixing provisions (s 45A), 
substantial lessening of competition provisions (s 45), exclusionary conduct 
provisions (s 45) and exclusive dealing provisions (s 47). 
2. The type of industry that the applicant belongs to.
3. Whether conditions were imposed by the ACCC in granting authorisation. 
4. The type of conditions imposed — for example, conditions could be imposed 
requiring that codes of conduct include an appeals process, or to safeguard 
against the misuse of market power, or to encourage the participation of 
external bodies in decision-making. 
5. Whether any evidence of pass-through of public benefit was discussed in the 
application, submissions or determination — pass-through refers to evidence 
of whether the benefits flow on to the consumer. 
6. Whether there was discussion of particular tests or standards to determine 
public benefit — there are four such tests/standards that have been used to 
quantify public benefits: total welfare standard, consumer welfare standard, 
price standard, and the balancing weights standard.




Because different types of information about each of these factors were collated, 
a different code to the one used above was used. The details of the factors and 
the manner in which the factors were coded are contained in the following table.
Table 2: Participation in the authorisation process
Identity of the participants Other information 
Individuals Reference to government policies
Reference to ACCC documents/decisions






Table 3: Weights used to assess the importance attached to the participation
Weight Public benefit 
1 There is minor influence exerted. Either this is explicitly stated by the 
commission or the reader has decided this on the basis of the context after 
examining the determination, draft determination, submissions and other 
available information .
2 There is major influence exerted. Important. Either this is explicitly stated by 
the commission or the reader has decided this on the basis of the context 
after examining the determination, draft determination, submissions and other 
available information .
3 Very important. This public benefit is critical in the determination. It is generally 
expressly recognised as such by the commission in the determination . 
0 Cannot gauge influence from examining the determination, draft determination, 
submissions and other available information; or No participation; or No 
influence.
Other relevant qualitative factors were also collated as described in Table 4.
Table 4: Other related qualitative factors
Qualitative factor Example of data collected
Was this a single determination 
or did it involve multiple 
determinations?
Qantas Airways Ltd involved four determinations 
made on 9 September 2003 (A90862, A90963, 
A30220, A30221) .
Was notification also sought? In Australian Wool Exchange Limited (A30185) 
decided on 30 December 1998, both authorisation 
and notification was sought.
Number of industry groups that 
made submissions .
In Australian Brick and Blocklaying Training 
Foundation (A90993) authorisation determination 
made on 26 April 2006, four industry bodies made 
submissions to the ACCC .
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